"Even so, Father, for so it seemeth good in thy sight." It was a matter of rejoicing and thankfulness to the benevolent heart of the Saviour, that the mercy of God had been "revealed unto babes," though it had been "hid," that is, had not been revealed unto "the wise and prudent." In like manner, we ought to rejoice and thank God whenever we hear of any one to whom God has "granted repentance unto life," Acts xi. 18; or to whom it has been "given to believe in Christ," Phil. i. 29.

The author also objects to the interpretation contended for, that "it is at utter variance with the exegeis of the passage in hand." He says,

"The hardening which was threatened against Pharaoh, was not a hardening causative of, or even precedaneous to, but in consequence of, and therefore subsequent to, his own actual and obstinate wickedness."-p. 338.

But this representation of the matter is a pure invention of the author; it is contradicted by almost every passage in which the "hardening" is mentioned. We may quote a few of these as specimens -Exod. iv. 21, "But I will harden his heart, that he shall not let the people go;"-vii. 3, "And I will harden Pharaoh's heart, and multiply my signs and wonders in the land of Egypt: But Pharaoh shall not hearken unto you;"-ver. 13, "And he hardened Pharaoh's heart, that he hearkened not unto them, as the Lord had said;"-viii. 15, "When

Pharaoh saw that there was respite, he hardened his heart, and hearkened not unto them, as the Lord had said." (See also ver. 32;-ix. 12; x. 27; and xiv. 4, 8). In these passages, the "hardening" is almost uniformly referred to as "causative of," and therefore "precedaneous to," Pharaoh's refusing to let the people go, or to "hearken" to the voice of Moses and Aaron. It is not "threatened," nor referred to as a "consequence of, and therefore subsequent to, his own actual and obstinate wickedness."

Having thus stated and defended our own view of the hardening of Pharaoh's heart, we may now take a glance at that of the author. He has devoted a large part of a long Lecture to the subject; and in its discussion he has evinced very considerable skill and ability, particularly in refuting some of the interpretations which have been adopted regarding it. We cannot help thinking, however, that his own hypothesis is as unsound as that of some of those to which he has objected. And though he has fabricated a very pretty system of psychological and moral philosophy in its support, it will not stand investigation. His whole theory is vitiated by a fundamental error, to which we have already adverted-namely, that the hardening was an "alternative to be resorted to only on the supposition of a preceding and obstinate unyieldingness," p. 346. But it is one of the plainest things imaginable,

that this "obstinate unyieldingness" is the very "hardening" itself. Where this existed, it would have been a work of supererogation to harden any farther. From the very first God had said, "I will harden his heart, that he shall not let the people go."

The author says:

"There must have been certain specific effects naturally and necessarily produced in the sensibilities of Pharaoh's heart by that determined unbelief, in view of which, and failing his conviction and conversion, God purposed to harden him, and thus fit him for his merited destruction. It is psychologically impossible that such determined unbelief could be cherished by the monarch, and yet produce no effects in the sensibilities of his heart. Faith always "works," and works upon the "heart," and so does unbelief," p. 348.

The "specific effects" to which the author refers, he says, must have been "evil," and must have been, "from the very nature of the case," either (1.) "insensibility to the danger impending over him for not permitting the Israelites to depart;" or (2.) "insensibility to the obligation under which he was laid to allow the Israelites to depart;" or (3.) "a complex insensibility both to his danger and to his duty," p. 348.

The author adds:

“A natural and necessary effect, when predicated of the mind, is manifestly an effect which, besides being in congruity with its occasioning cause, is necessitated, and is thus, in the circumstances, rendered unavoidable," p. 348, 349.

Now, we admit all this: and we are rather surprised to find such sound Calvinistic doctrine inculcated from the Morisonian Chair of Divinity! If "faith always works," and "so does unbelief," it will follow that "unbelief" always naturally, necessarily, and unavoidably produces the specific evil effect of insensibility to duty. The author, indeed, does not determine that this specific evil effect is the one always produced; but it is manifest, from the nature of unbelief, and from all the circumstances of Pharaoh's case, that "insensibility to duty" is the "specific evil effect" which unbelief always produces. This being self-evident, the question naturally arises, "Whence is it that any sinner, any unbeliever, ever becomes converted to the faith of the gospel?" The author has placed the unbeliever on an inclined plane, down which he is "necessitated" to go; and we submit that unless the grace of God, as held by Calvinists, be vouchsafed, he must sink into everlasting perdition.

Though we concur with the author as to the "evil," or hardening effects of unbelief, we decidedly object to ascribe these effects to God as their "efficient cause"-except in that peculiar sense in which God is the cause of, and has foreordained "whatsoever comes to pass." This is to make God the author of nearly all the sin in the world. It does not, of course, appear to the author in this light. Nevertheless, such a conclusion seems to

us unavoidable, from his theory of the matter, as explained by himself. This will immediately appear: meantime, we may remark, that it is to us exceedingly plain that the unbeliever himself is not only responsible for all the effects of his unbelief, but is the efficient cause of them, at least in the sense in which he can be the cause of any effects terminating in himself.

The author goes on to say:

suffer me

"To explain this subject a little more particularly, to draw your atention to the fact, that God sustains a peculiar relation to those emotional capacities within us, which constitute the sensibility of our minds. This peculiar relation is exceedingly different from that which he sustains to the volition-power of our minds, that is, the will," p. 350.

We cannot com

Here we differ from the author. prehend that the "peculiar relation" of God to the will should "differ" at all from that which he sustains to the "sensibility of our minds." There can be no doubt that the will is very much under the influence and guidance of the feelings and inclinations, or, as the author phrases it, "the emotional capacities within us." If, as the author maintains, God stands in the "relation of a necessitator, or efficient cause" to these emotions, he must also, to a great extent, stand in the same relation to our wills. For, what are these "emotional capacities?" The author tells us "they are affections, or unde