Fourthly, They gave the jury their charge in the prisoners absence, endeavouring highly to incense the jury against them.

Fifthly, The verdict being given (which is in law dictum veritatis, the voice of truth herself) being not suitable to their humours, they did five times reject it, with many abusive, imperious, and menacing expressions to the jury, such as no precedent can afford us; as if they were not the only constituted judges by the fundamental laws of the land, but mere cyphers, only to signify something behind their figures. Sixthly, Though the prisoners were cleared by their jury, yet were they detained for the non-payment of their fines, laid upon them for not pulling off their hats; in which the law is notoriously broken.

1st. In that no man shall be amerced, but according to the offence; and they have fined each forty marks. 2d. They were not amerced by any jury, but at the will of an incensed bench.

Besides, there is no law against the hat; and where there is no law, there can be no transgression, and consequently no legal amercement, or fine, 9 Hen. 3. chap. 14. But how the prisoners were trepanned into it, is most ridiculous on the side of the contrivers; who, finding their hats off, would have them put on again by their officers, to fool the prisoners with a trial of putting them off again which childish conceit not being gratified, they fined them forty marks apiece.

Seventhly, Instead of accepting their verdict as good in law, and for the true decision of the matter, according to their great charter, (that constitutes them proper judges, and which bears them out, with many other good laws, in what they agree to as a verdict) the court did most illegally and tyrannically fine and imprison them, as in the trial was expressed; and that notwithstanding the late just resentment of the house of commons in judge Keeling's case, where they resolved, that the precedents and practice of fining and imprisoning of juries for their verdicts, were illegal. And here we must needs observe two things:

First, That the fundamental laws of England cannot be more slighted, and contradicted in any thing (next to Englishmen's being quite destroyed) than in not suffering them to have that equal medium, or just way of trial, that the same law has provided, which is by a jury.

Secondly, That the late proceeding of the court at the Old Bailey, is an evident demonstration, that juries are now but mere formality, and that the partial charge of the bench must be the verdict of the jury: for if ever a rape were attempted on the conscience of any jury, it was there. And

indeed, the ignorance of jurors of their authority by law, is the only reason of their unhappy cringing to the court, and being scared into an anti-conscience verdict by their lawless threats.

But we have lived to an age so deboist from all humanity and reason, as well as faith and religion, that some stick not to turn butchers to their own privileges, and conspirators against their own liberties. For however magna charta had once the reputation of a sacred, unalterable law, and few were hardened enough to incur and bear the long curse that attends the violators of it, yet it is frequently objected now, that the benefits there designed are but temporary, and therefore liable to alteration, as other statutes are. What game such persons play at, may be lively read in the attempts of Dionysius, Phalaris, &c. which would have will and power be the people's law.

But that the privileges due to Englishmen by the great charter of England, have their foundation in reason and law; and that those new Cassandrian ways to introduce will and power, deserve to be detested by all persons professing sense and honesty, and the least allegiance to our English government, we shall make appear from a suber consideration of the nature of those privileges contained in that charter.

1. The ground of alteration of any law in government, where there is no invasion, should arise from the universal discommodity of its continuance but there can be no disprofit in the continuance of liberty and property; therefore there can be no just ground of alteration.

2. No one Englishman is born a slave to another, neither has the one a right to inherit the sweat and benefit of the other's labour, without consent; therefore the liberty and property of an Englishman cannot reasonably be at the will and beck of another, let his quality and rank be ever so great. 3. There can be nothing more unreasonable than that which is partial but to take away the LIBERTY and PROPERTY of any (which are natural rights) without breaking the law of nature (and not of will and power) is manifestly partial, and therefore unreasonable.

4. If it be just and reasonable for men to do as they would be done by ;' then no sort of men should invade the liberties and properties of other men; because they would not be served so themselves.

5. Where liberty and property are destroyed, there must always be a state of force and war: which however pleasing it may be unto the invaders, it will seem intolerable by the invaded; who will no longer remain subject, in all human probability, than while they want as much power to free

themselves, as their adversaries had to inslave them. The troubles, hazards, ill consequences, and illegality of such attempts, as they have been declined by the most prudent in all ages, so have they proved most uneasy to the most savage of all nations; who first or last have by a mighty torrent freed themselves, to the due punishment and great infamy of their oppressors such being the advantage, such the disadvantage, which necessarily do attend the fixation, and removal, of liberty and property.

We shall proceed to make it appear, that magna charta, as recited by us, imports nothing less than their preservation. 'No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised of his freeholds, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other ways destroyed; nor will we upon him pass, nor condemn him, but by the lawful judgment of his peers,' &c.

A freeman shall not be amerced for a small fault, but after the manner of the fault; and for a great fault, after the greatness thereof: and none of the said amercements shall be assessed, but by the oath of good and lawful men of the vicinage.'

First, It asserts Englishmen to be free: that is liberty. Secondly, That they have freeholds: that is property. Thirdly, That amercement, or penalties, should be proportioned to the faults committed: which is equity.

Fourthly, That they shall lose neither, but when they are adjudged to have forfeited them in the judgment of their honest neighbours, according to the law of the land: which is lawful judgment.

It is easy to discern to what pass the enemies of the great charter would bring the people of England.

First, They are now freemen: but they would have

them slaves.

Secondly, They have now right unto their wives, children, and estates: but such would rob and spoil them of all. Thirdly, Now no man is to be amerced, or punished, but suitably to the fault: whilst they would make it suitably to their revengeful minds, and unlimited wills.

Fourthly, Whereas the power of judgment lies in the breasts and consciences of twelve honest neighbours; they would have it at the discretion of mercenary judges. To which we cannot choose but add, that such discourses manifestly strike at this present constitution of government; for it being founded upon the great charter (which is the ancient common law of the land) as upon its best foundation, none can design the cancelling the charter, but they must necessarily intend the extirpation of the English government; for

where the cause is taken away, the effect must consequently cease. And as the restoration of our ancient English laws by the great charter, was the sovereign balsam which cured our former breaches, so doubtless will the continuation of it prove an excellent prevention to any future disturbances. But some are ready to object, That the great charter consisting as well of religious as civil rights, the former having received an alteration, there is the same reason why the latter may have the like.'

To which we answer, That the reason of alteration cannot be the same; therefore the consequence is false. The one being matter of opinion about faith and religious worship, which is as various as the unconstant apprehensions of men; but the other is matter of so immutable right and justice, that all generations (however differing in their religious opinions) have concentered and agreed to the certainty, equity, and indispensable necessity of preserving these fundamental laws; so that magna charta hath not risen and fallen with the differing religious opinions that have been in this land, but hath ever remained as the stable right of every individual Englishman, purely as an Englishman.. Otherwise, if the civil privileges of the people had fallen with the pretended religious privileges of the popish tyranny, at the first reformation (as must needs be suggested by this objection) our case had ended here, that we had obtained a spiritual freedom, at the cost of a civil bondage: which certainly was far from the intention of the first reformers; and, probably, an unseen consequence by the objectors to their idle opinion.

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In short, there is no time in which any man may plead the necessity of such an action as is unjust in its own nature; which he must unavoidably be guilty of, that doth deface or cancel that law by which the justice of liberty and property is confirmed and maintained to the people. And consequently, no person may legally attempt the subversion, or extenuation, of the force of the great charter. We shall proceed to prove from instances out of both.

First, Any judgment given contrary to the said charter, is to be undone and holden for nought.' 25 Edw. i. chap. 2. Secondly, 'Any, by word, deed, or counsel, that go contrary to the said charter, are to be excommunicated by the bishops and the archbishops of Canterbury and York are bound to compel the other bishops to denounce sentence accordingly, in case of their remissness, or neglect:' which certainly hath relation to the state, rather than to the church; since there was never any necessity of compelling

the bishops to denounce sentence in their own case, though frequently in the people's. 25 Edw. 1. chap. 4.

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Thirdly, That the great charter, and charter of the forest, be holden and kept in all points: and if any statute be made to the contrary, that it shall be holden for nought.' 43 Edw. 3. 1. Upon which Coke, that famous English lawyer, said, 'That albeit judgments in the king's courts are of high regard in law, and judicia are accounted as juris dicta; yet it is provided by the act of parliament, That if any judgment be given contrary to any of the points of the great charter, it shall be holden for nought.'

He farther saith, upon the statute of 25 Edw. 1. chap. 1. That this great charter, and the charter of forest, are properly the common law of the land, or the law common to all the people thereof.'

Fourthly, Another statute runs thus: If any force come to disturb the execution of the common law, ye shall cause their bodies to be arrested, and put in prison: ye shall deny no man right by the king's letters, nor counsel the king any thing that may turn to his damage or disherison.' 18 Edw. 3. chap. 7. Neither to deny right by any command under the great or little seal.' This is the judges charge and oath, 2 Edw. 3. chap. 8. 14 Edw. 3. 14. 11 Rich. 2. chap. 10.

Fifthly, Such care hath been taken for the preservation of this great charter, that in the 25th of Edw. 1. it was enacted,That commissioners should issue forth, that there should be chosen in every shire-court, by the commonalty of the same shire, three substantial men, knights, or other lawful, wise, and well-disposed persons, to be justices, which shall be assigned by the king's letters patents, under the great seal, to hear and determine (without any other writ but only their commission) such plaints as shall be made upon all those that commit, or offend against any point contained in the aforesaid charters.' 21 Edw. 1. chap. J.

Sixthly, The necessity of preserving these charters, hath appeared in nothing more than in the care they have taken to confirm them; which, as Coke observes, have been by thirty-two parliaments confirmed, established, and commanded to be put in execution, with the condign punishment they had inflicted upon the offenders.' Coke's proem to the second book of his Institutes.

Seventhly, That in the notable petition of right, many of these great privileges, and free customs, contained in the aforesaid charters, and other good laws, are recited and confirmed. 3 Car. 1.

Eighthly, The late king, in his declaration at Newmarket, 1641, acknowledged the law to be the rule of his power :'