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love of truth. It requires us to exercise the most anxious care respecting every statement which we receive as true; and not to receive it as such, until we are satisfied that the authority on which it is asserted is of a nature on which we can fully rely, and that the statement contains all the facts to which our attention ought to be directed. It consequently guards us against those limited views by which party spirit or a love of favourite dogmas leads a man to receive the facts which favour a particular opinion, and neglect those which are opposed to it. The sound exercise of judgment, which is connected with this love of truth, differs therefore from the art of ingenious disputation, and is often found directly at variance with it. The same principle is applicable to the truths which are derived as deductions from processes of reasoning. It is thus opposed to all sophistical arguments, and partial or distorted reasonings, by which disputants strive to establish particular systems, instead of engaging in an honest and simple inquiry after truth. The love of truth, therefore, is of equal importance in the reception of facts, and in the formation of opinions; and it includes also a readiness to relinquish our own opinions, when new facts or arguments are presented to us which are calculated to overturn them.

In the reception of truth, especially on the evidence of testimony, we acquire by experience a degree of caution, arising from having been sometimes deceived. In minds of a certain description, this may be allowed to produce a suspicion with regard to all evidence,-in other words, skepticism.

The want of the necessary and proper caution, again, leads to credulity. It is the part of a wellregulated mind to avoid both these extremes, by attentively weighing the evidence and the character of the witnesses, and giving to each circumstance its due influence in the conclusion.

(2.) Closely connected with the love of truth in receiving, is the exercise of veracity in the statement of facts, whether derived from our personal observation, or received by testimony from others. It consists, not only in the most scrupulous accuracy of relation, but also in giving it in such a manner as to convey a correct impression to the hearer. It is consequently opposed to all those methods by which either a false statement may be made to assume the appearance of truth, or one essentially true may be so related as to convey a false impression.

Direct fallacy may consist in the alleged facts being absolutely false, or in some of them being so, -in facts being wanting or kept out of view which would give a different import to the whole statement, or in some of the facts being disguised, distorted, or coloured, so as to alter materially the impression conveyed by them. But, besides such actual fallacy, there are various methods by which a statement literally true may be so related as to convey an erroneous impression. Facts may be connected together in such a manner as to give the appearance of a relation of cause and effect, when they are in truth entirely unconnected; or an event may be represented as common which has

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occurred only in one or two instances. The character of an individual may be assumed from a single act, which, if the truth were known, might be seen to be opposed to his real disposition, and accounted for by the circumstances in which he happened at the time to be placed. Events may be connected together which were entirely disjoined, and conclusions deduced from this fictitious connexion which are, of course, unfounded. Several of these sources of fallacy may be illustrated by a ludicrous example. A traveller from the Continent has represented the venality of the British House of Commons to be such, that, whenever the minister of the crown enters the house, there is a general cry for "places." It may be true that a cry of "places" has gone round the house at certain times, when business was about to commence, or to be resumed after an interval,-meaning, of course, that members were to take their seats. It is very probable, that, on some occasion, this may have occurred at the moment when the minister entered, so that the statement of the traveller might, in point of fact, be strictly true. The erroneous impression which he endeavours to convey by it arises from three sources of fallacy which the anecdote will serve to illustrate; namely, the false meaning he gives to the word employed, connecting it with the entrance of the minister as cause and effect, and representing the connexion as uniform which happened to occur in that particular instance. In the same manner it

will appear, that a false impression may be conveyed respecting the conduct of an individual,-by assign

ing motives which are entirely imaginary, by connecting things together which have no relation,-by keeping out of view circumstances which would afford an explanation or palliation of his conduct,or by attaching to his words a different meaning from that which he intended to convey by them. The common saying that there are two ways of telling a story does not therefore refer to what is strictly to be called fabrication or falsehood; but to those distortions or colourings of circumstances which, however slight in themselves, have the effect of essentially changing the impression of the whole.

To veracity, under this department, we are also to refer the rule-of giving to others an honest and fair impression of our views, motives, and intentions. This is sincerity. It is opposed to hypocrisy, that unworthy display of human character in which a man disguises his real sentiments, and, on the contrary, professes principles which he neither feels nor values, merely for the purpose of promoting his selfish interests. Such a character exhibits a singular combination of moral delinquencies. It is founded on the lowest selfishness, and includes a departure from veracity and honesty. But besides, it implies a knowledge of virtuous principles and of their proper tendencies, while there is a practical denial of their influence. Sincerity is also opposed to flattery, which tends to give a man a false impression of our opinion, and of our feelings towards him, and likewise leads him to form a false estimate of his own character. It is opposed also to insincerity or double-dealing, by which a man, for certain

purposes, professes sentiments towards another which he does not feel, or intentions which he does not entertain.

(3.) The third element of veracity is Truth of Purpose, or fidelity in the fulfilment of promises. This is opposed to actual departure from what was distinctly promised; likewise to all those evasions by which one may convey an impression, or excite the hope, of an intention which he does not mean to fulfil, or avoid the performance of a real or implied engagement on any other ground than inability to perform it. By this straight-forward integrity of purpose, an individual gives a clear impression of what he honestly intends to perform; and performs it, though circumstances may have occurred to make the fulfilment disagreeable or even injurious to himself::-"he sweareth to his own hurt," says a sacred writer," and changeth not."

IV. FRIENDSHIP, LOVE, AND GRATITUDE.

These affections are so nearly allied, that, in this slight analysis, they may be taken together. They consist in a personal and peculiar attachment to an individual, founded either upon some qualities in himself, or some benefits he has conferred on us, or on some one in whom we are interested. The feelings and conduct to which they give rise correspond with those referred to under the preceding affections, with this difference, that, in many instances, they lead to a much greater sacrifice of

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