it degenerates into selfishness; and it then interferes in a material degree with the exercise of the affections, or, in other words, with our duty to other men.

IV. We have next to attend to the fact, that every desire is not followed by actual volition towards obtaining the object; and that every affection does not lead to the conduct which might flow from it. Thus, a man may feel a desire which, after consideration, he determines not to gratify. Another may experience an affection, and not act upon it he may feel benevolence or friendship, and yet act, in the particular case, with cold selfishness ; or he may feel the impulse of anger, and yet conduct himself with forbearance. When, therefore, we go another step backwards in the chain of moral sequences, our attention is directed to certain principles by which the determination is actually decided, either according to the desire or affection which is present to the mind, or in opposition to it. brings us to a subject of the utmost practical importance; and the principles which thus decide the determination of the mind are referable to two heads.

This

(1.) The determination or decision may arise out of a certain state of arrangement of the moving powers themselves, in consequence of which some one of them has acquired a predominating influence in the moral system. This usually results from habit, or frequent indulgence, as we shall see in a subsequent part of our inquiry. A man, for example, may desire an object, but perceive that the D

attainment would require a degree of exertion greater than he is disposed to devote to it: this is the preponderating love of ease, a branch of selflove. Another may perceive that the gratification would impair his good name, or the estimation in which he is anxious to stand in the eyes of other men: this is the predominating love of approbation, or regard to character. In the same manner, a third may feel that it would interfere with his schemes of avarice or ambition; and so in regard to the other desires. On a similar principle, a man may experience a strong impulse of anger, but perceive that here would be danger in gratifying it, or that he would promote his reputation or his interest by not acting upon it; he may experience a benevolent affection, but feel that the exercise would interfere too much with his personal interest or comfort.

(2.) The determination may arise from a sense of duty, or an impression of moral rectitude, apart from every consideration of a personal nature. This is the Moral Principle, or Conscience in every mind in a state of moral health, it is the supreme and regulating principle, preserving among the moving powers a certain harmony to each other, and to the principles of moral rectitude. It often excites to conduct which requires a sacrifice of self-love, and so prevents this principle from interfering with the sound exercise of the affections. It regulates the desires, and restrains them by the simple rule of purity it directs and regulates the affections in the same manner by the high sense of moral responsi

bility and it thus maintains order and harmony in the whole moral system.

One of the chief diversities of human character, indeed, arises from the circumstance of one man being habitually influenced by the simple and straight-forward principle of duty, and another merely by a kind of contest between desires and motives of a very inferior or selfish nature. Thus also we acquire a knowledge of the moral temperament of different men, and learn to adapt our measures accordingly in our transactions with them. In endeavouring, for example, to excite three individuals to some act of usefulness, we come to know, that in one we have only to appeal to his sense of duty; in another to his vanity or love of approbation; while we have no hope of making any impression on the third, unless we can make it appear to bear upon his interest.

V. The principles referred to under the preceding heads are chiefly those which regulate the connexion of man with his fellow-men. But there is. another class of emotions, in their nature distinct from these; though, in a practical point of view, they are much connected. These are, the emotions which arise out of his relation to the Deity. regulation of the moral feelings, in reference to this relation, will therefore come to be considered in a department of the inquiry devoted to themselves, and in connexion with the views of the character and attributes of God, which we obtain from the light of reason and conscience.

The

This analysis of the principles which constitute the moral feelings indicates the further division of our inquiry in the following manner :—

I. The Desires, the Affections,

II. The Will.

and Self-love.

III. The Moral Principle, or Conscience.

IV. The moral relation of man towards the Deity.

These constitute what may be called the active principles of man, or those which are calculated to decide his conduct as a moral and responsible being. In connexion with them, there is another class of feelings, which may be called passive or connecting emotions. They exert a considerable influence of a secondary kind; but, in an Essay which is meant to be essentially practical, it perhaps will not be necessary to do more than enumerate them in such a manner as to point out their relation to the active principles.

If we

When an object presents qualities on account of which we wish to obtain it, we feel desire. have reason to think that it is within our reach, we experience hope; and the effect of this is to encourage us in our exertions. If we arrive at such a conviction as leaves no doubt of the attainment, this is confidence, one of the forms of that state of mind which we call faith. If we see no prospect of attaining it, we give way to despair, and this leads us to abandon all exertion for the attainment. When we obtain the object, we experience pleasure or joy; if we are disappointed, we feel regret. If again, we have the prospect of some evil which

threatens us, we experience fear, and are thereby excited to exertions for averting it. If we succeed in doing so, we experience joy; if not, we feel sorrow. If the evil seem unavoidable, we again give way to despair, and are thus led to relinquish all attempts to avert it.—Similar emotions attend on the affections. When we experience an affection, we desire to be able to act upon it. When we see

a prospect of doing so, we hope; if there seem to be none, we despair of accomplishing our object. When we have acted upon a benevolent affection, or according to the dictates of the moral principle, we experience self-approbation; when the contrary, we feel remorse. When either a desire or an affection has acquired an undue influence, so as to carry us forward in a manner disproportioned to its real and proper tendencies, it becomes a passion.

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