Northwestern railroads (Map: Wisconsin, C 2). It is in the productive Gogebic iron-mining district, several large mines being in the vicinity, and is engaged to some extent also in lumbering, farming, and stock-raising. Population, about 2000.

HURLING. A field sport, akin to the more modern game of hockey (q.v.). It is played today on a field 140 × 84 yards, with goals at each end, the posts of which are 21 feet apart and a ross-bar 8 feet high, and two point-posts 21 feet on each side of the goal-posts. The field is lined across, parallel with the goals, at 21 and 50 yards, and half-way down. The hurley-stick approximates to the ice-hockey stick in shape, but is held with the left hand below the right. The ball, or 'stiller,' is of cork, wound round with woolen threads and covered with leather. It is

5 inches in diameter and weighs 7 ounces. Play is begun by the 14 players on each side facing each other in the centre of the field. The referee

then throws the ball between the two lines of players, who thereupon scatter to their respective positions in the field. The object of the players is to drive the ball through the space between their opponents' goal-posts. If the ball passes over the side line, previously appointed sidesmen throw it back into play. The use of the hands is barred, though in a scrimmage a moderate use of the feet is tolerated. There are some very pretty strokes made with the hurley, notably that where the ball is raised in the air with the point and hit forward as it falls.

HURLOTHRUMBO. An operatic burlesque, written by one Samuel Johnson, a Cheshire dancing-master, in 1723, and produced at the Haymarket, April, 1729, the author himself taking the part of Lord Flame. Its prologue was written by Amos Meredith, and the epilogue by John Byrom. It was published by subscription, with a dedication to Lady Delves, in 1730, and a second edition, addressed to Lord Walpole, appeared the ensuing year. It was bitterly satirized by Fielding's The Author's Farce (1729).

HURON, hüʼron. A city and the county-seat of Beadle County, S. D., 120 miles east of Pierre; on the Great Northern and the Chicago and Northwestern railroads (Map: South Dakota, G 5). It is a division headquarters of the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad, with machineshops, roundhouses, etc., and has flour-mills and grain-elevators, carriage and wagon shops, a brick-yard, a creamery, and other industries. Population, in 1890, 3038; in 1900, 2793.

HURON. An Indian tribe. See WYANDOT. HURÓN. The name of certain animals of the family Mustelidæ. See GRISON.

HURON, LAKE. One of the five Great Lakes on the northern frontier of the United States, lving between Lake Superior on the northwest and Lake Erie on the southeast, connected with Lake Michigan on the west, and bounded on the southwest by Michigan and on the north, east, and south by the Province of Ontario (Map: United States, J 2). It is the third in size of the Great Lakes, having a total area of 22,322 square miles, and being about 250 miles long and 190 miles wide. A large arm of the lake in the east, extending far into Ontario, is known as Georgian Bay. Lake Huron receives the waters of Lake Superior through the Saint Mary's River,

and those of Lake Michigan through Mackinaw Straits. Its outlet is the Saint Clair River, flowing into Lake Saint Clair, which is connected by Detroit River with Lake Erie. The general direction of the lake lengthwise is from north-northwest to south-southeast. The surface is 9 feet above the level of Lake Erie, 335 feet above Lake Ontario, and 582 feet above the sea, with occasional fluctuations as in the other lakes. Its depth varies from 200 to 700 feet. The waters are very clear and cold, especially in the northern part, and abound in fish, of which the whitefish is the west side, but vessels find shelter in Saginaw the most important. There are few harbors on Bay, about 70 miles north of the outlet, and also in Thunder Bay, as much farther north. Presque Isle is also a fair harbor, and there is good shelter under the south side of the island of Macknavigation is safe from May 1st to December 1st. inaw. The lake is subject to violent storms, but Mackinaw has long been an important post for head of Saginaw Bay, is an important lumber fur trade with the Indians. Bay City, at the depot, and copper-mines have been opened in the grindstones are cut from the sandstone near upper portions of Manitoulin Bay. Excellent Thunder Bay. broken by islands, but there is a group of isThe main body of water is unlands in the north, most of them belonging to Canada, the largest of which is Grand Manitoulin. There is much the effect that Lake Huron was formerly deeper geological evidence to and more extensive than at present. See GREAT

LAKES.

HURONIAN SERIES. See PRE-CAMBRIAN FORMATIONS.

HURRICANE. See STORM; WIND.
HURRUR. See HARRAB.

HURST, JOHN FLETCHER (1834-1903). A Methodist Episcopal bishop and author. He was born in Dorchester County, Md., graduated at Dickinson College in 1854, and studied theology at the universities of Halle and Heidelberg. After his return to America he held a pastorate in New Jersey from 1858 until 1866. Again going to Germany, for three years he taught theology at the Mission Institute in Bremen, and Frankforton-the-Main, and then traveled extensively in In 1871 he was Europe, Syria, and Egypt. chosen professor of historical theology in the Drew Theological Seminary, Madison, N. J., becoming president of the institution two years later. In 1880 he was elected bishop, and has spent much time visiting missions and conferences in Europe and India. In 1891 he was chosen chancellor of the American University, Washington. He translated several theological works from the German, and wrote numerous works on Church history, including a History of Rationalism (1865); Martyrs to the Tract Cause (1873); Our Theological Century (1876); Bibliotheca Theologica (1883); and a History of the Christian Church (1897-1900).

HURTADO, Oor-tä'Do, LUIS DE TOLEDO (c.1530-c.1589). A Spanish poet and romancer, born at Toledo. He was the author of Palmerin de Inglaterra (1547), a famous romance which ranks next to Amadis of Gaul. It was exceedingly popular, and was immediately translated into French, Italian, and Portuguese. Hurtado also wrote: Tragedia Policeana (1548); Comedia de Preteo y Tibaldo (1552); and Egloga selviana

(1553), a pastoral comedy. Consult the study by Vasconcellos (Halle, 1883).

ca.

HURTADO DE MENDOZA, dâ mân-do'thå, GARCIA, Marquis of Cañete (1535-1609). A Spanish soldier and administrator, born at CuenHe fought in Italy and Germany, but by 1557 was Governor of Chile, where he took part in the local wars. Three years afterwards he was back in Spain, whose battles he fought in Portugal, but he returned to South America as Viceroy of Peru in 1590. He sent out expeditions which resulted in the discovery of the Marquesas Islands, called after him; but he resigned his post in 1596.

HURTER, hoor'ter, FRIEDRICH EMANUEL VON (1787-1865). A Swiss historiographer. He was born at Schaffhausen, and educated there and at Göttingen. He was pastor at Beggingen (1808), and at Löhningen, and in 1835 was made dean and antistes of the Reformed synod. After the publication of his Geschichte Papst Innocenz' III. und seiner Zeitgenossen (1834-42) he became a Roman Catholic (1844). At about the same time he published Die Befeindung der katholischen Kirche in der Schweiz seit 1831 (1842-43)), and Geburt und Wiedergeburt (1845), an apologia for his conversion. In 1846 he settled at Vienna, and was made historiographer to the Emperor of Austria. Under the liberal rule of Pillersdorf he resigned this position, but was reappointed in 1851. His other historical works include: Geschichte des ostgothischen Königs Theodorich (1807); Denkwürdigkeiten aus dem letzten Decennium des 18. Jahrhunderts (1840); Philipp Lang, Kammerdiener Rudolfs II. (1851); Zur Geschichte Wallensteins (1855); and Wallensteins vier letzte Lebensjahre (1862). Consult Hurter (his son), Friedrich von Hurter und seine Zeit (Gratz, 1876-77).

HUSBAND AND WIFE. A man and woman married to each other. The modes of contracting marriage, with the accompanying ceremonies, and the impediments to marriage will be more properly described under the head of MARRIAGE (q.v.), and the mode of dissolving the marriage has been already described under DIVORCE (q.v.). The effects of marriage upon the rights of the parties and upon their property will here be described.

The effect of marriage at common law may be viewed under two heads: first, as regards the persons and the personal rights of the married persons, and, secondly, as regards their property. (1) AS TO THE PERSON. By marriage at common law the husband became legally bound to support the wife in a manner consistent with his resources and social position. He also became bound to pay all debts contracted by her before the marriage, and when sued with the wife became responsible for her torts committed either before or during the coverture. In all other respects he remained in precisely the same position as before marriage. Independently of his wife he could sue and be sued, enter into contracts, and bind himself as fully after as before marriage, and he could even make a will and bequeath all his property to strangers regardless of the wife. As regards the person and personal rights of the wife, however, there was a material difference. Her person is said to be merged in that of her husband, and for many purposes they

were treated as one person in the eye of the law. The wife could neither sue nor be sued independently of the husband. Her contracts were void even when made with her husband. Even the personal property she had before marriage became her husband's absolutely, and he could dispose of it at will. She had no power to make a will of real estate, and her will disposing of personal property owned by her before her marriage could be effective only when authorized or consented to however, was bound to support the wife, she had by the husband at her death. As the husband, authority in law without his consent to pledge his credit for necessaries supplied by third persons. This obligation, being imposed by law, was not properly a contract, but a quasi-contract (q.v.). Necessaries are any articles of personal use, as food or wearing apparel, which are suited to the rank and position in life of the husband, and with which the wife is not provided. Therefore, if goods were ordered by the wife which were not necessary, the husband was under no legal liability to pay for them unless he expressly or impliedly ratified his wife's act in purchasing them. Thus he could not keep the goods and refuse payment. If, for example, he saw his wife wearing an expensive dress which he knew he did not himself order or pay for, and did not at once repudiate the purchase and return the goods, he would be held to have consented and approved of the purchase. Though the husband is bound to maintain his wife, there were, curiously enough, only circuitous means of enforcing this duty. The wife, for example, could not sue the husband herself, but having an implied authority to order necessaries, the tradesman so supplying them could sue the husband for the price. The wife also might impose liability on the husband by contract for articles not necessaries by virtue of an implied authority as agent of the husband to purchase such articles; thus, a husband might be liable to pay for articles such as he had regularly permitted his wife to purchase on his credit before, although he knew nothing of the particular purchase in question. See AGENT.

The husband, being entire master of his own actions, has the power to decide where to live, and the duty of the wife is to live with him in the same house. So long, then, as the husband and wife continue to live together, the domicile of the wife is determined by the domicile of the husband. If she ceases to live with her husband she may then acquire an independent domicile. If the wife lives apart from the husband without just cause he is not bound to support her even with necessaries. If, however, she separates from him for just cause, the liability of the husband for necessaries continues. There are, at common law, several just causes for her living apart from her husband. If the husband, for example, treats her with what is deemed cruelty in the eye of the law, as keeping a mistress in the house, or starving her, or assaulting her, she is entitled to leave him, and can order necessaries at his expense from any tradesman willing to supply her. There are, however, many degrees of cruelty and ill usage for which the wife has practically no remedy, and of which the law can take no cognizance. The statement frequently found in the early treatises that the husband has at common law the right to reasonably chastise the wife was probably without authority, and certainly has no support

in modern law. The husband can enforce the wife's antenuptial contracts, and can recover for torts committed toward her either before or after the marriage by joining her with himself as plaintiff in an action. For torts resulting in loss of her services to him or requiring him to provide medical attendance or other necessaries he can recover in his own name and right. He may also recover damages from a third person for unlawful intercourse with his wife, and either husband or wife might recover damages from a third person for alienating the affections of the other. As regards crimes committed by a wife, she is in general liable to be punished for them in the same way as if she were unmarried. But there is a peculiarity as regards crimes committed by the husband and wife jointly in the husband's presence. If the crime be treason or murder, both are punished precisely as if they were unmarried. But in all the lesser crimes the theory, as well as the practice, is that if the wife was a party to the crime, and committed it in her husband's presence, she is presumed by the law to have so acted under the compulsion or coercion of her husband, and is acquitted as a matter of course. The presump tion, however, is a presumption of fact only, and may be rebutted by showing that in fact the wife was not coerced by the husband; but in the absence of any direct evidence one way or the other on the subject of coercion it is presumed that the wife acted under this marital coercion, and so she escapes punishment. Another curious anomaly arising from the common-law maxim that husband and wife are one person is that the wife cannot be convicted of stealing her husband's goods. If she absconds with his property, however valuable, she cannot be punished. But this rule is qualified by the circumstance that if she commits adultery, and afterwards absconds with the adulterer, both taking away the husband's goods, the adulterer may be convicted of the larceny, though it is doubtful if she is in that case liable to any punishment. Where the third party does not have in view any adultery with the wife, but joins her in taking away the husband's goods, neither he nor the wife can be punished criminally.

At the common law also husbands and wives may be witnesses for or against other parties in all civil cases, i.e. actions and suits relating to debts, contracts, and wrongs which are not crimes, and in all inquiries of a civil nature. But neither can testify for the other in an action to which the other is a party; but either can be compelled by the opposite party to be a witness. In all cases neither husband nor wife can be compelled to disclose any confidential communication made to him or her by the other spouse during the marriage. As regards all criminal proceedings instituted against either husband or wife, the other spouse is neither competent nor can be compelled to be a witness; but where the husband and wife are not the accused, but are the prosecuting parties, then, inasmuch as the State is presumed to be the prosecutor, and the husband and wife are not parties. they may be both witnesses, subject to the qualification as to not being bound to disclose confidential communications made by and to each other during marriage. There is an exception also to the rule that neither can be a witness against the other in criminal proceedings-viz. where the wife charges her husband with an assault or other crime of greater degree upon her

person, she is in that case only a competent witness against him, for otherwise the crime might go unpunished. Moreover, in all proceedings instituted in consequence of adultery of the husband or wife, neither of the married parties is competent or can be compelled to be a witness.

(2) AS TO THE PROPERTY OF THE MARRIED PERSONS. As regards the husband, he not only remains sole owner of his property, and, subject to the wife's right of dower, can do what he likes with it, but he becomes absolute owner of her personal property of every kind which is capable of being reduced to possession. As will be hereafter explained, he also becomes a qualified owner of her choses in action (q.v.) and her chattels real. The legal title of the wife's real estate remains in the wife, but she cannot convey it without the husband joining in the conveyance by fine and recovery, and the rents, issues, and profits of her real estate belong absolutely to her husband. Owing to the common-law rule that the husband is entitled to the services of the wife, he becomes entitled to her earnings acquired by rendering service to others. It will thus be seen that during the coverture the wife cannot, at common law, acquire any personal property, and her title to real property acquired before or after her marriage is subject to the rights of the husband, as stated. But as regards the wife the case is different. The old rule as to the wife's personal property becoming the husband's absolutely after marriage suffered qualification when such property consisted not of money or chattels, but of what are called chattels real, such as leases and mortgages. (See CHATTELS.) In such a case they become so far the property of the husband that he can sell them during his life, but he cannot bequeath them by will; and on his death they remain hers, while on her death they become his. Again, where the wife's personal estate before marriage consists of mere rights of action, or debts due to her, they become so far his that he can at any time sue for them, and so reduce them into possession, and make them his own absolutely; but he cannot bequeath them by will, and if he does not sue for them in his lifetime they survive to the wife after his death. As regards the wife's real estate-i.e. her lands and houses held in freehold the husband does not acquire any legal interest in the title by the marriage, but, as has been pointed out, he acquires the right to the rents, issues, and profits, and consequently the right to dispose of the real estate during the coverture; and, if the wife bear him a living child, upon her death he becomes entitled to a life interest in her real estate, known as tenancy by the curtesy (q.v.). Upon marriage the wife also acquires an inchoate right to dower in real estate of which the husband may be seized or which he may thereafter acquirethat is, a life estate or interest in one-third of all such real estate. This right becomes complete only upon death of the husband before the wife, but it cannot be impaired by any act of the husband during the coverture or by the wife herself except by joining with her husband in a conveyance by fine and recovery. (See DOWER.) All real estate conveyed to husband and wife together, unless otherwise defined by the instrument of conveyance, is deemed to be an estate known as an estate by the entirety. Its peculiarity is that while the husband is entitled to the rents, issue, and profits during coverture,

neither can convey the title without the other, and the survivor becomes entitled to the property absolutely. On the death of one of the parties to the marriage the property is disposed of as follows: if the husband dies his will may, subject to the wife's right of dower, dispose of his whole property to strangers irrespective of the wife. But there are some things his will cannot take away from her, as, for example, her leases, choses in action not reduced to possession, and her real estate. To these may be added her paraphernalia, so called, which consists of her personal apparel and jewels; but even these may be taken by her husband's creditors if there be a deficiency of assets. When the wife dies before the husband he becomes entitled to all her personal estate, of whatever description, even though she leave children of the marriage; and it must be recollected that she can at the common law, generally speaking, make no will which has any effect if the husband chooses to repudiate it. The wife's real estate passes to her heirs unless a child has been born of the marriage, in which case the husband is entitled to curtesy in the entire estate. The English courts of chancery, by application of the doctrine of uses and trusts (q.v.), mitigated to some extent the harshness of the common-law rules relating to married women. By an ante-nuptial agreement between the parties to the marriage, sometimes called a marriage settlement, not only all the property she may have had before marriage, but property to which she may afterwards be entitled, may be given to trustees to hold for her separate use. The agreement may give her a practically unlimited right over the property thus settled upon her which equity would enforce, and she may thus receive regularly the income of the trust and use of it for her own purposes. She may bind her separate estate by contract, and even dispose of it by will. Courts of equity will also in a proper case enforce agreements made between husband and wife, and in certain cases will enforce a conveyance made by the husband to the wife when made for the purpose of providing for the wife. The various rights with reference to separate property thus created and enforced by courts of equity are known as married women's separate estates.

STATUTORY MODIFICATION OF THE COMMON LAW. The preceding statement is an outline of the rights and liabilities of the husband and wife according to the common-law rules. Half a century ago public attention was first directed toward the essential injustice of the common law to married women. The agitation which followed took fast hold upon the public conscience, and ultimately found expression both in England and the United States in a series of statutes known as married women's enabling acts. New York was the first State to adopt this reform, by an act framed in 1848, and its example was followed by other States in rapid succession. The various statutes relating to the subject have been repeatedly revised, and their scope widened by amendment, until at the present time in most jurisdictions, though the statutes differ in minor particulars, married women are on a substantial equality with their husbands with reference to both personal rights and rights of property, and each is practically independent of the other with reference to all matters outside the obligation of the status marriage or the marriage contract

itself. The effect of modern statutory law will be best understood by briefly mentioning some of the more important exceptions to the foregoing statement. In probably all jurisdictions the husband is still under obligation to support his wife, and to provide her with necessaries, and the wife, by acting as his agent, may still bind the husband by contract. As the husband no longer acquires any interest in the wife's personal property or choses in action, he is not subject to the corresponding obligation to answer for her torts and contracts, they being an obligation of the wife alone, for which she may be separately sued. Either may sue or be sued independently of the other. While the husband may no longer take the wife's earnings, he is in a general sense still entitled to the wife's services, so long as she continues to give them to him; and he may sue in his own right to recover for torts causing loss of her services or expenditure by him for necessaries, and either may sue for alienation of the affections of the other. The law of domicile of the husband and wife remains unchanged. The wife still has dower in the husband's real estate, and in some of the Southern and Western States she has by statute a homestead in the husband's lands. In many States the husband may acquire curtesy in the wife's real estate, but in some, like New York, the wife may defeat his right by conveyance or will. In some States, as New Jersey, the wife cannot convey her real estate as freely as the husband may, but must be examined apart from her husband by a notary, commissioner, or judge before making the conveyance, who must ascertain whether the conveyance is freely made without coercion by the husband. Estates by the entirety are now generally obsolete, the husband and wife taking as co-tenants, or tenants in common. In nearly all jurisdictions statutes of distribution (q.v.) have been enacted, by which either party to the marriage may acquire a part of the personal property of the other in case of his or her death without having disposed of the personal property by will. In other particulars these statutes follow closely the analogy of the law of inheritance. Provision has also been made by statute in most jurisdictions for directly compelling the husband to support the wife by means of a quasi-criminal proceeding brought at her instance. The same result may be obtained by the various statutory forms of judicial separation (see DIVORCE), by which the husband may be compelled to pay the wife certain sums of money, or alimony (q.v.).

SCOTLAND. The law of husband and wife in Scotland as regards their personal rights and disabilities, and the property during the marriage, does not substantially differ from the law of England, but the following points may be noticed: As regards their persons and personal rights and crimes the law is the same. It is often said that in Scotland the movable property of both husband and wife becomes a kind of joint-stock property, called goods in communion; but this phrase has no meaning except with reference to the principle of the division of the property after the death of one of the parties and the dissolution of the marriage. The husband is, as in England, entire master, except that he cannot on his death-bed bequeath more than a share of the property away from the wife. The wife's movable property becomes the husband's, and her

heritable property remains subject to the husband's life-rent. When she disposes of her heritable property she must ratify the deed by going before a magistrate, and acknowledging that she acts of her own free will. When the husband deserts her she may, as in England, obtain a judge's order to protect her earnings and moneys, and she has a preferable right to a reasonable provision out of any property to which she may succeed (Conjugal Rights Amendment Acts, 1861 and 1874). By the Married Women's Property (Scotland) Act, 1877, the produce of a wife's industry or skill is excluded from the rights of her husband, and his liability for her antenuptial debts is restricted to the amount she brought into the marriage. A wife has, in Scotland, the power to bind her husband for necessaries; but the husband can, by a process of inhibition, give notice to tradesmen not to supply her at his expense, and this notice will be binding on all the King's subjects.

CIVIL LAW. In the early period of the Roman law the power of the husband over his wife and her property was absolute, as the patria potestas. Whatever property the wife acquired, both before and after marriage, became the property of the husband; but in case the wife survived the husband she was entitled to share her husband's property equally with the children. At a later period, but before the time of Justinian, owing possibly to the lack of any formal marriage, we find a fully developed system of law relating to married women which, unlike the common law, was based upon the theory that husband and wife were in law distinct persons having independent rights and liabilities. The wife remained responsible for her own debts. She could sue and be sued independently of her husband, and her husband could not subject her property to any disability. While there were some restrictions upon the power of women to contract, there was no distinction in this respect between married women and unmarried women. The husband, as at common law, was bound to support the wife; but as compensation for this liability his wife or her family was required at the time of the marriage to provide the husband with the dos or dowry. The increase from the dos was the husband's property. He could also dispose of the dos so far as it was personal property, but not if it were real estate; and in the case of termination of the marriage by death or divorce, the dos was required to be returned to the wife. Corresponding to the dos was the donatio ante nuptiam or the donatio propter nuptiam, a gift made by the husband to the wife before the marriage. Not much is known of these, but it seems probable that the donatio was not required to be equal to the dos, but was given as a provision for the wife after her husband's death, she having lost the right to share equally in her hus band's property with the children of the marriage. These rules of law might, however, be freely modified by antenuptial contracts, which were enforced much as courts of equity enforced antenuptial contracts entered into at common law.

COMMUNITY PROPERTY. Occupying an intermediate ground between the common law and the civil law relating to the husband and wife is the law of community property. The notion of a community of interests by husband and wife in all property acquired during the coverture

seems to have been derived from the civil law and the medieval customary law, and is now incorporated into the Code Napoleon and most of the other European codes as fixing the rights of husband and wife in the abuse of contracts. The most important peculiarity of community property is the partnership of husband and wife in all property acquired by them during the coverture, and under some systems in property acquired before the marriage. The husband is the curator of the wife, who has no power to contract independently of her authority; but she retains her joint interest in the community property; and after her husband's death is entitled to one-half the community property, the other half passing to the heirs. The husband has the same right in case of the wife's death. See COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY.

GANANCIAL SYSTEM. For the particular doctrine of community property belonging to the Spanish law, and adopted in New Mexico, and to some extent in Arizona, California, Nevada, Idaho, Texas, and Washington, see GANANCIAL SYSTEM.

The criminal law relating to husband and wife remains substantially unchanged. The husband and wife are now generally competent witnesses in all civil actions with the exception of an action for divorce brought by one against the other, in which case neither is allowed in most jurisdictions to testify against the other or to acts of adultery; and in no case is either allowed to testify as to any confidential communication made to or received from the other during coverture. In case of testimony as to a transaction with a deceased person by or against whose representative an action is brought, a husband or a wife, because of his or her interest in the other spouse's property, may be an interested witness, and so be barred from testifying on that ground. (See EVIDENCE.) The competency of husband and wife to testify in criminal proceedings remains as at common law. Consult: The Commentaries of Kent and Blackstone; Hammick, Marriage Laws of England (2d ed., London, 1887); Macqueen. Rights and Liabilities of Husband and Wife (3d ed., London, 1885); Schouler, Domestic Relations; the statutes of the various States in the United States; and the authorities referred to under DOMESTIC RELATIONS.

HUSBANDRY, PATRONS OF. See GRANGE. HUSBANDS, huz'bandz, HERMAN (?-1795). An American revolutionist. He was born in Pennsylvania, but settled in North Carolina, and was a member of the Legislature of that Colony. In 1768 he became one of the leaders of the 'Regulators' (q.v.), an organization formed to redress grievances. After several times coming into conflict with Governor Tryon, at last, in 1771, his force of 2000 Regulators was defeated, and Husbands fled from the Colony, settling near Pittsburg. He was a member of the Pennsylvania Legislature in 1778, and at the time of the 'Whisky Insurrection' (q.v.) of 1794 was a member of the Committee of Safety with Albert Gallatin and others.

HUSCHKE, hoosh'ke, GEORG PHILLIP EDUARD (1801-86). A Prussian jurist, born at Münden, and educated at the universities of Göttingen and Berlin. At Göttingen he was made instructor in Roman law (1821). Afterwards he was professor of law at Rostock (1824) and at Breslau (1827).