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recesses of the inquiry, will be found in this collection, which it is the intention of the committee to publish. It is not from any doubt of the judgment which will preside over their publication, that I express a fervent hope it may be edited with a scrupulous consideration of the time and patience of the reader. There is nothing so dreary to the world at large as tables, and official returns, and statistical statements, and legal circumlocutions. Let there be ample appendices, if you please; but help us to some shorter way of penetrating to the pith of them, than by exploring their dismal mysteries for ourselves. Extract the vital spirit of these solid battalions of facts and figures, and spare us the drudgery of a task from which we are not unlikely to turn back in disgust, before we have gone half-way to its conclusion. There are in every subject two or three leading ideas, which form the clue to all the rest, and render easy the acquisition of the whole. Let us have these leading ideas expressed plainly, concisely, and logically, in the promised publication, and the common sense of the public of every country interested in the subject of copyright will trace them to their issues.

M. Romberg was the soul of the committee. His administrative capacity is conspicuous. Rapid, but never confused, he organises details with celerity and clearness. It was owing mainly to his tact and foresight that not a single hitch occurred throughout the whole of the arrangements for the meetings of the Congress. Everything was orderly, and fell regularly into its place, and the performance may be said to have gone off as smoothly as if the parts and they were numerous and varied -had been cast before-hand, and the play carefully rehearsed. He had, no doubt, some able and zealous colleagues. Of these, special acknowledgments are due to M. Baron, Professor of History in the University of Liege, and M. Grefs, Director of the class of the Fine Arts of the Royal Academy, and the most distinguished of Belgian sculptors. I have no means of knowing what help these gentlemen afforded in the pre

liminary work, but I know that their earnestness and courtesy were extremely serviceable during the progress of the discussion.

You must not suppose that I have the slightest intention of tracking the Congress through its daily sittings. One day must suffice to enable you to see how the final results were effected. Having finished the formal business of the opening, the assembly was broken up into the five sections previously arranged, each section taking possession of the room set apart for its deliberations. These sections met again every morning at nine, till they completed their labours, the general body meeting at one o'clock to receive their reports, and shape into resolutions the final judgment of the whole. The entire work was concluded in four days, not, however, without encountering occasional risks of shipwreck from the clamour of the disputants. I have never seen questions, even of a personal or a political character, so hotly contested. A stranger might have supposed that, instead of being a meeting possessing neither authority nor responsibility, and having no other end than that of collecting opinions, its decisions were conclusive acts of legislation, so strenuously was every inch of ground fought for.

The programme of the questions to be submitted to the sections had been well considered, with a view to secure distinctness and speciality, by keeping each division of the inquiry, so to speak, apart, and independent of the others. The points to which the attention of the sections was directed, embraced all the practicable aspects of the subject at large, and might be described as comprising a sort of catechism, in which every particular connected with the rights, real or imaginary, of authors and artists, was examined and exhausted. Whoever desires to have his thinking faculties awakened on the ethics and policy of copyright, cannot do better than study these interrogatories. Keeping clear of all the subsidiary features, I will endeavour, within the narrowest possible limits, to put you in possession of the principles which the sections were required to resolve. You will remember that these prin

ciples furnish the basis upon which the whole proceedings of the Congress reposed.

To the First Section was assigned the consideration of these elementary propositions-Whether the principle of an international recognition of a right of property in works of literature and art ought to be embodied in the legislation of all civilised people? and, Whether such a principle should be adopted, even in the absence of reciprocity? The propriety of adopting in all countries accepting this principle a uniform basis of legislation, was also submitted for consideration, an apparent corollary from the principle itself, but much easier to solve upon paper than in practice. The duration of the right of property that ought to be assigned to works of literature and art, formed the grand topic of discussion in the Second Section. It branched into a variety of channels: Whether the term should extend beyond the life of the author, and, if so, what conditions should enter into the additional term; what duration of the right should be granted to posthumous works, anonymous works, and works published pseudonymously; whether lectures and public speeches, taken down in short-hand, ought to be considered as copyright; whether authors should possess a right of property in the translation of their works, and, if so, to what extent, and under what conditions; and whether it would be desirable that, in order to establish their rights of property, authors should be required to execute certain forms, the omission of which should invalidate their rights. You will observe that these problems are of a thoroughly practical nature; that they are presented in a strictly practical shape; and that, assuming the right of property in intellectual works to be granted in the first instance, they supply complete materials for practical legislation.

The Third Section was restricted to the consideration of questions relating to dramatic and musical compositions; and, although the matters it discussed were necessarily of limited importance, it was one of the most interesting of the entire series. Here Scribe presided, elected by acclama

tion, and surrounded by a group of writers representing most of the national dramas of Europe. Any person who had formed his ideal of Scribe from the character of his works, full of skilful dialogue, in which the finesse and the humour are not more remarkable than the emotional power, traversing almost every variety of subject, gay and grave, equally at ease in every variety of costume, and displaying in all an extraordinary mastery of stage art, might be surprised to find in the real Scribe a man of modest and simple demeanour, with a tranquil air of perfect good-breeding, and looking very much like a private gentleman of a certain age, who had passed quietly and unobserved through the best society. You watch in vain in his motions, his gestures, or his words, for what you might suppose to be characteristic traits of the famous dramatic writer who has, probably, more intimate experiences of the life of the coulisses than any man living, and who has achieved more triumphs in the theatre than all his contemporaries added together. The thin grey hair, the expression of kindness and gentleness in the eyes, and the delicate cast of the pale features, constitute a portrait which might hardly have been looked for in one who has had to contend in his time against more caprice, vanity, and false pretension, jealousy, conspiracy, and ignorance, than any respectable individual who has been born in the lap of fortune, and brought up in the calm sunshine of domestic intercourse can, by any process of description, be made very clearly to comprehend. Let such an individual write for the stage, and he will then be in a condition to wonder at and admire this perfect specimen of a sweet and gentle nature, that has come out of a long ordeal of theatrical experiences unspoiled, in the person of Eugène Scribe. But this is a digression, and I must recall you to the propositions which the dramatic sec tion were called upon to examine. They may be thus shortly stated: Whether the right of representation of dramatic and musical works should be independent of the right of reproduction, and whether any distinction

ought to be made between the duration of the two rights; whether, and to what extent, the public execution of musical works should be prohibited without the permission of the author; and whether the right of property in musical works should also include the exclusive right of making arrangements upon them. You will probably agree with me, that these propositions indicate rather than open the questions which the Legislature would find it necessary to examine, in order to devise a complete scheme of protection for dramatic and musical works.

To the Fourth Section was referred the whole province of art; painting, sculpture, architecture, and engraving. The main question to be resolved here was, whether the author of a picture, statue, or any other work of art, should possess the sole right of reproducing it, or of authorising its reproduction, by the same, or by another art, upon a scale analogous or different? This question produced a vivacious discussion, which ploughed up topics wholly foreign to the business of the section, not the least curious of which was the application of the word "author" to the painter or the sculptor. It was alleged that literary people had taken possession of the word, had narrowed its meaning to a maker of books, and established a monopoly in it, and that it ought to be restored to its catholic signification, so as to include creators of all species; a dangerous expansion, which would let in a mob of workmen with whom the artists would be very unwilling to march through Coventry. Dismissing these episodes, which occupied more time than they are worth, the matters investigated by the Fourth Section were identical with the details that have again and again occupied the attention of artists in England, without leading to any practical result. The grievances of art have long been familiar, but the remedies are yet to be found. How are artists to be protected against fraudulent copies and forged signatures? It is very much like the Irish joke of putting the cart before the horse, to discuss what the duration of a

given property shall be, until you have secured its possession to the

owner.

The Fifth Section was occupied with fiscal considerations, of great importance, as following consequentially from the preceding propositions. Assuming the elementary rights to be accorded, it was the business of this section to inquire whether it would be desirable to abolish, or, at least, to reduce and simplify, the customs' duties on books and works of art, and to modify the postal duties, with a view to facilitate the transmission of printed matter, engravings, prints, &c.

All

The most superficial glance at the questions submitted to the several sections will enable you to see that the weight of the inquiry really fell upon the Second Section. All the rest were subordinate to the fundamental proposition that was to fix the term of the right, this term. being assumed as the common ground for general legislation. The result showed the importance which was attached to it. The debates in the Second Section occupied three long and tempestuous sittings, without being able to accomplish anything more than the affirmation of a general principle, while the business of the other sections was completed, and their reports were agreed upon, in two short meetings. the members of those sections, as soon as they were released from their own duties, crowded every morning into the bureau of the Second Section to listen to a debate, distinguished no less by its intelligence and the variety of views and illustrations it developed, than by the deep interest and earnest convictions manifested by the speakers. It is greatly to be regretted that these able and animated discussions were not reported, for they fairly ventilated every argument which, I imagine, can be brought to bear upon the subject. The proposition submitted to the section was to determine the duration of the right of property that ought to be assigned to an author in his works. This proposition obviously implied a limit. If the committee of organisation had not contemplated a limit, in view of an ulterior right

in society, they would, of course, have put the proposition in a wholly different form. The section, however, assumed the initiative upon a broader ground, and before they entered into the consideration of what the limit ought to be, they held it to be their preliminary duty to determine whether there should be any. Instead of putting the proposition in its original shape-What should be the duration of the right of property in literary and artistic works?-they ascended to first principles, and asked, Whether the right of property in literary and artistic works should be perpetual or temporary? Upon this question a debate was raised that lasted through three days, and that called up, according to the report, no less than sixteen orators, some of whom spoke at considerable length, and all with extraordinary fervour. How much longer it might have lasted, had not the regulations of the Congress brought it to a close, it is difficult to say, for at the eleventh hour the members exhibited the utmost reluctance in coming to the vote. But the vote was decisive-a majority of 56 against 36 rejecting the doctrine of perpetuity. You will probably be surprised that there should have been so large a minority on such a question. Your surprise would be abated if you knew how strongly the sentiment-for I will not venture to designate it by any more responsible term of a perpetual right in intellectual productions had taken possession of the feelings even of many persons in that assembly, whose judgment was opposed to its adoption, or who, at all events, were convinced that it never could be adopted as a principle of law. There were not a few who were willing to capitulate with the difficulty by first asserting the principle in a declaratory resolution, and then abandoning it in practice anything to be allowed to put upon record their opinion that works of genius ought to be invested with the attributes of a perpetual property.

Crochets were not confined to the Second Section. In the First Section, charged with the resolution demand ing the international recognition of the rights of property in works of litera

ture and art, questions of an equally visionary character were raised. It was doubted whether the word "property" should be used at all in reference to such productions, and it was suggested that the phrase, "rights of authors," should be substituted. This produced a lively tournament, nobody perceiving at first that the right of necessity implied property, and that, in this sense, they were in fact convertible terms. The absurdity of the distinction without a difference was illustrated by a pertinent anecdote. Analogous objections, it appears, had been urged in the Belgian Legislature in 1839, when a project of law, relating to literary and artistical property, was before the Chambers. Several members opposed the introduction of the word "property," contending in effect that the intention of the law was to confer rights, and not to maintain property; when one of the speakers put an end to the discussion by quietly observing that they could not dream of removing a word which had already been admitted into the legal vocabulary. "It is evident," he said, "that the law which confers upon authors rights in their own works, confers upon them at the same time a sort of property. It would therefore be a mere puerile affectation to attempt to evade the word while we recognise the thing."

Another view of the question was taken by the artists. They considered that property in works of intelligence was a natural (whatever that may be) and absolute right, and that it ought to be protected, and guaranteed, and fenced round by social privileges, like all other property; but they guarded themselves carefully against the supposition that they derived from this principle a claim to perpetuity of rights on the part of the author. On the contrary, they maintained that property, though absolute in its origin and character, is never absolute in its enjoyment. The arguments on this point are clear and precise. All property is obliged to sacrifice a part of its rights to the public interest; all property is held under conditions imposed for the public good. There are restrictions upon cutting down forests, building houses, extracting

minerals, and a hundred operations which proprietors carry into execution on their own property. In a certain time, bridges, railroads, and other works of common utility, fall into the hands of the public; but it does not follow that we ignore the right because the public interest limits the usage. The same rational view of the subordination of private property, so to speak, to the general interests, was finally adopted by the Fourth Section, at the close of their tumultuous contests on the principle of perpetuity. They held that property is a right which responds to the desire of appropriation inherent in man; but that property which seeks to be guaranteed by social law must submit to social conventions, and be subjected to conditions of enjoyment, conditions of transmission, imposts, disinherison, appropriation to public utility. All these obligations are corollaries from the rights guaranteed by law; and if literary and artistical property is to be legally guaranteed in its rights, it must come in under these obligations, unless logic is to be wholly disregarded in such affairs. It might be supposed that this very plain statement of an extremely reasonable necessity would have put the advocates of perpetuity to flight; but it only compelled them to shift their position.

Driven from their original ground of claiming for ideal property (if we may so designate it for the sake of distinction), the same rights as real property, by which they would have thus, against the grain of their own views, subjected it to the same conditions and restraints; some of the advocates of perpetuity retreated upon a plea which looked very much like begging the question. They asserted that literary property was essentially different from other property; that it conferred peculiar benefits upon society; that it was the great agent of civilisation and intellectual advancement; and that, therefore, it should be exempt from the obligations which law imposed upon other kinds of property. But this argument, if worth anything, would apply with equal, perhaps with greater, force to the discoveries and inventions of science; and if books,

busts, and pictures were to be relieved from legal restrictions on these grounds, we certainly could not, with any pretence of justice, refuse to extend a similar consideration to steamengines and electric telegraphs, which have undoubtedly contributed effectively, to say the least of them, to the march of human improvement.

If the Congress had accomplished no other result, it would be entitled to the gratitude of all reflecting men for the completeness with which it has disposed of the principle of perpetuity. It has settled that doctrine for ever. The principle of perpetuity, as one of the speakers very significantly observed, is not only inconsistent with the progress of knowledge, by shutting up thought within limits which cannot be overleaped, but, which is still more dangerous, it is irreconcilable with true liberty, notwithstanding that it was in the name of that liberty its advocates clamoured for its adoption. So far as authors themselves are concerned, it would not add a shilling to their gains, or a leaf to their laurels. Publishers would purchase copyrights just as they do at present, with a withering indifference to their transmission into an illimitable future. What author could hope to obtain larger terms by being enabled to whisper in the ear of his Dodsley or his Tonson, "Remember, my friend, times are changed with us; I am not now selling you a copyright terminable by law in forty or fifty years, but a copyright which will belong to you, and your children, and your children's children, and your children's children's children, to the end of the world"? How much more would a publisher be likely to give for this interminable term? And if it did not improve the author's relations with his publisher, if it did not, in other words, improve the market value of the copyright, of what earthly satisfaction would it be to endow works of art or literature with a sham character of perpetuity? Should we not find, under a regime of perpetuity, exactly the same state of things we find under a term such as we have in England, which is ample enough to cover the sale of nine hundred and ninety-nine thou

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