at any moment of sending men into our ships, and moving soldiers from our camps, and massing both ships and troops on a threatened point, would be a consummation of defence on which the nation might rely with confidence and security. Forts and batteries along the different points of the coast would doubtless assist and aid the defence. Such are being designed, but they must be works of time. Meanwhile a good and most efficient plan has been adopted, that of placing batteries of 18-pounders, equipped and ready for service, at different positions, which should be horsed on emergency from the neighbouring farms, and moved in any direction where they would be required. This might be further extended by establishing our floating batteries at certain stations, and manning them with old pensioners, who might be quartered in cottages or barracks on shore. But to resist an invasion it is never safe to trust the resistance to any stationary force. A place of landing, as our own experiences have shown, might be chosen where no such force could be. A movable defence is the only reliance. A camp such as that at Aldershott should be formed near another part of the coast line, somewhere, perhaps, near Dartmoor, with an outpost corresponding to Shorncliffe at Portland. A communication should be established by rail with the coast, and along its whole extent should exist a direct and continuous line of railways, by means of which bodies of men might be hurled and concentrated on any one position, or posted at several, with a rapidity and an ease which strategists never dreamed of. Confronted by an army in array, supported too by heavy guns, and conscious that, move where he would, turn where he would, that army would move more rapidly and more surely than he, and be ever ready to oppose him, an invader would pause and deliberate well ere he launched forth his legions on such an enterprise. There is another part of this movable force, however, to be considered our fleets. They would be equally ready with steam-power to concentrate and oppose, and an in

vasion which had to be covered by a naval action, or conducted under a fire from ships, would be a feature approximating too much to impossibility to be attempted. But to possess this part of the movable force, there is necessity for man-power. We have our ships, our guns, all of firstclass and excellence; but these must be manned-we must have the command of men, which shall assure us of sending them forth in the time of need. And this is a necessity, created not only by the exigencies of defence, but by the still greater urgency to assert our supremacy intact and unquestioned. We have ships and resources without limit-we need only men, or the command of men, sufficient to render these an everexisting and permanent power. Many schemes have been advanced for this a Channel fleet, with the blockships, guard-ships, and the coast guard as a reserve, is the favourite theory. But a Channel fleet is a thing which one Admiralty may create, and another destroy-which exists today, and may be doomed to-morrow by any financial exigency. The force on which England relies to maintain its maritime ascendancy, must be a permanent one-not subject to the will of a minister, or the pressure of a popular outcry. It must be a standing navy, a body of seamen enrolled and organised, quartered either in ships or barracks, but still endowed and invested with the character of stability, and affording those belonging to it the assurance of continuous pay and service; and giving to the men who wield the destinies of the nation the certain power of sending forth one powerful fleet after another to meet the exigencies of defence, and still retain the appointed reserve as a last resource. was our intent to have discussed the possibilities of forming such an institution, and the details of its arrangement; but space fails us, and, moreover, the subject is too large and important to be drawn in at the end of an article. It is one, however, which must be forced on our attention and consideration.

It

It is the lesson which Cherbourg conveys to us-the warning which it utters-that we must stand forth and

reassert our supremacy as a naval power; that we must answer such challenges as it and the system of which it is part may be supposed to signify, not by loud-voiced alarmnot by spasmodic efforts of preparation or defence, but by a methodised and systematic resolve equal to their own in strength, more than equal to theirs in powers of resources; to have ever alive and ready for action a naval force, a power of ships and men, which should defy the efficiency

and the capabilities of the five ports militaires the grand demonstration of the maritime aims of France.

Thus strengthened, thus defended, England might repose on her wealth, or develop her prosperity peacefully and securely-might hear of docks being opened without alarm, and of forts being built, without giving them a passing thought. Thus assured, England might assume the dignity of a great nation-too strong to fear aggression, too strong to provoke it.

THE grand case which absorbed the attention of Parliament last summer has at length been closed in point of form, as five months ago it was closed in point of fact. Lord Canning has made his reply to Lord Ellenborough's despatch, and the Government have published it. When tried in full Parliament last May, Lord Canning's case broke down so completely that his Whig friends, who had been so eager to bring it on, shrank from taking the verdict of the House, and, amidst a scene of the most grotesque humiliation, begged to be allowed to withdraw their charges against the Ministry. Lord Canning has now made appearance on his own behalf. We do not think his reply would have been such as it is, if he had not been prompted thereto by the course taken by his Whig friends at home. They had chosen to make his cause a party question, with a view to reinstate themselves in office; and accordingly, throwing statesmanlike wisdom to the winds, they had gone all lengths in eulogising the Oude Proclamation, and in denouncing Lord Ellenborough's censure of it. They staked their credit as a party in justifying Lord Canning and in criminating the Ministry. They failed, and now Lord Canning is invoked as a forlorn hope to cover their defeat. They did so much for him (although it was only in order to do much more

for themselves) that he could not forego doing his best for them. And so we have the "Reply." A very lengthy and elaborate document it is. But is it in any other sense satisfactory? During the debates in May, when the Whigs were making such a mere stalking-horse of him, Lord Canning might well have prayed to be saved from his friends. But his reply now makes it doubtful whether he do not need to be equally saved from himself. He has allowed himself to be caught in the outer edges of the maelstrom of Whig faction; and, having a bad cause, the very elaborateness of his reply only serves to bring out more clearly the errors of himself and his angry eulogists at home.

We do not underrate Lord Canning. He is a man of ability, an elegant scholar, and possessed of good moral firmness; but not even Lord Granville will assert that he is a man of original genius, a brilliant statesman, capable of saving or reconstructing an empire. He is an ordinary Governor-General placed in extraordinary circumstances. Without comparing him with the more illustrious of his predecessors in the Viceroyalty of India, it is enough to say, that in the history of the present Revolt he will be eclipsed by some of his own subordinates. The name of Lawrence will overshadow that of Canning. It is one of the most

marvellous facts of the war, that it was the Punjaub-the most recently conquered of our provinces, and the one which had fought most powerfully against us-that supplied the means of re- conquering Hindostan. This was the untoward realm which Lawrence had to deal with; yet he turned the very elements of danger into most potent allies, recreated an army of 80,000 men in a few months' time-raised loans to equip them and sent them fully armed, with long trains of siegeguns, ammunition, and supplies of transport, to retake Delhi, and aid in carrying the British standards in triumph back to Lucknow. In the Punjaub we saw men of genius acting in every quarter. It was not the muffled action of a system, but the rapid energetic coups of individuals. Everywhere individuality is present. The telegraph from Calcutta is interrupted-Lawrence becomes practically independent-and he and his coadjutors are seen working like paladins in upholding the tottering empire. If we turn to the other side of India-to Calcutta-we see nothing of this sort. Mountains of care indeed Lord Canning had on his shoulders, and he bore the burden bravely and with undaunted moral courage. But he had more of the nobility which, in the face of most terrible odds, stands and dies, than of the genius which can strike and save. As the head of an administrative machine, in which his own personality was half-lost, he did his work honourably and well; but if we look for a ruler dominating over the governmental machine, as an Ellenborough or Wellesley would have done, and making his personality felt through every part of the service -we look in vain.

Only in two matters has the personal action of Lord Canning stood out clearly-and neither of them can be made the subject of eulogy. The first of these is his overruling the military plans of the Commander-inChief. In the beginning of the present year, Sir Colin Campbell's plans were, to clear the Doab entirely of the enemy, and fully re-establish communications between Calcutta and the Punjaub,-to leave Central India

to be cleared by the Bombay and Madras field - forces, which, under Roberts, Rose, and Whitelock, were advancing to the line of the Jumna from the south and west, and to march himself into Rohilcund, the reconquest of which province could be effected with the force then at his disposal, and which reconquest was indispensable to free the important line of communication through the Doab from serious and ceaseless flank attacks. All the rebels over this wide extent of country, north-east of the Jumna, would thus have been either destroyed or driven into Oude, the conquest of which province Sir Colin designed to reserve for another campaign,-in the interim, spending the hot season and the rainy months in thoroughly strengthening and reorganising all the surrounding regions; so that, when the campaign reopened, whatever portion of the Oude rebels should escape from the attack of his converging columns (by that time strong in cavalry), would find no resting-place elsewhere, and be utterly crushed, without being able to betake themselves to (our greatest peril) a guerilla warfare. On the other hand, the Governor-General insisted that an attack should be made at once upon the centre of the enemy's power in Oude-maintaining that the capture of Lucknow would so discourage the rebels, that they would give up the contest, and send in their submission. The Commander-in-Chief had to yield to the orders of the Governor-General; and the consequence has been a widespread and harassing guerilla warfare, a campaign in the hot season, most disastrous to our soldiers-and results so unsatisfactory, that not a single revolted province has as yet been thoroughly reduced to order and tranquillity. Sir Colin Campbell did his part of the work-he took Lucknow-and not only Lucknow, but Bareilly, and every other place of importance. But the rebels did not surrender. Lord Canning had entirely miscalculated. The object for which he had overruled the plans of the campaign proved quite illusory. And thus, in this momentous matter, his policy was a failure.

The only other instance of marked

we

personal action on the part of Lord Canning was the issuing of the Oude Proclamation. When demurring to the alteration of his own military plans, Sir Colin Campbell doubtless expressed his scepticism as to the speedy surrender of the Oude rebels upon which the Governor-General calculated; and it was to make sure of this hoped-for submission that his Lordship resolved to issue a proclamation. The overruling of the General's strategy, and the issuing of the proclamation, stand together as parts of one plan; and both parts of the plan miscarried. Oude must be attacked, resolved Lord Canning; and though the generals demur, I will a proclamation which will make all things go right. Hence the origin of the proclamation which excited so much discussion and animadversion, and to a brief and final consideration of which we are constrained by the tenor of Lord Canning's reply. Very willingly should have let the question sleep. But Lord Canning is blessed with so many friends in this country, who are resolved to make of him a stalking-horse of party, that his unhappy proclamation has again been exhumed amidst a flourish of Whig trumpets. The Whig chiefs in Parliament were too thoroughly beaten in summer to have any thought of resuming the fight themselves; but it seemed to them a good way of covering their defeat to set their organs in the press a-sounding on the subject. And Lord Canning helped them to do so. It is a curious fact that his Lordship's "private" communications to his friends appear to be as frequent and full as his despatches to the Government are scanty and rare. In spring he had fully apprised his friends "privately" of his intention to issue a proclamation in Oude, and of its tenor, before the Government knew anything of the matter. And it was these private letters which enabled his Whig friends to arrange beforehand an attack upon the Ministry on the subject of this proclamation, and to boast that the Government would be out "in three weeks," while as yet nothing was publicly known of any proclamation at all.

VOL. LXXXIV.—NO. DXVII.

Something of the same kind, on a small scale, has happened again. When sending home his elaborate Reply, Lord Canning duly apprised his friends of his having done so, and of the contents of the document,doubtless informing them that he had not only exculpated himself and them, but that he had "walked into" Lord Ellenborough, and likewise shown that the whole Ministry were partakers in the crime of the noble Earl! The Palmerstonians thereupon instructed their organs in the press to clamour for the production of this precious document. A request which was very quickly answered by Lord Stanley's forwarding copies of the lengthy letter to each of the metropolitan journals. With his usual manly straightforwardness, Lord Stanley would have acted thus in any circumstances; but both he and his colleagues must have felt that in this instance their generosity was put to little proof. Whoever might be damaged by the publication of the despatch, they knew it would not injure them.

For what is the true inference to be drawn from Lord Canning's reply but this-That, according to his own showing, no proclamation should have been issued at all! A strange conclusion, certainly, but the only one that can be deduced from his Lordship's elaborate exposition of the case. Indeed, the whole document reads more like the production of an elegant scholar than of a masterly mind versed in the practical work of statesmanship. And there can hardly be a greater contrast than exists between the clearness of his style, and the temperate calmness of tone, marking the scholar and the gentleman,-and, on the other hand, his manifest incapacity to understand the broad nature of the opposition which his proclamation encountered, his confusion of ideas as to his own policy, and the self-contradictory and wholly untenable character of the elaborate justification with which he seeks to defend it.

We may pass over the exordium of the reply, in which his Lordship makes excuses for not resigning his high office; for not only had the

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Ministry assured him of their continued confidence and support, but the best justification of his continuance in office is to be found in the body of the reply itself,—the gist of which most unmistakably is, that he approved of Lord Ellenborough's policy, and meant to act upon it. Holding the views he does, the only consistent defence which he can put in is not that he dissents from Lord Ellenborough's maxims of policy, but that he thought that proclamations to Hindoos, like dreams to an Irishman, should always "go by contraries," and be understood in the opposite sense to that which they naturally bear! In this exordium, however, we regret to say, there are one or two manifestations of pet and party-misrepresentation, which we did not expect from his Lordship's antecedents, and which it is to be hoped by this time he himself regrets. Such, for instance, is the following, in which he seeks to show the whole Ministry responsible for the publication of Lord Ellenborough's despatch: "Before the despatch was published in England, it had been announced to Parliament by a Minister of the Crown as conveying disapproval in every sense of the policy indicated by the GovernorGeneral's proclamation." Here, for a most paltry purpose-one which could do his Lordship no good, but very obliging to his Whig friendsthe truth is kept in the letter, but is broken in the sense; for the fact is, that before Mr Disraeli announced the purport of the despatch, the pledge had already been given by Lord Ellenborough's under-secretary to lay it in full on the table of the House. Mr Disraeli, and the whole Ministry, adopted the principle of Lord Ellenborough's proclamation, but they dissented from his act of consenting to publish it. Lord Canning's object, therefore, in the sentence above quoted, is one of misrepresentation, very unworthy of himself. Another instance of mingled pet and wilful misconstruction appears in another place, where he says: It does not belong to me to say what line of conduct the British Government ought to follow, if it be

now determined that the course in taking possession of Oude was not lawful or justifiable." Lord Ellenborough never said that the annexation of Oude was not lawful or justifiable, but that there was a flaw in the proceedings of sufficient importance to make us chary of putting in force the utmost rigour of the law against Oudian malcontents to our rule. Still less did he ask Lord Canning for the advice which his Lordship so preposterously makes a show of withholding. We may also observe, before leaving this lengthy exordium, in which Lord Canning sets himself to carp at his censurers before entering upon his own defence, that, however undeclared the result at the time he wrote, his viceregal vaticinations of dire evil from Lord Ellenborough's despatch have been proved groundless; whereas, the bad effects of his own proclamation-and we may add, also, of his incompetent interference with the plans of the war, with which the issuing of the proclamation is intimately connected-are bearing their evil fruits to the present hour.

Coming to the body of the despatch, we find that it contains little that is new, but much that is important, as confirming statements and opinions which were questioned or wholly denied by the Opposition last summer. While writing his own defence, Lord Canning is compelled to justify Lord Ellenborough. On all the premises of the case, Lord Canning admits that the noble President of the Board of Control judged correctly. He admits that the facts in regard to Oude are entirely as Lord Ellenborough and Sir James Outram represented them. The case of the people of Oude, he allows, was altogether exceptional, and that they ought not to be regarded as rebels, but rather as ordinary enemies in war. Their allegiance was but of a single year; and the British rule, though proclaimed, had scarcely been acted upon in many of the districts. Moreover, he admits, the talookdars and other landowners had serious grievances, as many of them had been harshly and unjustly deprived or