with Enfields from the magazine stores of the 52d before leaving Sealkote, which they now used with much precision. The 9th Cavalry on the left, by a flank manoeuvre, charged down and came into Bourchier's battery on the rear, and the Sowars were actually among the guns; but what with rifles and revolvers their reception was too hot, and many a horse bolted off riderless. At the same time, the 46th Native Infantry came up at the charge in front, and were within twenty or thirty yards of the guns, when the 52d men could no longer restrain themselves, and sprang forward with a cheer. The foremost Pandies were bayoneted, and the rest soon retreated. The cavalry, too, finding themselves baffled, retired, leaving, however, a good many dead and wounded. The fate of the day was now settled. The Punjab Infantry advanced and drove the mutiners back into the stream: many were drowned. About 300 were left dead on the bank, while only a few troopers of the 9th escaped on the flanks. Of the plunder which the rebels carried off from Sealkote nearly all had been brought across the river; it was, of course, abandoned by them in their flight, and fell into our hands, affording a glorious harvest for the Sikh and Punjabee Irregulars, who helped themselves unsparingly. Thus closed the first scene of the Trimmoo Ghat drama, with at least one important result gained, that the rebels, if not destroyed, had been driven back from the left bank of the Ravee. The result had been far more complete with even a single squadron of trusty cavalry to follow up the suc

cess.

The rebels, however, found a difficulty they had little anticipated, and one which, combined with Nicholson's prompt movement, rendered their escape impossible, and their final annihilation complete. The ghat or ferry at Trimmoo is formed by the contraction of the river into a narrow though deep channel by a bank or strip of land, rising up and running along in the river-bed. When the river is low, the channel on the right side of this bank of land is always fordable, and sometimes nearly dry;

but as the water rises (and it was now rising rapidly from the melted snow), it floods it to such a depth as to be impassable. Thus it happened that the water which the rebels were able to wade through with some difficulty on the 11th, was utterly unfordable a few hours after; so that the bank of land on which they had taken up their position had become an island!

Here they were allowed to remain undisturbed till the morning of the 16th, while boats were being procured and other measures taken; a small body of Sikhs, under Lieut. Boswell, being left to watch them, or as a native would say, "sit on their heads." They were not, however, inactive the while; a breastwork was run up close to the water's edge, behind which the old gun was placed, and, as if preparing for a desperate struggle, they attempted to strengthen the walls of a little village, called Meeadea, on the northern point of the island. In this trap, formed as it were for them by nature, Nicholson resolved to catch them. On the morning of the 16th, Dawes's troop was brought down to the bank close to the Deenanuggur road, and Bourchier's battery a little lower down the stream, with orders to pour in shot and shrapnell on the solitary gun of the rebels; which, however, being of heavier metal than any of ours, and being admirably worked by a man who had been originally a bugler and then a gunner in the artillery, (and latterly a table-servant in Brigadier Brind's service!) kept up a regular fire against ours, though getting ten to one. So true was their fire, that one round-shot knocked over four horses attached to one of Bourchier's guns. In the meanwhile the 52d had moved some short distance farther down, out of sight of the rebels, and were busy crossing over in boats to the lower point of the island. Here they formed. Nicholson, taking a few Sowars with him, rode on to reconnoitre the position of the rebels; he then moved on the Column for some distance unobserved. The mutineers showed that the military training had not been thrown away on them; they had pickets out, and

their tactics were admirable. As soon as the 52d skirmishers were seen advancing, the pickets fell back slowly and in order; the gun was swung round, and brought to bear on them, and three or four rounds of grape were poured in, by which some of the 52d were wounded. Our skirmishers advanced in admirable order, and when near enough, went in "at the double," seized the gun, and bayoneted down the few who stood. "It was now helter-skelter," says an eyewitness: "the rest ran to the head of the island, were followed up by our fellows, and took to the water; many of them must have been drowned; numbers were like mud-larks on sandbanks and small islands; and how poor Pandy is to get out of it I know not. There is deep water on the other side, and the villagers are up; there are only two or three places on this side where they can cross; these are all watched, and the Zemindars are all alive.' The few who did get over were soon seized, given up, and either hung or blown away from guns. Of those who escaped upwards in the direction of Jummoo, and attempted to skirt round the lower ranges of the hills, great numbers were caught by the villagers and police, or by the Maharajah's troops, and were brought to Sealkote, where they were summarily dealt with as they deserved. The loss on our side was very slight: three officers were slightly wounded, Captain Fitzgerald, Lieut. Baillie of the 35th Light Infantry, and Lieut. Harrington of the Artillery; the latter, though with a ball in his instep, would not leave his guns, and remained sitting on a gun-carriage giving his orders to the last.

Thus ended a short week of inglorious mutiny!

Another change in this kaleidoscopic narrative! The scene of necessity shifts once more, and the reader, if not already wearied out with the carnage and heat of the plains, must

pass from the outbreaks of Jhelum and Sealkote, and the retribution at Trimmoo Ghat, to the peaceful regions of Kangra, where the mountain breezes bear on their wings no echoes of the cannon's roar, and sweep over hills and valleys unstained with Christian blood."

The fort of Kangra has for many centuries been a point of the greatest importance, not only from its position,-though it is by no means contemptible as a fortification,† crowning one of the most precipitous heights on the lower range of the Himalayas,-but even more from its political prestige. "He who holds Kangra, holds the hills," is a local tradition, which has survived the change of dynasties, and received its confirmation in each; Rajpoot, Mohammedan, Sikh, and English, alike attested its truth. The Mohammedan, when he wrested it from the Rajpoot, and lorded it over Northern India, though giving to these hillchiefs a semi-independent power, ever held Kangra in his own hands. Runjeet Singh inaugurated his aggressive policy over his mountain neighbours by first seizing this fort (in 1809 ); and the English, when in 1846 they annexed the Jullundhur Doab with the hill-ranges beyond, found the capture of Kangra carried with it the undisputed possession of the neighbouring district; for though the old Sikh Khilladar who held it had resolved on not yielding his fortress, the sight of English guns dragged by elephants over roads and up declivities hitherto deemed impassable for artillery, soon disheartened him out of his contemplated resistance, and he opened his gates to the gallant Wheeler; and with the Kangra fort followed, as a matter of course, the almost unresisted occupation of the whole range.

At the present crisis the safety of this fort was clearly of paramount importance, as the pivot on which the loyalty of all the Rajpoot clans

would turn. Not only would it have formed a most troublesome rallyingpoint for the mutineers of the surrounding stations; but, like Umritsur to the Sikhs, its loss would have raised every Rajpoot state against us.*

The manner in which the safety of Kangra was secured forms a pleasing episode in the tale of treachery and

carnage.

The fort was happily at this time held by a wing of the 4th Native Infantry, under Major Pattenson. Major Lake, the Commissioner of the Trans-Sutlej States, was marching in the neighbourhood when the tidings of the Meerut and Delhi disasters reached him, on the 15th of May. He at once wrote to Captain Younghusband, commanding the 2d Battalion of Punjab Police (better known by their sobriquet of "Shere Dils"+), to arrange for throwing a small body of them into the fort; and then rode over there with Major Reynell Taylor, the Deputy Commissioner, apparently to make a casual call on some of the officers, but really, as after events showed, with a much deeper object, the secret of which was disclosed only to Major Pattenson. By daylight on the following morning, the stillness of the Kangra fort was suddenly broken by the joyous notes of "The British Grenadiers," played by the band of the "Shere Dils," who, with their commandant at their head, were marching in at the gate! The citadel was the only place where spare quarters could be had, and it was the place of all others for them, commanding as it did the Sepoy lines in the fort and the city of Kangra outside, as well as the Hosheyarpore road; and here they bestowed themselves, and at once took charge of the magazine guards, the other guards being divided between them and the 4th Native Infantry. A few days after (on the 18th) a brass 24

*

pounder howitzer, which chanced to be in the magazine, and a good supply of ammunition, were brought up into the citadel, to be ready in case or need.‡

The men of the 4th Native Infantry had been taken wholly by surprise; and though there had appeared no reason to suspect them of being mutinously disposed, the measure was most wise as a precautionary one. They declared that their "hearts were small," especially at having the magazine_guards taken away from them. Their conduct, however, was throughout most orderly, and apparently loyal. Half a company of native artillery were also in the fort; but they were got out of the way a few days after, by orders coming from Lahore to send them to Phillour, on the plea that they would be required to accompany the siege-train.§ The Sepoys themselves requested that all Sepoys from other corps, who might come to visit the neighbouring shrine of Jowala Mukhi, should be kept out of the fort; and when occasionally a Sepoy did come (as several did, some from the 9th Light Cavalry at Sealkote, the 36th Native Infantry, and 61st Native Infantry at Jullundhur, and other corps), their motives were suspected as being more seditious than devout, and they were made over to a small guard of "Shere Dils," who marched them to the temple, waited there till they had concluded their pooja (worshipping), and then marched them out again, and unceremoniously sent them off.

Thus the fort of Kangra had been secured within four-and-twenty hours of the first tidings of danger. Nor was the rest of the district neglected. At the town of Dhurmsala, a place of considerable sanctity, due precautions were taken by Major Taylor; the Kotwallee (or native police station) was enclosed with gates and

+ Lion-hearts.

the walls loopholed, and made defensible in the event of attack. Every ford and ferry on the Sutlej, Beeas, and Ravee (all three of which rivers run through this district), was guarded by police and local levies; the boats were all drawn up and dry, and planks taken out of their bottoms, so as to render them utterly useless. The hill-passes were all watched; every passenger was examined; and if any disreputable or doubtful character made his appearance, he was carried off to the magistrate, and either imprisoned or turned out of the district. Proclamations also were issued warning the inhabitants that vagrancy would not be tolerated, that their pilgrim zeal must for a time be held in abeyance; every mosque, temple, and shrine, with which the district abounds, had its guard, in order to seize any suspected visitors. The post-offices, too, were duly cared for. Every native letter was opened, and if found at all seditious, or even suspicious in tone, it never reached its destination. By these admirable arrangements, so promptly and vigorously enforced by Major Lake and Major Taylor, the atmosphere of Kangra was kept clear.*

For nearly two months all remained quiet. The Sepoys of the 4th Native Infantry were perfectly orderly and respectful, and the district, after the first excitement had subsided, relapsed into its general peaceful state. On the 11th of July, however, the message from Mr Montgomery reached Major Taylor, reporting the rise of the Sealkote mutineers. The time now was clearly come to disarm the 4th Native Infantry, though not a shadow of suspicion rested on them: still the fear was, that neither their loyalty nor the fort would be proof against a large body of armed rebels pouring

down upon them; and it has been shown, on the safety of the fort depended the peace of the district. Major Taylor at once communicated his orders to Captain Younghusband, and by five o'clock that evening, the wing of the 4th Native Infantry and the Shere Dils were turned out at short notice on the parade-ground of the former. Major Taylor then addressed the Sepoys, and said the order had come to disarm them, not that there was a shadow of any imputation on their character, but a fear that they might not be able to escape the contagion of other mutinous corps coming down on them. Their reply was, that "their arms were the property of Government, and they were quite ready to give them up at the request of their officers, and only regretted that any show of force had been made." + The bells of arms were then opened, the muskets and ammunition taken out, and carried into the citadel, and all was safe. There still remained the right wing of the 4th Native Infantry at Noorpoor, thirty-four miles off, where also there was a fort, though much smaller and less important than that at Kangra. Having peaceably effected his purpose at Kangra, Major Taylor rode over that night to Noorpoor, taking a hundred of the Shere Dils, and sending on word to Major Wilkie, who commanded, of the object he had in view, and his intention of being there on the following morning. Here the news of the Jhelum and Sealkote outbreaks had already arrived, and the little station was actually in a state of siege. All the ladies and families had collected in the fort; the guards had been strengthened, and extra ammunition served out, that, in the event of the Sealkote mutineers coming down, a steady resistance might be offered. So unwavering

was the confidence of Major Wilkie in his men, that on receiving Major Taylor's intimation of his approach, and its object, he wrote back to beg that the Shere Dils might not be marched into the station, and at once went himself into the lines, and told the men they were required to give up their arms. To their honour be it recorded, they brought their arms without hesitation to the bungalow of Major Wilkie, above a mile from the fort, having to pass through the city on their way. Their one feeling seemed to be that of pride at being so trusted, and a determination to requite that confidence as it deserved. It should also be mentioned that when a report of the mutiny of the 2d Irregulars at Goordaspore reached Noorpoor, Major Wilkie armed one hundred men -fifty of them Punjabees, and fifty of them Poorbeahs-and sent them to oppose their advance. The report proved false; the men returned, and of their own accord delivered up their arms again.

While on the subject of Kangra and its fort, that head and fountain of honour to the Rajpoot clans around, it may not be amiss to introduce a short allusion to a danger which had, some weeks before, been threatening to involve some of these clans in a general outbreak. The Poorbeah Sepoy had been generally regarded as the chief object of suspicion; the Jat agricultural population of the Punjab, in their peaceful indifference or antipathy to the Poorbeah, and the Sikh soldier, in his hatred and contempt for his Hindostanee brother in arms, were regarded as our chief guarantee for the peace of the country, when denuded, as was now daily the case, by the withdrawal of available troops to swell the little gallant force before Delhi. The Rajpoot races along the lower Himalayan range, however much they might resent the loss of independence and power under the British rule, had not been regarded with much anxiety. Many causes had combined to engender a more peaceful character among them, and

the Kshutree element was gradually disappearing in the isolated nature of their position. Comparatively few in number, and split up into petty states, their mutual jealousies rendered any combined action very improbable, and seditious conspiracy next to impossible. Moreover, Gholab Singh, the Maharajah of Cashmere, the recognised head of all Rajpoots north of the Ravee, had taken his stand on the side of order, and sent money and men on the application of Sir John Lawrence. With the Jumowal Dogras thus pledged, and their own chief, the Kutoch Rajah of Kangra, believed to be friendly, there seemed little cause to anticipate any seditious movement from this quarter; nor, perhaps, was the conspiracy to which we are about to allude so much an endeavour to exterminate the English, as a desire to recover their own power and position in the general scramble which would follow their extermination, which they were led to believe was at hand. The watchfulness and activity of Major Hay, a retired officer in civil employ at Kooloo, by a timely discovery of the plot, averted the danger; to him it was entirely due that the conspiracy was detected, the chief conspirators caught, convicted, and punished.

The circumstances are briefly as follows: The district of Kooloo is a very Boeotia in a Himalayan Thessaly. Over its bucolic denizens a high Rajpoot family has ruled in unbroken line for several centuries.* About five-and-thirty years ago, however, the succession was disputed, and a rival claim asserted, which not only involved the State itself in civil war, but led indirectly to the conspiracy we have now to record.

At that time one Bikhram Singh was Rajah of Kooloo, and on his death bequeathed his throne to his son Jeet Singh. A brother of Bikhram Singh's, by name Kishen Singh, being a man of ambitious and turbulent spirit, instigated too by one Ghyru Bunghalia, a Rajpoot, who was his confidential friend, laid claim to the Guddee (throne), on the ground