1814] THE CONGRESS AT VIENNA 1337 the possession of the whole of Poland, a reward which the overweening value he set on his own services to the coalition induced him to regard as by no means more than his due. Both Prussia and Austria would have been called upon to restore certain portions of Poland which had fallen to their lot in the different partition treaties, but he supposed that his own resignation of certain portions would counterbalance these sacrifices, while Austria would be well rewarded by the possession of Lombardy and Venice, and Prussia by the whole of Saxony. The adhesion of the Saxon king to Napoleon was thought to justify the sovereigns of the coalition in confiscating his country, which, with the approbation of Russia, was claimed in its entirety by the Prussian Government. It is plain that the claims of Russia and Prussia could not but be in the last degree objectionable to Austria. Absolutist in its tendencies, it cared nothing for the freedom of Poland, while the possession of territory conterminous with the hereditary states of Austria would render Russia a most dangerous rival. At the same time, Prussia, the constant object of Austrian jealousy, if Saxony passed into its hands, would at once lose that broken and dislocated shape which had hitherto been its weakness, and would acquire a position in Germany which Austria could scarcely hope to equal. The policy of Austria was therefore clearly marked. The position of England was not so obvious. It is possible to say now, guided by the light of subsequent events, and led The policy of by the spirit of freedom and nationality which has made England at such vast strides of late years, that the Government of England, the home of free institutions and avowedly the champion of national liberty, should have come forward even then in that capacity, should have rejoiced at the reconstitution of Poland, and have sought the unification of Germany by supporting the power of Prussia, and should have objected to the establishment of Austria in Italy, a country where her rule was certain to be disliked by the population. But the English Government at the time was a Tory Government, bent rather upon restraining than increasing popular tendencies, and under the dominion of three overmastering influences -the desire to secure England from any possibility of a renewal of the Continental System, an extreme jealousy of the pretensions and power of the Russian Emperor, and the wish to establish for some years at all events the peace of Europe. Its policy was therefore inconsistent and shortsighted, but sensible and practical; the fear of the advance of Russia made the English ministry blind to its duties towards Poland; the satisfaction and friendship of France the Congress. were more important than the rights of Genoa; the immediate balance of the powers of Germany was more important than the national aspirations either of Italy or of Germany. The policy of France. It so happened that the views of France were at this instant similar to those of England. Before the formal opening of the Congress an attempt had been made by the four great powers to get the management of it entirely into their own hands. France would thus have been excluded from the settlement of Europe; but Talleyrand was not a man to bear quietly such an exclusion; he appeared as the champion of the smaller states, and succeeded in thwarting the efforts of the great powers. This, with other less important causes, had embroiled him with the Emperor of Russia, whose objects he was thus bent on thwarting. The King of Saxony was a friend and relative of Louis XVIII.; to save him and his country from destruction was a part of the French programme. It therefore suited Talleyrand to adopt the views of Castlereagh. Division of the Congress. Thus Austria, France, and England, in conjunction with the smaller German powers, who looked with great dislike to the annihilation of one of the chief among them, were thrown upon one side, in opposition to Russia and Prussia. The arrogant and high-handed manner in which those two powers proceeded to take temporary possession of the countries which they claimed still further excited the anger of their opponents. So severe did the dispute grow, so indissoluble did the knot appear, that war between the powers themselves seemed threatening. The Treaty of Ghent and the conclusion of the English war with America allowed Castlereagh to act with more vigour, and in January a secret treaty was entered into between France, Austria, and England, by which each country agreed to supply troops to compel, if necessary, the adoption of their combined policy. Although this treaty was kept a secret, the firm attitude and the combination of the three powers were so evident Compromise that, as neither party really wished for war, a compromise was discovered. About half of Saxony, with a third of its population, was taken from the King and given to Prussia, while the Czar, withdrawing from his extreme demand with regard to Poland, allowed the Duchy of Posen to remain in the hands of the Prussians, and a considerable portion of Gallicia, together with the district of Tarnopol, to be retained by Austria, while Krakow was to become a free and neutral republic. Poland was thus in part reconstituted, but entirely in the hands of Russia. These great questions being settled, the arrangements upon the agreed to. 1815] ESCAPE OF NAPOLEON 1339 minor points proceeded with some rapidity; the left bank of the Rhine was given to Bavaria; Genoa passed into the hands of Sardinia; the two houses of Hesse were re-established; Luxemburg was given to the Low Countries; Mayence became a Federal fortress; the Tyrol was restored to Austria; Switzerland was reorganized chiefly in accordance with the arrangements France had made there; the conduct of Murat, who began to show a tendency towards Napoleonism, facilitated the restoration of the Bourbons in Naples; Parma was given to Maria Louisa for her life; and the Congress completed its work by two great declarations of principle, one securing the freedom of the navigation of rivers, the other expressing, what was very dear to Englishmen at the time, a universal disapprobation of the slave trade. Escape of Before the conclusion of these questions Castlereagh had been compelled by the meeting of Parliament to return to England, and the Duke of Wellington had taken his place at Vienna. His work there was not completed when the news arrived that Napoleon had broken loose from Elba, and the Duke was wanted to take command of the allied army in Belgium. The renewal of the common danger produced a temporary harmony among the negotiators at Vienna. The chief questions were rapidly settled, and a joint proclamation, issued by the eight powers which had signed the Peace of Paris, declared Napoleon the public enemy of Europe. The Congress continued its sittings, but military preparations for the time absorbed all attention. Elba. preparations against It was agreed to act in accordance with the Treaty of Chaumont, each of the four great powers supplying its quota of troops, or in the case of England an equivalent in money. While Mutary the Prussians and the English with their allies were to advance into France and the Netherlands, the other Napoleon. powers were to pass the Rhine and join in a great advance upon Paris. It was hoped that by the end of April 500,000 men would be ready for the great movement. The French Court had taken refuge in the Netherlands, and as the people of that country were already half inclined to join the French, it seemed certain that that country would be the chief seat of operations; the war there was intrusted to the Anglo-allies under Wellington, and the Prussians under Prince Blücher. The hope of speedy action was quickly seen to be vain. Since the peace many countries had disbanded their troops, many of the best English regiments had been sent to America, and in spite of its long experience, the English Government showed its usual weakness in the war administration. Welling ton was convinced of the necessity of postponing the opening of the campaign till June or July. Napoleon enters This delay gave Napoleon an opportunity of striking the first blow, and although he could immediately dispose of not more than 125,000 men, and although the English and Prussian armies amounted to 220,000, the arrangement of the allied troops gave him much hope of a successful campaign. Bent upon covering Brussels, uncertain where the blow which he felt sure would soon be struck would fall and in order to facilitate the subsistence of his troops, Wellington had spread his army over a long line of frontier, from the neighbourhood of Charleroi to Antwerp and Ostend. In like manner the Prussiar corps were spread eastward from Charleroi to Liège. Trusting to the wide dissemination of the allied troops to render concer tration difficult, Napoleon thought to push between the Englis and Prussian armies, and to crush them one after the othe With all his old skill, he rapidly collected his army on the Sambre, issued on the 14th June a stirring general order, and on the 15th attacked the Prussians at Charleroi, passed the Sambre, anl drove them back along the Namur road to a position nea Sombreffe, which Blücher had already appointed as a point of corcentration should he be attacked from Charleroi. At the same time the left of the French army under Ney was sent directly northwar along the road to Brussels, to clear it of English and prevent the junction of the allies. Up to this point Napoleon's plans seemed thoroughly successful. He had already rendered any immediate junction of the armies difficult, if not impossible; with one part of his army he had already reached the chosen ground of the Prussians, and found it occupied by one only out of their four corps; with his left he had advanced to the position of Quatre Bras against the English, where as yet no considerable portion of the allies had arrived. But a strange slowness marks his course in this campaign. Instead of bringing up all his troops for an attack. in both directions, in the early morning of the 16th, he allowed his main body to pass the night on the Sambre, while there was an interval of twelve miles between Ney's position and that of his rear. Consequently all the morning was passed in bringing up these troops, and it was past noon before either at Quatre Bras or Ligny any formidable attacks were made on the enemy. During that time two ore Prussian corps had arrived at Ligny, and Wellington's troops Battle of |