year 1795 the treaty with Tuscany, Feb. 9; with Holland, May 15; with Prussia, April 5; and with Spain, July 14. La Vendée. The campaign of the following year, 1795, was confined to the Rhine, where Pichegru commanded the army of the Rhine and Moselle, Jourdan that of the Sambre and Meuse. Pichegru was meditating treachery, and lay idle opposite the Black Forest till the advance of Jourdan from the North to co-operate with him for the purpose of retaking Mayence forced him into action. He took Mannheim, and might have taken Heidelberg, but he wilfully resigned this advantage, and fell back in disorder upon the lines of Weissembourg, where he signed an armistice with the Austrians preparatory to joining them. His retreat had compelled that of Jourdan also. The English meanwhile had engaged in a lukewarm way in an Insurrection of expedition which, had it been carried out with vigour, might have changed the face of affairs. After the great destruction of the Vendéan army at Savenay, the war continued to smoulder both in La Vendée itself and in Brittany. But north of the Loire it assumed a somewhat different character; the open, simple and heroic devotion of the Vendéan peasantry, who had followed their priests, gentry, and leaders of their own rank to battle, was wanting, and the hostilities of Brittany assumed rather the form of brigandage than warfare. The country was infested with small bands, who kept up connection with one another by means of private signals, but who seldom appeared in large numbers, and worked chiefly by night-surprises and by rapid and secret cutting off of detached posts. The chief man of the Chouans, as the Breton insurgents were called, was Cormatin. But certain men of higher rank were also among them; the chief of these was Count Joseph de Puisaye, a man of considerable energy and ability, who had been a member of the National Assembly. De Puisaye saw that irregular warfare could produce but little effect, and desired to obtain assistance from England, where the Government was supposed to be ready to assist any endeavour against the French Republic; an impression kept alive by the rumours, probably much exaggerated, spread by agents who were constantly passing and repassing through the Channel Islands between France and England. In the autumn of 1794 De Puisaye betook himself to England and laid his plans before Pitt. It was suggested that 10,000 British Expedition from England troops should be joined with the corps of emigrants, and should land in Brittany and seize Rennes, and thence push forward at once over Normandy, Maine and Poitou. was thought advisable that a prince of the blood should either planned. 1795] EXPEDITION TO QUIBERON 1175 accompany the expedition or shortly appear upon the scene, and the Count of Artois was selected for the purpose. Lord Moira, favourably known in the American War as Lord Rawdon, was to take command of the English troops. But though speed and secresy were of the first necessity, the expedition hung fire, and news of it reached the ears of the French Government. The reason for this delay was partly jealousy and disunion among the emigrants themselves, partly Pitt's mistrust of the readiness of the French to join him, and his knowledge of the danger of relying on the assertions of sanguine exiles, and partly the discovery of the feeling existing among the royalists themselves in La Vendée and Brittany against the introduction of any large foreign army; for the belief seems to have been prevalent that Pitt's objects were selfish, and that an English army would be rather a danger than an assistance. It is at all events certain that the royalists in Paris, in their dislike that the reaction should be brought about by any means but their own, did their best to injure the expedition. The consequences of the delay were serious. In spite of considerable sums of money sent from England, and a good deal more much cheaper money, consisting of forged assignats, which were exported largely, in the spring of 1795 the skill of Hoche and Canclaux, the generals opposed to the insurgents, and the very favourable terms offered by the Convention, induced the chiefs both of the Vendéans and of the Chouans to accept an amnesty. The terms offered were certainly unusually tempting. A large indemnity of several millions of francs was to be given to the people to repay them for their losses; the houses that had been burnt were to be rebuilt; ten millions were to be given to the chiefs to take up the bonds that had been issued in their names during the insurrection; Charette was to be allowed to keep up 2000 men in the pay of the Government, freedom of religion was to be granted, and there were to be no requisitions in La Vendée for five years. The agreement was made as solemn as possible. The first to accept it was Charette, with whom the treaty was signed with great pomp in the city of Nantes in February. Subsequently, in April, Stofflet gave in his adhesion to the same arrangement, and finally the Chouans did the same. It seemed a proof of their sincerity that they gave up into the hands of the Commissioner of the Convention nearly a million of forged assignats, which they had received from the English fleet round the coast; but on the part of the insurgents it appears that this treaty was illusory, forced upon them by the delay of the English. It was used however as an additional ground for refusing large assistance, Destruction of the expedition to Quiberon. and it was an army of emigrants only, with a considerable quantity of stores and money, which in July of 1795 at length set sail from England. Even then the plan of De Puisaye was overruled for the worse. For the sake of a good roadstead for the English fleet, it was arranged that the landing should be upon the peninsula of Quiberon, close to Carnac, instead of in the north of Brittany; and again, apparently in mistrust of De Puisaye's partisan system of warfare, it was thought necessary to give him as second in command a royalist emigrant of the name of D'Hervilly, a red tape soldier, who had displayed considerable courage on the 10th of August, but who was a very bad man for the present irregular warfare. It even seemed doubtful whether his authority did not supersede De Puisaye's, and after Quiberon was reached, it was thought necessary to send an appeal to England to settle this weighty question. Meanwhile, after two days of delay, the troops were landed at Carnac. They were received with an enthusiasm so riotous and irregular, that the commander's love of discipline received a severe shock, and he ceased to trust his wild allies. However, in three days they were joined by some 10,000 men, and De Puisaye was eager to rush forward and raise the whole of the neighbouring country, but the answer from England had not yet been received, and the troops waited on in inactivity. At length something was done. A small fort called Fort Penthièvre covers the little isthmus which joins the peninsula of Quiberon to the shore. D'Hervilly proceeded to bring up all his artillery, but before his operations were completed, De Puisaye and a few hundred Chouans had gained possession of the place without difficulty. With his regular troops in the peninsula and holding the fort, and with his Chouans spread along the mainland, De Puisaye was compelled to remain inactive. All the jealousies which existed among the royalists burst out, and even worse than that, time was allowed for General Hoche to increase his 5000 troops, which might easily have been routed, to double that number. He suddenly attacked the invaders, and drove the whole mass, Chouans, emigrants, and all, to the narrow confined peninsula. Their efforts to break loose were unavailing; fresh emigrant troops under Sombreuil came from England. De Puisaye's authority was confirmed, but it was too late. Some republican troops taken in Fort Penthièvre had been admitted to the emigrant ranks. They entered into treacherous correspondence with Hoche's army, and by their assistance the fort was recaptured. The it from their peninsula was thus entirely closed to them, the 1795] POPULAR CONFIDENCE IN PITT 1177 enemy's cannon was placed along the corresponding shore, and swept the isthmus and the roadstead, while the republican troops, advancing from the fort, drove the invaders backward into the corner of the tongue of land. They were literally driven into the sea. The scene was a fearful one. Many in despair threw themselves upon their own swords, many tried to reach the boats of the fleet, and were a ready mark for the republican musketry. Some thought themselves fortunate in reaching fishing-boats which were hovering about the coast, but in zeal for their own preservation the boatmen lopped off their hands and suffered them to sink. Some 900, with De Puisaye at their head, reached the English squadron and were saved. About 700, under De Sombreuil, made, as they thought, terms with General Humbert, but the conditions were only verbal, and included, as the French asserted probably with truth, a reference to the Convention. The reactionaries in power were glad of the chance of freeing themselves of the charge of favouring the royalists. Orders were given that the law against emigrants taken in arms should be carried out to the letter. The prisoners were brought out in batches and shot upon the seashore till 700 of them had been killed. After this the fate of the insurgents was sealed. In the following year (1796) the Count of Artois again appeared upon the coast, and Charette and Stofflet were again in arms, but the Count of Artois was content to remain in idleness at L'Ile Dieu, and Hoche succeeded in the difficult work of at once conquering and conciliating all that remained of the insurrection. Charette and Stofflet were both captured and shot. Confidence of in Pitt. There can be but little doubt that when war was first declared the feeling of the English people was very strongly in favour of it. Accustomed for years to trust to Pitt, they the English continued their perfect confidence in him though his policy had changed, and, as we have seen, the opposition in the House of Commons was virtually destroyed. The confidence of the nation was chiefly exhibited in the readiness with which it met all the demands for increased taxation and for immense loans; in fact, Pitt was strongly supported by the commercial classes. With them the war was in itself popular, they were clearsighted enough to see how vast was the opening likely to be afforded them by the increase of English power upon the sea. In the year 1793 Pitt gained a fresh right to their gratitude by the assistance he afforded them during a brief mone- Increased by tary crisis which threatened to be very destructive. The year had been one of great financial difficulty. The crisis. his assistance in a financial sudden expansion of manufacturing industry which had followed upon the great inventions at the beginning of the reign, and the increase of commerce which followed the close of the American War, had rendered necessary a large amount of capital. The want had been met by a largely increased paper currency. Reckless banking had become prevalent, and provincial banks issued notes far beyond their capital. A very slight panic would be enough to cause the collapse of such a system. It was found that to meet the necessities of the exchange between England and the rest of the world bullion would have to leave England. Bullion was already scarce, and the Bank of England therefore thought it necessary to restrict its issues. This was enough to cause the failure of a few great houses; a panic ensued; there was a run upon the provincial banks; out of 350 more than 100 failed. Yet there was in reality quite enough property both in securities and in goods to enable merchants to meet all demands. It was only for the moment that there was a deficiency of money, that is, of the means of exchange. Pitt, with admirable clearness, recognized the real solvency of the country, and authorized the issue of bills on the Exchequer to the value of five millions. These were advanced to merchants, who could prove their solvency, against securities or goods. As these bills rested on the credit of the nation, they were readily received, the engagements of the merchants were satisfied by their means, and credit was restored. As it proved, not more than four millions was borrowed, and the whole sum was speedily repaid without loss to the nation. Effect of Pitt's new policy of repression. The effect of the complete trust placed in Pitt was to allow him to give full rein to his new policy. Now that policy was one entirely of repression, and the effect of it in the long run, indeed before the year was out, was to divide England much more sharply into the propertied and non-propertied classes, and to bring into existence a state of feeling highly undesirable, and which tended much to produce those very evils it was intended to prevent. While every movement in a liberal direction was certain to be checked, laws of the most stringent description were willingly passed, and at first the execution of existing laws, especially with regard to seditious writing, received great public support. In this class may be mentioned the Traitorous Correspondence Act. There has always been great March 15, 1793. dislike to tampering with or extending the law of treason, yet there were but fifty-three members of the House of Commons who could be found to lift their voices against this Bill, The Traitorous Bill. |