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of seducing the people. When desired to sacrifice, he replied, "that all the treasures of Trajan's empire would not induce him to forsake the only true and living God."

"What talkest thou of God?" cried the emperor; "thy God is dead on the cross. Our gods reign in Olympus."

Then Ignatius, much moved, replied:

"Your gods, oh, emperor! are vicious mortals, and as such have died. Jove is buried in Candia, Esculapius was shot with an arrow, Venus lies in Paphos, and Hercules burned himself alive. These, great Trajan, are your gods."

So Trajan ordered his mouth to be stopped, and Ignatius was condemned to be sent to Rome and torn to pieces by wild beasts, as befitted an obstinate unbeliever.

Nor were pagan associations wanting. I remembered that it was to Ostia Marius fled when overcome by the troops of his rival, Sylla. Stained with the blood of the noblest Romans, he fled alone, for all his followers had abandoned the now aged tyrant. A single friend, Numerius, awaited him in a small vessel, which after many mishaps and chances bore him to Carthage. Who does not remember the old school-room story of Marius receiving the message of the Roman governor forbidding him to set foot in Africa, and his reply, "Go tell thy master that thou hast seen the exiled Marius sitting on the ruins of Carthage?"

Ostia was to the emperors a suburban watering-place. They loved to sail up and down the Tiber in regal magnificence, the whole surrounding country decked out to do them honour. Old Claudius, the stupidest of hoodwinked husbands, built the port, and amused himself by loitering here while Messalina dragged the imperial purple in the filth of Rome. Hither her accusers came, and imparted to him the astounding fact that she had publicly married another man; to which he replied, like a fool as

he was, "Am I an emperor ?"

And in the old times, too, there were brave pageants at Ostia, such as when Paulus Æmilius, after his conquest of Macedon, and the capture of King Perseus, landed there with his royal prisoner. Then was the stout old Roman, who had driven all Greece before him, carried up the Tiber "in a royal galley of vast size, rowed by sixteen tiers of oars, decorated with Macedonian spoils, consisting not only of beautiful armour, but of tapestry and such kind of works, which had been the property of the king, while the banks of the river were covered with the multitudes that poured out to do him honour." So writes pleasant Livy. Such, too, as on that day-but I have done. I feel I am again off on my Pegasus on quite another tack, but surely one that will carry me as far as ever did the gods and goddesses of the Laurentine forest.

In good sooth I feel ashamed of my garrulity, and beg my reader's pardon, especially if chance has not led him to Italy, and he know not the delight of turning over the significant stories of the past, and pondering on their memories. We were a sad and sober party returning home, along the same road we had traversed with such glee.

There was

poor Sshivering with fever; K tired to death, fast asleep; Chumming a dreary tune; and I-I was-as I fear you will have thought me all the day-quite lost in the clouds of the past.



It is with very deep regret we find that our anticipations as to the conduct of Austria and Prussia, so frequently expressed in the pages of this Magazine, have been verified with a degree of systematic duplicity even surpassing the worst days of a Metternich. After every loophole for escape had been closed, Austria, much comforted by the example of Lord John, plucked up sufficient courage to throw the onus of the war upon us, and has plainly given us to understand that she will naught of it.

Who that has read the fable of the oyster and the lawyer but will find a parallel in the conduct of the Court of Hapsburg. They have swallowed the oyster-i. e. the Danubian Principalities-and we are sadly afraid that the Allies will find themselves compelled to employ very violent measures eventually, before they will disgorge their prey.

Prussia, on the other hand, has remained true to herself or to her king, and we can hardly regret that it is so. She has ever been a troublesome friend, and her alliance could only be purchased at the expense of much humiliation, which we Englishmen are not the people to endure, even if so many of our ministers would like John Bull to eat "humble pie." But we can leave time to effect the cure in this instance: Prussia is gradually sinking from her lofty position-she is becoming a by-word among nations, and the state which a Soldateska built up may yet be destined to perish by the sword.

But what becomes of the remainder of Germany? Our diplomatists appear to have ignored every German element save Austria and Prussia. And yet, at this moment, there are resources lying fallow which might be made of the greatest benefit to us, were we inclined to give the quid pro quo. In the May number of the New Monthly we showed the components of the German Army of Confederation, and in the present number we propose to draw attention to the forces which the lesser German regents could bring into the field, if they were once disposed to act energetically.

A certain Napoleon, called the Great, had the talent to form a Rhenish Confederation, which proved to him of the most material assistance in his campaigns. By cleverly playing on the jealousies and self-interest of a parcel of princes most different in religion and policy, he contrived to form them into one compact whole, and found among them many friends who adhered to him through good and evil repute. We need only refer to the King of Saxony among others, whom the Congress of Vienna punished so severely for daring to permit private friendship to outweigh the interests of Prussia and Austria. Why could not the same appliances be brought to bear now? In what do 1808 and 1855 so greatly differ, that we might not purchase (it's an ugly word, but the real one) the valuable assistance of troops now wasting their energies in acting Aug.-VOL. CIV. NO. CCCCXVI.

2 c

as policemen, and putting down beer commotions? Those mistaken notions which appear to have sprung up from a morbid feeling for peace at any price, have hitherto caused us to refrain from drawing other nations into the contest, forgetting the while that their vitality is imperilled more than our own. We certainly take the goods the gods provide us, and when a Quixotic monarch offers us his troops gratis, and we lend him a couple of millions in the same disinterested fashion, we feel as if we had done a good stroke of business. But such is not the in way which a war, more epecially with Russia, must be carried on. Necessity will compel us, ere long, to count up our friends, whether interested or disinterested, and the longer we delay, the greater will be the price we shall have to pay.

We are not singular in these views, as will be seen by an extract we purpose to make from a paper published at Stockholm, called the Svenska Tidningen:

"Now that the sun of spring is beginning to melt our snow, and burst the ice which enchains our seas, the Western Powers will assuredly renew their appeals to the Northern States to join their alliance. Will they succeed? Will the King of Sweden and Norway, who by the fundamental laws alone has the right to declare war, break the neutrality he has hitherto maintained? This is a question of immense importance for the future of our country, which our governments must face in the midst of difficulties, dangers, and caprice. The Western Powers have already attached Sardinia to their cause; she has sent 15,000 men to the eastern seat of war. The same Powers are striving to gain Portugal, which can only offer them a still smaller number of troops. If England and France are seeking such allies, what advantages would they derive from having Sweden and Norway on their side, able to throw very considerable forces on the side of the Baltic? Our assistance would be of especial service to England, when she possesses at this moment no army to send to the Baltic, nor can she form one; and in our flotilla she would find that species of maritime arm so necessary for crippling the Russians. France, too, would have 60,000 men at her disposition, whom, in the event of our non-assistance, she would be compelled to send to the north.

"Our situation is not that of Sardinia or Portugal, although there is some resemblance between the population and military forces. We are not, like them, at a great distance from the seat of war; we are not, like Sardinia, enclosed between two great protecting Powers, nor, like Portugal, situate at the extremity of Europe, under the ægis of an imposing flag. Our situation has more analogy with that of Austria. Like her, we are close to the great enemy, far from our great Allies; we should be the first, and probably the last, to bear the burden of the war. Austria, who can bring into the field 200,000 men, for whom the present war is a vital question, as her most precious commercial advantages, her religious and political independence are at stake,-Austria, who has on her right Turkey for an ally, and on her left. France, ready to send a formidable army to her aid through Germany,-Austria hesitates about drawing the sword, and is using her utmost exertions to terminate the contest by negotiations, and we, for whom the famous Four Points present scarce any interest-for whom the war has no settled object-are expected to hurl ourselves into it blindly!

"We say that the war has no definite object as far as we are concerned. But would not the weakening of Russia be of great effect on the future of Sweden? Doubtlessly, if this weakening is brought about. But the Great Powers are not yet agreed on this point. What resolutions have been formed? As long as the question remains as it is, we are on a sea of uncertainty. As long as the Great Powers have not agreed on a definitive settlement of the European balance, our union with them in the Russian war would only be a support given to a policy full of chances impossible to foresee, and of no advantage to us. We cannot afford to run so great a risk.

"No; before the three Great Powers at least have decided resolutely to deprive Russia of important territories, we do not believe that Sweden ought to give up that state of peace and security which she enjoys at present a status recognised by the whole of Europe, even by Russia, and blessed by the peoples of the united kingdoms. It is not yet known, and probably we shall not be informed for some time, how far the Allies have resolved to dismember Russia. Even if Austria were to give the Allies that armed co-operation for which they have waited so long, it would not then be certain that this dismemberment would be declared a necessary condition of peace. Might not other means be found which would equally satisfy the honour of all parties?—and where should we be in such a case?"

The arguments employed by the Swedes are good, and may be applied equally to Germany. Unless we can offer the smaller German princes a guarantee that they run no risk, it would be difficult to induce them to join us. But such guarantee could be afforded by a French army on the Rhine. The real truth is, Austria dare not engage in the contest. At the present moment she is compelled to send Radetzky very considerable reinforcements, for the whole of Italy is smouldering, and the fire may burst forth at any point. Hungary is quiet, it is true, but Poland will yet be a thorn in the side of her oppressors; and we believe that there is nothing to prevent our obtaining the assistance of the smaller German princes if we like to bid for it. The great bugbear of Russian influence is decidedly exaggerated. The princes may be on the side of the Czar, but the people is not: and the military in these states are very different from the Austrian Soldateska. Owing to the poverty of the governments, the troops are constantly on furlough, and hence a feeling of fraternisation with the people is largely kept up. 1848 taught us what dependence the smaller regents could place in their troops; and we feel confident that, were we to make a bid, the English government could secure the whole of Southern Germany to their side. It is not our business to point out the rewards that should be offered-we leave those to abler heads than our own-but we will content ourselves with showing where a very large accession of strength may be acquired, and if the proper measures are taken, a foreign legion may be easily obtained far superior to the specimens now to be seen at Heligoland and Shorncliffe.

The armies of the smaller German princes are collectively known under the title of the Army of Confederation; but it is highly probable that this plaything of peace would be dissolved immediately on the outbreak of a general war. Hence it will be desirable for us to regard the dif

ferent smaller states of Germany as independent of each other, and give details of the organisation of their armies without reference to the Bund. THE BAVARIAN ARMY, in its strength, takes the third place among the armies of Germany. It is now sufficiently large to form an independent corps in any war, and, consequently, possesses very considerable importance. The results of the year 1848 have proved highly beneficial to this army. It was not only considerably augmented in that year (each infantry regiment by a battalion, each cavalry regiment by a squadron, and the artillery by a horse regiment), but also greatly reformed. Discipline was more stringently regarded, and considerable attention paid to the education of the officers. The troops were exercised repeatedly and reviewed, and all the manoeuvres really of value in war, and not merely for parade, are now kept up sedulously. The unmistakable benefits of all these changes are already very perceptible, and the troops are in a great state of efficiency.

The STAFF is composed of

[blocks in formation]

INFANTRY.-The infantry, at the present time, is composed of

1. Sixteen regiments of the line, each

6 companies. The latter composed of

4 Officers

2 Under-officers

14 Non-commissioned officers

2 Musicians

2 Pioneers

3 battalions, each battalion

178 Rank and file, or 202 combatants

The battalion contains

1 Major

1 Adjutant

1 Battalion surgeon

1 Assistant-surgeon

1 Quartermaster

1 Ensign

1 Battalion drummer, and

5 Companies, or 1009 combatants

The whole 48 battalions of the line would, therefore, contain 48,432 men, of whom, during peace, two-thirds are on furlough. The armament consists of a percussion musket with bayonet, 24 men in each company carrying Thouvenin rifles, and, in addition, all the soldiers have short side-arms. The uniform consists of trousers and tunics of light-blue cloth with various collars and facings, a long grey, very good cloth cloak, and a small, low leather casque with a black woollen crest. The accoutrements are white.

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