marriage of the French emperor with an Austrian princess (1810) was a cause of difference between them. Shortly after this, Napoleon, finding that the continental system was laxly carried out in the north of Germany, without more ado, annexed the kingdom of Holland, the free cities of Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck, the duchy of Oldenburg, and other small states in that quarter, to the French territories; thus bringing the boundaries of France to the Baltic, where Russia claimed the right to dominate. Alexander immediately replied to this by issuing a ukase, which, while pretending merely to regulate the affairs of commerce, virtually renounced the continental system. This was to wound Napoleon in his most sensitive point, and an open rupture became inevitable. Both felt this, and the following year (1811) was spent in seeking alliances and in arming for the coming struggle.

When it became known that Napoleon had resolved on the invasion of Russia, his own friends were filled with consternation. Fouché, one of his prime adherents, in an able and eloquent address, reminded him that he was already the absolute master of the finest empire the world had ever seen, and that all the lessons of history went to demonstrate the impossibility of attaining universal monarchy. The French empire had arrived at that point when its ruler should rather think of securing and consolidating his present acquisitions, than of achieving farther conquests, since, whatever his empire might acquire in extent, it was sure to lose in solidity. Fouché stated the extent of the country which Napoleon was about to invade, and the distance which each fresh victory must remove him from his resources, annoyed as his communications were sure to be by hosts of Cossacks and Tartars. These and other admonitions were listened to with impatience. Napoleon, obstinate and imperative, despised counsel; and on this, as on many other occasions, carried his point, or silenced his advisers, by bombast_and_charlatanry. 'Don't disquiet yourself,' said he in reply to Fouché; 'but consider the Russian war as a wise measure, demanded by the true interests of France and the general security. Am I to blame because the great degree of power I have already attained forces me to assume the dictatorship of the world? My destiny is not yet accomplished—my present situation is but a sketch of a picture which I must finish. There must be one universal European code-one court of appeal. The same money, the same weights and measures, the same laws must have currency through Europe. I must make one nation out of all the European states, and Paris must be the capital of the world -it is I who assure you of it?

Advices from other counsellors were equally in vain. With the army he should be able to raise, nothing could be more easy than to bring Russia to terms. Alarmed for the consequences of plunging into so distant a war, his uncle, Cardinal Fesch, remonstrated with him on the undertaking. He conjured his kinsman to abstain from

tempting Providence; he entreated him not to defy heaven and earth -the wrath of man and the fury of the elements-at the same time; and expressed his apprehension that he must sink under the weight of the enmity which he daily incurred. The only answer which Bonaparte vouchsafed was in keeping with his character. He led the cardinal to a window, and opening the casement, and pointing upwards, asked him if he saw yonder star.' 'No, sire,' answered the astonished cardinal. But I see it,' answered Bonaparte; and turned from his relative, as if he had fully confuted his arguments.* Thus, refusing all counsel, Napoleon may be said to have rushed on his fate. At this period he was engaged in a war with Spain; yet such was his power, that he found little difficulty in raising fresh armies; and in 1812, just before the campaign of Russia, he is understood to have had altogether-in France, Spain, Italy, and elsewhere-eight hundred thousand men in arms, independently of allies. To raise so many soldiers in France, he made forcible draughts on the whole male population between eighteen and sixty years of age. Men were everywhere torn from their families to serve in the army; leaving mothers, wives, and children in distress and destitution, and causing a large part of the common business of the country to be conducted by women. To aggravate the exhaustion of the nation, there was at this time a dearth of food, which caused a widespread suffering through the country. Everything tended to prove the madness of the Russian expedition, yet nothing occasioned its interruption. Accustomed to submit, and to believe in the continued good-fortune of their emperor, deranged also on the subject of military 'glory,' the French generally entered into this new war with high hopes, or at least offered no obstacle to its commencement and progress.

Reckless as he was, Napoleon was by no means blind to the difficulties of his project. Before his armies could reach the interior of Russia, where battles were likely to be fought, they would require to march eighteen hundred miles, through different states, and across large tracts of country, possessing little or no food for men or horses. As he had gained, by open force or secret intimidation, the aid of Bavaria, Saxony, Prussia, and Austria, over which his forces would necessarily advance, he had nothing to fear from any attack by the way. His chief difficulty lay in procuring and transporting supplies of provisions for his army over such a wide and almost unknown territory. Another serious obstacle to his progress was the number of rivers. Between Paris and Moscow there are various large rivers issuing into the Baltic or Mediterranean seas, and therefore flowing at right angles with the proposed line of march of the French army. The Rhine, the Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula could be crossed by bridges; but the Niemen, the Beresina, the Dnieper, and some others,

* Scott's Life of Napoleon.

would require to be forded by men, horses, and wagons, and probably under the fire of an ever-vigilant and indignant enemy. Altogether, the enterprise was gigantic and hazardous. There had been nothing like it in modern history.

Napoleon's tactics as a general consisted in effecting sudden and overpowering movements; an enormous force being brought to bear on a centre of operations. On this principle he now acted. Gathering together that part of the army which France was to furnish, it was despatched in an easterly direction into Germany, where it was to unite with the levies drawn from Spain, Italy, Austria, Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria, Poland, and the other countries over which he exerted a control. From different directions, this immense force, under able generals, drew towards a central point on the Oder, whence all were to combine in a united attack on the Russian frontier.

COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN.

On the 9th of May 1812, Napoleon departed from Paris, to superintend the war in person. His march through France and part of Germany to Dresden was a continued triumph. Whole nations quitted their homes to throng his path; rich and poor, nobles and plebeians, friends and enemies, all hurried to have a passing view of the great man, almost looked upon by them as a supernatural being. Kings and princes forsook their capitals to do him homage. The adulation was universal. On the 29th he departed from Dresden, taking his route through Poland; and from this time he acted as a presiding genius over the various divisions of his army, which was now hurrying on to the Vistula.

The scarcity in France, and the length of the way, caused much reliance for provisions on the countries in this quarter. But great as was Napoleon's power, he failed in his calculations in this respect. Many of his arrangements for provisioning the army fell short of what was necessary; and the subsistence of his forcesman and beast-was made to depend in a great measure on plunder. If he did not sanction robbery as a principle, he winked at it as a practice. He felt that a compromise was necessary, in order to maintain his position. 'Ever since 1805,' observes Segur, 'there was a sort of mutual understanding-on his part, to wink at the plundering practices of his soldiers; on theirs, to suffer his ambition.' In one sense, therefore, Bonaparte, in all his pomp and pride, was but the chief of a band of robbers. Like all robberies, however, this toleration of rapine recoiled on its author. The injustice and inhumanity of indiscriminate theft, accompanied as it often was by the murder of the unhappy victims, was a shortsighted policy. Aware of the merciless disposition of the French army, every one fled at its approach, with all they could carry along

with them; and frequently what could not be transported to a place of security was destroyed. It was only by making a sudden onslaught, that the marauding soldiery had any chance of securing a prey.

Between the Oder and the Vistula, the army began operations, laying hold of everything useful that fell in their way: wagons, cattle, and provisions of all sorts were swept off; everything was taken-even to such of the inhabitants as were necessary to conduct these convoys. There was everywhere, however, a great want of forage. The crops of rye, yet green, were cut to feed the horses; and so insufficient was this resource, that often the thatch was stripped from the houses. Laying the country thus waste before them, the army reached the banks of the Niemen, on the verge of the Russian empire. Let us here take a glance at the composition of this mighty force.

The army consisted of several divisions which generally moved at one or two days' distance from each other, on different points. On the extreme right were 34,000 Austrians, commanded by Prince Schwarzenberg; on the left was Jerome Bonaparte, king of Westphalia, at the head of 75,200 Westphalians, Saxons, and Poles; by the side of these was Eugène de Beauharnais (viceroy of Italy, and stepson of Napoleon), with 75,000 Bavarians, Italians, and French; next, the emperor, with 220,000 men, commanded by Murat, king of Naples, and Marshals Davout, Oudinot, and Ney; and, finally, in front of Tilsit, was Marshal Macdonald, with 32,500 Prussians, Bavarians, and Poles. These, with some others not enumerated, amounted to 480,000 men actually present; besides which, many thousands were collected and kept in reserve. Of this large force, 400,000 were infantry, or soldiers on foot, and 80,000 cavalry. Along with this enormous force, there were thousands of wagons carrying provisions, thousands laden with gunpowder, shot, and shells, and thousands designed to accommodate the sick and wounded. The artillery consisted of 1372 pieces of cannon. drawing the wagons of various kinds and the cannon, about 100,000 horses were employed; and to supply food for these poor animals, thus brought into a service of danger and fatigue, independently of those used by the 80,000 cavalry, a most extensive system of foraging was required.

For

Here, then, were nearly half a million of men, accoutred with every appliance of war, and elated with hopes of victory, plunder, and triumph. The idea of defeat was never for an instant entertained. The army of Napoleon believed itself to be invincible. It is lamentable to think, that of the half-million thus brought together to do the work of one man, none as yet knew what was the real cause of the war. It was only understood generally that the attack was to be on Russia; but of the grounds of dispute with that nation none knew or cared. The emperor had no doubt his own reasons

for what he did. It is important, therefore, to observe, that the Russian campaign was a thing entirely of Napoleon's contrivance, with a view to his own selfish purposes. Satisfied with his preparations, and ready, as he believed, to stoop on his prey, he at length deigned to declare himself. On the 22d of June he issued. the following proclamation :

'Soldiers-The second Polish war has begun. The first terminated at Friedland and at Tilsit. At Tilsit, Russia vowed an eternal alliance with France, and war with England. She now breaks her vows, and refuses to give any explanation of her strange conduct, until the French eagles have repassed the Rhine, and left our allies at her mercy.

'Russia is hurried away by a fatality! Her destinies will be fulfilled. Does she think us degenerated? Are we no more the soldiers who fought at Austerlitz? She places us between dishonour and war. Our choice cannot be difficult. Let us, then, march forward. Let us cross the Niemen, and carry the war into her country. The second Polish war will be as glorious to the French arms as the first has been; but the peace we shall conclude will carry its own guarantee, and will terminate the fatal influence which Russia has, for fifty years past, exercised in Europe.'

This bombastic proclamation was quite satisfactory to a body of men who wanted no substantial reason for fighting. Every one pronounced it a miracle of eloquence, and proudly contemplated the 'glory' they were to achieve. Such glory! The glory of murdering, despoiling, and, if possible, enslaving a people who had done them no harm, and wanted only to be let alone.

By means of pontoons-a kind of floating platforms placed on the river-the Niemen was passed by the foremost divisions of the French army; and no sooner did the Emperor Alexander learn that this act of aggression had been committed, than he issued the following proclamation, breathing, it will be observed, a very different spirit from that of his boastful antagonist :

Vilno, June 25, 1812.—We had long observed, on the part of the emperor of the French, the most hostile proceedings towards Russia, but we had always hoped to avert them by conciliatory and pacific measures. At length, experiencing a continued renewal of direct and evident aggression, notwithstanding our earnest desire to maintain tranquillity, we were compelled to complete and assemble our armies. But even then we flattered ourselves that a reconciliation might be produced while we remained on the frontiers of our empire; and without violating our principle of peace, we prepared to act only in our own defence. All these conciliatory and pacific measures could not preserve the tranquillity which we desired. The emperor of the French, by suddenly attacking our army at Kovno, has been the first to declare war. As nothing, therefore, could inspire him with those friendly sentiments which possessed our