THOUGHTS ON THINKING.

(A Problem for the Materialist.)

THERE is a marked difference in the accounts given in the Sacred Record, of the creation of man, and of the inferior animals. It is simply said of fish and fowl, that the waters brought them forth, and that God made the other creatures from the earth; whilst of man it is recorded, that after his formation from the dust of the ground, " God breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul." Gen. ii. 7. The substance was organized before the Spirit was infused. Nor can it be

argued that this breath of divinity was lost at the fall; for Elihu, in referring to the subject at an after period, says distinctly, "There is a spirit in man, and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth him understanding." Job xxxii. 8.

But what is this spirit, and how is its existence to be detected, or its properties determined?

We have the express statement of Scripture, that man existed before the "breath of lives" was infused, and therefore, this breath cannot form any part of his organization, or depend on mechanical laws, as may possibly be the case with the animal soul of brutes-the spirit of the beast that, with the body, "goeth downward to the earth." Eccl. i. 21. The Scriptures, too, are clear in their assertions as to the threefold constitution of man; body, soul, and spirit (1 Thess. v. 23. Heb. iv. 12,) being in more than one instance spoken of as combined in our nature; so that we have no reason to doubt the existence of a principle in man, which is denied to the brute creation.

The existence of such a principle is proved, moreover, by internal evidence, which seems further to afford us the means of judging wherein it consists. The superiority of our own mind over the mere animus of the brute, constitutes its apparent imperfection, vitiates our instinct, and often leads us into actual error. For as the mind communicates through the mechanical medium of the senses with external things, it cannot come into entire and immediate contact with them. And even when, in this imperfect manner, it has received any impression, that impression is modified, controlled, over-ruled, or prejudiced by the principle of thought which has been supposed to form the essence of Mind. It is in this particular, that a broad line

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of distinction is drawn between man and the brute. The perceptions of the inferior animals are delivered to the inner sense photographically, and are there depicted with all the minute mechanical accuracy of the Daguerreotype. But in Man, they pass through, and are deeply tinged by, a thinking, reasoning, disturbing medium; so that they present themselves to the mind, not as they are received by the senses, but touched and tinted, and oftentimes disordered, by a certain mental process--a fact which very clearly proves the existence of something independent of, and above, mere mechanical action. And this is Mind.

There is, therefore, much reason in the definition which has been sometimes applied to man, as distinguishing him from the inferior animals; for although these creatures are found occasionally at fault, man is certainly entitled to be called par excellence-a Mistaking Animal. A few illustrations will place this definition in a clearer light.

Why is it that objects appear larger in a fog than if seen through a perfectly-transparent medium? Certainly not because either the eye or the atmosphere possesses a magnifying power under such circumstances; but entirely through the operation of the mental faculties peculiar to the human race. By means of our power of reasoning, we infer, that because an object is but dimly seen, it must be farther off than it really is; and having settled it in our minds that it is thus distant, we bring our knowledge of perspective into the account, and again infer what would be its dimensions if close at hand. It is, therefore, from an inference resting on another inference, that we form our estimate; and not from any mechanical properties either of the eye itself, or of the medium through which it receives the image. The effect results from an intellectual, and not an optical process, the Mind sees, and not the eye.

The instinct of the inferior animals affords many examples, which, on the first blush, may appear perfectly analagous, but which will not, on a stricter examination, prove to be so. Such an instance is recorded by Mr. Jesse, in his Gleanings in Natural History," i. 247.

"The passion of Lady Penrhyn," says he, "for pugs, was well known. Two of these, a mother and daughter, were in the eating room of Penrhyn Castle during the morning call of a lady

who partook of luncheon. On bonnets and shawls being ordered for the purpose of taking a walk in the garden, the oldest dog jumped on a chair, and looked, first at a cold fowl, and then at her daughter. The lady remarked to Lady Penrhyn, that they certainly had a design on the tray. The bell was therefore rung, and a servant ordered to take it away. The instant the tray disappeared, the elder pug who had previously played the agreeable with all her might, to the visitor, snarled and flew at her; and during the whole walk followed her, growling and snapping at her heels, whenever opportunity served."

Admitting the correctness of this statement, we must strongly protest against Mr. Jesse's conclusion, that "the dog certainly went through two or three links of inference, from the disappearance of the coveted spoil, to Lady Penrhyn's order; and from Lady Penrhyn's order to the remark made by her visitor." For, not to insist that the dog's conduct might have been the mere result of caprice, it does not appear that the creature went through any inferences at all, but simply through a course of observation. The dog had seen all that passed; she had noticed the visitor's manner towards Lady Penrhyn, accompanied, as most probably it was, by a significant glance at the animal, and a roguish expression of suspicion; had seen the bell rung, and the tray speedily disappear, and the poor creature was left without any other alternative than to vent its disappointment either upon the stranger, or its own indulgent mistress. Is it any proof of sound inductive reasoning-of rational inferencethat it should choose the former?

We have repeated evidences of the existence of the thinking principle in the operations of Memory. There can be nothing in the material organization of the eye calculated to retain impressions after the objects from which they were derived have disappeared. The pictures in a camera obscura vanish instantaneously on directing the instrument to another quarter; and such must, in reality, be the case with the human eye viewed simply as an optical apparatus. But the memory acting through this instrument, does not entirely lose one image before another is presented to it when the transition is abrupt or sudden. How often have we proof of this, when, after looking through a venetian blind into the brighter atmosphere out-of-doors, we

turn our eyes upon the wainscot, and transfer the figure of the blind to that part of the room. Upon this phenomenon, indeed, depends the great beauty of our pyrotechnic displays; a single jet of fire being made to revolve, assumes, in consequence of this retentive power, every variety of form and figure. On this principle, too, are constructed the ingenious toys called the thaumatrope, and the revolving card. In the last of these, the illusion is very curious. A number of figures in progressive stages of action are depicted on its disc, and as it revolves rapidly, each of these figures slides successively into the place of that which preceded it, conveying to the mind the idea of a continuous performance by one and the same figure; the deception is perfect, and, according to the subject, produces a serious or ludicrous effect. But it is more especially interesting when considered philosophically, and as an illustration of the presence of Mind; or at all events, of Memory, as one of its attributes; such an effect being absolutely inexplicable upon purely mechanical principles.

Another ingenious toy, the horizontorium, furnishes also an illustration of the same fact-the lines of vision diverging from the eye of a spectator, and touching the angles of an object placed diagonally before it on a horizontal plane, project its figure upon that plane in a strangely disguised and distorted form. Supposing then, the figure itself to be removed, and the outline projected upon this plane to be accurately mapped out, the slightest variation of our position would affect the transferred figures in such a manner, that we should be quite at a loss to know what object it was intended to represent. If, for instance, we looked at it in a sidelong or inverted position, it would present nothing but an amorphous and unintelligible outline, simply because it would fall upon the retina of the eye, unsophisticated by any mental process, the mind being unable to supply a type with which it might be compared. But by returning the eye to its original position, memory, imagination, experience, or some other faculty peculiar to the human family, would so gather up the several points of the outline into their respective places, that we should again fancy the real object to be actually before us. Does it not necessarily follow, therefore, that the sense of vision is something more than a mere act of

mechanism, and that the Mind plays a very important part in every application of this faculty?

Nor does this prejudice or predisposition-this over-ruling influence of the mind, act only through the eye. It is certain that some, if not all, the other senses are imposed upon. The ear, for instance, not unfrequently mistakes the low piping of gnats near at hand for the sound of far-off music; or the chimes from some church-tower softened and mellowed by distance. This effect is strikingly analagous to that of objects seen in a fog. Many persons have, probably noticed when seated in the cabin of a steamer, the monotonous and measured thumping of the paddle wheels, without any pleasurable associations. But directly the musicians on deck strike up a lively tune, this thumping of the paddles assumes a new character, seeming to keep time with the music, and conveying to the mind, the idea of a party dancing over-head. There is a rhyme, too well known, perhaps, to be repeated here

"As the bell tinks, so the fool thinks,

"As the fool thinks, so the bell tinks,"

-were it not that it involves a problem of high value in metaphysics. Why does the fool take his cue from the bells, but in virtue of that imaginative principle within, which, fool as he is, indicates the presence of a mind peculiar to his own species, and marks the boundary by which he is separated from the brutes which perish?

The taste in like manner is sometimes cheated, and revolts with a feeling approaching to disgust, from things which, in themselves, are pleasing to the palate, but which, tasted under the idea that they are something else, impart a shock which is long remembered.

It seems evident, therefore, that there must be some inward principle at work to modify and color these various impressionsa remembering, associating, reasoning agent, of which the lower animals are certainly devoid; and which we can designate by no other name than MIND.