The evidence, which I shall adduce for this purpose, will be derived,

1st. From the Scriptures; and,

2dly. From Reason.

The first argument, which I shall allege from the Scriptures, is the Moral Law: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, with all thy heart; and thy neighbour as thyself.

I have already observed, that Benevolence, or love to happiness, or to Intelligent beings as capable of happiness, is the object, and the only object, of the second of these commands. Should any doubt remain on this subject, it may easily be removed by the consideration, that our Saviour has taught us to consider our enemies, universally, as included under the word, neighbour. The enemies of a good man, knowing him to be such, are always wicked men; and, having no holiness, or evangelical virtue, cannot, in the physical sense, be loved with Complacency, or the love of virtue. The love of happiness, therefore, or Benevolence, is the principle, especially, if not only, enjoined in this law. Accordingly, our Saviour called the command, enjoining brotherly love, that is, the love of his disciples toward each other, or, in other words, Complacency, a New commandment.

As the moral law, then, enjoins, especially, the love of happiness; that is Benevolence; so it evidently enjoins this disposition in a proportion, corresponding with that, which has been insisted on in this discourse. We are required in it to love God with all the heart; and our neighbour as ourselves. In other words, we are required to exercise this love proportionally to the importance, or greatness, of the object loved: supremely towards that object, which is supremely great and important; and equally towards those objects, whose importance is equal.

With this view of the law perfectly accords our Saviour's practical comment on the second command: Whatever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so to them; for this is the Law and the Prophets. In this command, our own equitable wishes for good to be done to ourselves are made the measure of the good, which we are bound to do them.

2dly. As another proof, I allege Luke vi. 32, 33, 35, For if ye love them, that love you, what thank have ye? for sinners, also, love those, that love them. But love ye your enemies; and do good, and lend, hoping for nothing again: and your reward shall be great; and ye shall be the children of the Highest: for he is kind to the unthankful and to the evil.

In these declarations of our Saviour, it is manifest, First, that the love, which he enjoins, is Disinterested love: for it is productive of beneficence, without reference to a reward. Secondly; we learn from them, that even this is not sufficient to constitute the disinterestedness of the Gospel. It is still further required, that the benevolence shall operate towards enemies; overcoming all hostil

ity towards those, who hate us; requiring us, instead of being enemies, to become friends to our enemies; to render good for their evil; and blessing for their cursing. Unless we do this, we are elsewhere informed in the Gospel, we are not and cannot, be the children of our Father, who is in heaven. Thirdly; we are taught that the disposition, with which we do good to others, for the sake of gaining good at their hands; or the spirit, with which we do. good merely to those who do good to us; that is, Selfishness, in its fairest and most reputable form, neither merits, nor will receive, a reward; and is only the spirit of publicans and sinners.

3dly. I allege, as another proof, the declaration of the Apostle, 1 Cor. xiii. 5, Love seeketh not her own.

In this declaration, St. Paul has asserted the disinterestedness of Evangelical love, not only in the most explicit manner, but with the force, peculiar to himself. Literally, he declares, that love does not seek her own interest at all; but is so absorbed in her care for the common good, as to be wholly negligent of her personal concerns. This, however, I do not suppose to have been the meaning of the Apostle. But he plainly intends, that this spirit is wholly destitute of any selfish character. Less than this, it will, I think, be impossible to consider as meant by him in this passage.

With these three passages the whole volume of the Scriptures accords: and that these clearly determine the love, required in the Gospel, to be the love of happiness, proportioned to the importance of the object loved, and disinterested in its nature; the points, relative to this subject, which are chiefly disputed; cannot, I think, be denied without violence.

To this decisive voice of Revelation, Reason adds its own unqualified testimony: as I shall endeavour to show in the following observations.

1st. The Benevolence, which I have described, is the only equitable spirit towards God and our fellow-creatures.

That the interests of God are inestimably more valuable than our own, will not be questioned by any man. This being allowed; it can no more be questioned, that they deserve incomparably more regard, than our own. Nor can it any more be doubted, that the interests of our neigbour are, at a fair average, equally valuable with our own. The fact, that they are ours, certainly adds nothing to their value. For what, then, it may be asked, can they be more valuable, than those of our neighbour? God unquestionably regards them alike; and it will not be denied, that He regards them equitably, and in the very manner in which we ought to regard them.

A public or common good, therefore, is more valuable, and ought to be more highly regarded, than the good of an individual; for this plain reason, that it involves the good of many individuals. This has ever been the only doctrine of common sense. In free countries, particularly, where men have had the power, as well as

the right, to act according to their own judgment, a majority of votes has always constituted a law: obviously because a majority of interests ought ever to be preferred to those of a minority, and still more to those of an individual. On the same principle, laws, which consult the general good, are ever pronounced to be right; although they may operate against the good of individuals. On the same principle, only, are individuals required to devote their labour, their property, and at times their lives, for the promotion, or security, of the general welfare. Selfishness, on the contrary, which always prefers private good to public, would, if permitted to operate, produce an entire subversion of public good. All the views, affections, and operations, of selfishness, are unjust; the interests of an individual being invariably estimated more highly by this disposition, and loved more intensely, than their comparative value can ever warrant. It can never be a just estimation, which prefers the private good of one to the good of many, the interests of each of whom are just as valuable, as those of that one; or which prefers the interests of man to those of God. If this estimation is right; and the regard, which accompanies it; then God ought to give up his own kingdom, purposes, and pleasure, for the sake of the least of his Intelligent creatures: and the good of the universe ought to be sacrificed to the good of one.

2dly. It is reasonable to suppose that God would create, and that he has created, Intelligent creatures with this just disposition.

That there should no where exist, in the Intelligent kingdom, a disposition, regarding things according to their value, is a supposition too absurd in itself, and too dishonourable to the Creator, to be made by a sober man. Such a disposition, it is plain, must be more estimable, and lovely, to the eye of the Divine Mind, than any other, which is supposable. If, then, God made his works, with a design to take pleasure in them; or to be glorified by them, he could not fail to give existence to such a disposition; unless it was because he was unable. But this will not be pretended, Such a disposition, therefore, certainly exists.

3dly. If there be no such disposition, there can be no pure or last ing happiness.

For, in the first place, there is no original cause of happiness, but the action of minds. Minds are the only active beings in the universe. Matter, if eternal, must have been eternally quiescent. But minds never act, to the production of that, which they do not love. If, then, they did not love happiness, they could not act, to the production of it. Of course, If God had not been benevolent, that is, if he had not loved happiness; he never could have produced it; nor created those beings, who were to be made happy.

In the second place; without the same disposition, Intelligent creatures could never produce happiness for each other. Under the divine government, happiness, in an endless variety of forms, is produced by Intelligent creatures for each other. The degree,

in which their benevolent offices accomplish good for each other, is, to a finite eye, literally immense. But it is clearly evident, that if they were not benevolent, no part of this good would ever

exist.

Should it be said, that creatures, who are not benevolent, do in fact produce happiness for each other in the present world; as is unanswerably manifest in the proper influence of natural affection, and various other attributes of the human mind: I answer, first, that all this happiness, like all other, is ultimately derived from the benevolence of God; and would have had no existence, had he not possessed this disposition. Secondly, the happiness, thus produced, is far from being pure, or lasting. Thirdly, Natural Affection is not an original and necessary attribute of a rational being; but has its origin, and continuance, in circumstances, which may be termed accidental, and accordingly has no existence, where those circumstances are not found. Fourthly, Natural Affection is an attribute of a benevolent as well as of a selfish being; and is therefore no part of selfishness. Fifthly, the Scriptures teach us, that even this good is not derived from the proper tendency of our selfish nature, but from a particular restraining influence of God on its proper operations; which either prevents their existence, or lessens their malignant efficacy. That the world is so comfortable, as it actually is, is, I apprehend, the result of a mere act of mercy on the part of God, rather than of the genuine tendency of the human character. Finally, should all be allowed to this source, which is claimed for it, the happiness which it yields is so mixed, and so transient, as to form an exception to the doctrine, which I am defending, too unimportant to deserve any serious attention.

In the third place, there is no other disposition which is happy.

The happiness, inherent in a disposition, is the enjoyment either experienced in the exercises of the disposition itself; or springing from the consciousness of its excellence; or resulting from a knowledge of the desirable nature of its consequences. Some of the exercises of selfishness are pleasant in themselves, and some in a knowledge of their consequences. Thus pride is, in a degree, always pleasing to the proud man; pleasing, I mean, in its very nature. The same thing may be said also of the sensual appetites, whenever they are gratified. Some of them, also, are pleasant in the knowledge of their consequences; particularly those, which respect fame, power, and property. But the pleasure, furnished by all of them, is in itself poor, transient, and mixed with no small pain and mortification. The pleasure, furnished by our sensual appetites, is also, a part, not of a selfish, but of a merely animal, nature; and, so far as it is temperately enjoyed, belongs equally to a benevolent as to a selfish being. Selfishness can here claim nothing, as being peculiar to itself, except inordinate indulgence; and this is, regularly, a diminution of the enjoyment,

and ar. accumulation of pain and sorrow. In the mean time, none of the affections of Selfishness yield happiness from a consciousness of their nature and operations. They cannot be seen to be excellent, because they are all obviously evil, and odious. They cannot be seen to be honourable, because they are all base and contemptible. Of course, the mind cannot approve of these affections, nor of itself, while indulging them; but must condemn both them, and itself, for cherishing them, as being vile and despicable.

A great part of the happiness, enjoyed by Intelligent beings, arises from the knowledge, that they are esteemed, and loved, by other Intelligent beings. This is an enjoyment, to which Selfishness can make no claim for no being can approve of Selfishness. Whether it exists in himself, or in others, it necessarily, and always, awakens contempt. The selfish man is, therefore, cut off by his very nature from this delightful enjoyment.

At the same time, this spirit produces, of course, evils, immense in their number, and surpassing all finite estimation in their degree. Self-condemnation, the hatred and contempt of others, contentions, oppression, tyranny, war, and bloodshed; in a word, all the evils, occasioned by man to himself, or to his fellow-men, are uniformly, and universally, the effects of this disposition. No clearer proof can be reasonably demanded of its unhappy nature, and miserable consequences, than the unceasing, bitter complaints, with which this world every where resounds; almost all of which terminate in the deplorable nature of this disposition, or its malignant efficacy on the interests of man. It cannot be believed; it cannot with decency be said; that God has formed a universe of Intelligent creatures, and withheld from them all, that disposition, which alone. is productive of happiness; and left them wholly to that, which is the source of misery alone. That God made the universe with an intention to make it happy, and upon the whole to make it supremely happy, will be denied by gross Infidels only. But it is plain, that this end would be impossible, unless he should give to Intelligent creatures this disposition.

4thly. This is the only disposition, which can be approved, or loved, by God.

It is the only disposition, which is like that of God. But all beings approve, and love, that in others, which they approve, and love, in themselves. God approves, and loves, himself for his benevolence. Of course, he cannot but approve, and love, the same disposition in his Intelligent creatures; and, by unavoidable consequence, must equally hate that, which is of an opposite

nature.

It is the only disposition, which can voluntarily become the means of his glory. It has been already seen, that benevolence is the only fulfilment of his law. It was formerly shown, and is abundantly evident, that this disposition, and no other, voluntarily coinVOL. II.

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