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tion II of the convention, the United States should have seen to it that the office of president and other vacated positions were filled in accordance with the spirit of constitutional government, instead of countenancing a coup d'etat made possible by assassination. By keeping our hands off at this time, we revived the most vicious feature of the old order of things-disregard of orderly government in favor of political violence. A premium was put upon revolution and disturbance, and much of what we had professed was apparently negatived. There was no choice as between intervention or non-intervention, but only as between inaction then and gun boats later. All Dominican history made it certain that failure to preserve political stability at this stage would entail more serious involvement thereafter.
The revolutionary government endured exactly one year. Through its whole course ran political disturbance of such increasing force as eventually to compel American intervention. This entailed the recognition of the revolutionists, the resignation of the dictator-made president and the installation of a compromise successor as provisional president. Of the doubtful wisdom of the actual selection, it is unnecessary to speak. More general considerations arise in connection with the recognition of the revolutionists, as an unfortunate precedent in the future relations of the United States to San Domingo. It is very possible that with matters gone as far as they had no other course remained open to the United States, and that this necessity must be accounted the inevitable sequel of the original error of acquiescing in the coup d'etat. But the consequence was none the less grave. The Dominican mind once again revived the cherished principle of native politicsa doctrine become temporarily passé in the enforced calm of the preceding six years-that if a patriot be dissatisfied with the constituted government, he may take to the bush and eventually secure honor and emolument for his "revolution." A political settlement on such lines carried the assurance of its own destruction. On March 31, the resignation of the provisional president was presented to
the Dominican Congress and accepted, involving further disturbance and adjustments until the present administration was established-the stability of which still remains to be determined.
3. A no less serious feature of the intervention of September, 1912, was the validation on the part of the United States of a large amount of public indebtedness incurred during the dictator administration, by authorizing a new bond issue to provide for its discharge. Whether the mode of sale and the price realized for this loan offer any ground for criticism can not be determined without full knowledge of circumstances and records. Immediate judgment is however possible with respect to the validation itself.
The validation in question consisted in the affirmative exercise, on the part of the United States, of the authority conferred by section III of the convention: "III. Until the Dominican Republic has paid the whole amount of the bonds of the debt, its public debt shall not be increased except by previous agreement between the Dominican government and the United States."
The purpose of this clause was to prevent San Domingo, for a long term of years, from sinking back into the morass of semi-fraudulent debt from which the financial readjustment of 1907 had extricated the country. In drafting the convention an absolute prohibition of further debt contraction was at first contemplated and this was only modified in the thought that the economic regeneration of San Domingo might go on so rapidly as to make desirable some large public improvement for which current revenues would be inadequate. It was never anticipated that recourse would be had to this provision for the recognition of floating administrative debts and claims within the early years of the convention and while its working was still experimental.
Of the character of the floating indebtedness so validated by the United States, it is impossible to speak as details have not yet been made accessible. Inasmuch as it appears to have originated in the main during the twelve months of the dictator government, the presumption is that it differs
in no material respects from much of the pre-convention indebtedness. But even to the extent to which it may have been free from the unsavory quality of the old Dominican indebtedness, it should never have received the sanction of the United States as justifying a new loan secured by a lien upon customs receipts and a service administered by the customs receiver.
The spirit of the debt adjustment of 1907 and the letter of the convention had been to serve notice upon all prospective lenders that future advances to the Dominican Republic were at the lenders' risk and must, unless sanctioned by the United States, be in the nature of temporary loans repayable as to interest and principal from out of current revenues. If, during a twelve months of wasteful and inefficient administration in which graft and prodigality held carnival, any particularly daring lenders were willing to make advances, upon terms satisfactory to themselves, to a depleted treasury-it was certainly not the duty of the United States to secure such advances. It would have been wisdom on the part of the United States to have discouraged the contracting of such indebtedness; but failing to do this, it was in the last degree unwise to have approved its existence. If such indebtedness existed it should have been discharged by San Domingo in succeeding years from out of current revenues, made possible by less wasteful administration. The experience of the convention government had shown that such retrenchment was possible and the increased flow of customs revenue made it easier now than then. Such a mode of discharge would not, of course, have offered the comfort to the lenders that the debt validation did, but far from this involving any injustice, it would have been a salutary treatment of daring financial enterprise and a deterrent to further ventures of this kind.
It thus appears that with respect to administrative oversight, political stability and financial policy there has been appreciable departure from the course defined by the Convention and pursued during the first years of the customs receivership with the consequences of occasional friction
in San Domingo and unnecessary concern in the United States. But there will never by a reversion to old conditions. The convention clearly defines the duties and the obligations of the two contracting countries, and its wise and statesmanlike provisions are ample to meet every contingency likely to arise if we will but avail ourselves intelligently of them. It would be an incredible thing if the traditions and practices of two generations should not struggle to reassert themselves. Yet on every hand there is evidence that a new degree of national consciousness is crystallizing, that a new type of national leadership is being evolved and that new ideals of national well-being are taking form.
To sum up, the extension of the good offices of the United States to the Dominican Republic has meant that debts and claims aggregating nearly $40,000,000 have been and will be honorably discharged for about $17,000,000; that the Republic's credit has been established on a very high plane; that onerous concessions and monopolies have been redeemed and important works and improvements undertaken; that adequate revenues for the maintenence of orderly government have been assured; that social progress and economic betterment have been made possible and that imminent danger of foreign intervention has been removed, and all this without loss of territorial integrity or menace of independent sovereignty on the part of San Domingo and without embarrassing involvement or troublesome burden on the part of the United States.
AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN CENTRAL
By Philip Marshall Brown, Assistant-Professor of International Law and Diplomacy, Princeton University; formerly American Minister to Honduras
Since 1906 Central America has had two wars, three successful revolutions and five abortive uprisings, not including several conspiracies to assassinate the President of Guatemala or recent plots in Nicaragua for the overthrow of the revolutionary government which supplanted the Zelaya régime.
During this turbulent period the policy of the United States has developed by progressive steps from simple mediation, to direct intervention in the internal affairs of these republics. Our government has been almost incessantly occupied with the difficult task of trying to reconcile their differences, head off revolutions, avert war and facilitate the return of peace. We have come to realize that in order to prevent intervention on plausible grounds by European powers, the obligation of securing more stable conditions in Central America for the protection of all interests, logically devolves on the United States. This has become a most
embarrassing problem and we are constantly reminded that:
When constabulary duty 's to be done,
In June 1906, President Roosevelt with the coöperation of President Diaz acted as mediator between Guatemala on the one side, and Salvador and Honduras on the other, to terminate the brief war then in progress. The treaty of peace signed on board the American gunboat Marblehead submitted all differences to the arbitration of the two mediators and, moreover, invoked their moral guarantee for the fulfillment of the provisions of the treaty. This direct recognition of