virtue within them. How very few among them had any true notions of piety?

Alas! Sir, to make such general conclusions of the goodness of heathen religion, and sufficiency of human reasonings in all mankind to find it out, there ought to be many more instances of the knowledge and belief of the true God, and his spiritual worship, &c. and that among the heathens of Africa, and America, as well as Europe; and among the bulk of the inhabitants of Greece and Asia Minor, as well as the few philosophers: Whereas it is evident, that the gross of the heathen world, even in the cultivated and polite parts of it, were abominably over-run with shameful ignorance, idolatry, and immorality, profaneness and superstition: And in some of the rude and unpolished nations, there is scarce any thing but stupidity and error, darkness and madness, instead of truth, sobriety, and goodness.

While in the learned part of the world the poets and the priests tanght these wild superstitions as things sacred and divine, while the rulers commanded the observance of them, and the philosophers themselves complied with them, what can we suppose the people would do but believe in the same deities, worship them with the same ceremonies, and imitate their superiors in their religion, though it were never so ridiculous and immoral ? And as for the rude and unlearned nations and tribes of mankind, while their ancestors before them, and their companions al around them, gave themselves up to impious, and immoral, and shameful customs, and they were never taught to think for themselves, or to reason upon the subject, what can be expected, but that they should universally corrupt themselves, and live from age to age without God or goodness? The narratives which St. Paul gives us in his epistles of the Gentile nations through which he travelled, and the accounts of our later travellers, conspire to assure us of the most wretched and deplorable state of mankind there, in respect of religion and virtue. This is so copious a theme, Logisto, that one might talk upon it whole hours with pertinence and justice, and, one would think, to the conviction of those who are willing to hearken to truth. But I know in whose presence I speak: I am well apprized that the person to whom I address myself needs no more than short hints of these matters to refresh his own memory, and give him a compendious view of the things which he himself has been well acquainted with, in his own converse with the ancient writers of Rome and Greece, as well as the accounts which are given us of the more barbarous nations.

LOG. I confess, dear Sir, I am almost overpowered with conviction by the short account you have given us of these affairs, and the glaring light in which you have set them:

But yet still there remains some great difficulties upon my mind, which arise from other arguments which I have heard and read on this subject. Shall I propose them now, my friends? Or shall we appoint to meet again more early next Wednesday in the afternoon, and finish our conferences on this subject?

PITH. Indeed, Sir, I fear we have too much work upon our hands to be all finished this evening. And since you are so obliging, Logisto, to invite us to such a peaceful and pleasant retreat, and since I persuade myself Sophronius will be so good as to afford us a few hours more of his company, for my part, I know not how I can better employ my time than in endeavouring, in such society, to search after and communicate truth. It is indeed the appointed business and station of my life to be a teacher to others, yet I take pleasure gentlemen, to come hither and learn.

SOPH. But why will ye not please, my friends, to favour me with a visit, and let your last conference do my parlour the honour of finishing this friendly controversy? I will not pretend to such an elegant and spacious garden as Logisto has, nor to so neat and private a retreat for conversation, as this wherein we are now entertained: But you shall be attended with the best accommodations which my dwelling will afford; and if you will give yourselves the trouble to ascend to my study, we shall there be sufficiently retired from all other company.

LOG. I doubt not, Sophronius, of the sincerity of your request, nor the conveniency of your library, for such a friendly conference but since you have favoured us thus far with your happy assistance in a debate which Pithander and myself had appointed here in this garden, I cannot with any satisfaction permit the scene to be altered. Perhaps it may seem a degree of incivility to desire a visit from you so often without a return; yet I promise you, Sir, I will write myself down indebted to you for every such favour, and when we begin any new subject of debate, Sophronious shall appoint the place.

SOPH. Then since it is the pleasure of Logisto to have it so, without any more ceremony, we will attend him here next Wednesday.

PITH. I agree, Sir, to your proposal. I can never be in an ill situation at either of your houses, amidst the honour of such company.

LOG. Gentlemen, I own the obligation, and am your very humble servant.

THE THIRD CONFERENCE.

IN the days that passed after the last meeting, Logisto had been reviewing several books which have been written in vindication of the sufficiency of human reason to conduct men to happiness in a way of religion; and as he had renewed his own difficulties, so he had furnished his memory with some of their strongest arguments: but he found none so hard to answer, as that great and important one, which is derived from the wisdom, the equity, and the goodness of God; upon which account he resolved to reserve this to the last. When his company were come, he led them down to the usual place of learned conversation, and began the conference thus:

LOG. The only thing that remains before us, gentlemen, is, that I should propose some arguments, drawn from the reason of things, and from the nature of God, and man, why it appears necessary that the principle of human reason should be sufficient, in all mankind, to guide and conduct them to the belief and practice of such a religion, wherein they may obtain the favour of God, and happiness in a future state.

PITH. I wait with some impatience, Sir, to hear these arguments of yours, which you have so often intimated: And yet it may not be improper, before you produce them, to consider, what is the particular proposition your arguments can possibly prove, or what it is you can expect from them. Will you please to remember, Sir, it has been plainly proved and determined already, and agreed in our past debate, as a certain matter of fact, that there are several large countries of heathenism wherein the inhabitants have not reason sufficient to guide them into true religion, considering their vast prejudices and aversions to God and goodness; much less is it sufficient to enable them to practise it; that is, according to the distinction of our worthy friend Sophronius, that though there may be in them a remote, natural, and speculative sufficiency for this purpose, yet their reasoning powers are so poor and low, so unpractised, and so much perverted by a thousand errors, evil customs, vicious propensities, and wilful ignorance, that they are not practically and experimentally sufficient for this great design. This has been abundantly confirmed by the melancholy, and yet entertaining accounts Sophronius hath given us of African and American heathens. Now I humbly hope, Sir, you will not suppose that any of your arguments can destroy plain matter of fact, nor prove that to be sufficient, which has before been plainly declared and proved, and agreed to be insufficient.

Log. I must acknowledge, Pithander, I know not how to oppose what you say. It seems to be plainly proved, that reason

in these savages is not a sufficient guide. All that I can pretend therefore, is, only to shew, that if human reason is not in fact sufficient, even practically sufficient for this purpose: yet, at least, it ought to be practically sufficient; and perhaps my arguments will prove it.

PITH. Pray, Sir, be so good as to inform me, what you mean by saying, it ought to be sufficient? Will any of your arguments teach the all-wise God what he ought to have done, and in what other and better condition he ought to have placed mankind, than he has seen fit to place them in? Will your arguments give wisdom to your Maker, or instruct him in rules of justice? Or can any of your reasonings inform him, what superior talents, and happier circumstances, he ought to have bestowed upon his creatures? Have you courage enough to reprove or arraign the conduct of the supreme Governor of the world towards his African or American subjects! Is it right, Logisto, to talk at this rate? Or is it safe to venture on such an unequal contest? What else can you mean, Sir, by affirming, that reason ought to be sufficient, but this, viz. that God ought to have given men better faculties, or he ought to have bestowed upon them clearer light, and better helps, or ought to have brought them into the world with greater advantages than his wisdom has thought fit to do: And what is this, but telling the all-wise God, he has acted weakly, or charging the God of justice that he has dealt unjustly, or accusing the Father of Mercies that he has acted cruelly toward his creatures?

LOG. I confess, good Sir, that you confound me a little with these enquiries. I have no such hardiness of soul, as to dare to reprove my Maker, whom I adore with the most profound veneration; and I do acknowledge, that whatsoever he does, must be right and just. And yet there are arguments which seem to prove, that man, who as you agree, is to be tried and judged in the other world, for his behaviour in this, should, some way or other, have sufficient powers given him to know and fulfil his duty: Otherwise, men would be excusable in their greatest superstitions and immoralities, as being destitute, by the necessity of their circumstances, of a sufficient guide in matters of religion and virtue: And this is the first argument which I desire leave to offer upon this head, as a difficulty which I cannot solve.

PITH. Perhaps, Sir, it is an effectual relief to this difficulty, if we suppose mankind to be furnished with such reasoning powers as are, in the nature of things, and in a remote sense, sufficient to guide and conduct men in their religious affairs: For the neglect of using and improving these rational powers, is greatly criminal: And it is this universal neglect of using them well, that renders them practically insufficient. If they employ

not their reason in their most important concerns, you will grant it is their own fault; and this renders then condemnable for the neglect or abuse of it, and for the errors and vices proceeding from such an unreasonable conduct of life. This is confessed by the writers of your own side of the question. Besides, the reasoning faculty, and the remains of conscience, which are found even in the most savage tribes of mankind, may be called practically sufficient, though not to conduct to happiness completely, yet, to have taught them much more of the first principles of virtue and religion, than most of them either know or practise; and thus to have withheld them from their grossest immoralities and superstitions.

Yet further, reason may teach them the duties of an innocent man, but not to recover a sinner to God's favour. The obligations which their reason and conscience might lay on them to practise duty may be clear and strong as far as they go; and yet these may not be sufficient to bring sinners to the favour of God and eternal happiness. Devils are under clear and strong obligation to love God, and to repent, and obey him, through the dictates of a rational nature; but this rational nature is not sufficient to bring them to happiness and the favour of God. It is granted, the heathens have great hindrances; but great as they are, they are not so insurmountable, but that most or all of them might have arrived at much superior degrees of knowledge and practice in religion, than what any of them have actually arrived at, if they had not been so shamefully and criminally negligent, so exceeding fond of error and sin, and so lazy in their search after truth and duty. Therefore they are by no means excusable, as you express it, in their greatest immoralities.

Give me leave, Sir, to represent this matter by a plain similitude. Suppose Anergus a slave, to have a remote natural capacity sufficient to trace out all the demonstrations in Euclid : Then you consequently must suppose him also to have a proximate and practical sufficiency to trace out some of the first and plainest of them: Criton, his master commands him to demonstrate all the propositions there, or to practise all the problems : but he will not so much as set about the first and plainest of them: Is not Anergus greatly criminal? If he would have traced out the first, he might perhaps find a growing capacity, and a proximate and practical sufficiency to demonstrate the next and the next in succession, till he came to the last. Is he not chargeable then with the guilt of not demonstrating and practising the whole series, even though he never actually had a practical and proximate sufficience of reason or ability to grasp the deepest and most complicated theorems, or to perform the hardest problems, because he was lazy and thoughtless, and