reason, among those who never enjoyed the preaching of the gospel of Christ; though it must be confessed, it is almost infinitely easier for a christian to do it, than for a heathen. Yet still it is possible, in the nature of things, that mere human reason may be so cultivated and improved, without revelation, as to produce such fruits of knowledge as these are. This appears, in some measure, by the fine schemes and thoughts of some of the Greek and Roman philosophers, on the themes of rational, mathematical, physical, and moral knowledge, as well as in some parts of religion, and by the great progress a few of them have made in knowledge and truth, on some of the subjects which you have been debating. I confess indeed, I hardly think those polite writers and philosophers would have gone so far in virtue and religion, if they had borrowed no help from divine tradition, and converse with the Jews, or their neighbours. But after all, I cannot say that such a scheme of religion as I have here proposed, lies uttterly out of the reach of human reason, in the nature of things, since the several steps of it may be all connected by strong inferences.

VI. Though there be several whole nations of the earth sunk into such a brutal stupidity as the savages in the desarts of Africa, and the wilds of America, that they know nothing of religion; and though scarce any of the heathen philosophers, much less any whole nations, ever arrived at any clear and explicit knowledge of such a short and plain system of natural religion as I have proposed; yet it does not follow, that human reason is not sufficient to lead them into it. A man who is asleep is a reasonable creature still, and the reason that is in him is sufficient to enable him to discourse and act like a man; but he must be first awakened by some happy accident, and his reason set a working in a proper track. A man that is intoxicated with liquor, and thereby led astray into a thousand fooleries, and is preparing mischief and misery for himself, yet has the principle of reason in him still, and if he does not go on to drink, he may recover the exercise of his rational powers, and thereby find out a way to extricate himself from the dangers which surround him. Now I look upon the bulk of the heathen world in such kind of circumstances as these. Reason, so far as it relates to God, and religion, and eternal happiness, seems to be asleep in them; some happy hints may possibly awaken it, and set it a moving in a right channel, though without revelation it will be ever ready to wander, and go astray. Reason, in far the greatest part of them, seems to be intoxicated and drawn away into endless fooleries, instead of religion, led astray by wild appetite and passion, perverted by a thousand prejudices, and by the universal customs of the country, and seduced far from all the paths of truth and duty. Now if any occurrence arise which may bring them to a stand,

free them from the intoxicating influences of prejudice, custom, passions, &c. it is possible, in the nature of things, that the powers of reason may then trace out such a religion, which, if sincerely practised, may lead them to final happiness.

VII. But since we find by wretched and deplorable experience, that there have been very few among the best of the heathen nations, whose reason being left to itself, without any traditions of divine revelation, have worked well this way, and traced out all the most important and necessary principles of religion; and since also we have seen what shameful ignorance, even of the chief of these principles, is found universally reigning among the ruder and more unpolished nations, so that scarce a man of them knows the true God, or believes or practises the necessary duties towards God, and but very imperfectly toward his neighbour or himself; we may plainly infer this sufficiency of human reason to guide all men in matters of religion, is but little more than a speculative and abstract idea of sufficiency; it is a sufficiency, at best, that has very little or no influence: It is such a natural capacity, or remote power, or sufficiency, as is scarce likely to become effectual, in practice, in one soul among ten thousand of these rude and brutal creatures which we have been speaking of. And whatsoever speculative, natural, or remote sufficiency in matters of religion and happiness, may be ascribed to human reason among the rude and barbarous nations of the earth; yet it can hardly be called a proximate and practical sufficiency for this purpose: So that there seems to be a plain necessity of some higher means and advantages than they are possessed of, in order to introduce any thing of real religion actually amongst them. This appears evident to me, since I have scarce grounds enough to suppose there is one single person in several of these savage nations, that has arrived at so much religion and holiness, as to be fit, according to the representations of scripture, to enter into the presence of God, and heavenly blessedness, under all the guidance and conduct of their own reason; so ineffectual is it to combat with their natural stupidity, their innumerable prejudices, the incessant influence of their brutal education and customs, and their strong propensities to vice.

LOG. Permit me, gentlemen, after the moderator has spoken, to put in one word, which perhaps has been too much neglected in our present debate, though it has been at first agreed to belong to the question; and that is this: If all mankind used and exercised their reason well, and as they ought to do, I query whether it would not only have a remote, but also a proximate and practical sufficiency, to find out the articles of natural religion, so far as is necessary for future happiness: For it is evident enough, that neither the savage nor the polite nations which we have had occasion to speak of, have used their rea gon as they might and ought to have done on religious subjects.

SOPH. What you propose, Sir, I think may be safely grant ed by Pithander, even if he admit my distinction of this remote and proximate sufficiency. But the surrounding darkness and ignorance in which most of these heathens were born, the prejudices and customs of their nations, which they imbibe almost from their birth, their perpetual avocations by present sensible objects, the everlasting urgency of their appetites and passions, their native propensities to vice, and the constant temptations that attend them, are such a powerful hindrance to this right and due exercise of their reason on things moral, divine, and spiritual, and on things future and eternal, that though there be a natural sufficiency in human reason to find ont such a religion as might save them, yet it is ten thousand to one, if ever they duly and rightly exercise it. It is highly improbable, that ever their thoughts should be directed into such a track, and guarded and led onward in it so far, till they have found out such articles of faith and practice in religion, as you yourself have granted to be necessary.

And it is upon this account, Logisto, I say, that reason which is remotely sufficient in the nature of things, may be called practically insufficient for the purposes of religion and happiness; since so very few, or none, will actually exercise their reason well; this is the chief thing which I mean by the practical insufficiency of it, that not one in a thousand, or perhaps in many thousands, will so employ their reason as to guide them to religion and happiness under the present circumstances of the heathen world, and especially in the brutal and savage nations.

PITH. Methinks, Sophronius, I feel myself inclined to accept of your distinction, and to agree to your reasoning on this subject.

LOG. For my part, I thank you heartily Soporonius, for your good company, and for your concluding discourse. I must confess, I cannot see how to get over the difficulties which Pithander has before proposed, and which you seem to confirm. Nor do I find any just ground to oppose your distinction of this speculative and practical sufficiency of reason in matters of religion, and your present application of it: For according to the light in which Pithander and you have set these affairs, I think I must yield that our experience and observation seem to make it evident, that it is but a poor sufficiency that human reason, in these rude nations, has, to guide them into the knowledge of acceptable religion. Yet I have still some difficulties upon my mind, for there are several solid arguments drawn from various topics, relating to God and man, to prove that it is necessary God should furnish all mankind with sufficient powers for their own happiness: And these shall be the subject of our discourse to-morrow, when you please to favour me with your company.

PITH. My sincere thanks are due also to Sophroníus, for the office he has sustained, and so happily executed in this our conference.

LOG. Though the moon be risen so high, and the sky so free from clouds, that your walk homewards will be pleasant, yet my servant shall wait on each of you to your dwellings. Here, Davus, attend these gentlemen. Good night, dear Sirs, and remember the appointed hour to-morrow.

THE SECOND CONFERENCE.

Sophronius and Pithander being met in Logisto's summerhouse at the appointed hour, after mutual salutations, the conference began thus :

LOG. Was it not agreed, gentlemen, that I should now produce my other arguments, drawn from various topics, relating to God and man, to shew that reason is, and must be sufficient to guide, conduct, or bring man to happiness in the way of religion?

SOPH. I think, Sir, you have already gone through but one part of your intended enquiry concerning the sufficiency of reason, and that is, "Whether the light of reason be a sufficient guide to teach all men the necessary doctrines and duties of religion." Then it remains to be disputed, " Whether the powers of reason are able to shew such obligations and motives, and to set them before every person in such a view as shall be sufficient to enforce the practice of the duties required, and thus bring a man to the favour of God, and happiness?" If I remember aright, Sir, you proposed this method of debate yourself at first, and this is what I suppose you mean to include, when you say, Reason is sufficient, not only to guide, but to conduct and bring men effectually to happiness in a way of religion. As for those general arguments which you speak of, which may be drawn from the nature of God, and the nature of man, they will better be introduced at last, because they tend to prove both parts of your present question at once, viz. that reason is sufficient, both in its instructions to teach men religion, and with motives to bring them to the practice of it; or that it has both light and power enough for this purpose.

LOG. You are in the right, Sophronius, this was my meaning in the expression I used of conducting men to happiness, and this was the method which I myself proposed last night: But I must confess, I am something discouraged to pursue the second query, by the success Pithander has had in the former part of our debate. And yet, methinks, human reason should be sufficient to VOL. III.

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conduct man safe to the happiness that is suited to his intellectual and immortal nature, and to bring motives sufficient to enforce the practice of necessary duties. I will begin my argument therefore on this subject, and try what can be said.

PITH. I think Sophronius has set the matter right, and I entreat Logisto to proceed to his proof.

LOG. Then I begin thus. When two things are set before us whereof our reason tells us, with great assurance, that one is vastly more excellent and desirable than the other, reason does what is sufficient to engage us to chuse that which is most excellent. Now to apply this to the business in hand: Reason, working in a heathen, may assure him, that virtue hath much beauty and loveliness in it, because it is acting what is fit and right, and according to the nature of things: But vice is a hateful thing, contrary to what is right and fit: Reason can shew him, that the everlasting favour of such an almighty and all-sufficient being as God, and the happiness and joys of a future state, which are the rewards of virtue and religion, are vastly preferable to all the delights of sense, which are but short and vanishing, and to all the forbidden indulgences of appetite and passion, which often leave a sting behind them: I think then, that reason does its office, and performs what is sufficient to incline the man to chuse virtue, the favour of God, and future happiness, above all present and tempting sensualities, and to enforce the practice of religion and goodness. Again; When two things are set before us, whereof our reason assures us, that one will bring a hundred times more pain and sorrow upon us than the other, reason does what is sufficient to engage us most carefully to avoid that which brings the greatest misery, and to endure the less evil for the sake of avoiding the greater: And therefore when reason, working in a heathen, assures him, that anguish of conscience, and the displeasure and wrath of an almighty God, through all our state of immortality, which will be the consequent of a vicious life, will be inexpressibly harder to bear than a little troublesome selfdenial, which he finds in the present life, in the restraints of his passions and appetites, and in the practices of virtue, reason then does what is sufficient to incline the man to avoid vice and to practise virtue; because it teaches him, that it is far better to venture the lesser pains of self-denial here in this life, in order to avoid the more terrible pains and sorrows which the displeasure of God may bring both upon his body here, and his immortal soul hereafter. How can auy thing be sufficient, Pithander, to bring men to religion and heaven, if such motives as these are not sufficient? And these are the motives that reason finds out and produces.

PITH. Though your argument seems to run on, Sir, in so smooth a current, and to carry such perspicuity and force with it,