that is, impatience of study, and want of diligent attention in the search of truth. The dogmatist is in haste to believe something; he cannot keep himself long enough in suspence, till some bright and convincing evidence appear on one side, but throws himself casually into the sentiments of one party or another, and then he will hear no argument to the contrary. The sceptic will not take pains to search things to the bottom, but when he sees difficulties on both sides, resolves to believe neither of them. "Humility of soul, patience in study, diligence in enquiry," with an honest zeal for truth, would go a great way towards the cure of both these follies.

(3.) Another sort of temper that is very injurious to a right judgment of things, is an inconstant, fickle, changeable spirit, and a very uneven temper of mind. When such persons are in one humour, they pass a judgment of things agreeable to it: when their humour changes; they reverse their first judgment, and embrace a new opinion. They have no steadiness of soul; they want firmness of mind sufficient to establish themselves in any truth, and are ready to change it for the next alluring falsehood that is agreeable to their change of humour. This fickleness is sometimes so mingled with their very constitution by nature, or by distemper of body, that a cloudy day and a lowering sky shall strongly incline them to form an opinion both of themselves, and of persons and things round about them, quite different from what they believe when the sun shines, and the heavens

are serene.

This sort of people ought to judge of things and persons in their most sedate, peaceful, and composed hours of life, and reserve these judgments for their conduct at more unhappy

seasons.

(4.) Some persons have a violent and turgid manner both of talking and thinking; whatsoever they judge of it is always with a tincture of this vanity. They are always in extremes, and pronounce concerning every thing in the superlative. If they think a man to be learned, he is the chief scholar of the age; if another has low parts, he is the greatest blockhead in nature; if they approve any book on divine subjects, it is the best book in the world next to the bible: if they speak of a storm of rain or bail, it is the most terrible storm that fell since the creation and a cold winter day is the coldest that ever was known.

But the men of this swelling language ought to remember, that nature has ten thousand moderate things in it, and does not always deal in extremes as they do.

(5.) I think it may be called another sort of prejudice derived from humour, when some men believe a doctrine merely because it is ancient, and has been long believed; others are so fond of novelty, that nothing prevails upon their assent so much

new thoughts and new notions. Again, there are some who set a high esteem upon every thing that is foreign and fur-fetched; therefore China pictures are admired, how awkward soever : others value things the more for being of our own native growth, invention, or manufacture, and these as much despise foreign things.

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Some men of letters and theology will not believe a proposition even concerning a sublime subject, till every thing mysteterious, deep and difficult is cut off from it, though the scripture asserts it never so plainly others are so fond of a mystery, and things incomprehensible, that they would scarce believe the doctrine of the Trinity, if it could be explained; they incline to that foolish rant of one of the ancients, credo quia impossibile est ; “I believe it because it is impossible."

To cure these mistakes, remember that neither antique nor novel, foreign nor native, mysterious nor plain, are certain characters either of truth, or falsehood..

I might mention various other humours of men that excite in them various prejudices, and lead them into rash and mistaken judgments: but these are sufficient for a specimen.

VII. There are several other weaknesses which belong to human nature, whereby we are led into mistakes, and indeed are rendered almost incapable of passing a solid judgment in matters of great depth and difficulty. Some have a native obscurity of perception, (or shall I call it a want of natural sagacity?) whereby they are hindered from attaining clear and distinct ideas. Their thoughts always seem to have something confused and cloudy in them, and therefore they judge in the dark. Some have a defect of memory, and then they are not capable of comparing their present ideas with a great variety of others, in order to secure themselves from inconsistency in judgment. Others may have a memory large enough, yet they are subject to the same errors from a narrowness of soul, and such a fixation and confinement of thought to a few objects, that they scarce ever take a survey of things wide enough to judge wisely and well, and to secure themselves from all inconsistencies.

Though these are natural defects and weaknesses, yet they may in some measure be relieved by labour, diligence, and a due attention to proper rules.

But among all the causes of false judgment which are within ourselves, I ought by no means to leave out that universal and original spring of error, which we are informed of by the word of God; and that is, the sin and defection of our first parents; whereby all our best natural powers both of mind and body are impared, and rendered very much inferior to what they were in a state of innocence. Our understanding is darkened, our memory contracted, our corrupt humours and passions are grown

predominant, our reason enfeebled, and various disorders attend onr constitution and animal nature, whereby the mind is strangely imposed upon in its judgment of things. Nor is there any perfect relief to be expected on earth. There is no hope of ever recovering from these maladies, but by a sincere return to God in the ways of his own appointment, whereby we shall be kept safe from all dangerous and pernicious errors in the matters of religion; and though imperfections and mistakes will hang about us in the present life, as the effects of our original apostacy from God, yet we hope for a full deliverance from them when we arrive at heaven.

SECT. IV.-Prejudices arising from other Persons.

WERE it not for the springs of prejudice that are lurking in ourselves, we should not be subject to so many mistakes from the influence of others: but since our nature is so susceptive of errors on all sides, it is fit we should have hints and notices given us, how far other persons may have power over us, and become the causes of our false judgments. These might all be cast into one heap, for they are all a-kin, and mingle with each other; but for distinction-sake let them be called the prejudices of education, of custom, of authority, and such as arise from the manner of proposal.

I. Those with whom our education is intrusted, may lay the first foundation of many mistakes in our younger years. How many fooleries and errors are instilled into us by our nurses, our fellow-children, by servants or unskilful teachers, which are not only maintained through the following parts of life, but sometimes have a very unhappy influence upon us! We are taught that there are goblins and bugbears in the dark; our young minds are crowded with the terrible ideas of ghosts appearing upon every occasion, or with the pleasanter tales of fairies dancing at midnight. We learn to prophesy betimes, to foretel futurities by good or evil omens, and to presage approaching death in a family by ravens and little worms, which we therefore term a death-watch. We are taught to know beforehand, for a twelvemonth together, which days of the week will be fair or foul, which will be lucky or unlucky; nor is there any thing so silly, but may be imposed upon our understandings in that early part of life; and these ridiculous stories abide with us too long, and too far influence the weaker part of mankind.

We choose our particular sect and party in the civil, the religious, and the learned life, by the influence of education. In the colleges of learning, some are for the nominals, and some for the realists in the science of metaphysics, because their tutors were devoted to these parties. The old philosophy and the new have gained thousands of partisans the same way: and every

religion has its infant votaries who are born, live and die in the same faith, without examination of any article. The Turks are taught early to believe in Mahomet, the Jews in Moses; the heathens worship a multitude of gods, under the force of their education. And it would be well if there were not millions of christians, who have little more to say for their religion, than that they were born and bred up in it. The greatest part of the christian world can hardly give any reason why they believe the bible to be the word of God, but because they have always believed it, and they were taught so from their infancy. As Jews and Turks, and American heathens, believe the most monstrous and incredible stories, because they have been trained up amongst them, as articles of faith; so the Papists believe their transubstantiation, and make no difficulty of assenting to impossibilities, since it is the current doctrine of their catechisms. By the same means the several sects and parties in christianity, believe all the strained interpretations of scripture, by which they have been taught to support their own tenets: they find nothing difficult in all the absurd glosses and far-fetched senses that are sometimes put upon the words of the sacred writers, because their ears have been always accustomed to these glosses: and therefore they sit so smooth and easy upon their understandings, that they know not how to admit the most natural and easy interpretation in opposition to them.

In the same manner we are nursed up in many silly and gross mistakes about domestic affairs, as well as in matters of political concernment. It is upon the same ground that children are trained up to be whigs and tories betimes; and every one learns the distinguished terms of his own party, as the Papists learn to say their prayers in Latin, without any meaning, reason, or devotion.

This sort of prejudice must be cured by calling all the prin ciples of our young years to the bar of more mature reason, that we may judge of the things of nature and political affairs by juster rules of philosophy and observation: and even the malters of religion must be first enquired into by reason and conscience, and when these have led us to believe scripture to be the word of God, then that becomes our sovereign guide, and reason and conscience must submit to receive its dictates.

II. The next prejudice which I shall mention, is that which arises from the custom or fashion of those amongst whom we live. Suppose we have freed ourselves from the younger prejudices of our education, yet we are in danger of having our mind turned aside from truth by the influence of general custom.

Our opinion of meats and drinks, of garments and forms of salutation, are influenced much more by custom, than by the eye, the ear, or the taste. Custom prevails even over sense

itself, and therefore no wonder if it prevails over reason too. What is it but custom that renders many of the mixtures of food and sauces elegant in Britain, which would be awkward and nauseous to the inhabitants of China, and indeed were nauseous to us when we first tasted them? What but custom could make those salutations polite in Muscovy, which are ridiculous in France or England? We call ourselves indeed the politer nations, but it is we who judge thus of ourselves; and that fancied politeness is sometimes more owing to custom than reason. Why are the forms of our present garment counted beautiful, and those fashions of our ancestors the matter of scoff and contempt, which in their day were all decent and genteel? It is custom that forms our opinion of dress, and reconciles us by degrees to those habits which at first seemed very odd and monstrous. It must be granted, there are some garments and habits which have a natural congruity, or incongruity, modesty, or immodesty, decency, or indecency, gaudery, or gravity: though for the most part there is but little reason in these affairs but what little there is of reason or natural decency, custom triumphs over. it all. It is almost impossible to persuade a gay lady that any thing can be decent which is out of fashion; and it were well if fashion stretched its powers no farther than the business of drapery and the fair sex.

The methods of our education are governed by custom. It is custom, and not reason, that sends every boy to learn the Roman poets, and begin a little acquaintance with Greek, before he is bound an apprentice to a soap-boiler, or leather-seller. It is custom alone that teaches us Latin by the rules of a Latin' grammar; a tedious and absurd method! And what is it but custom that has for past centuries confined the brightest geniuses, even of the highest rank in the female world, to the business of the needle only, and secluded them most unmercifully from the pleasures of knowledge, and the divine improvements of reason? But we begin to break all these chains, and reason begins to dictate the education of youth. May the growing age be learned and wise!

It is by the prejudice arising from our own customs, that we judge of all other civil and religious forms and practices. The rites and ceremonies of war and peace in other nations, the forms of weddings and funerals, the several ranks of magistracy, the trades and employments of both sexes, the public the domestic affairs of life, and almost every thing of foreign customs, is judged irregular. It is all imagined to be unreasonable or unnatural, by those who have no other rule to judge of nature and reason, but the customs of their own country, or the little town where they dwell. Custom is called a second nature, but we often mistake it for nature itself.