These are very much a-kin to conditional propositions, and the truth of them depends upon the justness of their connection.

VI. Discretive propositions are such wherein various and seemingly opposite judgments are made, whose variety or distinction is noted by the particles, but, though, yet, &c. as, travellers may change their climate, but not their temper: Job was patient, though his grief was great.

The truth and goodness of a discretive proposition, depends on the truth of both parts, and their contrary distinction to one another; for though both parts should be true, yet if there be no seeming opposition between them, it is an useless assertion, though we cannot call it a false one; as, "Descartes was a philosopher, yet he was a Frenchman: the Romans were valiant, but they spoke Latin :" both which propositions are ridiculous for want of a seeming opposition between the parts.

Since we have declared wherein the truth and falsehood of these compound propositions consist, it is proper also to give some intimations how any of these propositions, when they are false, may be opposed or contradicted.

All compound propositions except copulatives and discretives, are properly denied or contradicted when the negation affects their conjunctive particles; as, if the disjunctive proposi tion asserts, it is either day or night; the opponent says, it is not either day or night; or, it is not necessary that it should be either day or night: so the hypothetical proposition is denied, by saying, it does not follow that the earth must move if the sun be fixed.

A disjunctive proposition may be contradicted also by denying all the parts; as it is neither day nor night.

And a causal proposition may be denied or opposed indirectly and improperly, when either part of the proposition is denied; and it must be false if either part be false; but the design of the proposition being to shew the causal connection of the two parts, each part is supposed to be true, and it is not properly contradicted as a causal proposition, unless one part of it be denied to be the cause of the other.

As for copulatives and discretives, because their truth de pends more on the truth of their parts, therefore these may be opposed or denied, as many ways as the parts of which they are composed may be denied; so this copulative proposition, riches and honour are temptations to pride, may be denied by saying, riches are not temptations, though honour may be or, honour is not a temptation, though riches may be: or, neither riches nor honour are temptations, &c.

So this discretive proposition, Job was patient, though his grief was great, is denied by saying, Job was not patient, though his grief was great: or, Job was patient, but his grief was not great: or, Job was not patient, nor was his grief great.

We proceed now to the second sort of compound propositions, namely, such whose composition is not expressed, but latent or concealed; yet a small attention will find two propositions included in them. Such are these that follow:

1. Exclusives; as, the pious man alone is happy, it is only Sir Isaac Newton could find out true philosophy. 2. Exceptives; as, none of the ancients but Plato well defended the soul's immortality. The Protestants worship but one God. 3. Comparatives; as, pain is the greatest affliction. No Turk was fiercer than the Spaniards at Mexico. Here note, that the comparative degree does not always imply the positive; as if they say, a fool is better than a knave, this does not affirm that folly is good, but that it is a less evil than knavery. 4. Inceptives and decitives, which relate to the beginning or ending of any thing; as the Latin tongue is not yet forgotten. No man before Orpheus wrote Greek verse. Peter Czar of Muscovy began to civilize his nation.

To these may be added continuatives; as, Rome remains to this day, which includes at least two propositions, namely, Rome was, and Rome is.

Here let other authors spend time and pains in giving the precise definitions in all these sorts of propositions, which may be as well understood by their names and examples: here let them tell what their truth depends upon, and how they are to be opposed or contradicted; but a moderate share of common sense, with a review of what is said of the former compounds, will suffice for all these purposes, without the formality of rules.

SECT. VII-Of true and false Propositions.

PROPOSITIONS are next to be considered according to their sense or signification, and thus they are distributed into true and false. A true proposition represents things as they are in themselves; but if things are represented otherwise than they are in themselves, the proposition is false.

Or we may describe them more particularly thus: a true proposition joins those ideas and terms together whose objects are joined and agree, or it disjoins those ideas and terms whose objects disagree, or are disjoined; as, every bird has wings: a brute is not immortal.

A false proposition joins those ideas or terms whose objects disagree, or it disjoins those whose objects agree; as, birds have no wings, brutes are immortal.

Note, It is impossible that the same proposition should be both true and false at the same time, in the same sense, and in the same respect; because a proposition is but the representation of the agreement or disagreement of things; now it is impossible that the same thing should be and not be, or that the same thing should agree and not agree, at the same time, and in the same respect. This is a first principle of human knowledge.

Yet some propositions may seem to contradict one another, though they may be both true, but in different senses, or respects, or times; as, man was immortal in Paradise, and man was mortal in Paradise. But these two propositions must be referred to different times; as, man before his fall was immortal, but at the fall he became mortal. So we may say now, man is mortal, or man is immortal, if we take these propositions in different respects; as man is an immortal creature as to his soul, but mor tal as to his body. A great variety of difficulties and seeming contradictions, both in holy scripture and other writings, may be solved and explained in this manner.

The most important question on this subject is this, what is the criteriou, or distinguishing mark of truth? How shall we know when a proposition is really true or false? There are so many disguises of truth in the world, so many false appearances of truth, that some sects have declared there is no possibility of distinguishing truth from falsehood; and therefore they have abandoned all pretences to knowledge and maintain strenuously that nothing is to be known.

The first men of this humour made themselves famous in Greece by the name of Sceptics, that is, seekers: they were also called Academics, borrowing their name from Academia, their school, or place of study. They taught that all things are uncertain, though they allowed that some are more probable than others. After these arose the sect of Pyrrhonics, so named from Pyrrho their master, who would not allow one proposition to be more probable than another; but professed that all things were equally uncertain. Now all these men (as an ingenious author expresses it) were rather to be called a sect of liars than philosophers, and that censure is just for two reasons: (1.) Because they determined concerning every proposition that it was uncertain, and believed that as a certain truth, while they professed there was nothing certain, and that nothing could be determined concerning truth or falsehood; and thus their very doctrine gave itself the lie. (2.) Because they judged and acted as other men did in the common affairs of life; they would neither run into fire nor water, though they professed ignorance and uncertainty, whether the one would burn, or the other drown them.

There have been some in all ages who have too much affected this humour, who dispute against every thing, under pretence that truth has no certain mark to distinguish it. Let us therefore enquire what is the general criterion of truth? And in order to this it is proper to consider what is the reason why we assent to those, propositious which contain the most certain and indubitable truths; such as these, the whole is greater than a part; two and three make five.

The only reason why we believe these propositions to be true, is because the ideas of the subjects and predicates appear with so much clearness and strength of evidence to agree to each other, that the mind cannot help discerning the agreement, and cannot doubt of the truth of them, but is constrained to judge them true. So when we compare the ideas of a circle and a triangle, or the ideas of an oyster, and a butterfly, we see such an evident disagreement between them, that we are sure that a butterfly is not an oyster; nor is a triangle a circle. There is nothing but the evidence of the agreement or disagreement between two ideas, that makes us affirm or deny the one or the other.

Now it will follow from hence, that a clear and distinct perception, or fall evidence of the agreement and disagreement of our ideas to one another or to things, is a certain criterion of truth for since our minds are of such a make, that where the evidence is exceeding plain and strong, we cannot withhold our assent; we should then be necessarily exposed to believe falsehood, if complete evidence should be found in any propositions that are not true. But surely the God of perfect wisdom, truth and goodness, would never oblige his creatures to be thus deceived; and therefore he would never have constituted us of such a frame, as would render it naturally impossible to guard against

error.

Another consequence is naturally derived from the former;" and that is, that the only reason why we fall into mistake, is be cause we are impatient to form a judgment of things before we have a clear and evident perception of their agreement or disagreement; and if we will make haste to judge while our ideas are obscured or confused, or before we see whether they agree" or disagree, we shall plunge ourselves into perpetual errors. See more on this subject in an Essay of the Freedom of Will in God and man; published in 1732. Section 1. page 13.

Note, What is here asserted concerning the necessity of clear and distinct ideas, refers chiefly to propositions which we form ourselves by our own powers; as for propositions which we derive from the testimony of others, they will be accounted for in Chap. IV.

SECT. VIII. Of certain and dubious Propositions of Knowledge and Opinion.

SINCE we have found that evidence is the great criterion, and the sure mark of truth; this leads us directly to consider propositions according to their evidence; and here we must take notice both of the different degrees of evidence, and the different kinds of it.

Propositions according to their different degrees of evidence are distinguished into certain and dubious.*

Where the evidence of the agreement or disagreement of the ideas is so strong and plain, that we cannot forbid nor delay our assent; the proposition is called certain, as every circle hath a centre, the world did not create itself. An assent to such propositions is honoured with the name of knowledge.

But when there is any obscurity upon the agreement or disagreement of the ideas, so that the mind does not clearly perceive it, and is not compelled to assent or dissent, then the proposition, in a proper and philosophical sense, is called doubtful or uncertain; as, "the planets are inhabited; the souls of brutes are mere matter; the world will not stand a thousand years longer; Dido built the city of Carthage," &c. Such uncertain propositions are called opinions.

When we consider ourselves as philosophers, or searchers after truth, it would be well if we always suspended a full judg ment or determination about any thing, and made farther enquiries, where this plain and perfect evidence is wanting; but we are so prone of ourselves to judge without full evidence, and in some cases the necessity of action in the affairs of life, constrains us to judge and determine upon a tolerable degree of evidence, that we vulgarly call those propositions certain, where we have but very little room or reason to doubt of them, though the evidence be not complete and resistless.

Certainty, according to the schools, is distinguished into objective and subjective. Objective certainty, is when the proposition is certainly true in itself; and subjective, when we are certain of the truth of it. The one is in things, the other is in our minds.

But let it be observed here, that every proposition in itself is certainly true or certainly false. For though doubtfulness or uncertainty seems to be a medium between certain truth and certain falsehood in our minds, yet there is no such medium in things themselves, no, not even in future events; for now at this time it is certain in itself, that Midsummer-day seven years hence will be serene, or it is certain it will be cloudy, though we are uncertain and utterly ignorant what sort of day it will be; this. certainty of distant futurities is known to God only.

Uncertain or dubious propositions, that is, opinions; are distinguished into probable, or improbable.

It may be objected, that this certainty and uncertainty being only in the mind, the division belongs to propositions rather according to the degrees of our assent, than the degrees of evidence. But it may well be answered, that the evidence bere intended is that which appears so to the mind, and not the mere evidence in the nature of things, besides, (as we shall shew immediately) the degree, of assent ought to be exactly proportionable to the degree of evidence; sad. therefore the difference is not great, whether propositions be called certain or unceriaip, according to the measure of evidence, or of assent.