SECT. IX.—Of a comprehensive Conception of Things, and of Abstraction.

THE third rule to direct our conceptions, requires us to conceive of things comprehensively. As we must survey an object in all its parts to obtain a complete idea of it, so we must consider it in all its modes, attributes, properties, and relations, in order to obtain a comprehensive conception of it.

The comprehension of an idea, as it was explained under the doctrine of universals, includes only the essential modes or attributes of that idea; but in this place the word is taken in a larger sense; and implies also the various occasional properties, accidental modes, and relations.

The necessity of this rule is founded upon the same reason as the former; namely, That our minds are narrow and scanty in their capacities, and as they are not able to consider all the parts of a complex idea at once, so neither can they at once contemplate all the different attributes and circumstances of it: we must therefore consider things successively and gradually in their various appearances and circumstances; as our natural eye cannot at once behold the six sides of a dye or cube, nor take cognizance of all the points that are marked on them, and therefore we turn up the sides successively, and thus survey and number the points that are marked on each side, that we may know the whole.

In order to a comprehensive view of any idea, we must first Consider whether the object of it has an existence as well as an essence whether it be a simple or complex idea; whether it be a substance or a mode; if it be a substance, then we must enquire what are the essential modes of it which are necessary to its nature, and what are those properties or accidents of it which belong to it occasionally, or as it is placed in some particular circumstances: we must view it in its internal and absolute modes, and observe it in those various external relations in which it stands to other beings: we must consider it in its powers and capacities either to do or suffer we must trace it up to its various causes whether supreme or subordinate. We must descend to the variety of its effects, and take notice of the several ends and designs which are to be attained by it. We must conceive of it as it is either an object or a subject, what are the things that are a-kin to it, and what are the opposites or contraries of it; for many things are to be known both by their contrary and their kindred ideas.

If the thing we discourse of be a mere mode, we must enquire whether it belongs to spirits or boies; whether it be a physical or moral mode; if moral, then we must consider its relation to God, to ourselves, to our neighbours; its reference to VOL. VII. В в

this life, or the life to come. If it be a virtue, we must seek what are the principles of it, what are the rules of it, what are the tendencies of it, and what are the false virtues that counterfeit it, and what are the real virtues that oppose it, what are the evils which attend the neglect of it, and what are the rewards of the practice of it both here and hereafter.

If the subject be historical, or a matter of fact, we may then enquire whether the action was done at all; whether it was done in such a manner, or by such persons as is reported; at what time it was done; in what place; by what motive, and for what design; what is the evidence of the fact, who are the witnesses; what is their character and credibility; what signs there are of such a fact; what concurrent circumstances which may either support the truth of it, or render it doubtful.

In order to make due enquiries into all these, and many other particulars which go towards the complete and comprehensive idea of any being, the science of ontology is exceeding necessary. This is what was wont to be called the first part of metaphysics in the peripatetic schools. It treats of being in its most general nature, and of all its affections and relations. I confess the old popish school-men have mingled a number of useless subtleties with this science; they have exhausted their own spirits, and the spirits of their readers, in many laborious and intricate trifles; and some of their writings have been fruitful of names without ideas, which have done much injury to the sacred study of divinity. Upon this account many of the moderns have most unjustly abandoned the whole science at once, and thrown abundance of contempt and raillery upon the very name of metaphysics; but this contempt and censure is very unreasonable, for this science, separated from some aristotelian fooleries, and scholastic subtleties, is so necessary to a distinct conception, solid judgment, and just reasoning on many subjects, that sometimes it is introduced as a part of Logic, and not without reason. And those, who utterly despise and ridicule it, either betray their own ignorance, or will be supposed to make their wit and banter a refuge and excuse for their own laziness. Yet thus much I would add, that the later writers of ontology are generally the best on this account, because they have left out much of the ancient jargon. See the brief scheme of ontology in the Philosophical Essays, by I. Watts.

Here let it be noted, that it is neither useful, necessary, or possible to run through all the modes, circumstances, and relations of every subject we take in hand; but in ontology we enumerate a great variety of them, that so a judicious mind may choose what are those circumstances, relations and properties of any subject, which are most necessary to the present design of him that speaks, or writes, either to explain, to illustrate, or to prove the point.

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As we arrive at the complete knowledge of an idea in all its parts, by that act of the mind which is called division, so we come to a comprehensive conception of a thing in its several properties and relations, by that act of the mind which is called abstraction; that is, we consider each single relation or property of the subject alone, and thus we do as it were withdraw, and separate it in our minds both from the subject itself, as well as from other properties and relations, in order to make a fuller observation of it.

This act of abstraction is said to be twofold, either precisive or negative.

1 Precisive abstraction is, when we consider those things apart which cannot really exist apart; as when we consider a mode, without considering its substance and subject, or one essential mode without another. Negative abstraction is, when we consider one thing separate from another, which may also exist without it; and when we conceive of a subject without conceiving of its accidental modes or relations; or when we conceive of one accident without thinking of another. If I think of reading or writing without the express idea of some man, this is precisive abstraction; or if I think of the attraction of iron, without the express idea of some particular magnetic body. But when I think of a needle without an idea of its sharpness, this is negative abstraction: and it is the same when I think of its sharpness without considering its length.

SECT. X.-Of the extensive Conception of Things, and of

Distribution.

AS the completeness of an idea refers to the several parts that compose it, and the comprehension of an idea includes its various properties, so the extension of an idea denotes the various sorts or kinds of beings to which the same idea belongs and if we would be fully acquainted with a subject, we must observe,

This fourth rule to direct our conceptions, namely, Conceive of things in all their extension; that is, we must search out the various species, or special natures which are contained under it, as a genus or general nature. If we would know the nature of an animal perfectly, we must take cognizance of beasts, birds, fishes, and insects, as well as men, all which are contained under the general nature and name of animal.

As an integral whole is distinguished into its several parts by division; so the word distribution is most properly used when we distinguish an universal whole into its several kinds or species; and perhaps it had been better if this word had been always confined to this signification, though it must be confessed, that we frequently speak of the division of an idea into its seve~! ral kinds, as well as into its several parts.

The rules of a good distribution are much the same with those which we have before applied to division, which may be just repeated again in the briefest manner, in order to give examples of them.

I. Rule. Each part singly taken must contain less than the whole, but all the parts taken collectively, or together, must contain neither more nor less than the whole; or as logicians sometimes express it, the parts of the division ought to exhaust the whole thing which is divided. So medicine is justly distributed into prophylactic, or the art of preserving health; and therapeutic, or the art of restoring health, for there is no other sort of medicine besides these two. But men are not well distributed into tall or short, for there are some of a middle stature.

II. In all distribution we should first consider the larger and more immediate kinds or species, or ranks of being, and not divide a thing at once into the more minute and remote. A genus should not at once be divided into individuals, or even into the lowest species, if there be a species superior. Thus it would be very improper to divide animal into trout, lobster, eel, dog, bear, eagle, dove, worm, and butterfly, for these are inferior kinds; whereas animal ought first to be distributed into man, beast, bird, fish, insect; and then beast should be distributed into deg, bear, &c. bird into eagle, dove, &c. fish into trout, eel, lobster, &c.

It is irregular also to join any inferior species in the same rank or order with the superior; as if we should distinguish animals into birds, bears, and oysters, &c. it would be a ridiculous distribution.

III. The several parts of a distribution ought to be opposite; that is, one species or class of beings in the same rank of division, ought not to contain or include another; so men ought not to be divided into the rich, the poor, the learned, and the tall; for poor men may be both learned and tall, and so may the rich.

But it will be objected, are not animated bodies rightly distributed into vegetative and animal, or (as they are usually called) sensitive? Now the sensitive contains the vegetative nature in it, for animals grow as well as plants. I answer, that in this, and all such distributions, the word vegetative signifies merely vegetative; and in this sense vegetative will be sufficiently opposite to animal, for it cannot be said of an animal, that it contains mere vegetation in the idea of it.

IV. Let not subdivisions be too numerous, without necessity; therefore I think quantity is better distinguished at onceinto a line, a surface, and a solid; than to say, as Ramus does, that quantity is either a line, or a thing lined; and a thing lined is either a surface or a solid.

V. Distribute every subject according to the special design you have in view, so far as is necessary or useful to your present enquiry. Thus a politician distributes mankind according to their civil characters into the rulers and the ruled; and a physician divides them into the sick or the healthy; but a divine distributes them into Turks, Heathens, Jews, or Christians.

Here note, That it is a very useless thing to distribute any idea into such kinds or members as have no different properties to be spoken of; as it is mere trifling to divide right angles into such whose legs are equal, and whose legs are unequal, for as to the mere right angles they have no different properties.

VI. In all your distributions observe the nature of things with great exactness; and do not affect any particular form of distribution, as some persons have done, by dividing every genus into two species, or into three species; whereas nature is infinitely various and human affairs and human sciences have as great a variety, nor is there any one form of distribution that will exactly suit with all subjects.

Note, It is to this doctrine of distribution of a genus into its several species, we must also refer the distribution of a cause according to its several effects, as some medicines are heating, some are cooling; or an effect, when it is distinguished by its causes; as faith is either built upon divine testimony or human. It is to this head we refer particular artificial bodies, when they are distinguished according to the matter they are made of, as a statue is either of brass, of marble, or wood, &c. and any other beings, when they are distinguished according to their end and design, as the furniture of body or mind is either for ornament or use. To this head also we refer subjects when they are divided according to their modes or accidents; as men are either merry, or grave, or sad; and modes, when they are divided by their subjects as distempers belong to the fluids, or to the solid parts of the animal.

It is also to this place we reduce the proposals of a difficulty under its various cases, whether it be in speculation or practice; as, to shew the reason of sun-beams burning wood, whether it be done by a convex glass or a concave or to shew the construction and mensuration of triangles, whether you have two angles and a side given, or two sides and an angle, or only three sides. Here it is necessary to distribute or divide a difficulty in all its cases, in order to gain a perfect knowledge of the subject you contemplate.

It might be observed here, that logicians have sometimes given a mark or sign to distinguish when it is an integral whole, that is divided into its parts or members, or when it is a genus, an universal whole, that is distributed into its species and individuals. The rule they give is this: whensoever the whole idea