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from the mind of man. This sort of relations are called by the schools entia rationis, or second notions, which have no real being, but by the operation of the mind.

III. The third division of modes shews us, they are either intrinsical or extrinsical. Intrinsical modes are conceived to be in the subject or substance, as when we say, a globe is round, or sæis, rolling or at rest: or when we say, a man is tall or leurned, these are intrinsie modes : but extrinsic modes are such as arise from something that is not in the subject or substance itself; but it is a manner of being, which some substances attain by reason of something that is external or foreign to the subject ; as, this globe lies within two yurils of the wall; or, this man is beloved, or hated. Note, such sort of modes, as this last example, are called erternal de nominations.

IV. There is a fourth division much a-kin to this, whereby modes are said to be inherent or adherent, that is, proper or improper. Adherent or improper modes arise from the joining of some accidental substance to the chief subject, which yet may be separated from it; so when a bowl is wet, or a boy is cloihed, these are adherent modes; for the water and the clothes are distinct substances, which adhere to the bowl or to the boy ; but when we say, the bowl is swift, or round; when we say the boy is strong or willy, these are proper or inherent modes, for they bave a sort of in-being in the substance itself, and do not arise from the addition of any other substance to it.

V. Action and passion are inodes or manners which belong to sabstances, and should not entirely be omitted here. When a smith with a hammer strikes a piece of iron, the hammer and the smith are both agents, or subjects of action; the one is the prime or supreme, the other the subordinate: the iron is the patient, or the subject of passion, in a philosophical sense, because it' receives the operation of the agent ; though this sense of the words passion and patient differs much from tlie vulgar meaning of them*.

VI. The sixth division of modes may be into physical, i. e. naturul, civil, moral, and supernatural. So when we consider the apostle Paul, who was a little man, a Roman by the privilege of bis birth, a man of virtue or bonesty, and an inspired Sapostle ; bis low stature is a physical mode, his being a Roman is a civil privilege, bis honesty is a moral consideration, and his being inspired is supernatural. »

12303 23108 VII. Modes belonging either to body, or to spirit, or to Boch. " Modes of body belong only to matier or to corporal be

203 he tu ilin , * Note, Agent signifies the doer, paliene the sufferer, action is doing, passion is suffering": "gent and action bave retained their origtoal nod philosophical sense, though patiepi and passion have acquired a pery different meaning in commoa language.

ings; and these are shape, size, situation, or place, &c. Modes of spirit belong only to minds; such are, knowledge, assent, dissent, doubting, reasoning, &c. Modes which belong to born have been sometimes called mixt modes, or human modes, Tor these are only found in human wature, which is compounded both of body and spirit; such are sensation, imagination, pussion, &c. in all which there is a concurrence of the operations both of mind and body, that is, of animal and intelleclual nature.

But the modes of body may be yet farther distinguished. Some of thein are primary modes or qualities, for they belong to bodies considered in themselves, whether there were any man to take notice of them or no; such are those before-mentioned, namely, shape, size, situation, &c. secondary qualities, or modes, are such ideas as we ascribe to bodies on account of the various impressions which are made on the senses of men by them, and tiese are called sensible qualities, which are very numerous ; such are all colours, as red, green, blue, &c. such are all sounds, as sharp, shrill, loud, hoarse ; all tastes, as siceet, bitter, sour; all smells, whether pleasant, offensive, or inditlerent; and all tactile qualities, or such as affect the touch or feeling, namely, heut, cold, &c. These are properly called secondary qualities, for though we are ready to conceive them as existing in the very bodies themselves which affect our senses, yet true philosophy has most undeniably proved, that all these are really various ide

or perceptions excited in buman vature, by the different impressions that bodies make upon our senses by their primary modes, that is, by means of the different shape, size, motion, and position, of those little invisible parts that compose them. Thence it follows, that a secondary quality, considered as in the bodies themselves, is nothing else but a power or aptitude to produce such sensations in us : See Locke's Essay on the Understanding, Book II. Chap. 8.

VIJI. I miglit add, in the last place, that as modes belong to substances, so there are some also that are but modes of other modes : for though they subsist in and by the substance, as the original subject of them, yet they are properly and directly attributed to some mode of that substance. Motion is the mode of a body; but the swifiness or sloveness of it, or its direction to the North or South, are but modes of motion. Walking is the mode or manner of a man, or of a beast; but walking gracefully implies a manner 'or mode superadded to that action. All comparative avd superlative degrees of any quality, are the modes of a mode, as swifier implies a greater measure of swiftness.

It would be too tedious here to run through all the modes, accidents, and relations at large that belong to various beings, and are copiously treated of in general in the science called metaphysics, or more properly ontology; they are also treated of

in particular in those sciences which have assumed them severally as their proper subjects. Sect. V.–Of the ten Categories. Of Substance modified.

WE have tbus given an account of the two chief objects of our ideas, namely, substances and modes, and their various, kinds : and in these last Sections we have briefly comprised the greatest part of what is necessary in the famous ten ranks of being, called the ten predicaments, or categories of Aristotle, on which there are endless volumes of discourses formed by several of his followers. But that the reader may not be utterly ignorant of them, let him know the names are these : substance, quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, where, when, situalion, and clothing. It would be mere loss of time to shew how loose, how injudicious, and even ridiculous, is this ten-fold division of things; and whatsoever farther relates to them, and which may tend to improve useful knowledge, should be sought in ontology, and in other sciences.

Besides substance and mode, some of the moderns would have us consider the substance modified, as a distinct object of our ideas ; but I think there is nothing more that need be said on this subject than this, namely, There is some difference between a substance when it is considered with all its modes about it

, or clothed in all its manners of existence, and when it is dis tinguished from them, and considered naked without them.

Sect. VI.- Of Not-being. AS being is divided into substance and mode, so we may consider not-being with regard to both these.

I. Not-being is considered as excluding all substance, and then all modes are also necessarily excluded ; and this we call pure nihility, or mere nothing.

This nothing is taken either in a vulgar or a philosophical sense ; so we say, there is nothing in the cup, in a vulgar sense, wlren we mean there is no liquor in it; but we cannot say

there is nothing in the cup, in a strict philosophical sense, where there is air in it, and perhaps a million of rays of light are there.

II. Nol-being, as it has relation to modes or inaoners of being, may be considered either as mere negation, or as a privation.

A negation is the absence of that which does not naturally belong to the things we are speaking of, or which has no right, obligation, or necessity to be present with it ; as when we say a slone is inanimate, or blind, or deaf, that is, it has no life, nor sight, nor hearing; nor when we say a carpenter or a fisherman is unlearned, these are mere negations.

But a privation is the absence of what does naturally belong to the things we are speaking of, or which ouglit to be pre

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sent with it, as when a man or a horse is deaf, or blind, or dead, or if a pbysician or a divine be unlearned, these are called privations ; so the sinfulness of any human action is said to be a pridation ; for sin is that want of conformity to the law of God, which ought to be found in every action of man.?!. -{{"" Note, 'There are some writers who make all sort of relative modes or relations, as well as all external denominations, to be mere creatures of the mind, and entia rationis,' and then they rank them also under the general head of not beings; but it is my opinion, that whatsoever may be determined concerning mere mental relations and external denominations, which seem to have something less of entity or being in them, yet there are many real relations, which ought not to be redaced to so low a class, such are the situation of bodies, their mutual distances, their particular proportions and measures, the notions of fatherhood, brotherhood, sonship, &c. all which are relative ideas. The very essence of virtue or holiness consists in the conformity of our actions to the rule of right reason, or the law of God: the nature and essence of sincerity is the conformity of our words and actions to our thoughts, all which are but mere relations ; and I think, we must not reduce such positive beings as "piety, and virtue, and truth, to the rank of non-entities, which have anothing real in them, though sin (or rather the sinfulness of an iaction) may be properly calleil a nol-being, for it is a want of piety and virtue. This is the most usual, and perhaps the justest way of representing these matters.

CHAP. III.Of the several Sorts of Perceptions or Ideas,

IDEAS may be divided with regard to their original, their nature, their objects, and their qualities.

3 Sect. I.--- Of sensible, spiritual, and abstracted Ideas...“ % There has been a great controversy about the origin of ideas, namely, whiether

any of our ideas are innate or no, that is, born with us, and naturally belonging to our minds. Mr.' Locke utterly denies'it; others 'as positively affirmn it. Now; though this controversy may be compromised, by allowing that there is

sepse, wherein our first ideas of somo things may be said to be innate, as I have shewn in some reinarks on Mr. Locke's Essay, (which have lain long by me) yet it does not belong to this place and business to have that point debated at large, nur' will it hinder our pursuit of the present work to pass it over in silence. ,

There is sufficient ground to say, that all our ideas, with regard to their original, may be divided into three sorts, namely, sensible, spiritual, and abstracled ideas.

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Lind Sensible or corporeal ideas, are derived originally from bur senses, and from the communication which the soul has with the animal body in this present state ; such are the nations we frame of wall colours, sounds, tastes, figures or shapes, and motions: for our seases, being conversant about particular sensible objects, become the occasions of several distinct perceptions iy the mind, and thus we come by the ideas of yellow, white, beat, cold, soft, bard, bitter, sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities. All the ideas which we have of body and the sensible inodes and properties that belong to it, seein to be derived from sensation.

And howsoever these may be treasured up in the memory, and by the work of fancy may be increased, diminished, compounded, divided, and diversified, (which we are ready to call our intention) yet they all derive their first pature and being from something that has been let into our minds by one or other of our senses. If I think of a goldeo mouutain, or a sea of liquid fire, yet the single ideas of sea, fire, mountain, and gold, came into my thoughts at first by sensation; the mind bas only compounded them.

II.* Spiritual or intellectual ideas are those which we gain by reflecting on the nature and actions of our owy souls, and tärning our thoughts within ourselves, and observing what is transacted in our own minds. Such are the ideas we have of thought, assent, dissent, judging, reason, knowledge, understanding, will, love, fear, hope.

By sensation the soul contemplates things, as it were, out of itself, and gains corporeal representations or sensible ideas : by reflection the soul contemplates itself and things within itself, and by this means it gains spiritual ideas, or representations of things intellectual.

Here it may be noted, though the first original of these two sorts of ideas, namely, sensible and spiritual, may be entirely owing to these two principles, sensation and reflection, yet the recollection and fresh excitation of them may be owing to a thousand other occasions and occurrences of life. We could never inform a man who was borp bliud or deal, what we mean by the words yellow, blue, red, or by the words loud, or shrill, nor convey, any just ideas of these things to his mind, by all the powers of language, ugless he has experienced those sensations of sound and colour ; . nor could we ever gain the ideas of thought, judgment, rcason, doubting, hoping, &c. by all the words that map could invent without turning our thoughts inward upon the actions of our own souls. Yet when once we have attained diwalio 16 daft ligione 109 ord - spiritual" is used in a mere patura), and not in a re

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