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from the mind of man. This sort of relations are called by the schools entia rationis, or second notions, which have no real being, but by the operation of the mind.

III. The third division of modes shews us, they are either intrinsical or extrinsical. Intrinsical modes are conceived to be in the subject or substance, as when we say, a globe is round, or swift, rolling or at rest or when we say, a man is tall or learned, These are intrinsie modes: but extrinsic modes are such as arise from something that is not in the subject or substance itself; but it is a manner of being, which some substances attain by reason of something that is external or foreign to the subject; as, this globe lies within two yards of the wall; or, this man is beloved, or hated. Note, such sort of modes, as this last example, are called external denominations.

IV. There is a fourth division much a-kin to this, whereby modes are said to be inherent or adherent, that is, proper or improper. Adherent or improper modes arise from the joining of some accidental substance to the chief subject, which yet may be separated from it; so when a bowl is wet, or a boy is clothed, these are adherent modes; for the water and the clothes are distinct substances, which adhere to the bowl or to the boy; but when we say, the bowl is swift, or round; when we say the boy is strong or witty, these are proper or inherent modes, for they bave a sort of in-being in the substance itself, and do not arise. from the addition of any other substance to it.

V. Action and passion are modes or manners which belong to substances, and should not entirely be omitted here. When a smith with a hammer strikes a piece of iron, the hammer and the smith are both agents, or subjects of action; the one is the prime or supreme, the other the subordinate: the iron is the patient, or the subject of passion, in a philosophical sense, because it receives the operation of the agent; though this sense of the words passion and patient differs much from the vulgar meaning of them*.

VI. The sixth division of modes may be into physical, i. e. natural, civil, moral, and supernatural. So when we consider the apostle Paul, who was a little man, a Roman by the privilege of his birth, a man of virtue or honesty, and an inspired apostle; his low stature is a physical mode, his being a Roman is a civil privilege, his honesty is a moral consideration, and his being inspired is supernatural.

VII. Modes belonging either to body, or to spirit, or to both. Modes of body belong only to matter or to corporal be

Note, Agent signifies the doer, patient the sufferer, action is doing, passion is suffering agent and action have retained their original and philosophical sense, though patient and passion have acquired a very different meaning in common language.

ings; and these are shape, size, situation, or place, &c. Modes of spirit belong only to minds; such are, knowledge, assent, dissent, doubting, reasoning, &c. Modes which belong to both have been sometimes called mixt modes, or human modes, for these are only found in human nature, which is compounded both of body and spirit; such are sensation, imagination, pussion, &c. in all which there is a concurrence of the operations both of mind and body, that is, of animal and intellectual nature.

But the modes of body may be yet farther distinguished. Some of them are primary modes or qualities, for they belong to bodies considered in themselves, whether there were any man to take notice of them or no; such are those before-mentioned, namely, shape, size, situation, &c. secondary qualities, or modes, are such ideas as we ascribe to bodies on account of the various impressions which are made on the senses of men by them, and these are called sensible qualities, which are very numerous; such are all colours, as red, green, blue, &c. such are all sounds, as sharp, shrill, loud, hoarse; all tastes, as sweet, bitter, sour; all smells, whether pleasant, offensive, or indifferent; and all tactile qualities, or such as affect the touch or feeling, namely, heat, cold, &c. These are properly called secondary qualities, for though we are ready to conceive them as existing in the very bodies themselves which affect our senses, yet true philosophy has most undeniably proved, that all these are really various ideas or perceptions excited in human nature, by the different impressions that bodies make upon our senses by their primary modes, that is, by means of the different shape, size, motion, and position, of those little invisible parts that compose them. Thence it follows, that a secondary quality, considered as in the bodies themselves, is nothing else but a power or aptitude to produce such sensations in us: See Locke's Essay on the Understanding, Book II. Chap. 8.

VIII. I might add, in the last place, that as modes belong to substances, so there are some also that are but modes of other modes for though they subsist in and by the substance, as the original subject of them, yet they are properly and directly attributed to some mode of that substance. Motion is the mode of a body; but the swiftness or slowness of it, or its direction to the North or South, are but modes of motion. Walking is the mode or manner of a man, or of a beast; but walking gracefully implies a manner or mode superadded to that action. All comparative and superlative degrees of any quality, are the modes of a mode, "as swifter implics a greater measure of swiftness.

It would be too tedious here to run through all the modes, accidents, and relations at large that belong to various beings, and are copiously treated of in general in the science called metaphysics, or more properly ontology; they are also treated of

in particular in those sciences which have assumed them severally as their proper subjects.

SECT. V. Of the ten Categories. Of Substance modified.

WE have thus given an account of the two chief objects of our ideas, namely, substances and modes, and their various. kinds and in these last Sections we have briefly comprised the greatest part of what is necessary in the famous ten ranks of being, called the ten predicaments, or categories of Aristotle, on which there are endless volumes of discourses formed by several of his followers. But that the reader may not be utterly ignorant of them, let him know the names are these: substance, quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, where, when, situation, and clothing. It would be mere loss of time to shew how loose, how injudicious, and even ridiculous, is this ten-fold division of things; and whatsoever farther relates to them, and which may tend to improve useful knowledge, should be sought in ontology, and in other sciences.

Besides substance and mode, some of the moderns would have us consider the substance modified, as a distinct object of our ideas; but I think there is nothing more that need be said on this subject than this, namely, There is some difference between a substance when it is considered with all its modes about it, or clothed in all its manners of existence, and when it is distinguished from them, and considered naked without them.

SECT. VI.-Of Not-being.

AS being is divided into substance and mode, so we may consider not-being with regard to both these.

I. Not-being is considered as excluding all substance, and then all modes are also necessarily excluded; and this we call pure nihility, or mere nothing.

This nothing is taken either in a vulgar or a philosophical sense; so we say, there is nothing in the cup, in a vulgar sense, when we mean there is no liquor in it; but we cannot say there is nothing in the cup, in a strict philosophical sense, where there is air in it, and perhaps a million of rays of light are there.

II. Not-being, as it has relation to modes or manners of being, may be considered either as mere negation, or as a privation.

A negation is the absence of that which does not naturally belong to the things we are speaking of, or which has no right, obligation, or necessity to be present with it; as when we say a stone is inanimate, or blind, or deaf, that is, it has no life, nor sight, nor hearing; nor when we say a carpenter or a fisherman is unlearned, these are mere negations.

But a privation is the absence of what does naturally be long to the things we are speaking of, or which ought to be pre

sent with it, as when a man or a horse is deaf, or blind, or dead, or if a physician or a divine be unlearned, these are called privations; so the sinfulness of any human action is said to be a privation; for sin is that want of conformity to the law of God, which ought to be found in every action of man. T

Note, 'There are some writers who make all sort of relative modes or relations, as well as all external denominations, to be mere creatures of the mind, and entia rationis, and then they rank them also under the general head of not beings; but it is my opinion, that whatsoever may be determined concerning mere mental relations and external denominations, which seem to have something less of entity or being in them, yet there are many real relations, which ought not to be reduced to so low a class, such are the situation of bodies, their mutual distances, their particular proportions and measures, the notions of fatherhood, brotherhood, sonship, &c. all which are relative ideas: The very essence of virtue or holiness consists in the conformity of our actions to the rule of right reason, or the law of God: the nature and essence of sincerity is the conformity of our words and actions to our thoughts, all which are but mere relations; and I think, we must not reduce such positive beings as piety, and virtue, and truth, to the rank of non-entities, which have nothing real in them, though sin (or rather the sinfulness of an action) may be properly called a not-being, for it is a want of piety and virtue. This is the most usual, and perhaps the justest way of representing these matters.

CHAP IIIOf the several Sorts of Perceptions or Ideas.

IDEAS may be divided with regard to their original, their nature, their objects, and their qualities.

SECT. I.—Of sensible, spiritual, and abstracted Ideas.

There has been a great controversy about the origin of ideas, namely, whether any of our ideas are innate or no, that is, born with us, and naturally belonging to our minds. Mr. Locke utterly denies it; others as positively affirm it. Now, though this controversy may be compromised, by allowing that there is a sense, wherein our first ideas of some things may be said to be innate, as I have shown in some remarks on Mr. Locke's Essay, (which have lain long by me) yet it does not belong to this place and business to have that point debated at large, nor will it hinder our pursuit of the present work to pass it over in silence.

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There is sufficient ground to say, that all our ideas, with regard to their original, may be divided into three sorts, namely, sensible, spiritual, and abstracted ideas.

Sensible or corporeal ideas, are derived originally from bur senses, and from the communication which the soul has with the animal body in this present state; such are the notions we frame of vall colours, sounds, tastes, figures or shapes, and motions for our seases, being conversant about particular sensible objects, become the occasions of several distinct percep tions in the mind, and thus we come by the ideas of yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities. All the ideas which we have of body and the sensible modes and properties that belong to it, seem to be derived from sensation.

And howsoever these may be treasured up in the memory, and by the work of fancy may be increased, diminished, compounded, divided, and diversified, (which we are ready to call our invention) yet they all derive their first nature and being from something that has been let into our minds by one or other of our senses. If I think of a golden mountain, or a sea of liquid fire, yet the single ideas of sea, fire, mountain, and gold, came iuto my thoughts at first by sensation; the mind has only compounded them.

*I* Spiritual or intellectual ideas are those which we gain by reflecting on the nature and actions of our own souls, and turning our thoughts within ourselves, and observing what is transacted in our own minds. Such are the ideas we have of thought, assent, dissent, judging, reason, knowledge, understanding, will, love, fear, hope.

By sensation the soul contemplates things, as it were, out of itself, and gains corporeal representations or sensible ideas : by reflection the soul contemplates itself and things within itself, and by this means it gains spiritual ideas, or representations of things intellectual.

Here it may be noted, though the first original of these two sorts of ideas, namely, sensible and spiritual, may be entirely owing to these two principles, sensation and reflection, yet the recollection and fresh excitation of them may be owing to a thonsand other occasions and occurrences of life. We could never inform a man who was born blind or deaf, what we mean by the words yellow, blue, red, or by the words loud or shrill, nor convey any just ideas of these things to his mind, by all the powers of language, unless he has experienced those sensations of sound and colour; nor could we ever gain the ideas of thought, judgment, reason, doubting, hoping, &c, by all the words that man could invent without turning our thoughts inward upon the actions of our own souls. Yet when once we have attained

Yet when once

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Here the word spiritual" is used in a mere natural, and not in a rewasbi lavoucija bus lustrage aldiame

ligious sense.