her. But does this shew that the Greeks had no statues of Vesta? At Athens there was one in the d Prytaneum near the statue of peace. The people of Iasos boasted that they possessed one, upon which, although it stood in the open air, neither snow nor rain ever fell. Pliny mentions one, in a sitting posture, from the hand of Scopas, which, in his time, might be seen in the Servilian garden, at Rome(28). And, allowing that it is not easy for us to distinguish a mere Vestal priestess from the goddess herself, does this prove that the ancients could not, much more did not wish to, draw this distinction ? Certain emblems of art are manifestly more in favour of the one than of the other. The sceptre, the torch, the palladium can only be presumed to be in the hand of a goddess. The cymbal, which Codinus attributes to her, might perhaps belong to her, only as the Earth; or Codinus may not have really known what it was he saw(29). c Pausanias Corinth, Lib. ii. cap. 35. sect. 1. d Pausanias Attic, Lib. i. cap. 18. sect. 3. * Polyb. Hist. Lib. xvi. ii. Oper. vol. ii. p. 443, Edit. Ernesti. CHAPTER X. I go on to notice an expression of surprise in Spence, which most significantly proves how little reflection he can have bestowed upon the nature of the limits of Art and Painting. "As to the muses in general, he says, it is re"markable that the poets say but little of them in "a descriptive way; much less than might indeed "be expected for deities, to whom they were so "particularly obliged."a What does this mean, if not that he feels surprised that, when the poet speaks of the deities, he does not do it in the dumb speech of the painter? Urania, with the poets, is the muse of astronomy; from her name and her performances we at once recognise her office. The artist, in order to render it palpable, represents her pointing with a wand to a globe of the heavens. This wand, this celestial globe, and this posture, are, as it were, his type, from which he leaves us to collect the name Urania. But when the poet wishes to say that "Urania had a Polymetis, Dial viii, p. 91. long ago foreseen his death in the aspect of the stars, Ipsa diu positis lethum prædixerat astris why should he, out of respect to the painter, subjoin, “Urania, wand in hand, and heavenly globe before her? Would it not be as though a man, who could and might speak clearly, should still make use of those signs, upon which the mutes in the Seraglios of the Turks, from an inability to articulate, have agreed among themselves? . с Spence again expresses the same surprise at the moral beings, or those divinities, to whom the ancients allotted the superintendence of virtues, or whom they supposed to preside over the conduct and events of human life. "It is observable," he says, that the Roman poets say less of the best "of these moral beings, than might be expected. "The artists are much fuller on this head; and 'one, who would settle what appearances each of "them made, should go to the medals of the Roman "emperors. The poets, in fact, speak of them 66 very often as persons; but of their attributes, "their dress, and the rest of their figure they "generally say but little." b C Statius, Theb. viii. 551. Polymetis, Dial. x. p. 137. d Polymetis, Dial. x. p. 134. When the poet personifies abstractions, they are sufficiently characterised by their names, and the actions, which he represents them as performing. The artist does not command these means. He is therefore compelled to add to his personified abstractions some emblems, by which they may be easily recognised. These emblems, since they are different and have different significations, constitute them allegorical figures. A female form, with a bridle in her hand, another, leaning against a pillar, are, in art, allegorical beings. On the contrary, with the poets, temperance and constancy are not allegorical beings, but personified abstractions. The invention of these emblems was forced upon artists by necessity. For thus only could they make it understood what this or that figure was intended to signify. But why should the poet allow that to be forced upon him, to which the artists have only been driven by a necessity, in which he bimself has no share? What causes Spence so much surprise deserves to be prescribed, as a general law, to poets. They must not convert the necessities of painting into a part of their own wealth. They must not look upon the instruments, which art has invented for the sake of following poetry, as perfections, of which they have any cause to be envious. When an artist clothes an image with symbols, he exalts a mere statue to a higher being. But, if the poet makes use of these artistic decorations, he degrades a higher being into a puppet. This rule is as invariably confirmed by the practice of the ancients; as its intentional violation is invariably the favourite fault of modern poets. All their imaginary beings appear masqued, and the artists, who are most familiar with the details of this masquerade, generally understand least of the principal work, viz. how to make their beings act in such a way, that their actions indicate their character. Still, among the emblems with which the artists characterise their abstractions, there is a class, which is more capable, and more deserving, of being adopted by the poets. I mean those, which possess nothing properly allegorical, but are to be considered less as emblems than as instruments, of which the beings, to whom they are attributed, should they be called upon to act as real persons, would or could make use. The bridle in the hand of Temperance, the pillar, against which Constancy is leaning, are entirely allegorical, and therefore of no use whatever to the poet. The scales in the hand of Justice are somewhat less so; because the right use of the scales is really a part of justice. But the lyre or flute in the hand of a Muse, the lance in the hand of Mars, the hammer and tongs in the hands of Vulcan, are in reality not symbols, but simply instruments, without which |