for their generous coöperation in our plans, and it should be urged that the selections which appear in this Series, while adequate to the object sought, do not fairly represent the value of the works from which they are taken. The compilers also express their indebtedness to Elbert H. Gary, Esq., of New York City, for his ample provision of materials consulted in the Gary Library of Ancient and Primitive Law (in Northwestern University). A. K., J. H. W. ADDENDUM TO PREFACE TWENTY-FIVE years ago, while living in Japan, I became interested in the sources of old Japanese law. On turning over its then unpublished materials, I discovered that its institutions, point for point, showed parallel legal ideas, and sometimes (amidst influences totally independent) a striking similarity of development with the Occident. I was led to study these ideas from the comparative point of view. As yet a novice in the world of legal thought, I came under the fascination of what is called comparative law (or, as it may preferably be named, universal legal ideas). And I felt a wish and hope to cultivate that field especially. The world-wide spell of Maine's "Ancient Law" (published nearly a generation before) was still unique. Fustel's "Ancient City," its contemporary in France, had established a new point of view. Little or nothing more had been done by AngloAmerican scholars; Tylor, Lubbock, Morgan, MacLennan, had not emphasized the legal element in evolution, nor its continuity and universality. Even on the Continent the science of comparative law was but summoning its adherents and marshalling its materials. Dareste was just publishing (1889) his first series of "Etudes." Post's "Ursprung des Rechts" (1876), "Bausteine" (1880), and "Grundlagen" (1884), were beginning to receive a hearing. Kohler's "Zeitschrift" had been started a decade before (1878). Tarde's "Transformations du droit" (1893), Letourneau's "Evolution juridique" (1891), and Leist's" Alt-arisches jus" (1889, 1892), were yet in manuscript. In a published study (now forgotten by the learned world) on "The Pledge-Idea," I satisfied myself there were great possibilities in the tracing of the evolution of universal legal ideas. I can see now, in the light of what others have since done, how much more there is in the philosophy of the subject than I then imagined. But that early experience convinced me in a personal way that the subject had a real claim upon us and a great future, - immensely greater than the then state of the literature might indicate. Circumstances obstructed my wish to pursue the task, and it was laid aside as a dream. But, through the kindness of my colleague, the opportunity has now after all been afforded to me to take a share in the work awaiting to be done in this fascinating field. I obtrude here this personal statement because I have a sentimental interest in thus returning to the science of my early hopes. And it will perhaps be interesting to some to be reminded how long we have been waiting in Anglo-America to take up into our scientific legal thought the study of this culminating and comprehensive subject. Maine's inspiring call has echoed all through these fifty years. For part of that time, the materials for general study were perhaps hardly worth while. But now they are plentiful. The hope of the editors of this work is that it will provide at once a stimulus and an opportunity for a general interest in the subject, and will help it to take its rightful place in legal studies. J. H. W. |