72 SCHEME FOR THE INVASION OF EGYPT. altogether failed of success. Fearful, however, that the French interference, which was so paramount at Constantinople, would be extended to Egypt, a plan for the invasion of that province was drawn up by General Fox, at Messina, and an armament of five thousand men was despatched, under Major General Mackenzie, for Alexandria. This place had been represented by Major Missett, our consul there, as favourable to the English, whose army was good, and the officers experienced; but the measure failed of success. Of what possible use was such a mere handful of troops, in so deadly a climate, and in a hostile and distant country? The possession of Egypt, to be sure, was of the utmost consequence to the French, and had for ages been the darling object of cupidity with her politicians. It is wrong to suppose that the scheme of Egyptian conquest originated with Napoleon Bonaparte. It is as old as the time of Sanuto, the Venetian. He mentions the subjugation of Egypt, by the Europeans, as the most effectual blow which could be struck against the towering power of the Crescent; and, for the objects of traffic, he strongly recommended this enterprize to the government. Count Feliasi, speaking of Sanuto's advice, has these remarkable words" Si lo avessero fatto, il traffico dell' Indie orientali forse non sarebbe fuggito dalle loro mani." And Count Daru has the following passage: "En Egypte, ils (the Venetians) firent et renouvellèrent souvent des traités avec le gouvernement du pays; ils se conformèrent à l'esprit du siècle, en sollicitant l'autorisation du Pape pour trafiquer avec les Mahométans; mais, en mêmetemps, ils ne se faisaient pas scrupule de condescendre aux erreurs des infidèles, en intitulant leurs traités, Au nom du Seigneur, et de Mahomet. Leurs relations ne purent être, dans cette contrée, ni si étendues, ni si amicales qu'en Asie: aussi plus d'une fois conçurent-ils l'idée d'en faire la conquête: Marin Sanuto la leur conseillait, en leur disant que cette possession les rendrait mâitres de tout le commerce de l'Orient; que la communication de l'Inde avec la Méditerrannée, par la Mer Rouge, était la plus courte, la plus économique, et la plus sûre; qu'il n'était pas impossible d'établir une communication entre la Mer Rouge, et le Nil; qu'indépendamment du commerce de l'Inde, il y avait, sur la côte orientale de cette mer, un pays abondant en aromates et en parfumes (plus tard on y aurait ajouté le Café); que l'Afrique elle-même offrait une riche matière au commerce, par son or, et son ivoire; qu'enfin la possession de l'Egypte, pour une puissance maritime de la Méditerrannée, était préférable à la possession des Indes. Il ajoutait que les Vénetiens étoient alors la seule nation en état de tenter cette conquête.” -Histoire de Venice, pp. 75, 76. tom. 3. Leibnitz, too, sent a memorial on the subject to Louis XIV. He advises the Grand Monarch to lay hold of the land of the Pharaohs, for the purpose of destroying the maritime and commercial ascendancy of the Dutch" Hollandi," says the philosopher, "ex Egypto commerciis Indicis nullo negotio depillentur, quibus omnis eorum potentia hodie niti tur ; et longe certius, rectiusque affligirentur quam fieri possit maximo successu belli aperti." Bonaparte, it will, therefore, be seen, only revived, by his invasion of Egypt, an old theory. For Holland place Great Britain, and the position of the philosopher's terms remains equally perfect. It is not to be wondered at, that, notwithstanding the stipulation in the treaty of Amiens, with respect to Egypt, both France and England should yet have been constantly striving to establish friendly communications in the country. Elfy would have proved an invaluable person to the latter, had he possessed, in an equal degree, that energy of mind so conspicuous in Mahomed; or, if no opponents like Mahomed had been in the field. But the French had gained over the subtler and stronger spirit, and the fortune of the day was theirs. The English expedition to Egypt proved entirely unsuccessful. It landed there on the 17th of March, 1807, and sailed away, according to agreement with the Pacha, on the 14th of September following, for Sicily. Our small army suffered, during that space, most dreadfully. General Wancof, commanding the chasseurs Britanniques, was killed before Rosetta, where many of our brave men fell. Four hundred and fifty of their heads were publicly exposed at Cairo. Many prisoners, too, were taken, and conducted to that city. The enterprize, on the part of the English ministry, was wrong in principle; childish in execution, from scantiness of numbers; and, as it is known, unfortunate in its result. The very best thing for Great Britain, that Napoleon could have undertaken, would have been a second expedition to Egypt. The advantage, then, would have been ours in every way. In the first place, the expedition owing to the unhappy fate of the army under Menou, was of a most unpopular character throughout all the French empire. Next, we might have met their armament at sea, and destroyed it. Then the Egyptians, themselves, would have risen against the army of France; for they, and most certainly their ruler, would have been most inimical to a foreign domination-particularly, as he had played so deep and difficult a game to win his Viceroyalty from the Ottoman. And, finally, that measure which could have drawn away any portion of the French Emperor's army from the plains of Europe, and thus narrowed, there, his sphere of action and annoyance, would have favoured the cause of Eng |