to other departments of Christian theology,-as, for instance, the doctrine of the Trinity,-to assume, as these objections do,—that we are entitled to make our actual perception of, or our capacity of perceiving, the consistency of two doctrines with each other, the test or standard of their truth. We do not pretend to be able to solve all the difficulties connected with the alleged inconsistency between the peculiar doctrines of Calvinism, and the truths that God is not the author of sin, and that man is responsible for his character and conduct, so as make their consistency with each other plain and palpable to our own minds or the minds of others; but we cannot admit that this affords any sufficient reason why we should reject one or other of the doctrines, provided each separately can be established upon competent and satisfactory evidence. 3d, The difficulties in question do not apply to the Calvinistic system alone, but bear as really, though not perhaps at first view as palpably, upon every system of religion which admits the moral government of God, the prevalence of moral evil among His intelligent creatures, and their future eternal punishment. Indeed, it is easy to show, that the leading difficulties connected with every scheme of doctrine virtually run up into one great difficulty, which attaches, and attaches equally, to them all, viz., the explanation of the existence and prevalence of moral evil ; or,— what is practically the same question, in another form,—the exposition of the way and manner in which God and men concur (for none but atheists can deny that in some way or other they do concur) in forming men's character and in determining men's fate. This subject involves difficulties which we cannot, in our present condition, fully solve; and which we must just resolve into the good pleasure of God. They are difficulties from which no scheme. of doctrine can escape, and which every scheme is equally bound, and at the same time equally incompetent, to explain. Men may shift the position of the one grand difficulty, and may imagine that they have succeeded at least in evading it, or putting it in abeyance or obscurity; but with all their shifts and all their expedients, it continues as real and as formidable as ever. Unless men renounce altogether, theoretically or practically, the moral government of God, the prevalence of moral evil, and its eternal punishment, they must, in their explanations and speculations, come at length to the sovereignty of God, and prostrate their understandings and their hearts before it, saying with our Saviour, "Even so, Father, for so it hath seemed good in Thy sight;" or with the great apostle, "O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are His judgments, and His ways past finding out! For who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been His counsellor? Or who hath first given to Him, and it shall be recompensed to Him again? For of Him, and through Him, and to Him, are all things; to whom be glory for ever. Amen."* *Rom. xi. 33-36. CALVINISM, AND THE DOCTRINE OF PHILOSOPHICAL NECESSITY.* In his "Discussions," Sir William Hamilton makes a theological demonstration, of a somewhat imposing kind. It is contained in the following passage :- "Averments to a similar effect might be adduced from the writings of Calvin, and certainly nothing can be conceived more contrary to the doctrine of that great divine than what has latterly been promulgated as Calvinism (and, in so far as I know, without reclamation), in our Calvinistic Church of Scotland. For it has been here promulgated, as the dogma of this church (though in the face of its Confession as in the face of the Bible), by pious and distinguished theologians, that man has no will, agency, moral personality of his own, God being the only real agent in every apparent act of His creatures; in short (though quite the opposite was intended), that the theological scheme of the absolute decrees implies fatalism, pantheism, the negation of a moral governor, as of a moral world. For the premises, arbitrarily assumed, are atheistic, the conclusion, illogically drawn, is Christian. Against such a view of Calvin's doctrine and of Scottish orthodoxy, I for one must humbly though solemnly protest, as (to speak mildly) not only false in philosophy, but heretical, ignorant, suicidal in theology."+ This strange passage was intended as a deadly assault upon Dr Chalmers, and upon the views which he had promulgated upon * British and Foreign Evangelical | Reform." By Sir WILLIAM HAMILTON, Review. January 1858. Bart. Second Edition, 1853. † Discussions, p. 628. "Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University The doctrine here so the subject of philosophical necessity. vehemently denounced cannot, from the nature of the case, be any other than that commonly called the doctrine of philosophical necessity; and though many will regard what is here said as very unjust and unfair, if viewed as applied to that subject, there is manifestly no other to which these statements can have any appearance of applying. When it is settled that the doctrine which Sir William here denounces is that of philosophical necessity,—and that, of course, the pious and distinguished theologians who are here held up to scorn are Dr Chalmers, and all who, professing like him to receive the Westminster Confession, have concurred with him in maintaining the doctrine of necessity as taught by Jonathan Edwards,―men will be able to understand something more of the import and object of the passage. We do not of course intend to plunge into the mare magnum of the general subject of philosophical necessity as connected with "absolute decrees," "fatalism," "pantheism," "negation of a moral governor," etc., on which Sir William here declaims. The general subject brought before us by these statements is the most perplexing and mysterious that has ever occupied the mind of man. No one acquainted with the discussions which have taken place regarding it, can fail to have reached these two conclusions:-1st, That everything of any worth or value that can be said upon the subject, has been said in substance a thousand times; and, 2d, That after all that has been said, there are difficulties and mysteries connected with it which never have been fully solved, and which manifestly never will be fully solved,—at least until men get either more enlarged mental faculties, or a fuller revelation from God. The practical result of the adoption of these conclusions,which must have forced themselves upon all who have intelligently surveyed this subject,-is to render men rather averse to unneces sary discussions regarding it,-to make them less anxious about answering objections and clearing away difficulties,—and more willing to rest upon those fundamental principles which constitute the direct and proper evidence of what seems to be the truth upon the point. This state of mind and feeling,-the reasonable result of a deliberate survey of the discussions which have taken place upon the matter,-is sanctioned also by the example of the Apostle Paul, who, when the same objections were brought against his doctrines as have in all ages been brought against Calvinism, resolved the whole matter into the inscrutable sovereignty of God and the ignorance and helplessness of man, instead of directly and formally grappling with the objection. Sir William Hamilton's own views upon the subject are of a kind fitted to discourage,—if not to preclude, discussion; especially discussion conducted in the way of bringing the opposite doctrines face to face, and trying to make an estimate of the comparative force of the objections against them. His views are briefly indicated in the following passages: "The philosophy, therefore, which I profess, annihilates the theoretical problem,-How is the scheme of liberty or the scheme of necessity to be rendered comprehensible?—by showing that both schemes are equally inconceivable; but it establishes liberty practically as a fact, by showing that it is either itself an immmediate datum, or is involved in an immediate datum, of consciousness." * "How the will can possibly be free must remain to us, under the present limitation of our faculties, wholly incomprehensible. We are unable to coneeive an absolute commencement; we cannot, therefore, conceive a free volition. A determination by motives cannot, to our understanding, escape from necessitation." † "How, therefore, I repeat moral liberty is possible in man or God, we are utterly unable speculatively to understand. But practically, the fact, that we are free, is given to us in the consciousness of an uncompromising law of duty, in the consciousness of our moral accountability."† "Liberty is thus shown to be inconceivable, but not more than its contradictory necessity; yet though inconceivable, liberty is shown also not to be impossible. The credibility of consciousness, to our moral responsibility, as an incomprehensible fact, is thus established.” ‡ "This hypothesis alone accounts for the remarkable phenomenon which the question touching the liberty of the will-touching the necessity of human actions, has in all ages and in all relations exhibited. This phenomenon is the exact equilibrium in which the controversy has continued; and it has been waged in metaphysics, in morals, in theology, from the origin of speculation to the present hour, with unabated zeal, but always with undecided success." § It appears from these statements that Sir William, by his own admission, has thrown no new light upon this subject; and that he claims credit for scarcely anything more than bringing out clearly, by an application of the doctrine of the conditioned, that there are, and must ever be, insoluble difficulties attaching to it. Reid's Works, p. 599, note. "Discussions," p. 624. "Discussions," p. 630. |