AN APPENDIX

To the three foregoing Sermons, wherein two important Questions about TRUTH and LYING, are debated at la ge

QUESTION I.

IF I have a good and valuable end in speaking, and my design is to serve the glory of God, or the good of my neighbour, may I not then use the art of lying, or speak a Lnown falsehood, without sin? Did not Rahab the harlot practise this; Josh. ii. 4, 5. when she hid the spies of Israel, and told the messengers of the king of Jericho, that she knew not whence they came, nor whither they went? And yet she is commended by the apostle Paul; Heb. xi. 31. That by faith the harlot Rahab perished not with unbelievers, when she received the spies in peace.

Answer I. When any action, considered in itself, is utterly unlawful, it is not possible that the goodness of the end or design, can so change the law of God, or alter the nature of things, as to make that action lawful. The apostle Paul brings the same objection; Rom. iii. 7. If the truth of God hath more abounded through my lie unto his glory, why am I judged as a sinner? But in the next verse, he speaks of it with indignation, as a heinous slander cast upon him, that he should maintain this pernicious doctrine, Let us do exil that good may come: And he adds concerning these slanderers, or concerning those who hold this doctrine of doing evil with a good design, that their damnation is just; ver. 8.

Answer II. The case of Rahab is easily adjusted in this manner, without allowing a lie to be lawful: Rahab, though she was a woman of evil fame in Jericho, yet had heard of the promise of God to Israel, to establish them in the land of Canaan; she believed this promise, and under the influence of this faith she entertained the spies, and thereby assisted the Israelites in the conquest of that city; so far her action is approved of God, and mentioned with honour: But she used a very sinful method in compassing this design, when she told a plain lie to the messengers of the king. The timorousness of her temper was a sore temptation to her; and though she fell into a criminal action, yet God so far excused the ill conduct, as to forgive the falsehood, and thereby put a more signal honour upon the eminence of her faith. Her name stands therefore recorded with honour in scripture among believers. But the lie, though it was pardoned, remains still a blemish to her character.

There may be also a reason given why the scripture does not particularly make any sharp remark upon this falsehood of Rahab for the great degree of her ignorance does much lessen her fault, though not cancel it. A woman of her character, living in a heathen country, may well be supposed to have had little knowledge of the sinfulness of so beneficial a lie as that was, and no scruple about it.

But it is by no means a sufficient justification of her conduct, that the scripture does not directly censure her for lying; for there are many actions recorded in scripture, both of saints and sinners, which are utterly unlawful in the sight of God, which yet have not an express censure passed upon them. Rahab's being an harlot is not censured in any part of her history; nor Judah's defiling Tamar his daughter-in-law; nor Jacob and Rebecca's complication of lies to gain the blessing; nor the most express and wicked lie of the old prophet in Bethel, though it was the cause of the death of another prophet; 1 Kings xiii. yet surely these were crimes of heinous guilt. The plain commands or prohibitions of scripture are the rules to govern our practice: Nor can we fetch the lawfulness or unlawfulness of any matter of fact from the mere silence of the historical part of scripture about it.

Question II. If there are some persons who have not a right to truth, may we not lawfully speak falsehood to them? Now to prove that some have not a right to truth, it is urged, that truth or veracity is a virtue or duty of the social life: But there are many questions may be asked in the social life which the speaker has no right to be informed of, and therefore he has no right to truth when they are answered; may we not then answer them with falsehood? There are also some characters of persons who seem to have no part in the social life, as children who are not capable of judging for themselves, nor acting regularly in society; may we not speak a falsehood to them for their good? There are some who practise no social virtue, such as knaves and cheats, thieves, and pilferers; surely these have no right to truth, who are ever dealing in falsehood; and may we not cozen them who would cozen us? I will first offer two or three general answers to the question, and then descend to consider the particular instances.

Answer I. Truth seems to be a matter of eternal right and unchangeable equity. And there are general and express commands given us in scripture to speak the truth, and there are as express prohibitions of falsehood and lies. Now if there were any such exceptions as these against the general rule, I think God would have given us some plainer evidence of these exceptions in so important a point as truth is, upon which the welfare of

mankind so necessarily depends: But I cannot find any such evident exceptions given in the whole word of God.

Answer II. When we say a person has no right to truth, it may signify one of these two things:

1. That he has no right to demand of me a direct answer to his enquiry: And I will readily grant it in this sense, there are thousands who have no right to the truth; and therefore I may wave the question, I may give them an insufficient answer, or I may be silent, and boldly refuse to give them any answer at all. But 2, If his having no right to truth, be intended to signify, that the character of his person, or the nature of his question, is such as releases me from all obligation to truth in answering him, and that therefore I may lawfully tell him a falsehood; then I deny the propositions : For my obligation to speak truth doth not all depend on the nature of his question, nor doth it depend merely on the character of the enquirer, but on the eternal rule of equity, and the command of God. And I think this

appears from hence, that though I were alone, it would not be warrantable in me to assert with my lips a known falsehood: and in this case the right or claim of man can have no place nor consideration.

Answer III. If this exception be made to the plain law of God, that we may speak a direct and express falsehood to any persons who in our esteem have no right to the truth in their enquiry; this seems to break all the bands of human society, violate all the faith of men, and render the divine commands of veracity, and the prohibitions of falsehood almost useless. The consciences of men would find a way of escape from the greatest part of the bonds of duty, and yet think they

committed no sin.

For let us consider, who it is that must judge whether the person to whom we speak has a right to truth or no. Is it not the speaker himself who will be the judge? Now if the speaker must judge whether his neighbour has a right to truth, there is no case, wherein the speaker's interest may be any ways endangered by the truth, but his own sinful heart will readily whisper to him, that the hearer has no right to truth in such a question: and conscience will easily be warped aside, and comply to pronounce a known falsehood, under the colour and pretence of this exception As for instance; if the buyer asks the seller, how much he gave for any merchandize? The seller by this rule may tell him double the price that it cost; for he will say, the buyer has no right to truth in such a question as this is. So if I ask an artificer, how he fashions his work, or what tools he uses in it? He may by this rule give me a very false answer, under pretence that I have no right to truth.

I readily grant in these cases, that the enquirer has no right to demand and claim an answer to such questions; therefore the seller or the artificer may refuse to inform him. But it is surprising to think that any man should persuade himself, that such a question being once asked, gives him a right to tell a lie! That any person should ever believe, that the mere enquiry of a thing improper to be told, absolves the answerer from all the obligations of truth, which his duty to God and man have laid npon him! Surely such a rule of conduct as this, had need have better arguments to establish it. But those who maintain this principle, must rather recur to the character of the person who makes the enquiry and here indeed they give a little better colour to their cause.

I come therefore now to give particular answers to the instances alledged; 1. Concerning children. 2. Concerning knaves and cheats.

Instance I. Will you say, that children have no right to truth, because they are not capable of civil society?

But I reply, they are capable of knowing what truth and falsehood are, and of being influenced by the one or the other; they are capable of being deceived, and of knowing when they are deceived, they are capable of judging when they are treated with truth and sincerity, and acting according to the things you tell them; or else to what purpose do you speak falsehood to them instead of truth, and try to impose a lie upon them?

They are capable of resenting your conduct, when they find out the falsehood; and of refusing to believe you another time; For the very reason why they believe your falsehood at first, is, because they suppose you speak truth to them, and would not deceive them: And it is only upon this very principle that you yourselves can attempt to impose upon them.

Again, They are capable of learning from you and imitating your conduct, and they will be so much more ready to practise lying, and to deceive you with it, when they have found you practising lies, in order to deceive them. Suppose a mother has now and then persuaded a child to take a wholesome bitter medicine, by saying, it is not bitter, or has allured it to bed or to school by some of the arts of falsehood, and this child should imitate the mother's example, and grow up to a confirmed liar; what inward and piercing reflections must the mother feel? Alas! I have taught my child this sinful practice, I myself have led it into the ways of the devil: How can I chide and correct by my reproof that vice, which I have taught by my example!

It is sufficiently evident therefore, that though children are Bot capable of half the duties of the social life, yet they are so far

capable of them, as to know what truth and falsehood are, and to resent, and to practise accordingly: And this is sufficient to the present argument, 'and fully answers the objection. I think therefore it is infinitely better to allure those, whose understandings are weak, and whose wills are obstinate, to the practice of duty, by all the gentle arts of softness and fondness, of persuasion and love, than by venturing to make an inroad upon our own sincerity, and to trifle with so sacred a thing as truth.

But the querist may say, Suppose these softer arts have been tried, and have no effect, and children may be in danger of destroying themselves, if they are not immediately prevented by some plain and express falsehood; is it then unlawful to preserve their lives by a lie? Answer. It is a command of God indeed to preserve life, but it must be done by lawful means. May a man rob on the high-way, to get money to feed and clothe him? Surely we ought to trust the kind care and providence of God with our own lives and others in the way of duty, and not do evil that good may come, as was said under the former question.

Thus much shall suffice for the case of children, on pretence of their being incapable of civil society. But the querist will insist still on the next instance :

Instance II. Cheats, and knaves, and thievish criminals, have no right to truth; for they have broken the bonds of civil society, though not by a public renunciation of them, and therefore we may use all manner of deceit toward them, and treat them with express falsehood and lying, wheresoever it may promote our own interest and safety.

To this I reply, that the rule of Christ is, Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye also that unto them; Mat. vii. 12. But this licentious doctrine cancels this divine rule, and substitutes another in the room of it, viz. Whatsoever men do unto you, do ye also that unto them; which is as widely different from the sacred rule of Christ, as light is from darkness, or heaven from hell. By this new rule we are no longer bound to practise that truth, that justice, that goodness to others, which we think reasonable they should practise towards us; but we have leave to practise that falsehood and knavery, that fraud, and injustice, and mischief to others, which they do actually practice towards us, or which we suspect they design to practise.

If one half of a city or a nation were fallen into knavish practices, through the great degeneracy of the age, or were become thievish pilferers, the other half would, by this rule, practise knavery with licence toward them, and deal out falsehoods to them by divine permission. And then the charge would