Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict

Forsideomslag
Harvard University Press, 1991 - 568 sider

Eminently suited to classroom use as well as individual study, Roger Myerson's introductory text provides a clear and thorough examination of the models, solution concepts, results, and methodological principles of noncooperative and cooperative game theory. Myerson introduces, clarifies, and synthesizes the extraordinary advances made in the subject over the past fifteen years, presents an overview of decision theory, and comprehensively reviews the development of the fundamental models: games in extensive form and strategic form, and Bayesian games with incomplete information.

Game Theory will be useful for students at the graduate level in economics, political science, operations research, and applied mathematics. Everyone who uses game theory in research will find this book essential.

 

Indhold

DecisionTheoretic Foundations
1
Basic Models
37
Equilibria of StrategicForm Games
88
Sequential Equilibria of ExtensiveForm Games
154
Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form
213
Exercises
242
Repeated Games
308
Bargaining and Cooperation in TwoPerson Games
370
7
390
8
396
9
403
Coalitions in Cooperative Games
417
7
456
Cooperation under Uncertainty
483
370
561
Copyright

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Almindelige termer og sætninger

Om forfatteren (1991)

Roger B. Myerson is Harold L. Stuart Professor of Decision Sciences at the J. L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University. He is a Fellow of the Econometric Society.

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