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AN ESSAY ON INSTINCT.

(Concluded from col. 47.)

As it appears certain that the origin at least of some of the actions of man cannot be explained, unless we admit the existence of such a principle as instinct, it becomes necessary to consider some of those actions of the lower animals, which are generally allowed to be instinctive. This step seems the more necessary, as the existence of instinct, even in the lower animals, seems of late to have been wholly denied, since it has been asserted, in a "New System of the Natural History of Animals," published in Edinburgh, in 3 vols. 8vo. by Peter Hill, in 1791; "that the laws of analogical reasoning do not justify the opinion, that the brutes act, on any occasion, absolutely without design." Whilst, on the other hand, it has been maintained by Mr. Smellie, in his "Philosophy of Natural History," "that between reason and instinct there is no difference, and that the reasoning faculty is itself the necessary result of instinct." Nothing can be more directly opposite than both these opinions; and, like most extremes, nothing can be more easily shewn to be false. To prove that some of the natural operations of the lower animals are not performed with design, or with a view to consequences, in opposition to the former, many examples will not be necessary; and first, let us attend to the operations of the winged tribe.

The youngest pair of birds, it is known, without instruction or experience, build their first nest of the materials commonly used by their species; in situations, whose privacy, &c. render them fit to afford them security, and convenient for incubation and the rearing of their young. It is also certain, that they shew equal skill with the oldest and most practised of their tribe, in the neatness, accuracy, and symmetry of their work. It is further known, whenever the climate or situation, or any change of circumstances, renders a change in the structure of nests necessary, that this change is made by all the individuals (young and old) of the same species equally, and that only when such a change is necessary. Thus, "in countries infested with monkeys, many birds, which, in other climates, build in bushes and clefts of trees, suspend their nests upon slender twigs, and, by this ingenious device, elude the rapacity of their enemies." It is moreover certain, that no improvement has been made, within the memory of man, in the art of nest-building, by any tribe, or by any of its individuals. Now the nature of all the 134.-VOL. XII.

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arts with which we are acquainted is such, and their history shews us, that they were first invented by some person, and then improved in the course of time, either by the inventor or by others, and finally brought to some degree of perfection. History and experience also shew, that human arts are best known, and practised with most skill and dexterity in general, by those only to whom they have been taught: and that in different ages and countries they all undergo considerable variations. But in the arts of animals we observe no such variations; nor can any individual be pointed out as the inventor, the improver, or the perfecter of any of them; for instance, of nest-building. Each of them is perfectly skilled in the workmanship of its tribe: we do not say that they know the nature and the rules of the different arts which they practise; but that they are acquainted with the mode of working in them to perfection.

How many very simple arts do we daily see practised by our species, without being able to practise them, or learn them ourselves. What a long apprenticeship is generally necessary before we can practise even some of the most common and necessary. A peasant spends months and years under his simple roof, and yet is not able often to build such a hut as that he inhabits. Birds require no such teaching or experience: they served no apprenticeships; and yet a pair of young birds kept solitary and sequestered from their infancy, build exactly such another nest as that in which they themselves had been brought into life. But what is the inference to be drawn from these facts? If the natural actions of the lower animals, for instance this of nest-building, be all under the influence of motives, in other words, rational, we must conclude, since they are so invariable, either that their workmanship is perfect beyond the reach of improvement, or so imperfect as not to be capable of degenerating. The former of these conclusions cannot be supported, unless it be contended at the same time, that the lower animals have made more early and greater discoveries and advances in the arts and sciences than we have. Nor will the latter be maintained by any man, who considers the structure of a honey-comb, or who reflects, that all the skill of man has never yet excelled the workmanship even of a wren in the structure of such a nest as he builds. However, if the supposition be admitted, the former seems the better inference. But if this doctrine be true, we must say, that birds are good

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judges of climate and circumstances; that they know the dangers and advantages resulting from them, and the best methods for obviating the former and securing the latter. We must say, that reasoning shews them the necessity of equality in the structure of their nests; or when, after having been absent for some time, they turn their eggs so as to heat them properly, and at all times equally, we must think, that they know heat, and even an equal distribution of it, to be necessary for incubation. But as none of these can, we think, be affirmed with the smallest appearance of truth, and since those actions of birds are, without teaching, habit, or experience, as perfectly performed by the young as by the old, and always so invariable, we must conIclude, that in these instances we discover not the reasoning of animals, pointing to consequences and devising means, but the unerring reason and wisdom of Him who made them, and implanted such principles in their constitutions as guide them unceasingly in the performance of their various natural operations, the complete purposes and utility of which He only knows. This reasoning is confirmed by that of Addison.

"What," says he, "can we call the principle which directs every different kind of bird to observe a particular plan in the structure of its nest, and directs all of the same species to work after the same model? It cannot be imitation; for though you hatch a crow under a hen, and never let it see any of the works of its own kind, the nest it makes shall be the same, to the laying of a stick, with all the other nests of the same species. It cannot be reason; for were animals endued with it to as great a degree as man, their buildings would be as different as ours, according to the different conveniences that they would propose to themselves."

Some birds display a wonderful share of sagacity in the process of incubation and in rearing their young. Without attentive and cautious observation, one would be almost positive, that in every step they are guided by reason. But it is easy to shew that this is not the case. Let us take a very familiar instance: a hen seeks a silent and an unfrequented place for her nest; when she has laid her eggs and begun to cover them, she takes care to turn them frequently, that the vital warmth may be communicated to all parts of them. When she is obliged to leave them in order to procure food, she is sure to return before they have time to cool, which would render them incapable of producing chickens.

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In summer she will often stay away for two hours; but in winter, when the cold would destroy the principle of life, she stays away a much shorter time. When the birth approaches, with how much nicety and attention does she help the little ones to break their prison. When brought forth, how cautiously does she cover them from the injuries of the weather, provide them proper nourishment, and teach them to help themselves. It deserves also to be remarked, that she forsakes the nest, if, after the usual time of reckoning, the young do not begin to make their appear. ance. Can any thing have a greater appearance of reason and sagacity than all this !

"But, at the same time, the hen that has all this seeming ingenuity (which is indeed absolutely necessary for the propagation of the species,) considered in other respects, has not the least glimmering of thought or common sense. She mistakes a piece of chalk for an egg, and sits upon it in the same manner; she is insensible of any increase or diminution in the number of those she lays; she does not distinguish between her own and those of another species; and when the birth appears of ever so different a bird, she will cherish it for her own. In all these circumstances which do not carry an immediate regard to the subsistence of herself or her species, she is a very idiot." None of these instances justifies the doctrine, "that animals, in all their natural operations, act with a view to consequences."

To confirm our reasoning and opinion still farther, out of the numberless examples afforded us by natural history, we shall content ourselves with one, which, if we mistake not very much, is decisive of this question. This we take from the operations of the bee, as it seems to act with a view to consequences.

Let us attend a little to the structure of a honey-comb. The cells of the bees are equal and similar; and of the three possible ways in which this can be effected, they have chosen the best for holding their honey and rearing their young. The cells are built on both sides: they may then be placed exactly opposite one another, so that two would rest upon the same bottom; or they may be so placed, that the bottom of one will rest upon the point where the partitions meet on the opposite side. This latter mode gives them more strength, and they are accordingly built thus. Further, the bottoms of the cells are not planes perpendicular to the sides, but consist of three planes meeting in a solid angle in the

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centre, exactly where the partitions on the opposite side cross one another. And it has been demonstrated, that this makes the cells similar without loss of room, and considerably spares both labour and materials. Thus, then, it is shewn, that bees build their cells so as to lose no room; to have no useless partitions; in the strongest possible manner; and with the least possible expense of labour and materials. All this, as far as geometry and mathematics can shew it, has been rigorously demonstrated by Mr. Maclaurin, and proves them, on the supposition that they act with a view to consequences in this instance, more skilled in both these instances than the most philosophical and learned men; and that too from the earliest ages. But as this is a doctrine too improbable to be insisted upon, we must rather conclude, that the bees, although they act geometrically, understand neither the rules nor the principles of the arts which they practise with such accuracy; but that the geometry in this instance is in the Maker of the bee, "that Great Geometer, who made all things in number, weight, and measure."

Were a man to construct so nice a piece of workmanship as a honey-comb, we should immediately conclude, that he worked according to rule, and understood the principles upon which he proceeded, but we have no reason whatever for thinking that bees understand one or the other. In the most complicated works of human contrivance, a man of equal knowledge and skill will comprehend the principles and general design of the artist: but to understand the rules and principles which are so rigorously adhered to in the constructing of a honey-comb, is, and will always be, beyond the comprehension of the far greater part of mankind. The few instances of animal instinctive operations, which we have now briefly detailed, will, we hope, be sufficient for the present: they correspond fully with our notion and explanation of instinct, and serve our purpose, as well as a million of instances crowded together.

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But it is objected, that this instinct, which we call a simple, original principle, accommodates itself to circumstances; that it is improved by experience and imitation; that no such accommodation to circumstances can take place without reasoning, or a comparison of ideas; and, therefore, that this principle of the constitution of the lower animals is not instinct, but reason. The instances to prove that instinct accommodates itself to circumstances are numerous. Birds stay

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away from their eggs longer in warm than cold weather. The ostrich in Senegal, where the heat is great, neglects her eggs during the day, but sits on them during the night but at the Cape of Good Hope, where the heat is less, she sits on them both night and day. In countries infested with monkeys, birds, which in other climates build in bushes and clefts of trees, suspend their nests upon slender twigs, and thus elude their enemies. The same species of birds build their nests differently, when climate and circumstances require it. We have numberless instances of this accommodation to circumstances in the pairing instincts of animals. None, it has been observed, ever pair, except those whose young require the nursing care of both the parents. The extent and continuance of the parental care are in the proportion of the wants and helplessness of the young. When the wants of the young cease, the mother withdraws her fondness, and leaves them to provide for themselves; but the love of the parent may be lengthened out beyond its usual time, as we see in birds, which continue to feed their young, if they are tied to the nest, or confined within a cage, or by any other means appear to be out of a condition of supplying their own necessities. This last instance, whilst it very finely exemplifies an accommodating instinct, affords the happiest proof of the guardian care of a kind and parental Providence.

In answer to the objection which these facts contain, it may be first observed, that taking instinct, as it is generally defined, to be a principle in the constitution of animals, given them by their Maker, for the purpose of preserving the individuals and continuing the kind, in other words, a predisposition to perform certain actions necessary for these ends, when incited by certain feelings or sensations, that its accommodating itself to circumstances and situations is no argument against its existence, nor a good proof that it is the result of reasoning; since He, who made it a part of the constitution of his creatures, knows, that the same ends must be often sought by different means, particularly when times, places, and circumstances are altered; and only manifests his wisdom and goodness the more, by constituting this principle of such a nature, as to vary when requisite, and to change only when such a change is necessary. Let us add to this, that did He not impart this accommodating property to instinct, it would not produce the effects for which it seems intended; as we know it to be impossible

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that similar means should produce similar effects, when circumstances, climates, and situations, are different. Indeed this accommodating peculiarity, so far from being a good argument against it, is a necessary consequence of instinct. The abettors of this principle do not maintain, that the accommodating variations will take place on every occasion. They will occur only where the disadvantages exist, against which the instinct is intended to provide. Instinctive actions take place when certain sensations exist, and when these do not exist, we cannot wonder that the actions do not occur.

Before we positively conclude, that no accommodation to circumstances can take place without reasoning, or a comparison of ideas, it may not be irrelevant to consider some of the appearances which the vegetable and inanimate worlds exhibit. If, because the operations of some animals are so artificial, and because they sometimes accommodate their actions to circumstances, we must say, that they reason and compare ideas, we must contend, that | vegetables and inanimate bodies do so likewise we know, that a vegetable reared in a dark cellar, if some light be admitted, will bend itself towards the light; or, if made to grow in a flower-pot with its head downwards, that it will turn its head upwards, according to the natural position of a plant. Can it be maintained, that the plant in either case does what it does from any judgment or opinion that it is best, and not from a necessary determination of its nature? The facts taken from the inanimate world are equally in point. How shall we account for the phenomena of elective attractions? when one body unites with another, and then, if a third is presented to it, quits the first, and unites itself with the other; shall we say that this is the effect of reasoning and of a comparison of ideas, and suppose that this preference of the one to the other proceeds from any predilection or opinion that it is better to cleave to one than to the other? What shall we say of the crystallizations and configurations of salts exhibited to us by the microscope, so various and yet so constant and regular? Must we say, that their minute particles reason and compare ideas, because their operations are so various, and, at the same time, so regular and constant? Or, if nobody affirms this, why should we think, that the actions of animals, not more various and surprising, not more constant or regular, than these motions of the salts, should be the result of reasoning and of a deduction of inferences?

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Should we not rather affirm, as those inanimate substances arrange themselves so regularly, and yet so variously, upon different occasions, in consequence of an original law of nature, that the benevolent Author of all such laws, intending to display his providence and wisdom still more conspicuously in his animal kingdom, bestowed upon his creatures this accommodating instinct, without which, (supposing that they act instinctively on any occasion) the great purposes of their propagation and preservation could never be attained?

That some animals display wonderful sagacity and docility, that they even reason on several occasions, is, we think, clear from the most satisfactory evidence. We shall mention a few facts in support of this opinion.

On the northern coast of Ireland a friend of Dr. Darwin's saw above a hundred crows at once preying upon muscles: each crow took a muscle up into the air twenty or forty yards high, and let it fall upon the stones, and thus, by breaking the shell, got possession of the animal. A few years ago there was shewn at Exeter Change, London, an old monkey, which having lost his teeth, used, when nuts were presented to him, to take a stone in his hand, and crack them with it one by one; thus, using means, like the crows in the preceding instance, to accomplish his purposes, as well as we do. We are told by Linnæus, that the martin dwells on the outside of houses in Europe under the eaves; and that, when it has built its nest, the sparrow frequently takes possession of it.

The martin, unable to dislodge his intruding enemy, convokes his companions, some of whom guard the captive, whilst others, bringing clay, completely close up the entrance of the nest, and then fly away, leaving the sparrow to be suffocated, as the punishment due to his injustice and temerity. This fact is mentioned in the "Amusement Pholosophique," &c. of Father Bougeant. There is likewise an instance of it in the "Gentleman's Magazine;" in which we find also some interesting particulars concerning a raven kept, some years ago, at the Red Lion at Hungerford. The account is, however, too long to be transcribed, although very much to our present purpose. We recollect seeing, a few years ago, a very sensible cat, which, when out at night, would tap regularly at the windows, if the doors and shutters were closed; knowing by experience, that she was often let in at the windows by day. And what is still a better proof of her reasoning and sagacity,

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An Essay on Instinct.

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she would always tap at the bed-room | general very just, and worthy of perusal. windows, when disappointed at the others, or when the night was far advanced. A lady with whom we were acquainted, had a tame bird, which she was in the habit of letting out of its cage about her room every day. One morning, as it was picking up some crumbs of bread off the carpet, her cat, which always before shewed great kindness for the bird, seized it on a sudden, and jumped, with it in her mouth, upon a table. The lady, alarmed for the fate of her favourite, on turning about, observed that the door had been left open, and that a strange cat had just come into the room. After turning it out, her own cat came down from her place of safety, and dropped the bird, without injuring, if we may so express it, a hair of its head. Cowper's beautiful little poem on the dog and the water lily, gives an amiable instance of the reasoning of the lower animals, which has been so sweetly, and yet with such elegant simplicity, told in verse, that we cannot think of melting it down into the languid coldness of prose.

When we see brutes thus using means to obtain their ends, as well as ourselves, must we not conclude that they reason? When the cat watches for hours in silent expectation of her prey; when the hound traverses a wide extent of country in the chace; when the meanest insect that we tread on, drags its wounded frame to a safe retreat; they shew as much persevering voluntariness as man can boast. No animal manducates its food, or laps its drink, from the mere pleasure of the motions. It uses them as means for an end; and if hunger and thirst were not felt, they would be considered as labours, and would not be performed.

"Animals (says professor Stewart, nearly in the words of Mr. Hume,) are left to make some small acquisitions, by experience, as sufficiently appears in certain tribes, from the sagacity of the old, when contrasted with the ignorance of the young; and from the effects which may be produced on many of them, by discipline and education."-"It seems as evident to me," says Mr. Locke, "that some animals do, in certain instances, reason, as that they have sense; but it is only in particular ideas, just as they receive them from the senses. They are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, and have not, as I think, the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of abstraction." The observations which Mr. Locke makes in this part of his work on the faculties of the brutes, as compared with ours, are in

-But there are several facts, which our limits do not allow us to state, from which it is evident that brutes on some occasions exhibit proofs of the power of abstraction. That an animal can be capable of gratitude and affection for its master, without reasoning, can, we think, hardly be maintained. From the master's protection and kindness, it infers that it is under obligations to him, which it owes not to another. Before concluding our remarks on the reasoning of animals, we may quote one instance of the affection of a dog, which we think has never been surpassed. And we do it the more readily, as the circumstance has been very poetically described by an author, who, with all his great merits, seldom writes better than he has upon this occasion. The instance to which we allude is very interesting, from the incident to which it relates, the death of an unfortunate young gentleman of promising talents, who perished, by losing his way, in the spring of 1805, on the mountain Hellvellyn. His remains were found three months afterwards, guarded still by a terrier bitch, that had long been the companion of his solitary rambles. This last circumstance in particular, is very finely alluded to by Mr. (now Sir Walter) Scott, in his little piece on the subject, to which he has given the name of Hellvellyn. As the few instances now stated are sufficient, and speak fully for themselves, we shall not add to the number, nor stop to make any comments upon them.

But it has been asked, if we allow reason to the lower animals, in what does the difference between them and man consist? Do their faculties and ours differ in degree, or in kind? To this question we have not the vanity of thinking that we are able to give a satisfactory answer; we may, however, offer a few remarks.

We see that animals learn much from experience and observation as well as ourselves. It is thus they learn the nature, or the properties, of the objects that surround them, such as heights, depths, distances, &c. "A horse that has been accustomed to the field, becomes acquainted with the proper height which he can leap, and will never attempt what exceeds his force and ability. An old greyhound will trust the more fatiguing part of the chace to the younger, and will place himself so as to meet the hare in her doubles; nor are the conjectures which he forms on this occasion, founded in any thing but his observation and experience." By training and education we can teach our domestic

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