Ethics and Practical ReasonGarrett Cullity, Berys Gaut Clarendon Press, 20. nov. 1997 - 430 sider These thirteen new, specially written essays by a distinguished international line-up of contributors, including some leading contemporary moral philosophers, give a rich and varied view of current work on ethics and practical reason. The three main perspectives on the topic, Kantian, Humean, and Aristotelian, are all well represented. The editors' introduction provides a valuable introductory survey of the topic, putting the individual essays in context. Ethics and Practical Reason will be essential reading for scholars, postgraduates, and upper-level undergraduates working in this area. - ;These thirteen new, specially written essays by a distinguished international line-up of contributors, including some leading contemporary moral philosophers, give a rich and varied view of current work on ethics and practical reason. The three main perspectives on the topic, Kantian, Humean, and Aristotelian, are all well represented. Issues covered include: the connection between reason and motivation; the source of moral reasons and their relation to reasons of self-interest; the relation of practical reason to value, to freedom, to responsibility, and to feelings. The editors' introduction provides a valuable introductory survey of the topic, putting the individual essays in context. Ethics and Practical Reason will be essential reading for scholars, postgraduates, and upper-level undergraduates working in this area. - |
Indhold
Introduction | 1 |
Deciding How to Decide | 29 |
On the Hypothetical and NonHypothetical in Reasoning | 53 |
Humean Doubts about the Practical Justification of Morality | 81 |
Practical Theory ΙΟΙ | 101 |
Moral Judgement and Reasons for Action | 125 |
The Structure of Practical Reason | 161 |
Aquinas and his Critics | 189 |
The Normativity of Instrumental Reason | 215 |
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accept agency Allan Gibbard amoralist Aquinas argue argument Aristotle belief Bernard Williams capacity categorical imperatives Christine Korsgaard claim commitment conception of practical concern condition considerations constitutive constructivist deliberation deliberative desire discussion distinction epistemic essay ethical theory eudaemonistic evaluative explain external fact first-order friends Gauthier's give ground human Hume Humean hypothetical imperatives impartial imperfect duties independent instrumental principle interests internalist interpretation intrinsic irrational justification Kant Kant's Kantian kind Korsgaard macro-prudence maxim meta-reasons moral judgement moral reasons moral requirements morally wrong motivating reasons motivational internalism Nagel nature neo-Humean normative reasons notion o-ing object one's Oxford person Philosophy plausible possible practical reason premiss Press proposition propositional attitude prudence question rational agent rational choice rationalist reasons for action recognize reflection regress argument relevant response seems sense simply someone sort suppose synderesis take the means things tion truth Univ virtue virtuous Williams's