We have now followed the author of this tract through his speculations, and have mentioned, as we proceeded, a few of the objections to which his reasoning is frequently open; but we have reserved for the conclusion of this article, such reflections upon its general scope, and such remarks upon the important subject of his work, as have suggested themselves during its perusal.

First of all, we are disposed to admit, to a very great extent, the truth of the representation which he gives of the vast power of Russia, and the increase which it has during late years received beyond the natural development of national resources, by the extraordinary accidents that have roused the energies of the 'empire, and advanced, even by means of prodigious disasters, more rapidly than the ordinary course of things could have done. The exasperation of the country by the invasion of 1812, and the subsequent destruction of the invading army, with the events which followed in a succession equally rapid and brilliant, we are willing to admit, accelerated, by many years, the improvement of the Russian army, and the improvement of the military system generally; beside acquiring for the Russian government a premature degree of weight and reputation in European politicks. We must also allow, that Russia has been permitted to gain such an ascendancy, and that her resources have been augmented to such a degree, as may give her the means of creating great alarm and mischief before she can be foiled in any attempt to carry still further her projects of aggrandizement. But, on the other hand, we cannot for a moment believe that she could succeed in the plan of universal empire, or acquire the same formidable power which France of late years possessed.

It is not to be conceived that such designs could exist on the part of Russia, without producing a combination to resist their execution. We believe that our author has greatly mistaken the probable effects of an external alarm upon the French nation. Unpopular as the present dynasty is, the feeling of national honour is perhaps more powerful among the people than ever,

⚫ contain a direct guarantee of the present government of France against the people of that country; and, in my judgment, imply a general and perpetual guarantee of all European governments against 'the governed. I hold such a design to be unlawful, I believe it to 'be impracticable; and recollecting the principles on which the Revolution in 1688, and the succession of the House of Hanover were 'founded, I cannot give the sanction of my vote to a system, which, if it had prevailed in those times, might have deprived this kingdom of all the benefits that have resulted from a national government and ' a free constitution.' (p. 190.)

because they are irritated by the recollection of their defeats and humiliations, and pant for an opportunity of flinging them into the shade, by the lustre of fresh achievements. They still reckon war and victory as synonymous; and, beyond all question, the most popular act of their rulers will be to make war, as soon as it can be done with safety. It argues, in our apprehension, an imperfect estimate of their character, to assert, that the armies raised by the French vernment will be more dangerous to its own stability than to goits enemies. As long as no very outrageous act is doing ;-as long as the great landmarks of the revolution are left untouched, and the sure though slow progress towards a truly popular constitution is permitted gradually to consolidate the fabric of the government upon the basis of publick liberty, the generally prevailing dislike of confusion and change will maintain a dynasty, odious perhaps at the first, and even now rather tolerated than loved; until it gains favour by its association with publick prosperity. But, at any moment of its reign, we are convinced its power will be augmented and consolidated, and not shaken by dangers from without; and that the force from which it has the least to dread, is the army levied under its authority for the defence of the country.

*

Surely, notwithstanding all her losses, and they are, after the lapse of a year or two, rather in name than in substance, France is still by far the most powerful nation on the Continent. Her thirty millions concentrated; her vast natural resources of soil and climate; and her position both for sea and land operations, are more formidable to the neighbours against whom she may bring her force to bear, than the forty-four millions of Russia scattered over half the globe, and only capable of overwhelming a weaker state, if all the rest of Europe stand by inactive. In a national and a popular war, France would be as impregnable now, as she was five-and-twenty years ago. While every thing like liberty was extinguished, and all public spirit seemed to have perished with it, the Allied armies marched indeed to Paris, after defeating the only troops opposed to them. But we believe no man doubts, that if the French people had taken part with Buonaparte, either in 1814 or 1815, the result of both campaigns would have been different. It is quite possible that the recollection of those disasters, and the ardent desire to revenge them, may even supply the place of a more free constitution, and, in a very short time, enable France to present as formidable a front as ever to the neighbouring powers. One of the greatest errors committed by the Congress, was the leaving

* They are allowed to be above 29 by the latest returns.

her in possession of Alsace and Lorraine. Here, as in all their other arrangements with respect to her, too little was done to reduce her means of annoyance, when so much had been done to fill her with all the desire of revenge, and indeed to leave in her side thorns which might rankle and irritate without weakening.

The only secure foundation of an alliance is some one powerful state which can make head, even if left alone, against the common enemy. If France were nearer Russia, unquestionably the peace of Europe would be more secure; but a cordial cooperation with Austria would render the success of any attack from the North scarcely practicable. The principal danger would unquestionably arise from the advantages which Russia might find in the discontents of the states lately delivered over to new masters, especially the Austrian dominions on the side of Italy; and this is not so much a risk of ultimate conquest, as of difficult and protracted warfare. The present settlement of continental affairs is exposed to similar danger from the aggressions of France, after her strength shall have been recruited. In concert with Russia, she may shake the authority of Austria among her Italian subjects, by taking their part; or, cooperating with Austria, she may appeal to the states unwillingly incorporated with Prussia. In both these cases, however, as well as in the former, we see little chance of any great strides being made towards a power similar to that which Buonaparte lost by the advance upon Moscow. But the repose of the world may be put in jeopardy by attempts falling far short of success; and the mischief of the present arrangement is, that it furnishes both the motive and the means of such disturbance.

This leads us to what, we apprehend, is the great error which has been committed by the pacificators of Europe. They have, in every quarter, left the materials of change, and mutual annoyance; because they have left the people discontented, and because, with respect to the people, they have almost everywhere put themselves unequivocally in the wrong. By violating good faith, breaking promises, sacrificing the weak, despising all idea of national right, and of public principle, as unworthy of a Statesman's consideration, they have destroyed the confidence at first reposed in their integrity and wisdom; they have taught mankind that courts are not to be trusted for the redemption, in prosperity, of pledges given under the pressure of disaster; they have planted everywhere, not adversaries of this or that dynasty, but natural enemies of the existing arrangement of Europe. It may be vain, and it certainly is useless, to inquire from what quarter the attempt will proceed, to encroach upon the limits prescribed by it to each State.

One thing, however, is manifest, that danger may again appear in any quarter, without the generous efforts to repel it, which freed Germany from the French yoke; and another thing is equally certain, that where so many nations are held in subjection to foreign masters, the first of the powers that is disposed to break the league, which, after distributing millions of people like cattle to their masters, now pretends to stifle the voice of nature by force of arms, will find allies everywhere to aid him. The stability of the system (as they call their patchwork) is thus at every moment endangered; and the power of putting down a formidable enemy of national independence is circumscribed.

That England should have borne so conspicuous a part in these transactions, is seriously to be lamented. She has lost that high character for liberal policy and strict principle which once not merely ennobled her in the eyes of other nations, but strengthened her hands in regulating their affairs. The best service that a lover of his country can now render to her, is to show, by his protestations, that the crimes of the Cabinet were not shared by the Nation.

But have the late wars not produced consequences almost as fatal to our influence abroad, as the treaties which closed them? It is alarming to reflect upon the necessary inactivity to which we must now be doomed, should the peace of the Continent be broken. An invasion, indeed, or any other imminent danger to our own security, would be strenuously and successfully repelled. But where is the man who can expect the people of England to engage again in wars, to prevent the growth of remoter mischiefs? The sinking fund barely covers the yearly deficit of our peace establishment. Admitting that the Income Tax could be raised to meet a war expenditure, thirty or forty millions more must be annually borrowed; and the history of the last eight years demonstrates, that no new taxes can be raised to pay the interest. The incalculable distresses from which the country has hardly recovered, after three years of peace, must be renewed in far worse circumstances; and an immense addition made to the load of debt which is already hardly to be endured. As often as the necessity is mentioned of watching over the balance of Europe (one of the first duties of an English statesman in good times), the frightful picture of 1812 and 1816 will rise in the people's recollection; and the danger of perishing, by present famine, is likely to make the risk of eventually falling by the sword be disregarded. A less lavish use of the splendid resources which England once possessed, would have preserved her power entire, without any injury to her honour; and it is melancholy to reflect, that they who have squandered away her resources, have also been the first to sully her fame,

ART. IX. Voyage en Savoie, en Piemont, à Nice et à Gènes. Par A. L. MILLIN, Chevalier de l'Ordre Royal de la Legion d'Honneur, &c. &c. 2 vol. 8vo. Paris, 1816.

WE

E are ashamed to confess, that we have allowed the many valuable productions of M. Millin which have appeared since we started in our career, to pass unnoticed. He deserves to be considered as one of the representatives of the worthy old school of French archaiologists-of those men who have contributed more towards the knowledge of antiquity than all Europe besides. It is singular, indeed, that our lively neighbours should have produced a host of the most sturdy and indefatigable writers. We see even the sprightly Caylus plodding like the secluded inmate of the cloister; and the wig à-la-mode has often covered a head which would not have disgraced the cowl of St Ben

All the works of M. Millin are distinguished by the unva ried diligence of the author. In his literary labours, we find a condensation of matter which spares the inquirer many a weary search through many a shelf of quartos and folios. He endeavours to be useful; and he seldom fails to attain his end.

We were glad to see the announcement of the present work. Although we have been almost surfeited with Italian travels of every kind and quality; yet a new description of Italy is by no means superfluous. The remains of the middle ages in Italy have been miserably neglected. It was almost in vain that Maffei urged the necessity of extending to the memorials of Christianity some portion of the favour with which the vestiges of Paganism have been overwhelmed. Until of late, the Italians continued to hold the sculpture and architecture of the period which elapsed between the fall of the Empire, and the so called revival of the arts, in sovereign contempt; and our tourists have seldom the courage to admire any object, except that to which the Cicerone points his finger, or to allow their descriptions to take a wider range than the useful chapters of the Guida de' Forestieri. From the present writer we expected a bolder proceeding-Gothic antiquity being as familiar to M. Millin as classical antiquity was reputed: Nor have our expectations been disappointed, to find many of the deficiencies of former travellers supplied by his diligence and discernment. Even where they have been most communicative, we now require fresh information. Italy has been so often won and lost in the course of the last quarter of a century, and so many visitations and calamities have fallen upon this garden of the world, that the greatest portion of our standard works of reference has been rendered useless. Even the excellent tours of Forsyth and Eustace, perhaps the most