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rity to examine the acts of the legiflative body, and to refufe to endow them with the facred character of laws.

"If the whole collective body of the people were capable of exprefling their will in direct terms, it would be abfurd to fubject laws fo enacted to a royal fanction; but in a reprefentative government, where the deputies might be chofen more from circumftances of fortune and fituation than from perfonal virtue and merit, and where it is poffible that the majority of them might, unite in oppofition to the general good, it is neceflary to counteract fuch an aristocracy by the prerogative of a monarch. Hence an alliance between the crown and the people, against every fpecies of ariftocracy, is created by their refpective interefts and their fears. If, for inftance, the prince is poffeffed, of no negative, what fhall hinder the reprefentatives from pafling an act for perpetuating their own authority, like the famous long parliament of England? What fhall prevent them from invading all the functions of the executive power, as well as the rights of the people? There are only two cafes in which a monarch can be fuppofed to refufe his affent: it, where he conceives the law in queftion to be oppofite to the real interefts of the people; or 2dly, where, deceived by his minifters, he is induced to refift a law which is injurious to their perfonal interelts. In the firft cafe the prerogative will be beneficially exercifed; in the fecond, the law will be only fufpended: for it is impoffible that a limited monarch fhould long refift the wishes of the whole nation. In fact, his veto, however abfolute, can be no more at any time than an appeal from the legiflature to the people at large."

Such were the arguments with which the almoft irrefiftible eloquence of Mirabeau, in particular, defended the abfolute veto: they were however combated with not, lefs force and energy by the oppofite party. "It is effentially neceffary," faid they, "to preserve diftinct the two departments of government, the legislative and the executive powers; nor is there any. thing in the proper and natural functions of a king, which makes it neceffary to conftitute him as an effential integrant branch of the legiflature. It is difficult to draw the line between the right of stopping proceedings, and the right of action. The right of ftopping proceedings in the hands of the executive power, would be to make it fuperior to the majority of the legiflature; it would be a lettre de cachet against the fupreme will of the nation.

"A fufpenfive veto, or an appeal to the will of the nation, would be attended with worfe confequences than even the abfolute negative: it would change the very nature of the government, and convert it into a pure democracy, inftead of a repre-, fentative government. What an appeal would it be to 26 millions of people, of whom nine-tenths are deftitute of inftruction, and incapable of underftanding the complex na-. ture of political queftions? But it is pretended that the legislative power may one day encroach upon the executive; as if a power defti. tute of arms, could contend with a power which has continually arms in its hands; as if an affembly, of, 1200 men, neceffarily divided by their private interests, and inveted with a tranfient authority, were likely to invade fuccefsfully the perpetual and hereditary depolitory of the whole public force. Confult

hiftory,

hiftory, and you will find throughout every page the legiflature of free nations employed, not in ufurping the executive power, but in reftraining it. Doubtless a good king will confult the general with of the nation; but a violent and obftinate king will expofe, in defending his prerogative, both his crown and his life."

It was in thefe terms that Meff. Garat junior, de Landine, Sales, Beaumetz, and others, attacked the royal negative. A very fmall party pleaded for a fufpenfive veto; but as both the great parties agreed in rejecting it, every plan of mediation appeared at firft improbable. In the courfe, however, of the difcuffion, new lights were reflected upon the fubject, and inclined both parties at length to this fafe and middle path: "It was acknowledged that the great fountain of the executive power could not, without fome danger, be deprived of this prerogative; nor could it be unlimitedly af figned to the monarch, without the apprehenfion of a danger till fuperior. The decifions of a legislative body are certainly not infallible, and in fome inftances may be oppofite even to the will of the nation in general in that cafe, therefore, there fhould exift fome counterpoife to their action; and though it might be dangerous and impolitic to make the king a conftituent part of the legiflature, yet the power of fufpending a law is not an act of legiflation. An actual appeal to the people at large would be impracticable, if not unconftitutional. When France adopted the reprefentative form of government, it virtually abolished mandatory instructions from the contituents; fuppofing then the national affembly to be changed at certain periods by new elections, no great inconvenience can arife from

invefting the monarch with a power of fufpending, for a certain number of fucceffive legislatures, any law that may appear to him contrary to the welfare of the flate. Will not this fufpenfive veto, on the other hand, place the reprefentatives and the king in a flate of emulation extremely conducive to the general good? Will not the deputies of the nation become more circumfpect in prefenting for the royal fanction, laws which the king may reject with applaufe? And will not the monarch be cautious of fufpending laws, which are in themfelves fo good as to fecure their enaction in fucceffive legiflatures?"

The difcuffion of this important queftion was not confined to the af fembly. The city of Paris in particular was confiderably agitated on this occafion: the populace threatened again to relapfe into all their former violence; and even a lift was fhewn, in which a number of members belonging to the assembly itself were marked for deftruction. Rennes and Dinan alio formally protefted againit the veto in the most violent terms. In the mean time a memoire was fent from M. Neckar to the affembly on this fubject, in which, by a number of very fenfible arguments, be enforced the adoption of the fufpenfive veto, limiting its effects to two legislatures: but the majority, confifling of the most violent of both parties, on the plea of prohibiting all minifterial influence, would not permit the memoire to be read. It was, however, made public in a few days, and is fuppofed to have had confiderable weight with the people at leaft, if not with the affembly. It was therefore at length determined, "that the king fhould have the power of fufpending any decree for two fucceffive legiflatuses; but that if a third should

perfift

perfit in enacting it, in that cafe it fhould have the force of a law without the royal fanction." While the affembly remained undetermined on the important queftion of the royal veto (for it was in agitation from the latter end of Auguft to the 14th of September), other fubjects of government not lefs intereiting prefented themselves for difcuffion. The firft of thefe regarded the permanence of a na tional affembly; in plain terms, whether there fhould always exift an affembly ready to be convoked upon any occafion, like the parliament of England; or whether it fhould only meet periodically, and be virtually diffolved on the clofe of the feflion. On this topic there was little room for diffent, and it was carried in favour of a permanent affembly with only three diffenting voices. On the next topic of difcuffion there was lefs unanimity. M. Lally Tolendal, in the name of the committee of conftitution, propofed that the legislature fhould confift of two chambers, a lower and an upper houfe. In the original draft which the reporter exhibited as an improvement on the English conftitution, the fenate or upper house was to be compofed of members chofen for life; but M. Mounier thought that this high dignity ought to be conferred only for feven years.

This propofed organization was univerfally difapproved by the people. It was evidently founded on the imaginary balance of powers in the English conftitution. But the popular party confidered it as the afylum of the old aristocracy, and (to use the phrafeology of a writer of this party) as the cradle of a new one: nay, even the partifans of the feudal fyftem oppofed the creation of a new dignity, which was to be

1791.

raised in function and authority above the ancient nobility of the realm.

On the difcuffion of the fubject in the affembly, the English government was treated with all due refpect; but M. Rabaud de St. Etienne obferved, "that the establishment of an upper houfe there, was not originally with any view of reftraining the exceffes of popular counfels, but was fimply a treaty of accommodation; a capitulation between the arrogance of the great and the fpirit of liberty in the people. It is," faid he, " one of the feudal relics, and we have agreed to deftroy that pernicious fyftem."

"The very nature of things," it was urged, "is adverfe to every divifion of the legislative authority. The nation which is reprefented is one, the reprefentative body ought to be one also. The will of the nation, of which the affembly is the organ, is indivifible, and fo ought to be the voice which pronounces it.Again, if the two chambers have not refpectively a veto upon the acts of each other, there is no object in dividing them: if each of them poffeiles this velo, in fome cafes they will be reduced to perfect inaction. If the fenators are appointed for life, they will naturally be on the fide of the monarch, who may gratify their avarice by places and penfions, and amufe their ambition by fplendid expectations and promifes: a fenate. for life then would be no more than an additional force added to the executive power."

The remainder of the debate was interrupted and tumultuous. The bifhop of Langres, who was prefident, and a decided friend to the measure of two chambers, quitted the chair, which was taken by the count de Clermont Tonnerre; and when the fuffrages were taken, though more than one thoufand

D

voted,

voted, only eighty-nine were in fa- of the difaffected party now refted vour of an upper house.

In the difcuffion of the veto two other fubjects alfo had been involved; namely, the duration of the legislative body, and the mode to be purfued in re-electing the deputies. On the firft of these topics two evils were to be avoided an exiftence too short, which afforded no fcope for experience, nor for the difplay of talents, and which would neceffarily render the operations of the legiflature verfatile and inconftant; and a protracted duration, which might open the door to corruption, and generate the efprit de corps. The term of two years was adopted, as the medium between the extreme points of an annual aflembly and the dangerous poffeffion of authority for a more extended period. The fame reasons induced the affembly to prefer the election of new members entirely to each legislature, rather than a partial re-election; fince it was evident, that whatever the new members might want in experience they would compenfate in diligence and zeal; fince it was a means of extending the political knowledge and ability of the fuperior claffes; and fince, in fine, it appeared the only effectual mode of utterly excluding the evils of faction and venality.

The affembly decreed with an unanimous voice of acclamation That the perfou of the king is inviolable; that the throne is indivifible; that the crown is hereditary in the males of the reigning family according to the order of primogeniture, to the perpetual exclufion of females.

The unanimity on thefe queftions was nearly deftroyed, and the proceedings of the affembly interrupted, by the artful introduction of a molt imprudent topic. The only hope

on the probability of involving the nation in a difpute or conteft with fome foreign power; and a fair opportunity was offered when the motion for regulating the fucceffion came under confideration. It was then propofed, that the affembly fhould decide whether the Spanish branch of the Bourbon family were legally excluded by the renunciation which Philip V. had agreed to by the treaty of Utrecht. No queftion could be more impertinent or irrelevant in its object than this; and the neceffary confequence of a decifion must have been, on the one hand to difguft the court of Spain, or on the other to give occafion to the calumniators of the new legiflature to affert that they paid no regard to the facredness of treaties. From this dilemma they were happily relieved, after three days debate, by an amendment propofed by M. Target, which difavowed the intention of extending the spirit of the laft of the above articles to the prejudging of the effect of renunciations by treaty.

The decrees of the 4th of Auguft had, as we have already ftated, been fent to the king; and on the 12th of September a decree was paffed, prefling the neceffity of their promulgation. On the 18th a letter was received from his majesty, approving in general terms of the fpirit of the decrees, but ftating fome objections against particular articles, especially the abolition of thofe rents which had been originally founded in perfonal fervice, but which were to the prefent proprietors a fpecies of actual property; and alfo remarking, that fome difficulty would attend the abolition of tithes; and that there appeared fome danger of offending the German princes who had poffeffions in

Alface,

to

Alface, which were
them by treaty. To thefe articles
therefore he propofed to give only
a conditional affent, with a promife
of modifying or even renouncing
his opinions, if convinced by the
obfervations of the national af
fembly.

Neither the people nor the affembly were fatisfied with this letter of the king. It was faid that thefe decrees were fent to the executive power, not for his affent, but for the purpofe of promulgation mere ly; that they were principles rather than laws, and that the fanction of the executive power was not necef fary to the confecration of principles; but that the obfervations of his majefty would come properly under confideration when these arti cles were to be reduced into the form of laws. On the motion of M. Chappelier, therefore, it was refolved, "That the prefident fhould wait on the king to entreat him, that he would immediately order the promulgation of the decrees of the 4th of Auguft and the following days; affuring his majefty that the national affembly would pay the molt refpectful attention to the obfervations which he had been pleafed to communicate." The king immediately acceded to the wishes of the legislature, and on the 20th of September fanctioned the decrees.

Amidit this general profpect of a happy establishment of rational liberty, the derangement of the finances feemed to oppose an invincible obftacle to the patriotic labours of the friends of the people. The propofed loan of eighty millions had failed; loans in general were decried; and the current fpecie of the king dom was transferred to diftant countries. Nothing, however, could difcourage the confidence which the citizens repofed in their reprefenta-.

tives: the pecuniary difficulties which embarraffed the government were no fooner known, than a number of difinterested expedients were pro jected for relieving them. The wives and daughters of the opulent inhabitants of Paris appeared at the bar of the affembly, and, after the example of the Roman ladies, offered their jewels and their ornaments of value on the altar of the public. The whole kingdom was at once actuated by a general enthufiafm; infancy facrificed its toys; old age its comforts; opulence prefented the tribute of its wealth; and poverty itself confecrated to its country a part of its fubfiftence. The king, whofe benevolence has never been queftioned, however imprudently he may have acted in fome difficult circumstances, and under improper influence, voluntarily fent his rich fervices of plate to the mint, though the affembly entreated him in the ftrongeft terms to revoke the refolution.

The neceffities of the flate, however, were too confiderable to be materially relieved by thefe patriotic donations; and they were found scarcely fufficient to anfwer the current expences. M. Neckar was the only perfon who did not defpair. He had the courage to represent to the affembly the calamitous fituation of the republic, and the means of alleviating it. He fhewed that by certain reductions in the public expence, by different projects of œconomy, by an equalization of the taxes, the moft reasonable hopes might be entertained refpecting the future refloration of credit, and reestablishment of the finances; and, in order to obviate the present embarraffments, proposed that a contribution fhould be demanded from every citizen equivalent to a quarter of his nett income, to be collected in the fpace of fifteen months, agreeably

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