great fervices. Mr. De Sartine, was not a man of rank; but he had the merit of following up, with extraordinary fpirit and diligence, the plan ofincreafing the marine, which had been adopted in the late reign; but more languidly purfued on account of the ill ftate of the revenue. But the prefent king took a ftill ftronger ftep in the regulation of that important object. Louis the XVI. had the magnanimity, to place Mr. Necker, a foreign gentleman, and a proteftant, at the head of his finances. The fuccefs and reward, were equal to the liberality and wisdom of the measure. France recovered her public credit. The people of France, for the first time, had the fatisfaction of feeing a war carried on by facrifices on the part of the king, and with an attention to the eafe and relief of the people. This measure could not fail to encourage and promote their confidence in government; and muft prove a fource of strength, which that great monarchy never poffeffed before. The virtues of a republican ftate were professed, and in fome meafure practifed. France opened the year by a fuccefsful expedition to the coast of Africa. The fquadron employed upon this fervice was commanded by the Marquis de Vaudrevil, and a land force, much greater than was neceffary, (but both taking Africa only in their way to reinforce D'Estaing in the Welt-Indies) was commanded by the Duke de Lauzun. As the garrifons in that quarter were totally incapable of making any refiftance, the British forts, fettlements, factories, and property, at Senegal, in the river Gambia, and other parts of that coaft, fell without trouble into the hands of the enemy, between the latter end of January, and that of February, 1779. The French upon that fuccefs, abandoned the island of Goree, which they had recovered by the late peace; and transported the artillery and garrison to ftrengthen Senegal. Sir Edward Hughes foon afterwards, on his paffage to the Eat-Indies, feized and garrifoned the island of Goree; and as he had a body of troops on board the fquadron, it was eagerly expected and hoped by the public at home, that he would have recovered thofe fettlements which we had fo newly loft. But as no attempt of that fort was made, it must be concluded that officer's orders did not extend fo far. It was perhaps an object not fo important as to rifque upon it the much greater objects which were then in view. As the fummer advanced it was thought neceffary in France to attempt fomething, which might fhew an early alacrity in fome fort correfpondent to their great military preparations. The firft was an attempt on the ifle of Jerfey, part of the ancient dutchy of Normandy. This, with Guernsey and the leffer iflands, being the fole remains of our vaft poffeffions on the continent of Europe. The defign was laid by aprince, or count of Naffau; whofe anceftor, if we are not misinformed, had rendered a very difputed claim, of being in fome manner defcended from a defunct branch of that illuftrious family, the means of much furthering his fortunes in France. The force employed upon this service has been estimated, by different accounts, from three, to five or fix thoufand men. They Trifing and ineffective as this diverfion was, it had the fortune of being productive of fome confequences, with refpect to the American war. For it happened that Admiral Arbuthnot, with a fquadron of men of war, and a prodigious convoy, amounting to about four hundred merchantmen and tranfports, was then on the outfet of his voyage to New York. He happened to fall in with the veffel which was fent exprefs from Jerfey to England, with the firft account of the attack upon, and the appa, rent imminent danger of the island. That commander had fpirit and refolution enough, rather to hazard any perfonal confequence that might attend his venturing upon a breach of orders, than to fuffer the loss of fo valuable an island, whilft he commanded a force in the channel. He accordingly ordered the convoy to wait for him at Torbay, and proceeded himfelf with the fquadron, to the relief of Jerfey. Although the delay immediately occafioned by this meafure, was in the firft inftance but trining, yet through the fucceeding cafualties of wind and weather, the feet was not able to get clear of the land of England, until the beginning of the enfuing month, and did not arrive at New York till near the end of Auguft. As that fleet conveyed the reinforcements, camp equipage, ftores, and other neceffaries, which were to enabic Sir Henry Clinton to open the campaign with any vi gour, the confequences of fo late an arrival are fufficiently obvious. Notwithstanding the repulfe and difappointment which attended the late attempt upon Jerfey, the defign did not, however, feem to be relinquished. The French troops were landed and retained for feveral days on the small iflands which lie between it and the continent; while the armed veffels paraded on the oppofite coafts of Normandy, The fpirit, activity, and gallantry of Sir James Wallace, in the Experiment of 50 guns, being feconded by two frigates, and as many armed brigs, by which he was accompanied, put an end to this appearance of threat, and state of alarm, That officer having purfued feveral large frigates, with fome fmaller craft, into the bay of Concalle in Normandy, until they had run afhore under the cover of a battery, and his pilots not venturing to take any farther charge of his hip, he directly took that charge and rifque upon himself, and boldly carried her up the bay, and layed May 13th. her afhore abreast of the battery, In that fituation he continued to engage, until he had filenced the guns of the battery, and compelled the French crews to abandon their fhips; which being then boarded by the armed boats from the Experiment and Cabot brig, the La Danac, of 34 guns, and rated at 250 men, with two fmall loaded prizes, were brought fately off; but the country people, with fome troops and militia, now keeping up a conftant fire, with cannon and howitzers, as well as fmall arms from the shore, they were obliged to be contented with burning, or otherwife deftroying, two other fout frigates, an armed Cutter of 16 guns, with a number of small craft. tion of her naval force in Europe. This was to prevent the junction of the French and Spanish fleets, by blocking the former up in the port of Breit, until the feafon of enterprize was over. Although this meafure was undoubtedly in contemplation, yet, whether the naval preparation of Great Britain was not fo forward as was imagined and given out; or from whatever caufe, the fea was left open; and the French fleet at Breft was permitted to join the Spanish at Cadiz. This neglect, or neceffity, was the more felt, as it ferved in its confequences to go The attempt upon Jersey appeared, however, to be only a prelude, or intended as a preparatory exercife, to that grand invafion of Great-Britain, Ireland, or both, which feemed at that time,vern all the enfuing naval events and during the greater part of the fummer, to be in the immediate contemplation of France. Whether that defign was really adopted, was, with fome, a matter of doubt; but it was certainly ftrongly indicated by appearances; the northern provinces of France were every where in motion; as well on the coafts, as in the interior country. Armies were marched down to the fea coafts of Normandy and Brittany; the ports in the bay and on the channel, which were the best calculated for the purpose, were crowded with shipping; and the king named the generals and principal officers, who were to command or to act in a grand intended expedition. The military power of England was not at that time fully called forth; and the defenceless state of Ireland in the beginning of the year might well have given birth to fuch a defign. Whatever the defigns of the enemy were, Great Britain feemed to have one great object of policy with refpect to the direction and difpofi of the campaign; and to give a new caft and colour to the ftate of public affairs between the house of Bourbon and Great Britain. The murmur and diffatisfaction were likewife much increased, from a general report and opinion, not only that the French fleet was more backward in point of preparation and condition than the British, but that the latter had been dilatory in its motions after it had failed, as well as flack in its endeavours to prepare for failing. However thefe charges or opinions might have been founded, they could not but derive great strength from the fubfequent infult on our coafts, which appeared to be the direct confequence of that junction of the enemies united force. The French fleet, confifting of about 28 fail of the line, under the command of M. D'Orvil, liers, failed from Breft early in the nonth of June, and 4th. by directing its courfe to the fouthward, indicated its deftination to the coat of Spain. It has been fince faid, that it was very defec tive in point of preparation; but that it hurried to fea in that condition, from an apprehenfion of its being intercepted by the British fleet under Sir Charles Hardy, which was then daily expect ed in the Bay of Biscay. It spent fome confiderable time on the Spanish coafts; and it was reported, that fome mifunderitanding, or difference, between fome of the commanders on both fides, prevented an enterprize of the utmost importance from taking place. It would feem that this muft allude to an attack upon Gibraltar, a defign which does not, however, feem very confiftent with their fubfequent conduct. It does not feem improba ble that the delay proceeded from. the defect of preparation on both fides. However that may be, the whole force being at length joined, the combined fleets made a tremendous appearance; amounting to between fixty and feventy line of battle fhips, befides a cloud of frigates, firefhips, and all those smaller kinds and denominations of vessels which in any manner appertain to war. This formidable force, having turned its face to the northward, continued to direct its courfe to the coafts of Great Britain. It was rather fingular, that the British home fleet, under Sir Charles Hardy, amounting to about 35, or from thence to 38 fhips of the line, was then cruizing in fome part of the bay, or fomewhere near the chops of the channel, and was paffed by this great armament, which covered fo great an extent of ocean, with A The enemy entered the British channel about the middle of Auguft, and paraded two or three days before Plymouth, to the great alarm of the people, but without making any attempt on the place. The Ardent man of war, of 64 guns, which was on her way from Portsmouth to join Sir Charles Hardy, mistaking them for the British fleet, had, however, the misfortune of being taken in fight of Plymouth. ftrong easterly wind, which continued for feveral days, feems to have driven them out of the channel. They however pretended, that they went in fearch of the British fleet; and they continued to range about the Land's End, the Scilly Islands, and the chops of the channel, until the end of the month. On the laft of August, the wind being in his favour, Sir Charles Hardy gained the entrance of the channel, in fight of the combined fleets, without their being able to prevent him. The great object of that commander, was to draw them up to the narrow part of the channel, where, if he should be obliged to an engagement, he could engage upon lefs difadvantageous terms; and where, either a defeat, or certain changes of the wind, might have been productive of the most ruinous confequences to the enemy. The enemy purfued him as high up as Plymouth; but being fenfible of the danger, particularly at that feafon of the year, they did not adventure much farther. And as the combined fleets were now become fickly in the moft extreme extreme degree, fo as almoft wholly to difable fome of the fhips; that their fhips were otherwife much out of condition; and the equinox faft approaching; their commanders thought it neceffary, pretty early in September, totally to abandon the Britifh coafts, and repair to Breft for the affiftances which they wanted. Thus ended the expectations of the enemy, and the apprehenfions of Great Britain. Never had perhaps fo great a naval force been affembled on the feas. Ne ver any by which lefs was done, Nothing could have been more СНАР. II. State of public affairs previous to the meeting of parliament. Vaft combination of power against Great Britain. Proclamations; for reprizals on Spain; and for defenfive measures in cafe of an invasion. Various manifeftos, and public pieces, issued by the belligerant powers. Some obfervations on the charges exhibited by Spain. Oftenfible caufes, and real motives for war, on the fide of the House of Bourbon. Ireland. Caufes which led to the prefent ftate of affairs in that kingdom. Commercial, and non-confumption agreements. French invafion threatened. Military affociations. People become strongly armed. Exemplary Prudent meafures of government in that conduct of the afficiators. Difconcountry. General demand of a free and unlimited commerce. tents in Scotland, under an apprehenfion of a relaxation of the popery laws. Outrages in Edinburgh and Glasgow. Subfcriptions for raising troops, and other public purposes. Eaft India company grant bounties far raifing 6000 feamen, and undertake to build three ships of the line, State of parties. Changes in as an augmentation to the royal navy. adminiftration. Meeting of the Irish parliament. fovereignty perfect in the European feas; to afford the fulleft protection to our own commerce, whilft we nearly ruined that of the enemy, and to fuffer no difgrace any where. It is true, that abroad, we loft the valuable ifland of Dominica; but if this was not compenfated for in point of commercial value by the reduction of St. Lucia, it was am ply |