XXIV. 1792. BOOK at the progress of irreligion and infidelity; and invoke, with ill-assumed devotion, the protection and blessing of Providence in the prosecution of a cause which was asserted to be the cause of GoD and Heaven. That vain and presumptuous confidence in the Divine favor expressed in the successive speeches from the throne during the American war, notwithstanding the final confusion of those arrogant hopes, was now revived in all the ostentation of humility. But kings have long claimed the lofty prerogatives appertaining to the vicegerents of Heaven.* *Three centuries ago, Edward IV. having in contemplation a war with France, and alleging, as a ground of hostility, the violation of engagements on the part of his adversary Louis XI. in the same spirit of princely pride and pious zeal thus addressed his parliament :-" This contumely I am resolved to punish, and I cannot doubt success: Almighty God still strengthens his arm who undertakes a war for justice,Besides all that right which led Edward III, our glorious ancestor, and Henry V. our glorious predecessor, we seem to have a deputyship from Heaven to execute the office of the supreme judge in chastising the impious." "How long shall it be thus? say, Reason, say, When shall thy dilatory kingdom come? Haste, royal infant, to thy manhood spring, XXIV. 1792. efforts of of France to war. Although the determination of the English court BOOK was from the first sufficiently manifest, the government of France left no means unessayed to ac- Ineffectual complish an accommodation. On the 27th of De- the execu cember a memorial was presented by M. Chauvelin tive council to lord Grenville, in which he informs his lord- avert the ship," that the executive council of the French republic, thinking it a duty which they owe to the French nation not to leave it in the state of suspense into which it has been thrown by the late measures of the British government, have authorized him to demand with openness, whether France ought to consider England as a neutral or hostile power? at the same time being solicitous that not the smallest doubt should exist respecting the disposition of France towards England, and of its desire to remain in peace." In allusion to the decree of the 19th of November, M. Chauvelin says, "that the French nation absolutely reject the idea of that false interpretation by which it might be supposed that the French republic should favor insurrections, or excite disturbance, in any neutral or friendly country whatever. In particular, they declare in the most solemn manner, that France will not attack Holland so long as that power ad Their heads to Heaven, and laugh at laws-To thee FAWCET. 1792. BOOK heres to the principles of her neutrality." As to XXIV. the navigation of the Scheld, M. Chauvelin affirms it "to be a question of too little importance to be made the sole cause of a war; and that it could only be used as a pretext for a premeditated aggression. On this fatal supposition (he says) the French nation will accept war; but SUCH a war would be the war not of the British nation, but of the British ministry, against the French republic; and of this he conjures them well to consider the TERRIBLE RESPONSIBILITY." To this communicarashness of tion lord Grenville returned a most arrogant and ville. provoking answer. His lordship acknowledged Indiscre tion and lord Gren the receipt of a note from M. Chauvelin, styling himself Minister Plenipotentiary of France. He reminds him that the king, since the unhappy events of the 10th of August, had suspended all official communication with France; and informs him, that he cannot be treated with in the quality and under the form stated in his note. Nevertheless, "under a form neither regular nor official," his lordship condescended to reply-but in a mode which could only tend to inflame the differences subsisting between the two nations; and which, far from accepting the concessions and explanations made by France, sought only to discover new prétences of cavil and quarrel. In a tone of the most decided and lofty superiority, his lordship says "If France is really desirous of maintaining XXIV. 1793. friendship and peace with England, she must shew BOOK herself disposed to renounce her views of aggression and aggrandizement, and to confine herself within her own territory, without insulting other governments, without disturbing their tranquillity, without violating their rights." The relinquishment of her recent conquests being thus haughtily demanded of France as a preliminary of peace, it might well be supposed that negotiation was at an end. But the government of France, in the midst of their triumphs, discovered a degree of temper and moderation in their intercourse with England as surprising as it was laudable. In answer to the letter of lord Grenville, a memorial was transmitted from M. Le Brun, minister of foreign affairs, in the name of the executive council, dated January 4, 1793, framed in terms of singular wisdom and ability, and forming a striking contrast to the pride, petulance, and folly, displayed in the communications of the English minister. They begin with repeating "the assurances of their sincere desire to maintain peace and harmony between France and England. It is with great reluctance (say they) that the republic would see itself forced to a rupture much more contrary to its inclination than its interest." In reference to lord Grenville's refusal to acknowledge M. Chauvelin in his diplomatic capacity, the council remark, "that in the negotiations XXIV. 1793. BOOK now carrying on at Madrid, the principal minister of his Catholic majesty did not hesitate to address M. Bourgoign, the ambassador of the republic at that court, by the title of Minister Plenipotentiary of France. But that a defect in point of form might not impede a negotiation, on the success of which depended the tranquillity of two great nations, they had sent credential letters to M. Chauvelin, to enable him to treat according to the severity of diplomatic forms." The council repeat, "that the decree of the 19th of November had been misunderstood; and that it was far from being intended to favor sedition-being merely applicable to the single case where the general will of a nation, clearly and unequivocally expressed, should call for the assistance and fraternity of the French nation. Sedition can never exist in an expression of the general will. The Dutch were certainly not seditious when they formed the generous resolution of throwing off the Spanish yoke; nor was it accounted as a crime to Henry IV. or to queen Elizabeth that they listened to their solicitations of assistance." As to the right of navigation on the Scheld, the council affirm, "that it is a question of absolute indifference to England, little interesting even to Holland, but of great importance to the Belgians, who were not parties to the treaty of Westphalia, by which they were divested of that right: but when that |