an outward expression of re

ligion, and a type of the future.

Offering is the fundamental notion of S.

Through ac

GOD admits to communion

with Him. Its essential

character not destruction, but consecration.

to be twofold. On the one hand, sacrifices are the symbols of certain feelings, desires, and ideas; on the other, they are types of the future. The first we gather from the rites themselves; the second from their fulfilment in the Christian Dispensation. The notion of offering (oblatio, пробдорά) may be taken as the fundamental notion of all sacrifices. Man gives to the Divinity part of his property, in order either to express his veneration and gratitude, or to secure the Divine favour, taking it for granted that GOD is pleased with such gift and with the dispositions of the giver. The ceptance of S., Divine pleasure is supposed to be increased by the fact that the gift implies submission, adoration, and veneration on the part of the giver. The burning or outpouring of the gifts hands them over to GOD, and through their acceptance GOD admits the giver to communion with Him; for the essential character of the sacrificial gift is not its destruction, but its handing over and consecration to GOD. The outpouring of the libations and the killing of the animals are but the means for handing over the gift to GOD and bringing the giver into communion with Him. The killing necesonly prepara- sarily precedes the burning, but the killing is not the sacrifice. "The victim is killed in order to be offered' (S. Gregory, in Ezek., i., 2, Hom., x., 19). In other words, the killing is preparatory to the sacrifice. The privation suffered by the giver in parting with his property, and the dispositions with which that privation is endured, may have a great moral effect on the giver, but they are not essential, since many sacrifices involve no appreciable privation,-the Sacrifice of the Mass probably none at all.

The killing

tory to the S.

We may here remark that an examination of the sacrificial terms used in Greek, Latin, and Hebrew

quite bears out this view that destruction is not the essential element in sacrifice,* inasmuch as opater is the only Greek sacrificial word which contains the notion of slaughter, and of Latin terms not one in its original signification suggests this idea; while in the Old Testament Hebrew, Zebach (1) alone of the seven terms used for sacrifice signifies "the slaughtering of animals."

In the Hebrew sacrifices, the two sacrificial actions seem to have been the outpouring of the blood and the burning of the offering. The greatest importance attaches to the blood of the victim, which is gathered and poured out at the Altar; for, according to ancient ideas, the life, or the soul, is in the blood: "For the life of the flesh is in the blood and I have given it to you upon the Altar to make an atonement for your souls; for it is the blood that maketh an atonement for the soul." When, therefore, the blood is offered, the highest that man can give-that is, a soul or a life-is handed over to GOD. This may be seen in that, while the pouring out of the blood is the especial function of the Priest, the killing may be performed by a layman.

In the sprinkling of the blood there is more than an act of propitiation, and in the cremation of the offering there is more than an act of supreme worship (latria). Both may well express, in the first place, the oblation of self to GOD, and the communion of self with GOD.

The sanctifying power of fire is as well known as the rôle it plays in heathen mythologies. GOD Himself

* As the discussion in this place of these various sacrificial terms would occupy several pages, and therefore would somewhat interrupt the course of our argument, the reader is referred, for a fuller treatment of them, to Appendix A.

† Lev. xvii. II.

Greek, Latin, and Hebrew that destruction is not the

terms show

essential idea.

with the Hebrews the two effusion of

sacrificial acts,

blood, and

cremation.

Philo's explanation of the effusion.

was the Fire: "Our GOD is a consuming Fire" (Heb. xii. 29); or the fire was a power sent from heaven, and frequently the heavenly fire is said to have consumed the victim.

Philo Judæus* explains the shedding of the blood as an oblation of the soul. Our LORD Himself says that He will give His soul (vxv) for our redemption (S. Matt. xx. 28). The independent unbloody sacrifices can only be explained from the same point of view, namely, that they express oblation of self to, and comIn burning in- munion with, GOD. In the most ancient sacrifices of incense and of oil, the sweet odour generated by the burning is the chief object in view. The Fathers † remark that burnt bones and flesh produce no sweet odour, and, consequently, that the pleasure GOD finds in the sacrifices must lie in the pious dispositions of those who offer.

cense and oil, the object is the sweet odour, not the destruction.

The meal a

munion.

Again, the sacrificial meal is an element to be consymbol of com- sidered in the interpretation of sacrifices, but taken by itself it affords no explanation for the outpouring of the blood, which is not food, nor of the incense offered. The eating of the victim accepted by GOD is simply the symbol of the communion with GOD intended by those who offer the sacrifice. This making perfect (TEλɛiwo15, Heb. ix. 9, x. 1, 14) is the end and final object of all sacrifices. S. Irenæus says: "Sacrifices do not sanctify man, for GOD is not in want of sacrifices; but it is the conscience of him who offers that sanctifies the sacrifice, for when it is pure it causes GOD to accept the sacrifice as from a friend."

S. Irenæus.

Sacrifice in general, therefore, is defined by Schanz

* Philo J., 839 B. in the Paris edition of 1640.
†Theodoret, in Exod. q. 62.

S. Iren., Adv. Hær., 1. iv., c. xviii., 3.

as

"the presentation to GOD of a visible gift at the Schanz's

hands of a legitimate minister, through its transform- definition of S.

ation, for the purpose of recognizing the Divine Ma

jesty, and as a means of propitiation and of union

with GOD."*

finitions of S.

IV. Here we may well go on to consider some of the IV. Various dedefinitions of sacrifice in general, which have been put forth at different times by the Fathers and the theologians of the Church.

definition.

We begin with the famous quasi-definition of S., 1. S. AugustAugustine: Every good deed, therefore, which is ine's famous performed to unite us with GOD in holy fellowship, that is, having regard to that final good in which we are able to be perfectly happy, is a true sacrifice." †

We must examine this definition with the greatest care, not only on account of the authority of the author, but because it is relied upon by a certain school of theologians in our own time as the chief support of a modern view of sacrifice which lays so much stress upon the inward dispositions of the offerer as practically to ignore the outward sign of the sacrificial action.

Now, what exactly is S. Augustine defining? Cert- ofa true S., not ainly not "sacrifice," since "sacrifice" is the of S. in general. predicate, and not the subject of his definition. In the chapter of the De Civitate Dei which immediately precedes this definition, S. Augustine has been pointing * Schanz, Die Lehre von den Heiligen Sacramenten der Katholischen Kirche, p. 479.

"Proinde verum sacrificium est omne opus quod agitur ut sancta societate inhæreamus Deo, relatum scilicet ad illum finem boni quo veraciter beati esse possimus" (De Civ. Dei, lib. x., cap. vi.). It is strange how many translate sacrificium as though it were the subject instead of the predicate; e. g., the translation of S. Augustine in The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, and the Bishop of Brechin's Primary Charge, p. 48.

The union of

out that the important part of sacrifice is the inward
part, that is, the dispositions of the offerer, so that GOD
calls a broken and contrite heart" a sacrifice. This
chapter, which we have already given,* ends with the
statement that in a certain sense mercy is a sacrifice,
for GOD says,
I will have mercy, and not sacrifice.” †
The next chapter begins with the words of our de-
finition, "Proinde verum sacrificium." S. Augustine
affirms that every good deed, therefore (and we must
carefully notice the "therefore," which connects the
statement with the argument of the last chapter), is a
true sacrifice. He does not, however, imply that the
terms every good deed" and "sacrifice" are coex-
tensive. If we may use a homely illustration, it would
be as correct to say that in the proposition " Every man
is an animal," we were defining the genus "animal,"
and that in putting into it the species "man," we were
asserting that the two were coextensive, as to say that
in this passage S. Augustine is defining sacrifice. He
merely states that every good deed which is done to unite.
us with God in holy fellowship, etc., is a true sacrifice,
that is, has those characteristics which entitle it to be
considered not "a sacrifice," but "a true sacrifice."

At first sight "a true sacrifice may seem an expression of wider significance than "sacrifice" without the qualifying attribute "true," but even a superficial examination shows us that this is not so, since the adjective "true," in distinguishing the word which it qualifies, really limits it and imparts to it a different meaning. S. Augustine is evidently only contrasting a true sacrifice with what is not a true sacrifice.

Now, we have already pointed out that sacrifice "is two parts in S. clearly the union of two things, one of which is inward, † S. Matt. ix. 13.

*

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