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criticism on what most people will feel to be the weak points of his book. It undoubtedly contains. much useful matter, but does not excel in its arrangement or definitions. Mr. Day divides logic into "two parts-the first treating of the elements of thought; the second of the method of thought. The elements of thought, further, are either its essential properties, in this use of them called laws; or the different kinds or forms_in which thought appears." The forms of thought are stated to be the judgment, the concept, and "the reasoning," the treatment of which occupies the first half of the volume. In the second half, devoted to method-or "the conditions of perfect thought in order to its end, which is truth, science, or perfect knowledge "-these three topics are again discussed, which occasions frequent repetition of what was said before.
We do not see the necessity or advantage of first explaining the process of judgment, and then in a subsequent part of the work discussing the conditions necessary to its correct performance. A similar remark applies to the other two subjects. Again, in the early parts of the book there are brief definitions of generalization and determination, and towards the end fuller accounts of the same processes. We have noticed other instances of repetition, for which we can see no sufficient reason. A method of arrangement which leads to such results is not to be commended, however exact may be the principles on which it is founded.
Mr. Day's definitions are even less to be admired than his arrangement. As one instance the following may be quoted: "The concept is that derived form of thought which springs directly from the matter of a judgment, and appears
in the form of such matter. more briefly, the concept is a derivation of a logical term from the matter of a judgment or judgments." A definition should at any rate be definite and clear, which is more than can be predicated of this. As far as we can gather from its hazy language, it conveys a very different notion of concept, from Sir W. Hamilton's or Archbishop Thomson's.
We object to the author's definition of copula also, which is stated thus: "The essence of the judging act lies in the uniting of the subject and the predicate, and the recognizing of them as the same. This element in a judgment is called the copula. We may accordingly define the copula to be that element of a judgment in which the terms are identified or differenced, or recognized as the same or different. The copula, it should be noticed, is not always expressed by the so-called substantive verb is, is not."
We have always been given to understand that the copula is part of a proposition, or judgment expressed in words, and therefore consists of a word or words; but Mr. Day here speaks of it as an act of the mind, which, though called an "element in a judgment," is, in fact, the whole of it, for what else is there in such an act than the comparison of the subject with the predicate and recognition of their agreement or difference?
Mr. Day says, "The copula is sometimes expressed by such words as contains, comprehends, consists of, involves, and the like;" but all these words contain part of the predicate as well as the copula, which is usually and better considered to consist simply of the substantive verb, with or without a negative particle.
Mr. Day is not so accurate in the
use of language as might be de sired. He says, Inasmuch as thought is in its very nature discursive, discriminating in every object of knowledge in every datum to thought, subject, and attribute which it yet recognizes as one and the same, and so ever identifies, everything that can be known or thought by us must be accepted as admitting in its nature this discrimination and this identification."
It is not easy to understand how the subject and the attribute can be discriminated or distinguished from each other as different, and yet be recognized "as one and the same."
But passing over this apparent contradiction, we wish to call attention to the confusion and inaccuracy of saying that thought, which is simply an act of the mind, discriminates and recognizes, i.e., performs acts of mind. Of course what Mr. Day means is that the mind itself discriminates and recognizes but that is not what he says.
Mr. Day is guilty of self-contradiction as well as loose language. In one place he says, "All pure thought, whether primitive or derivative, is necessarily true, for thought cannot contradict itself." Elsewhere, on the contrary, we are told, "It should be remarked, however, that the fallible mind of man is liable to err even in pure thought."
We cannot accept the novelties of principle or language which Mr. Day has introduced, still less his etymological explanations of words. His work will not bear comparison with those already extant in clearness and precision of statement, scientific and convenient arrangement, and general practical utility.
Poems of the Months. By M. A.
Baines. The etchings by Wilhel mina Baines. Sampson, Low, and Co. London, 1876.—This is not so much a work of literature as of art. The text, consisting of verses on each of the months is in ornamental (but not very legible) writing, with headings and borders of flowers and leaves. We regret it is not in our power to speak highly of either department of the work. The verses have little freshness or beauty, and the illustrations, though tasteful in design, are imperfect in execution. On the month of June there are the following lines:
"June! the month of Roses bright, Untold charms now greet the sight; Nook, and glade, and glowing noon, Ev'rything proclaims 'tis June."
Both on this page and throughout the work the etching far surpasses the writing.
Bluebeard's Widow and her Sister Anne; their History evolved from Mendacious Chronicles. By Sabilla Novello. With illustrations by the authoress. Ward, Lock, and Tyler. 1876. The authoress of this book for young people having previously published "The History of Bluebeard's Wives," here continues her efforts to amuse that class of readers. She writes in so sprightly and charming a strain, that there can be little doubt this object will be effectually accomplished. The interest is well sustained throughout, and the pages are rendered the more piquant by the pleasantry with. which they are interspersed. Some of the jokes, however, are rather above the comprehension of little folks. Many of them consist of absurd blunders in the use of words, such as are ascribed to Mrs. Mala
prop. Unfortunately the words. are often far beyond the range of a child's knowledge, so that very much of the fun must be missed. Except in these instances, the language is so simple and racy as to be easily understood and highly enjoyed. The illustrations are tolerably good as the work of an amateur, but show an insufficient training in figure drawing. It is highly desirable that children's story books, if illustrated at all, should contain none but correct drawings. From the earliest years the eye should be accustomed to truthful delineation of natural forms.
A Classified English Vocabulary. Being an attempt to faciliate a knowledge of words and their meanings by an arrangement of ideas according to their scientific connections. London: Provost and Co. 1876. We are at a loss to discover in what way this book is intended to be used, or what practical advantage can be gained from its use. Bare lists of words, arranged under certain headings, are neither interesting nor instructive reading. Nor are they suitable for learning by heart, except as spelling lessons, for which they are not intended or adapted. They have been drawn up, we are told, "to facilitate a knowledge of words and their meanings." Yet, strange to say, not a single word has a meaning attached to it. The object of the author seems to be to form habits of comparing and classifying, but unfortunately he himself has no idea of logical division and arrangement. He arranges his materials under the following
"1. Existences in General; their forms, and conditions of manifestations.
"2. The Material World.
"3. The World of Mind. "4. The Social World. "5. Things arbitrarily distinguished, constructed or produced.
It is evident that his divisions are not mutually exclusive, and the same thing might belong to several classes. This fault vitiates all his subordinate classification, and runs through the whole book, leading to utter confusion.
The Errors of Homœopathy. By Dr. Barr Meadows. London: G. Hill, 1876. This is the third edition of a little work designed to expose the fallacies of the Homœopathic system. That the principles, or more correctly speaking the suppositions, on which that system is based should ever have seriously engaged the attention-let alone received the approbation-of men of intelligence and education, only serves to illustrate to what extremes human credulity and delirium can be carried, when men of active minds allow imagination and not reason to guide and control their investigations. In such cases ridiculous and fanciful hypotheses take the place of scientific truth, and reason is altogether lost sight of.
Like almost any kind of human folly, however, the absurdities of homoeopathy have been the indirect cause of good. The persistency with which these absurdities have been proclaimed, and their adoption and advocacy by some medical men, have promoted scientific inquiry for the purposes of refutation, and such inquiry can never be searchingly conducted in a proper spirit without advantage to the cause of truth.
In one respect particularly so
ciety has benefited largely by the efforts of homoeopathists to propagate their doctrines in so far as those efforts may be taken as a protest against the merciless system of excessive drugging that prevailed at the commencement of the present century, and as having materially contributed to the introduction of the more enlightened
and scientific practice that is now followed. In this way homœopathy, by directing attention to reckless drugging, and stimulating inquiry, undoubtedly was the means of unconsciously serving a good purpose, yet the inherent folly of the system is not the less on that
In the previous part of this article we gave an outline of Servian history down to the middle of the eighteenth century. The closing years of that century, and the opening years of the nineteenth, were the epoch in which the Servians re-conquered their independence. Few tales contain more of the elements of romance than the record of their struggle for freedom. The rayahs were livingan unarmed populace trodden under heel by an armed despotism. Even the worm turns when trodden upon. There is a point beyond which oppression cannot go the point at which it becomes better to die than longer to bear it-when the most phantom-like hope of future freedom becomes a possession more cherished than any mere temporary benefit. Then men determine to conquer or die; and, with this alternative constantly present to their minds, they gird
on the sword with a fixed purpose, and wield it with a despairing energy, that seldom fail to be crowned with victory.
So it was with the Servians. It has been written of them at this period of their history:-“ Their wrongs became at length so intolerable that nothing was talked of in Servia but revenge. The forests and mountain-defiles were filled with armed men. The profession of a bandit came to be considered as the most honourable. To waylay, pillage, and kill the plunderers of their country and the defilers of their homes were the most praiseworthy acts which Servians could achieve. Crimes were transmuted into virtues, and a vast organization, having assassination for its object, was justified by patriotism, if not sanctified by the Church. Servia was in the hands of an association of 'Heyducs;' and when a Russian noble