its skilful artists and manufacturers, for its lawyers, physicians, divines, and even for its generals and statefmen. And this leads to confider, in the fifth place, the influence that great and small eftates have on manners. Gentlemen of a moderate fortune, connected with their fuperiors and inferiors, improve society, by spreading kindly affection through the whole members of the state. In such only refides the genuine spirit of liberty, abhorrent equally of fervility to fuperiors and of tyranny to inferiors. The nature of the British government, creates a mutual dependence of the great and small on each other. The great have favours to bestow: the small have many more, by their privilege of electing parliament-men; which obliges men of high rank to affect popularity, however little feeling they may have for the good of their fellow creatures. This connection produces good manners at leaft, between different ranks, and perhaps some degree of cordiality. Accumulation of land into great estates, produces oppofite manners : when all the land in Scotland is fwallow'd up by a number of bet grandees, and few gentlemen of the middle I Prank rank are left; even the appearance of popularity will vanish, leaving pride and infolence on the one hand, and abject servility on the other. In a word, the distribution of land into many shares, accords charmingly with the free spirit of the British constitution; but nothing is more repugnant to that spirit, than overgrown estates in land. In the fixth place, Arts and sciences can never flourish in a country, where all the land is engrossed by a few. Science will never be cultivated by the dispirited tenant, who can scarce procure bread; and still less, if possible, by the infolent landlord, who is too self-fufficient for inftruction. There will be no encouragement for arts: great and opulent proprietors, fostering ambitious views, will cling to the feat of government, which is far removed from Scotland; and if vanity make them sometimes display their grandeur at their country-feats, they will be too delicate for any articles of luxury but what are foreign. The arts and sciences being thus banished, Scotland will be deserted by every man of spirit who can find bread elfewhere. In In the seventh place, Such overgrown estates will produce an irregular and dangerous influence with respect to the House of Commons. The parliament-boroughs will be fubdued by weight of money; and with respect to county-elections, it is a chance if there be left in a county as many qualified landholders as to afford a free choice. In such circumstances, will our constitution be in no danger from the ambitious views of men elevated above others by their vast possessions? Is it unlikely, that fuch men, taking advantage of public difcord, will become an united body of ambitious oppreffors, overawing their fovereign as well as their fellow-fubjects? Such was the miferable condition of Britain, while the feudal oligarchy fubfifted: fuch at present is the miferable condition of Poland: and fuch will be the miferable condition of Scotland, if the legislature do not stretch out a saving hand. If the public interest only were to be regarded, entails ought to be destroy'd root and branch. But a numberless body of substitutes are interested, many of whom would be disinherited, if the tenants in tail had power. To reconcile as much much as possible these opposite interests, it is proposed, that the following articles be authorised by a statute. First, That the act of parliament 1685 be repealed with respect to all future operations. Second, That entails already made and completed, shall continue effectual to such substitutes as exist at the date of the act proposed; but shall not benefit any fubstitute born after it. Third, That power be reserved to every proprietor, after the act 1685 is at an end, to settle his eftate upon what heirs he thinks proper, and to bar these heirs from altering the order of fucceffion; these powers being inhe rent in property at common law. At the fame time, the prohibiting entails will avail little, if truft-deeds be permitted in their utmost extent, as in Enga land. And therefore, in order to re-establish the law of nature with respect to land-property, a limitation of trust-deeds is neceffary. My proposal is, That no trust-deed, directing or limiting the fuc ceffion of heirs to a land-estate, shall be effectual beyond the life of the heirs in existence at the time, modw 3 L 2 SKETCH SKETCH II. Government of Royal Boroughs in Scotland. Y a royal borough Brda royal is in Scotland unan incorporation that hold their lands of the crown, and are governed by magistrates of their own naming. The administration of the annual revenues of a royal borough, termed the common good, is trusted to the magistrates; but not without dcontrol. It was originally fubjected to the review of the Great Chamberlain; and accordingly the chap. 39. § 45. of the Iter Camerarii, contains the following articles, recommended to the Chamberlain, to be enquired into. "Giff there be an good affedation and "uptaking of the common good of the burgh, and giff faithful compt be " made thereof to the community of the Burgh; and giff no compt is made, he " whom and in quhaes hands it is come, " and how it passes by the community." In pursuance of these instructions, the Chamberlain's |