king up what loss is sustained by wrongs of whatever kind. With respect to the first, it is clear, that punishment in its proper sense cannot be inflicted for a wrong that is culpable only; and if nature did not provide some means for repreffing fuch wrongs, society would scarce be a comfortable state. Laying confcience afide, pecuniary reparation is the only remedy that can be provided against culpable omissions: and with refpect to culpable commissions, the neceffity of reparation is still more apparent; for conscience alone, without the fanction of reparation, would feldom have authority fufficient to restrain us from acting rafhly or uncautioufly, even where the possibility of mischief is forefeen, and far less where it is not forefeen.

With respect to the second end of reparation, my confcience dictates to me, that if a man fuffer by my fault, whether the mischief was foreseen or not foreseen, it is my duty to make up his lofs; and I perceive intuitively, that the lofs ought to rest ultimately upon me, and not upon the fufferer, who has not been culpable in any degree.

In every cafe where the mischief done can be estimated by a pecuniary compensation, the two ends of reparation coincide. The fum is taken from the one as a fort of punishment for his fault, and is bestow'd on the other to make up the lofs he has fustained. But in numberless cafes where mischief done cannot be compenfated with money, reparation is in its nature a fort of punishment. Defamation, contemptuous treatment, personal restraint, the breaking one's peace of mind, are injuries that cannot be repaired with money; and the pecuniary reparation decreed against the wrong-doer, can only be confidered as a punishment inflicted in order to deter him from reiterating fuch injuries: the sum, it is true, is awarded to the perfon injured; but not as fufficient to make up his loss, which money cannot do, but only as a folatium for what he has fuffered.

Hitherto it is supposed, that the man who intends a wrong action, is at the fame time confcious of its being fo. But a man may intend a wrong action, thinking erroneoufly that it is right; or a right action, thinking erroneoufly that it is VOL. IV.

K

wrong; and the question is, What shall be the consequence of fuch errors with refpect to reparation. The latter cafe is clear: the perfon who occafionally fuffers loss by a right action, has not a claim for reparation, because he has no juft caufe of complaint. On the other hand, if the action be wrong, the innocence of the author, for which he is indebted to an error in judgement, will not relieve him from reparation. When he is made fenfible of his error, he feels himself bound in confcience to repair the harm he has done by a wrong action: and others, fenfible of his error from the beginning, have the fame feeling: nor will his obstinacy in refifting conviction, nor his dullness in not apprehending his error, mend the matter: it is well that these defects relieve him from punishment, without wronging others by denying a claim for reparation. A man's errors ought to affect himself only, and not those who have not erred. Hence in general, reparation always follows wrong; and is not affected by any erroneous opinion of a wrong action being right, more than of a right action being wrong.

But

1

But this doctrine suffers an exception with respect to one who, having undertaken a trust, is bound in duty to act. A judge is in that state: it is his duty to pronounce fentence in every cafe that comes before him; and if he judge according to his knowledge, he is not liable for consequences. A judge cannot be fubjected to reparation, unless the judgement he gave was intentionally wrong. An officer of the revenue is in the fame prediLed by a doubtful clause in a statute, he makes a seizure of goods as forfeited to the crown, which afterward, in the proper court, are found not to be seizable: he ought not to be subjected to reparation, if he have acted to the best of his judgement. This rule however must be taken with a limitation: a public officer who is grossly ignorant, will not be excused; for he ought to know better.

cament.

Reparation is due, tho' the immediate act be involuntary, provided it be connected with a preceding voluntary act. Example: If A ride an unruly horse in "Lincolns-inn fields, to tame him, and

the horfe breaking from A, run over B " and grievously hurt him; B shall have

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an action against A: for tho' the mifchief was done against the will of A, yet since it was his fault to bring a wild horse into a frequented place where mifchief might ensue, he must answer for the confequences." Gaius feems to carry this rule still farther, holding in general, that if a horse, by the weakness or unskilfulness of the rider, break away and do mischief, the rider is liable (a). But Gaius probably had in his eye a frequented place, where the mischief might have been forefeen. Thus in general, a man is made liable for the mischief occafioned by his voluntary deed, tho' the immediate act that occafioned the mischief be involuntary.

SECT.

VII.

Final Causes of the foregoing Laws of Nature.

Everal final caufes have been already mentioned, which could not conveni

(a) 1. 8. 1. ad leg. Aquil,

ently