subjective aspect, as right or wrong, are conceived as innate; in the other, as derived; and these two classes will be found to be strictly analogous to the classes, above distinguished, of Physical Theories with respect to the Forces that determine motion in its merely objective aspect. But, as in the case of the theories of Dynamism and of Atomism, I must here confine myself to pointing out the radical vice of want of relativity, in the conceptions both of the Intuitional, and of the Utilitarian School; and, as the Intuitionalists seem now driven to admit that the forms of Moral Principles are externally determined, I would submit that the Utilitarians can complete, and, in completing, transform their theory only by admitting that Experience could never give rise to any Moral Principles whatever, save in the interaction between its memories and systems of spontaneous Moral Want, or Wills, defined as in our principle of Co-oneness, and in the conception thence-deduced of Cause as Ethical End. In conclusion, with reference generally to that reconciliation which seems to me to be effected by the conception of Mutual Determination, as explicated in our New Principles of Co-existence, Correlation, and Co-oneness, I would remark, that, only in a partial conception of Relativity, and hence of Law, has the dispute as to Freedom and Necessity any standing-ground. For, if what Law really is, and what Causation truly means, is Mutual Determination; then, evidently, neither Freedom nor Necessity can be absolutely predicated either of Physical Motions, or of Ethical Actions; and, if used at all, these terms can be rightly used only to denote the

character of phenomena from correlative inward, and outward stand-points. And the view thus given, not only of Moral, but of Natural Phenomena; the sublime view, by this fuller development of the conception of Law, given us of Conditioned Spontaneity; the view thus given of the Universe, no more as, from without it may appear, a mere mechanism, and necessity of sequence, but as, from within it is seen to be, a divine Life, and freedom of Coexistence-will have, it may safely be predicted, results altogether incommensurable.

9. But the reconciliation of the antagonistic Causation-theories of Physics, of Metaphysics, and of Ethics, was but the more immediate aim of our new inquiry. Its remoter, but never-despaired-of aim, was the discovery of the Ultimate Law of History. For, as I have already in the first Section noted, on recognising Hegel's Rational Law of History, and Comte's Empirical Law of History to be the outcome respectively of an Idealist, and of a Materialist theory of Causation, and hence of Method; it became clear that a new inquiry into Causation was the necessary preliminary to any further attempt at a development of the Philosophy of History. When, even in the first months of this new inquiry, it was seen that a new definiteness had been given to the conception of law by the great principle of the Conservation of Energy, and the Equivalence of Transformation; it was hoped that a new inquiry into Causation would be found not only the necessary preliminary, but the most direct course

of research that could be entered on with a view to the discovery of an Ultimate Historical Law. And this probability seemed strongly confirmed by those general historical considerations which led me to believe that the revolution, in the midst of which we at present are, is, in its inmost meaning, a change in men's notions of the causes of change. Have these anticipations of the remote, been justified by the proximate result of our new inquiry into Causation? Have they not? Have we not thus caught the skirts at least of a form which may, if held fast, reveal itself, at length, as that very Ultimate Law, the aim of all our researches? For when Causation, as all our later knowledge leads us to conceive it, is clearly seen to be definable as Mutual Determination; clearly seen it must also be that Causation, as in the earlier stages of knowledge conceived, is to be defined as Onesided Determination. In the later stages of knowledge we should seem required to conceive Causes as Relations; in the earlier stages of knowledge Causes are unquestionably conceived as Agents. Reciprocal Action is the conception, in which all our later knowledge of Causation seems to be generalised; but this only makes it clear that but more or less gross or refined expressions of that conception of Onesided Action, formed by primitive ignorance, are the Fetiches of the Savage, the Gods of the Theologian, and the Entities of the unscientific Metaphysician. Is there not, however, thus defined for us that first stage in the conception of Causation pointedout by Hume? Starting from his general theory of Causation, in our systematic inquiry, have we not been

thus suddenly brought to a great historical result? And are we not thus able to characterise in their inmost nature those two great stages in the natural history of Religion, which were but in their outward form characterised by Hume? Combining our two great inductions, the one of which defines the later conception of Causation as Mutual Determination; while the other defines the earlier conception of Causation as Onesided Determination; we state the general fact, or Empirical Law of Man's History to be Advance from the conception of Onesided Determination to the conception of Mutual Determination.

SUBSECTION 11.

The Speculative Development of our Hypothetical Law.

1. Such, then, is the historical Hypothesis to which we have at length been led by our new inquiry into Causation. And with reference to such a result, the whole of our inquiry hitherto assumes quite a new aspect; and an aspect which seems strikingly to illustrate the complete relativity of scientific conceptions. Considered in reference to its immediate aim, the discovery of a more complete theory of Causation, and one reconciliative of the antagonisms of the current Causation-theories, all the three processes of scientific research may be said to have been already illustrated: Inductive Generalisation, in that physical inquiry which gave, as its result, the hypothesis of Mutuallydetermining Atoms; Speculative Development, and Deductive Verification, not merely in the establishment

of that hypothesis as in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the foregoing Subsection stated; but Speculative Develop-. ment and Deductive Verification in the higher spheres also, first, of the development of Metaphysical and Ethical principles corresponding to that Physical Principle in which our Hypothesis of Atoms was generalised; and secondly, of the verification of these principles, not only severally, but jointly, in the reconciliation which they are shown to effect, by their more complete relativity of conception. But, considered in reference to its remoter aim, the discovery of the Ultimate Law of History, all the foregoing processes of research assume but the aspect of one prolonged and complicated process of Inductive Generalisation. For the Historical Law, to which we have just been led, though a higher result than that to which we were previously led the definition of Causation as Mutual Determination-is yet, in itself, of a more incomplete and hypothetical character. With respect, therefore, to a result thus higher, but more incomplete, both the great processes of Speculative Development and Deductive Verification still lie before us. And, that this must be so, will be evident on remarking that the above-stated law, even if true, states the character only of the primitive, and of the ultimate stages of Intellectual Development. But we can have no working Law of History; no law by which its beginning and end can be brought into relation, and thus its whole course illuminated; no such law shall we have, except we can, in some definite and verifiable manner, generalise the method of the advance from the earlier to the later mode of conceiving Causation. It