their dependence on God, which without the punishment of sin, cannot be done. But God is not obliged to the exercise of mercy, nor doth the forbearance of such an exercise any way intrench upon the holiness of his nature, or the glory of his rule. It is true, mercy is no less an essential property of God, than justice; but neither the law, nor the state and order of things wherein they were created, nor their dependence on God, as the Supreme Governor of the whole creation, raise any natural respect, or obligation between mercy and its object. God, therefore, can execute the punishment that his justice requireth, without the least impeachment of his mercy; for no act of justice is contrary to mercy. But absolutely to pardon, where the interest of justice is to punish, is contrary to the nature of God.

But, moreover, we deny that sin and misery do constitute the proper object of mercy. It is required, that every thing contrary to the nature of God in sin, and the sinner, be taken out of the way, or there is no proper object for mercy. Such is the guilt of sin unsatisfied for. And Socinus himself acknowledgeth, that it is contrary to the nature of God to pardon impenitent sinners. And even mercy itself, on the account of an antecedent reconciliation, will be justly exercised.

$7. That it is necessary sin should be punished, or not be absolutely pardoned, without respect to satisfaction given to the rectoral justice of God, appears from the consideration of his holy nature. God, the Ruler of the World, is of so holy a nature, as that he cannot but hate and punish every sin, and, therefore, so to do belongs to his absolute perfection; for what is the purity and holiness of God, but that universal perfection of his nature, which is accompanied with a

displeasure against sin, and a hatred of it, whence he will punish it according to its desert? Heb. i, 13; "Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil, and "canst not look on iniquity." Not to be able to behold iniquity, expresseth the most inconceivable detestation of it. "He cannot," that is, because of the holiness of his nature, to which such an action would be contrary, "look upon;" that is, to pass by, spare, or connive at iniquity; for that is the rule of what God can do, or cannot do. He can do every thing that is not contrary to himself; that is, the essential properties of his nature. He can do nothing that is contrary to, or inconsistent with his truth, holiness, or righteousness.

Hence this holiness of God is sometimes expressed by jealousy, where he would instruct men in his severity, in the punishing of sin, Exod. xx, 5. For the nature of jealousy is not to spare, Prov. vi, 34; nothing but the executing of vengeance will satisfy it. And this is that which God intended in the revelation of himself, which he made by the proclamation of his name before Moses, Exod. xxxiv, 7; "That will by "no means clear the guilty;" namely, for whom no atonement is made. And it is to instruct us herein, that this holiness of God is expressed by fire, Heb. xii, 29; "Our God is a consuming fire." Devouring fire and everlasting burnings, Isa. xxxiii, 14. If we may not learn thence, that as eventually fire will burn any combustible thing that is put into it, so the holiness of God requires, that all sin be as assuredly punished, we know not what to learn from it. If the punishing of sin depend upon a mere free act of the will of God, which might, or might not be without any disadvantage to his nature, there is no reason why his holiness and righteousness should be so often mentioned as

those which induce him thereto, and indispensably require it.

Again, God in the scripture is proposed to us as the Supreme Judge of all, acting in rewards and punishments according to his own righteousness, or what the rectitude and holy properties of his own nature require. That God should have any external rule or law in his government of the world, is absolutely and infinitely impossible. But his law and rule is the holiness and righteousness of his nature.

§8. The whole of what hath been thus far pleaded, may be reduced to the ensuing heads:

1.

God is naturally and necessarily the Supreme Governor of his rational creatures, with respect to their utmost end, which is his own glory. Upon the supposition of his being and their's, an imagination to the contrary would imply all sorts of contradic

tions.

2. The law of obedience to such creatures ariseth naturally and necessarily from the nature of God, and their own; for this original law is nothing but that respect which a finite dependent creature hath upon an absolute, infinitely wise, holy, and good Creator, suitable to the principles of the nature with which it is endowed; therefore, it is indispensably necessary.

3. The annexing of a penalty to the transgression of this law, was nothing but what the righteousness of God, as the Supreme Ruler of his creatures, did make necessary; as that, without which, the glory and holiness of his rule could not be preserved upon the entrance of sin.

4. The institution of punishment answereth to the sanction of the law, is an act of justice in God, and necessary to him, as the Supreme Governor of the universe.

$9. Socinus contends,* that the righteousness we here plead for is contrary to that mercy, whereby God forgiveth sins; and therefore, that they cannot be properties of his nature, but only external acts of his will and power. But we reply, that absolutely and essentially, they are the same; nor are their effects contrary to each other, though divers. To punish, where punishment is deserved, is not contrary to mercy; but to punish, where punishment is not deserved, is cruelty. And yet, to punish without desert, is more opposite to justice itself, than to mercy. And so it is where punishment exceeds guilt, or where proceedings are not according to an equal standard. Nor is "to spare" by mercy, contrary to justice; for if to spare and pardon be not for the good of the whole, for the preservation of order, and the end of rule, it is not mercy to pardon or spare, but facility, remissness in government, or foolish pity. Secure those things in rule and government, which justice takes care of and provides for, and then to spare in mercy, is in no way contrary to it. If these things be not provided for, to spare is not an act of mercy, but a defect in justice. And if these things were not so, it would be impossible that any one could be just and merciful also; yea, or do any act either of justice or mercy; for if he punish, he is unmerciful; that is, wicked, if punishment be contrary to mercy; and if he spare, he is not just, if sparing be opposite to justice. And on this supposition, upon an alike act of the will of God, sin might have been made to be virtue, and obedience sin; and so it might have been the duty of man to have hated God, and to have opposed him to the utmost of his power. For all the merely free acts of God's will might have been otherwise, and contrary to what they are. And if you say it could

*De Jesu Christo Servatore, lib. i, cap. i; lib. iii, cap. i.

not be so in this case, because the nature of God, and his righteousness required it should be otherwise, you grant all that is contended for.

Moreover, actually to pardon is no way opposite to justice, where satisfaction is made; nor is to punish opposite to mercy, where the law of obtaining an interest in that satisfaction is not observed. And all that God declares in the scripture, concerning his justice and mercy, with the exercise of them towards sinners, is grounded on the supposition of the interposition and satisfaction of Christ; where that is not, as in the case of the angels that sinned, no mention is made of mercy more or less, but only of judgment, according to their desert.

$10. That justice and mercy are properties of the Divine nature, contrary to the Socinian creed, we may even argue from the light of nature; as not only teaching us by the conduct of right reason, that there is a singular perfection in these things, which must, therefore, be found in him, who is so the author of all goodness and limited perfections to all others, as to contain essentially and eminently all goodness and perfection in himself; but also, it is not difficult to evince the actual consent of all mankind who ac

knowledge a Deity, to this principle, That God is just and merciful, with that justice and mercy which have respect to the sins and offences of men. When God shewed to Moses his glory, and made a declaration of himself by his name, he did it not by calling over the free acts of his will, or shewing what he would or could do if he pleased; but described his nature to him by the essential properties of it, that the people might know who and what he was with whom they had to do, Exod. xxxiv, 6, 7. And yet among them is that mercy reckoned, which is exerted in the pardoning of