After Butler had ascertained, by looking through some letters found with Friedland, that the duke of Saxe, Francis Albert, would soon appear in person (as his letter promised), and that troops would follow him for the purpose of opening the closed passes that the confederated regiments might unite with Friedland, and carry out their chief design; he (Butler) sent out several squadrons of horse and dragoons upon the roads, which lead to the Palatinate, with orders to take the aforesaid duke wherever they might find him, and bring him in the emperor's name to Eger, which was also done.1

To Gallas, Butler reported briefly the slaying of Wallenstein, and in conjunction with Gordon, issued a proclamation to the army. In this it is stated that Wallenstein intrigued with the two electors of Saxony and Brandenburg, and would have plunged not only the army, but also the emperor's hereditary kingdoms and states into the most extreme danger and ruin. Wherefore, they, as the emperor's loyal subjects, had taken the most energetic means at hand to preserve the emperor's hereditary kingdom and states, and thereby inform them that, by the singular direction and providence of the Almighty and his assistance to the military execution, on the day before, the rebels and conspirators against his Imperial majesty had been brought to nought, and from life to death. In conclusion, all were called upon to have a particularly watchful eye upon the fortified places, and to obey no orders except those coming expressly from his Imperial majesty; and in fine, to have at heart the importance of preserving the general weal as the emperor's service and their allegiance required. The troops remained quiet. In one place only, in Silesia, some regiments revolted, but were soon quickly brought to order.

Having thus set forth the facts which relate to the murder of Wallenstein, it now remains to inquire who caused it.

It has hitherto been believed that the emperor caused the assassination, inasmuch as he had given the order to take Wallenstein alive or dead, and had thereby proscribed him. This assertion and view is founded principally upon "The Complete and Authentic Account of the Horrible Treason of the late Friedland and his Adherents, published by the Special Command of his Imperial Majesty." This exculpatory document has naturally and excusably misled even the contemporary Imperialist writers, Khevenhüller and Gualdo Priorato. But as the proscribing clause in question was not contained in either the first or second proclamation, it has been sought to re

Here ends all that is worth extracting from Taaffe's letter. The remainder is only in praise of the modesty of Butler, who ever afterwards when the subject was mentioned, ascribed the whole to the providence of God, which had always, in such a remarkable manner, protected the family of Ferdinand. It is also mentioned, in con

clusion, that Butler met with so gracious a reception from the Imperial court, that he never could do enough to evince his

sense of it.

2 Vienna, 1634, pp. 38. This was the official apology published by the Imperial court, which will be discussed further

on.

concile the contradiction between the silence of these two proclamations and the above-mentioned complete and authentic account, by supposing that a secret special order, with the words "alive or dead," had been issued by the emperor to the generals. This opinion has been generally acceded to by almost all writers; but it is entirely unfounded. The emperor never issued any order of the tenor that Wallenstein should be taken alive or dead. The emperor had not any even the most remote share, directly or indirectly, in the slaying of Wallenstein. We must be permitted first to adduce a negative proof. No such order has ever been found in the archives of any state or country, or in the repositories of any private person, nor has even an allusion to any such order ever been discovered. This negative proof would of itself be most satisfactory, but receives great force from the following circumstances: If such an order had ever been given, it must at least have been known to the emperor's most confidential ministers and generals, namely, Gallas, Altringer, Piccolomini, Maradas, marchese di Caretto, and Pucher of the council of war; but that no such secret order was known to any of these is evident from their accounts which have come down to us.

The endeavours and preparations of all the generals were directed, as appears from their mutual correspondence with one another, only to the expulsion of Wallenstein from Bohemia (which is directly contradictory to any secret Imperial order to bring him in alive or dead, and proves the non-existence of any such), and it was only when they had heard that he had fortified himself in Eger, that they thought of enclosing him there and preventing his junction with the enemy.

The orders of Gallas only signified that Wallenstein, Illo, and Terzka were not to be obeyed; this is acknowledged by Butler himself, after the so-called execution, in his report of it to Gallas, despatched on the 25th of February, 1634, and it may also be perceived from Gallas' own letter to the emperor, dated from Pilsen, the 27th February, in which he accuses Gordon and Leslie of disobedience to his orders and therefore of disloyalty, making this imputation against them, solely because they had admitted Wallenstein into Eger. It may also be perceived from this despatch that the plan of Gallas was to drive Wallenstein out of Bohemia; even the emperor, as appears from a letter to the marchese di Caretto of the 26th of February, 1634, at a time when he was already aware that Wallenstein had left Pilsen with a small escort, only commanded that he should be followed and pursued.

Piccolomini in his despatch to Gallas of the 21st of February, 1634, was then of opinion that to drive Wallenstein out of Bohemia was the best method a method which he never would have proposed, if he had been aware of a secret Imperial order to secure Wallenstein in any way, whether alive or dead. It must further be adduced, in confirmation of the opinion above set forth, that in a second despatch,

under date of Horasdiowicz, the 25th of February, 1634, Piccolomini still repeated to Gallas, "che V.E. venga qui con ogni prestezza, con la gente che habiamo, insieme andar persequitando il Waldstain e cacciarlo di Boemia"-" that his excellency should come to him there with all speed, that with the troops which they had they might go in pursuit of Wallenstein and drive him out of Bohemia," and is altogether silent about Butler's having sent his confessor Patrick Taaffe to him on the 23rd of February, for new instructions with regard to Wallenstein, and of his (Piccolomini's) having expressed to Taaffe "that he had never doubted Butler's loyalty, but that others might not be able to doubt it, and that he might acquire the special favour of the emperor, that he should bring back Wallenstein alive or dead." It is clear, from the turn and manner of the expression, that it was founded on no secret order of the emperor, but arose from Piccolomini's personal hatred to Wallenstein, and that he in this respect went beyond the orders of his sovereign.

That Piccolomini hated and pursued Wallenstein with the vindictiveness of a southern, appears incontestably from the continuance of this hatred even after Wallenstein's death. He alone called what had occurred at Eger "a glorious deed," and he would even have had the bodies of "the executed," as they were called, exposed in the vilest places. The marchese di Caretto also, in his despatch dated Pilsen, the 27th of February, charges Gordon with having opened the gates of Eger to Wallenstein. He proposes on every occasion that a formal process should be proceeded with against Wallenstein, and could not therefore have been in any way implicated in the occurrences at Eger; neither could any secret special order of the kind

have been known to him.

Pucher of the council of war, to whom such a secret special order could have been no secret, says, in his narrative of the 13th March, 1634, in clear language, concerning the occurrences at Eger, "that Butler, Gordon, and Leslie, after due consultation and deliberation, came to a decided resolution of their own, without having any order in that respect, and exterminated these manifest patriæ proditores."2

With this narrative agree entirely, first, Butler's report to count Gallas of the 25th; secondly, Butler and Gordon's joint proclamation, of the 26th, to the troops, and lastly, Butler's report to the emperor, of the 27th February, 1634; and from all three one may perceive that they effected the deed after careful deliberation and consequently without any order. A further confirmation of the correctness of these statements is found in the account, composed nineteen years later, by Butler's chaplain, Patrick Taaffe. This bears upon it

1 Piccolomini to Caretto, Mies, 27th Feb. 1634.

2 Pucher's narrative will be mentioned again. As he had to compose an account

of Wallenstein's murder for all Europe, all the secret circumstances connected with that transaction must have been communi. cated to him.

unmistakeably the stamp of veracity and of a cool view of the circumstances. He informs us that Butler was without decided instructions with regard to Wallenstein, that to obtain such, he despatched his confessor Taaffe, that Taaffe found Piccolomini, who, although his general, gave Butler rather advice than a command, which, however, Taaffe was unable to deliver to him. But Taaffe's inartificial relation of the whole details, discloses to us Butler's inmost feelings upon the occasion. His recall from the frontiers, thronged with the enemy, without the substitution of any relieving troops, and the order to march to the White Mountain in the centre of a peaceful kingdom, in the vicinity of the capital town, confirmed him in his mistrust of Wallenstein's loyalty to the emperor. In all this, he never swerved from his resolution, not to desert his colours, to which he had sworn fidelity till death, to remain unshaken in his loyalty to the emperor, and even though surrounded by rebels to fight for the good cause to his last breath. The White Mountain should be stained with more blood than in the time of the Palatine Frederick. These were Butler's sentiments on the 23rd of February, therefore he had neither concerted nor previously determined upon that, which afterwards occurred at Eger.

Wallenstein's march out of Pilsen, not as was usual at the head of a numerous army, but with a small body of troops, appeared to Butler not as a march against the enemy, but to the enemy, and his suspicions became thereby very much increased. But when Wallenstein ordered Butler to join him with his dragoons, assigned him night quarters near to himself and always at a distance from his soldiers, expressed to him his regret that he had not yet been able to reward him for his brave and faithful services, but laid the blame upon the emperor's not having fulfilled his promises; when he promised him two regiments and money to raise them, then his suspicion became certainty. Wallenstein appeared to him as an undoubted traitor, and the danger (by the generally believed approach of the enemy, magnified by the boasting of Wallenstein's adherents) imminent. And thus, from a thorough conviction of the treason, and of the urgent necessity for the deed, Butler determined to execute it.

But all these facts and proofs in writing here adduced, however they may contradict any previous order of the emperor to take Wallenstein alive or dead, are yet not sufficient to prove directly false the clear expressions in the complete account published by order of the emperor, or to make us take them, as suggested in the "Austrian Military Journal," as words of course, escaped from the pen of a legal official accustomed to this form. But that this proclamation of outlawry against Wallenstein, contained in the complete report, was really first published six months after his death (the report appeared in the course of October), is proved by the yet extant letter of Ferdinand III., king of the Romans, to his father Ferdinand II., dated Nordlingen, 5th of September, 1634, in which he says: "with

regard to the manifesto upon the treason of Friedland, sent here for our consideration, we, with the general officers and councillors there present, are most humbly of opinion, that perhaps it would be more advisable to publish likewise against the executed traitors sententiam post mortem." Now, however, in the complete report referred to, if considered very attentively word by word, no other passage, except this proclamation of outlawry in the usual form "alive or dead," occurs, to which this "sententia post mortem" would apply. This letter alone is able to remove the obstacle on which contemporaries and posterity have alike foundered, this alone can explain the insertion of the form "to arrest alive or dead" in the complete report, and give it its true signification.

In this report the second proclamation of the 18th of February was also first publicly acknowledged; but it could not have been issued at the time of its date by the emperor, as he, in a despatch of the 1st of March, still refers exclusively to the proclamation of the 24th of January, and commands that the pardon promised therein should be strictly observed; and to count Altringer, also, this proclamation was unknown on the 14th of March.

This subsequent pronouncing of sentence must appear a psychological enigma, which can only be solved by those, who are able to comprehend accurately Ferdinand's personal character. The thoroughly religious character of Ferdinand regarded the unhappy end of Wallenstein as the undoubted punishment of God, which had overtaken a perjurer and traitor; those who executed the deed must have appeared to him as instruments chosen by God for his preservation. How should he call them to an account? They must be secured from every summons before any tribunal of human justice; this could only be attained by' alleging a previous proclamation of outlawry. The entirely erroneous supposition, that the emperor had on the 24th of January, already signed a proclamation of outlawry against Wallenstein, has also brought upon the emperor the reproach of having, with hypocritical friendship, for fully three weeks made the most confidential communications to him. But how completely different Ferdinand appears, when one considers that he, on that day, signed his removal from the command-in-chief, and that he required to be assured that it should only be made use of in the most pressing necessity. The justice of this last assertion is confirmed by the circumstance, that Gallas did not make public this order for Wallenstein's removal from the command, and dated 24th January, 1634, before the 13th February, after he had learned that Wallenstein had summoned the officers at Pilsen to a second meeting.

I cannot conclude this examination without observing on two points: The emperor had 3000 masses said for the souls of Wallenstein and his accomplices. Förster infers from this that the empe

1 Berthold, German War, p. 131; Förster's Letters, 3 vols. p. 180; and Wallenstein's Life, p. 261.