as they are closely related to any discussion of the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine today.

That there is any danger to Brazil, Argentina or Chile, such as was existent in 1823, it is impossible to believe. Undoubtedly these now comparatively powerful countries would stand together were either attacked with a view to subjugation, by a European power. Such an alliance is in itself an all sufficient Monroe Doctrine in so far as the establishment of a European hegemony in the southern and south-eastern part of South America is concerned. I thus am of the opinion that we need not concern ourselves about such a danger more than to declare a readiness to join with these three principal powers in case such emergency should arise. But I am convinced that no such emergency will arise through any European power, though there is a volume of immigration which is sure to change the predominance in importance of the Portuguese blood in southern Brazil and that of the Spanish in Uruguay, Argentina and more slowly in Chile. For more than ninety years there has been emigration from Germany to South Brazil, and the 110,000 who have come to southern Brazil between 1820 and 1911 amount today to more than 300,000 by far the greater number of whom know of course no other fatherland. There are also today hundreds of thousands of Italians chiefly of the better north Italian stock and who, in Brazil are chiefly a little to the north of the Germanic region. But these people whatever may come (and it must be kept in mind that migration to South America is Latin in enormous proportion, the German, to Brazil being not more than 4000 a year), will never put themselves under the government of a European power. Should Brazil, which be it remembered is considerably larger than the United States, leaving aside Alaska, ever separate into a north and a south through racial differences, the south would either set up its own government or attach itself to Argentina which in time may control the whole of the river Plate region. I would say however that I regard any danger of separation, by reason of race, extremely unlikely in that

the northern states are destined to be peopled by those of a blood whose special characteristic is subordination. In any case even were there a fear of European difficulty it would seem the part of wisdom to encourage the filling up of these vast spaces where possible by a better sort of man than the negro or Indian. It would be better far, for Brazil and the world, if the Germans in Brazil numbered millions where they are now only a few hundreds of thousands. If in time Germanic blood became the chief element, the state would still be Brazil, but a Brazil of a higher type intellectually and economically. We must not lose sight of race values, and this question is thus to Brazil of the most momentous character. Of its population of about 19,000,000, much the largest population is negro, mixed negro and white and Indian. The whites predominate in numbers in the further south only.

While this south is largely a high table land, the northern interior is chiefly a vast low-lying region all well within the tropics and with the tepid climate in which the white can never thrive. Escaping disease, as at Panama, is one thing, thriving in such a climate is another, and however strenuous may be the endeavor to people the whole of Brazil with white men it must be to a very great extent a failure. At least two-thirds of her territory must in time be the abode of colored races, and in time there will be in most parts but very few pure whites.

We thus need not concern ourselves about European emigration to Brazil north of Rio Janeiro; nature will take care of that part of the problem.

While there are great regions to which the white man will not go to establish himself permanently, the colored races are able to thrive even in fairly cold climates. Thus the facts just stated open up a problem more vast and momentous to us than our slavery question; that is shall we approach the Brazilian conditions?

However kindly our feeling, we can not but recognize that some races make a more valuable return to the species than others. We preach greatly what we now term eugenics which translated broadly means the production of

the best man. We are faced in our own country by this question in a more serious form than is any other great nation. A tenth of our population is now negro which is rapidly in the north mixing with the white; the incoming population is largely itself negroid, particularly that from the Portuguese islands, less markedly from Portugal itself and markedly from Sicily and Naples. Many thousands of jet black negroes calling themselves Portuguese, as they are under the flag, have entered Massachusetts from the Cape Verde Islands in the last few years and every Cape Verde Islander will finally come and help his fellows pick cranberries on Cape Cod, or work in the New Bedford mills. The census gives nearly 50,000 negroes as part of our population not born in the United States, and there are undoubtedly many more than the census notes. The time is rapidly approaching when we may expect a great immigration from the Congo basin of Africa. It becomes a mighty question which it behooves us to consider, and that soon. Says Pearson, in his National Life and Character, and he saw farther into the future than most of his time:

The distant future of a country is so unimportant by the side of its immediate needs to the men in possession that even if they were reasonably certain that a particular evil ought to be guarded against at an immediate sacrifice, they would rarely be possessed of the moral force required for the effort.

Shall we have this moral force in the matter of Africa whose millions will undoubtedly before long be at our doors? If not, the present differentiation in character between ourselves and Mexico and much of South America will in no very distant time disappear and we shall have approximated a general likeness in both parts of our hemisphere. It is a matter for our most serious thought, to which at the moment I can give but bare mention, but I would that you would hold it in earnest thought. Shall we have and display that patriotism of race, to use a phrase of Arthur Balfour's, which alone can save us from being a negroid nation? If it is a vital question; one before which the questions involved in the Monroe Doctrine shrink to insignificance.

The Monroe Doctrine does not necessarily involve opposing any warlike action between a European power and an American nationality, for an offense which necessarily calls for such action. This part of the subject is covered by Mr. Seward's despatch, 2 June, 1866, to our minister in Chile regarding the hostilities then active between Spain and Chile. The gist of this despatch is that "the republican system" in any South American State,

shall not be wantonly assailed and that it shall not be subverted as an end of a lawful war by European powers.

We concede to every nation the right to make peace or war, for such causes other than political or ambitious, as it thinks right and wise. In such wars as are waged between nations which are in friendship with ourselves, if they are not pushed, like the French war in Mexico, to the political point before mentioned, we do not intervene, but remain neutral conceding nothing to one belligerent that we do not concede to the other and allowing to one belligerent what we allow to the other.1

This in nowise contravenes the Monroe Declaration which declares that "We should consider any attempt on their part [meaning the European powers] to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety," that "we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them [the South American states], or controlling in any other manner their destiny by any European power in any other light than as a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition to the United States." It must be admitted that the word "republican" in Mr. Seward's dispatch, and, which is only implied in the Monroe dcelaration, is made to cover much which we should be sorry to so term; but in any case the constitutions of all have established such a form as their ideal and they should have full chance to work toward it.

The whole question is thus one of denying the right of a foreign power to dominion in any American state or part of a state nor already in possession of a foreign power. In other words we are very properly opposed to conquest.

While holding that as to the more southern governments of South America our relations should be as a fourth equal 1 Diplom. Cor. 1866, part 2, p. 413.

with a like understanding as to attempted foreign domination, and not in the nature of a protector which carries with it an idea of patronage, the matter stands on a very different footing as to the regions bordering on the Caribbean sea and the Gulf of Mexico, and on that part of the Pacific in the neighborhood of the Panama Canal. That we must have and exercise a commanding influence in these regions should go without saying. We can brook no increase of foreign control in this region. Our newly established gateway between the two great oceans and the protection of this vital link in our defensive system demand this independent of any question of the Monroe Doctrine. Thus in addition to our policy of aiding in the preservation of any South American state from foreign control, we would oppose anything like new occupancy of any of the West India Islands or Caribbean or Gulf of Mexico litoral, or any part of the Pacific litoral of Mexico or the Central American states, or neighboring islands, such, for example, as the Galápagos.

There are of course already in the hands of foreign nations commanding points in the Caribbean region, as Jamaica, (the most commanding as a single point of all), in possession of the English, St. Thomas which is Danish, Martinique and Guadeloupe which are French. All the important West India Islands are in fact in European possession except Cuba, Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico. It is not unreasonable, as a mere matter of safeguarding our own shores, to demand that there should be no extension of foreign occupancy in this region. In this we are looking after not the safety of any Central or South American state, but our own safety from a naval or military standpoint. The Panama Canal is the very navel of our system, strategic and commericial. Our battle fleet for instance could reach San Francisco from the Caribbean in a fourth of the time taken by the Oregon in her famous passage from San Francisco to the Caribbean. Any foreign action which could look to weakening our control of the canal and its approaches thus could not be tolerated.

I am well aware that there are probably some who lay