which came up for consideration, and when they required the approval of congress, they were sent to it and approval was given in due course. As an illustration of this, my associates and myself wished a concession for building a railroad near the capital; through our attorneys we arranged all the details with the President and cabinet and then left the matter in their hands. The concession required the approval of congress which was then in session; there was only just time to have it take its regular course before congress adjourned. We paid no further attention to it, but it was put before congress and approved at the last effective moment.

Had he been other than the man he was, of course, one can readily see what this condition would have led the country into, but, being as he was, a patriotic man, devoting his life to his country, and working in every way for its development, he handled this great power with so much wisdom and discretion as to bring about the results which were achieved.

Of course, many things were done by him and under his administration that did not meet with the approval of some of his people. The church influence in the government, which formerly had been paramount, was entirely subdued by him and was in no way recognized, and for many years no one dare to oppose him with any hope of success. In fact, the people believed in him so strongly and his power and influence were so great that no effort at opposition was made. However, there was always an element, which though latent and quiet was powerful, and which was constantly on the lookout for a chance to assert itself. There was also an undercurrent of feeling of discontent and unrest on the part of other factions, which will always prevail in a country like Mexico, and under conditions existing there, and in fact in any country, which wished to get control of the government for purposes for their own good or bad as the case might be. These various elements worked quietly over their object and waited a time when they could assert themselves.

General Diaz was probably fully aware of what was going

on, but having exercised his power and control so long, he probably felt himself amply able to control and subdue whatever opposition might arise, but he was getting on in years, he was more anxious to maintain peace and give the country a chance to develop into a position where the full conditions and development of a republican form of government could be maintained and so let up on that tense hold which he had had, with the consequence that the various opposing factions had a chance to gain strength and prepare to assert their opposition to him.

For a long time he was anxious to resign from the Presidency and take a rest which he felt he so richly had earned, but he was always afraid that conditions were not ripe for his retirement, and he was doubtful of what might follow.

The constitution of the country made no provision for a vice-President, but in 1904 the constitution was altered, providing for one. Some time before he had brought from the State of Sonora, Ramon Coral, formerly governor of that state, and made him governor of the Federal District (corresponding to our District of Columbia), later a member of his cabinet, and finally vice-President. This was with the ultimate object of having him become President, but as conditions developed Coral did not seem to be the man for the place, and General Diaz did not dare to have him succeed him. Other men in the cabinet and outside were also considered, but none seemed to come up to the full requirements. Consequently, General Diaz held on, but as often happens in such cases, he held on too long. Had he given up several years before, and before the elements opposing him had become so strong, and been succeeded by someone whom there is no doubt he could have placed in power, who while probably not fully satisfactory to all elements, would have continued the Diaz policies, backed up by the aid General Diaz could have given him, the overturn which took place would not have occurred.

In the meantime the different opposing elements had been gaining strength and later became united under Madero. Had General Diaz recognized Madero's strength and treated with him, probably on a show of strength between the two,

Diaz would have prevailed, but instead Diaz attempted to suppress Madero in a way that finally became persecution, which resulted in increasing Madero's strength so that he was able finally to force Diaz to resign, which he did on May 25, 1911.

Madero's claim to leadership came from his opposition to the previous policies and administration of the government, and his promises if in power to reform the evils which he claimed existed and to give his country a government filling all the requirements and advantages of a republic. His promises were liberal and naturally the people felt that the change meant what they might term reformation. Madero claimed that he did not wish to become President, unless by a regular constitutional election. Consequently Francisco Leon de la Barra was appointed provisional President May 25, 1911, and held the office until the constitutional election took place which made Madero President.

It was my good fortune to know General Diaz personally, as well as every member of his earlier cabinets. After he had weeded out from time to time from the members of his cabinet, the last being Romero Rubio, his father-in-law, the men who had not entirely broken away from the old conditions of graft, etc., which formerly prevailed there, I believe its members to have been men of honesty, integrity, of high character, and devoted to their country, men who had the best interests of their country at heart and who worked to attain the greatest good. Of course, some will disagree with me in this, but I am looking at the whole subject in its broadest sense and based on my personal knowledge of the men, and while many mistakes were made as there always will by whoever may be in power, still considering everything it is doubtful if any set of men could have been in power in such a country who would have brought about such satisfactory results.

The administration of government as carried on by and under General Diaz was that which I believe was best adapted to secure the development which he was carrying on, in the most simple and effective way. If one had dealings with the government, he could go directly to the proper

official and secure immediate and direct consideration for what he had to offer. This meant that the way was easy and simple to do business with the government and did away with the great amount of red tape which is usually so prominent in connection with government affairs. And in this connection one must consider that the people in Mexico are no more like ourselves, naturally, that the people of France, Germany, Spain, China, Japan, or any other foreign nation, and we must consider their temperament, methods of life, and of business, their past history, and their personal characteristics in thinking of and in dealing with them. We would not think of going to Japan or Germany or Spain and finding conditions or people as we do in the United States, nor would we expect to reform or change their life and habits to conform to our own.

In our early experience in Mexico, we found many things different and we thought much inferior to our own, and we set about trying to reform them, but we soon found that their life, customs and ways were based upon a longer experience of their peculiar natural conditions than our own, and we soon concluded that it was much better to graft the best of ours with the best of theirs with the result that we both secured a lasting good.

It was my pleasure and privilege to know Mr. de la Barra personally, and no one can be found of higher character, more gentlemanly characteristics, and I think more honest and faithful than he. He is not, however, a forceful man, and probably could not handle a government passing through a condition of conflict such as at present exists, but as an administrator and executive he was highly efficient and successful.

I was also personally acquainted with some of the members of President de la Barra's cabinet, and have a very high opinion of them.

President Madero, I did not know personally, but from what I have heard about him, he appears to have been a man of high ideals and a certain amount of patriotism, but without the other qualities necessary to make a successful ruler.

He made many promises before he came into power, he proclaimed all the deficiencies of the previous administration and promised reforms in them all, but he was weak in many ways, and was unable to command the support necessary to carry through his reforms. In fact, he showed many of the common defects of men of his calibre, nepotism being one of the most prominent. He soon learned what the temperament and disposition of his people were and what General Diaz had to contend with in holding them in subjection, for elements which were disturbing, when he was fomenting rebellion, continued to be disturbing and he had them to contend with as Diaz previously had with him, and they finally compassed his overthrow.

He took the government under generally peaceful conditions and with a full treasury, he left it in unrest and in poverty. He diposed Diaz, and was in turn deposed by Huerta and Felix Diaz.

Some time in the future Mexico may attain a position where such methods as Madero followed may be successful but the time for that is not now. His career is a forceful illustration of the result of promises made when power is sought for, which are not carried out when one has the power to perform.

The success of General Diaz and his methods indicate strongly that the kind of a government which he gave is what Mexico must have for some time to come. It has been my own personal opinion since General Diaz was deposed that the country must be returned to his kind of a government before peace and progress will be resumed. The fact is not only is there a rebellion against the central government, but the rebels are divided into many bands under separate leaders, bandits in reality, none of which have any standing as a separate government; one only having a center or head of sufficient importance to be recognized as a power, and if ever an attempt was made to recognize a belligerant power, the recognition of one or more would not include all, nor would it bring them all under one control, it would simply mean a faction with other factions still to deal with.