sures me that he can hear of no seats to be disposed of. After a Parliament which had lived little more than four months, one would naturally suppose that those scats which are regularly sold by the proprietors of them, would be very cheap: they are, however, in fact, sold now at a higher price than was ever given for them before. Tierney tells me that he has offered 10,000l. for the two seats of Westbury, the property of the late Lord Abingdon, and which are to be made the most of by trustees for creditors, and has met with a refusal. 6000l. and 55007. have been given for seats, with no stipulation as to time, or against the event of a speedy dissolution by the king's death, or by any change of administration. The truth is, that the new ministers have bought up all the seats that were to be disposed of, and at any prices. Amongst others, Sir C. H- the great dealer in boroughs, has sold all he had to ministers. With what money all this is done I know not, but it is supposed that the king, who has greatly at heart to preserve this new administration, the favourite objects of his choice, has advanced a very large sum out of his privy purse.

"This buying of seats is detestable; and yet it is almost the only way in which one in my situation, who is resolved to be an independent man, can get into Parliament. To come in by a popular election, in the present state of the representation, is quite impossible; to be placed there by some great lord, and to vote as he shall direct, is to be in a state of complete dependence; and nothing hardly remains but to owe a seat to the sacrifice of a part of one's fortune. It is true, that many men who buy seats do it as a matter of pecuniary speculation, as a profitable way of employing their money they carry on a political trade; they buy their

seats and sell their votes." 1 He afterwards bought his seat for Horsham of the Duke of Norfolk, for 20007.

rents for

ment.

So regular was the market for seats, that where it was Annual inconvenient to candidates to pay down the purchase- seats in money, they were accommodated by its commutation Parlia into an annual rent. It was the sole redeeming quality of this traffic, that boroughs were generally disposed of to persons. professing the same political opinions as the proprietors.2

The practice of selling and letting seats at last became so notorious, that it could no longer be openly tolerated by Parliament. In 1809, Mr. Curwen brought in bill to prevent the obtaining of seats in Parliament by corrupt practices, which after much discussion in both Houses, he succeeded in passing. It imposed heavy penalties upon corrupt agreements for the return of members, whether for money, office, or other consideration; and in the case of the person returned, added the forfeiture of his seat.3

Sale of strained by

seats re

Act, 1809.

But notwithstanding these penalties, the sale of seats, This Act inopera-if no longer so open and avowed-continued to be tive. carried on by private arrangement, so long as nomination boroughs were suffered to exist, as one of the anomalies of our representative system. The representation of Hastings, being vested in a close corporation, was regularly sold, until the reform act had enlarged the franchise, for 60001.4 And until 1832, an extensive sale of similar boroughs continued to be negotiated by the Secretary to the Treasury, by the "whippers-in" of the Opposition, and by proprietors and close corpora

1 Life of Sir S. Romilly, ii. 200 Deb., xiv. 354, 617, 837, 1032, -201. &c. From private information.

2 Ibid., 202.

3 49 Geo. III. c. 118; Hansard's

Government in

fluence in larger boroughs.

Revenue

officers disfranchised.

tions. So long as any boroughs remained, which could be bought and sold, the market was well supplied both with buyers and sellers.

Boroughs whose members were nominated, as to an office, and boroughs bought in the open market, or corrupted by lavish bribery, could not pretend to popular election. The members for such places were independent of the people, whom they professed to represent. But there were populous places, thriving ports, and manufacturing towns, whence representatives, freely chosen, might have been expected to find their way into the House of Commons. But these very places were the favourite resort of the government candidates.

The seven years' war had increased the national debt, and the taxation of the country. The number of officers employed in the collection of the revenue, was consequently augmented. Being the servants of the government, their votes were secured for the ministerial candidates. It was quite understood to be a part of their duty, to vote for any candidate who hoisted the colours of the minister of the day. Whereever they were most needed by the government, their number was the greatest. The smaller boroughs were already secured by purchase, or overwhelming local interest; but the cities and ports had some pretensions to independence. Here, however, troops of petty officers of customs and excise were driven to the poll, and, supported by venal freemen,-overpowered the independent electors.

In 1768, Mr. Dowdeswell had in vain endeavoured to insert a clause in Alderman Beckford's bribery bill, for the disqualification of revenue officers. In 1770 he proposed a bill to disqualify these officers from voting

at elections, and was supported by Mr. Grenville. It was urged, however, that they were already prohibited from interfering at elections, though not from voting; and that no further restraint could reasonably be required. But, in truth, the ministry of Lord North were little disposed to surrender so important a source of influence; and the bill was accordingly rejected.1

The measure, however, was merely postponed for a time. The dangerous policy of the Court, under Lord North, -and its struggle to rule by prerogative and influence.-convinced all liberal statesmen, of the necessity of protecting public liberty, by more effectual safeguards. Meanwhile the disastrous American war further aggravated the evils of taxes, and tax-collectors.

In 1780, a bill to disqualify revenue officers was proposed by Mr. Crewe, and though rejected on the second reading, it met with much more support than Mr. Dowdeswell's previous measure.2 It was again brought forward in 1781, with less success than in the previous year. But the time was now at hand, when a determined assault was contemplated upon the influence of the Crown; and in 1782, the disqualification of revenue officers,—which had hitherto been an opposition measure,—was proposed by the ministry of Lord Rockingham. Its imperative necessity was proved by Lord Rockingham himself, who stated that seventy elections chiefly depended on the votes of these officers; and that eleven thousand five hundred officers of customs and excise were electors. In one borough, he

By a majority of 263 to 188; Parl. Hist., xvi. 834; Cavendish Deb., i. 442.

3 The numbers being 133 to 86; Parl. Hist., xxi. 1398.

4 June 3rd, 1782; Parl. Hist.,

2 The numbers were 224 to 195; xxii. 95. Parl. Hist., xxi. 403.

VOL. I.

U

Vexatious contests in populous cities.

said that one hundred and twenty out of the five hundred voters, had obtained revenue appointments, through the influence of a single person.

This necessary measure was now carried through both Houses, by large majorities, though not without remonstrances against its principle, especially from Lord Mansfield. It is not to be denied that the disqualification of any class of men is, abstractedly, opposed to liberty, and an illiberal principle of legislation; but here was a gross constitutional abuse requiring correction; and though many voters were deprived of the rights of citizenship, these rights could not be freely exercised, and were sacrificed in order to protect the general liberties of the people. Had there been a franchise so extensive as to leave the general body of electors free to vote, without being overborne by the servants of the Crown, it would have been difficult to justify the policy of disfranchisement. But with a franchise so restricted that the electors were controlled by the Crown, in the choice of their representatives, the measure was necessary in the interests of freedom.

Such being the dependence and corruption of the smaller boroughs,-and such the government influence in many of the larger towns,--there were stili a few great cities, with popular rights of election, whose inhabitants neither landowners nor government could control, and which were beyond the influence of corruption. Here, at least, there might have been a free expression of public opinion. But such were the vices of the laws which formerly regulated elections-laws not designed for the protection of the franchise, that a popular candidate, with a majority of votes, might be met by obstacles so vexatious and oppressive, as to debar him from the free suffrage of the electors. If not defeated