CHAPTER L

THE

HIS SECOND PROPO-
WHEREIN IS SHOWN, THE DESTRUCTIVENESS OF SPINOSA'S SCHEME AND DESIGN TO RELIGION AND THE TEMPLE OF GOD.
HIS VAIN ATTEMPT TO PROVE WHAT HE DESIGNS.
HIS THIRD, FOURTH, AND
REPUGNANCY OF HIS DOCTRINE TO THIS ASSERTION-THAT WHATSOEVER EXISTS NECESSARILY AND OF ITSELF, IS ABSOLUTELY
PROVES NOT HIS PURPOSE.
PERFECT; WHICH IS THEREFORE FURTHER WEIGHED.
SITION CONSIDERED.
FIFTH PROPOSITION.

HIS DEFINITION OF A SUBSTANCE DEFECTIVE.
HIS EIGHTH SCHOLIA.

THE MANUDUCTIO AD PANTOSOPHIAM.

HITHERTO We have discoursed only of the Owner of this temple, and shown to whom it rightfully belongs; viz. That there is one only necessary, self-existing, and most absolutely-perfect being, the glorious and ever-blessed God who is capable of our converse, and inclined thereto; whom we are to conceive as justly claiming a temple with us, and ready, upon our willing surrender, to erect in us, or repair such a one, make it habitable, to inhabit and replenish it with his holy and most delectable presence, and converse with us therein suitably to himself and us; i. e. to his own excellency and fulness, and to our indigency and wretchedness. And now the order of discourse would lead us to behold the sacred structure rising, and view the surprising methods by which it is brought about, that any such thing should have place in such a world as this. But we must yield to stay, and be detained a little by some things of greater importance than merely the more even shape and order of a discourse; that is, looking back upon what hath been much insisted on in the former Part -That some being or other doth exist necessarily and of itself, which is of absolute or universal perfection-and taking notice of the opposite sentiments of some hereto; because the whole design of evincing an object of religion would manifestly be much served hereby, we could not but reckon it of great importance to consider what is said against it. We have observed in the Preface a two-fold opposite hypothesis, which therefore, before we go further in the discourse of this temple of God, require to be discussed.

what is so impotent must be very imperfect: yea, and whatsoever is not omnipotent, is evidently not absolutely perfect. We are therefore cast upon reconsidering this proposition-Whatsoever being exists necessarily and of itself, is absolutely perfect. It is true that if any being be evinced to exist necessarily and of itself, which is absolutely perfect, this gives us an object of religion, and throws Spinosa's farrago, his confused heap and jumble of self-existent being, into nothing. But if we carry the universal proposition as it is laid down, though that will oblige us afterwards as well to confute his French confuter, as him; it carries the cause of religion with much the greater clearness, and with evident, unexceptionable self-consistency. For indeed that being cannot be understood to be absolutely perfect, which doth not eminently comprehend the entire fulness of all being in itself; as that must be a heap of imperfection, an everlasting chaos, an impossible, self-repugnant medley, that should be pretended to contain all the varieties, the diversifications, compositions, and mixtures of things in itself formally. And for the universal proposition: the matter itself requires not an immediate, self-evident, reciprocal connexion of the terms-necessarily self-existent, and absolutely perfect. It is enough that it however be brought about by gradual steps, in a way that at length cannot fail; and I conceive hath been in the method that was followed in For, to bring the business now within as narrow a the former Part. possible: nothing is more evident than that compass as some being exists necessarily, or of itself; otherwise nothing at all could now exist. Again, for the same reason, there is some necessary or self-existent being that is the cause of whatsoever being exists not of itself; otherwise nothing of that kind could ever come into being. Now that necessary being, which is the cause of all other being, will most manifestly appear to be absolutely perfect. For, if it be universally causative of all other being, it must both have been the actual cause of all being that doth actually exist, and can only be the possible cause of ali that is possible to exist. Now so universal a cause car be no other than an absolutely or universally perfect being, For it could be the cause of nothing, which it did not virtually or formally comprehend in itself. And that being which comprehends in itself all perfection, both actual and possible, must be absolutely or universally perfect. And such a being, as hath also further more particularly been agent, or cause; because, upon the whole universe of promade apparent, must be an intelligent and a designing II. And it most directly opposes the notion of a self-duced beings, there are most manifest characters of design, existent Being, which is absolutely perfect: for such a in the passive sense. They are designed to serve ends to being must be a substance, if it be any thing; and he which they have so direct and constant an aptitude, as allows no substance but one, and therefore none to be that the attempt to make it be believed they were forced And since we are sure some is or fell in that posture of subserviency to such and such perfect, unless all be so. imperfect, it will be consequent there is none absolutely ends, by any pretended necessity upon their principal cause perfect; for that the same should be imperfect, and abso- or causes, or by mere casualty, looks like the most ludilutely perfect, is impossible. Besides, that he makes it no crous trifling to any man of sense. And because that among way possible to one substance to produce another, and produced beings there are found to be many, that are them

I. The first is that of Spinosa, which he hath more expressly stated, and undertaken with great pomp and boast to demonstrate, in his Posthumous Ethics; which we shall therefore so far consider, as doth concern our present design. He there, as hath been noted in the preface, asserts all "substance to be self-existent, and to be infinite; that one substance is improducible by another; that there is but one, and this one he calls God, &c." Now this horrid scheme of his, though he and his followers would cheat the world with names, and with a specious show of piety, is as directly levelled against all religion, as any the most avowed atheism: for, as to religion, it is all one whether we make nothing to be God, or every thing; whether we allow of no God to be worshipped, or leave none to worship him. His portentous attempt to identify and deify all substance, attended with that strange pair of attributes, extension and thought, (and an infinite number of others besides,) hath a manifest design to throw religion out of the world that way.

Self-existence! Into how profound an abyss is a man cast at the thought of it! How doth it overwhelm and swallow up his mind and whole soul! With what satisfaction and delight must he see himself comprehended, of what he finds he can never comprehend! For contemplating the self-existent Being, he finds it eternally, necessarily, never not existing! He can have no thought of the self-existing Being,a as such, but as always existing, as having existed always, as always certain to exist. Inquiring into the spring and source of this Being's existence, And it will increase the obligation upon him, to deliver whence it is that it doth exist; his own notion of a him from the entanglement of his demonstration, as he self-existing Being, which is not arbitrarily taken up, but calls it, of this proposition; as I hope we shall also of the which the reason of things hath imposed upon him, gives other too, for no doubt they are both false. Of this pro him his answer; and it can be no other, in that it is a self-position his demonstration is fetched from his third definiexisting Being, it hath it of itself, that it doth exist. It is tion, viz. of a substance, "That which is in itself, and an eternal, everlasting spring and fountain of perpetually-conceived by itself; i. e. whose conception needs the conexistent being to itself. What a glorious excellency of being is this! What can this mean, but the greatest remoteness from nothing that is possible; i. e. the most absolute fulness and plenitude of all being and perfection? And whereas all caused being, as such, is, to every man's understanding, confined within certain limits; what can

each an equilateral triangle of the same dimensions, or in a thousand places besides; each one of these do only make one and the same numerical triangle, because they have each the same attribute. But how are the attributes of these several triangles the same? What! the same numerically? Then indeed they are all the same numerical triangle; for one and the same numerical essence makes but one and the same numerical thing. But who that is in his right wits would say so? And if it be only said they have all attributes of one and the same kind, what then is consequent, but that they are all triangles of one kind? Which who in his right wits will deny? And if the attribute of a substance be that which constitutes its essence, the attribute of any thing else is that which constitutes its essence. See then how far Spinosa hath advanced with his demonstration of the identity of substance! If he prove not all substance to be numerically the same, he hath done nothing to his purpose. And it is now obvious to every eye how effectually he hath done that.

but the simple nature of the thing defined;" and we may | Vienna, a third at Rome, a fourth at London, describe as well expect it distinctly to express that. Doth this definition express the simple nature of a substance, "That which is in itself," when it is left to divination what is meant by is, whether essence, or existence, or subsistence? And when we are to be at as random a guess, what is intended by being in itself? Whether being only contained, or being also sustained in, and by, or of itself? And supposing this latter to be meant, whether that self-subsistence exclude dependence only on another, as a subject, which we acknowledge true of all substance; or dependence as on an efficient, which if he will have to be taken for true of all, he was in reason to expect it should be so taken from his effectual proof, not from the reverence of his authority only for what he adds, “And that is conceived by itself; and whose conception needs not the conception of any other thing by which it ought to be formed;"-would he have us believe this to be true, when afterward his tenth proposition is, "That every attribute of substance ought to be conceived by itself?" Whereupon then so many attributes, so many substances, it being the nature of a substance to be conceived by itself.

V. But passing from his notion of a substance, let us consider, secondly, How it proves his proposition, that "Two substances, having different attributes, have nothing common between them." According to him, every attribute of substance is to be conceived by itself; and yet have one and the same substance common to them all: therefore the distinct conception of things is, even with him, no reason why they should have nothing common between them. But as to the thing itself, he must have somewhat more enforcing than his definition of a substance, to prove that two (or many) individual substances may not have the same special nature common to them, and yet be conceived by themselves; having different individual natures or attributes, or different special natures, having the same general nature. Yea, and an equal dependence on the same common cause, which is a less ingredient in the conception of a thing, than the general or special nature is. And I doubt not, we shall find he hath not disproved, but that there is somewhat, in a true sense, common to them and their cause, that is of a conception much more vastly different from them both.

Whereupon, it is necessary to take distinct notice of his third proposition, "What things have nothing common between them, of them the one cannot be the cause of the other." In which nothing is to be peculiarly animadverted on, besides the contradiction in the very terms wherein it is proposed, What things have nothing common between them. How can they be things, and have nothing common between them? If they be things, they have sure the general notion of things common to them; there can therefore be no such things, that have nothing common. And let this be supposed to have been absurdly set down on purpose; yet now, for his demonstration hereof, it rests upon a palpable falsehood-that causes and effects must be mutually understood by one another; as we shall see more hereafter.

His fourth we let pass; what it hath regardable in it, being as fitly to be considered under the

VI. Fifth; "There cannot be two or more substances, in the whole universe, of the same nature or attribute;' unto which, besides what hath been said already, we need only here to add, that (whereas he hath told us, by the attribute of a substance, he means the essence of it) if he here speak of the same numerical essence or attribute, it is ridiculously true; and is no more than if he had said, One thing is but one thing. If he speak of the same special or general attribute or essence, it is as absurdly false; and for the proof of it, in the latter sense his demonstration signifies nothing. There may be more than one (as a stone, a tree, an animal) that agree in the same general attribute of corporeity, and are diversified by their special attributes; and there may be many of the same special attribute, (viz. of rationality,) as John, Peter, Thomas, &c. that are distinguished by their individual ones. He might as well prove, by the same method, the identity of his modi, as of substances; as that there can be but one individual triangle in all the world, of one attribute or property, as but one substance. Let (for instance) one at París, another at

Whence also it is further equally evident, his demonstration dwindles into nothing; and gives no support to VII. His sixth proposition, which contains the malignity of his whole design, viz. “That one substance cannot be produced by another substance," which rests (as you see) partly upon the fifth, "That there cannot be two substances of the same attribute," which in his sense is, as hath been shown, most absurdly false, and the attempt of proving it as absurd; partly upon his second, "That two substances, of different attributes, have nothing common between them," which might be said of whatsoever else, as truly as of substances; but which is also most evidently untrue; and partly, upon his third, "That such things as have nothing common between them, the one of them cannot be the cause of the other," which depends upon two false suppositions,-1. "That there can be two things, which have nothing common between them;" which, as hath been noted, contradicts itself, and needs not be further stood upon. 2. "That whatsoever things are cause and effect, the one to the other, must be mutually understood by one another," which we shall here more distinctly consider, it being also his second demonstration of the corollary of this his sixth proposition, (which nothing but a disposition to trifle, or having nothing to say, could have made him mention, as a corollary from this proposition, it being in effect but a repetition of the same thing,) viz. "That if one substance can be produced by another, (agent, or substance, which you please,) the knowledge of it must depend upon the knowledge of its cause, (by the fourth axiom,) and thereupon (by definition third) it should not be a substance." We are here to consider,

But

1. This his fourth axiom, "That the knowledge of an effect depends upon the knowledge of its cause, and doth involve it." An effect may be considered two ways; absolutely, as it is in itself, or relatively, as it is the effect of an efficient cause. It cannot, it is true, be understood to be the effect of such an efficient, but the knowledge that this was its efficient, is involved therein; for it is the same thing, and so much may be known, without knowing any thing of the nature of either the efficient or effect. this signifies nothing to his purpose. He must therefore mean, that the knowledge of an effect absolutely considered, and in its own nature, depends upon and involves the knowledge of the nature of its efficient. Surely, the nature of a thing may be competently known by its true definition. But is the efficient cause wont to be universally put into definitions? He tells us himself, (Schol. 2. upon Proposition 8.) "A true definition contains, or expresses, nothing, besides the mere nature of the thing defined." And let any man that thinks it worth it, be at the pains to examine his own definition in the several parts of this ethico-geometrical tract, and see whether he always puts the efficient cause into every definition. And (no doubt) he thought himself to define accurately. If all other men, who have so generally reckoned the efficient and end, external causes, and only matter and form internal, and ingredient into the nature of things, and therefore only fit to be put into definitions, were thought by him mistaken and out in their reckoning, it was, however, neither modest nor wise, to lay down for an axiom a thing so contrary to the

common sentiments of mankind; and without the least attempt to prove it, go about to demonstrate by it, in so portentous a cause; and lay the whole weight of his horrid cause upon it; expecting all the world should be awed into an assent, by the authority of his bare word; and not presume to disbelieve or doubt it, only because he is pleased to stamp the magisterial name of an axiom upon it. If therefore any man assume the boldness to deny his axiom, what is become of his demonstration ? And whereas it is commonly apprehended, that definitions are not of individual things, but of special kinds, and is acanowledged by himself, "That the essence of things produced by God, involves not existence, and the producion of a thing is nothing else but the putting it into actual existence;" why may not the abstract essence, or nature of things, be well enough conceived and defined, without involving the conception of their productive cause? And this enough shows, 2dly, That his definition of a substance proves not, that one substance cannot be produced by another, viz. "That which can be conceived by itself," for so it may, without involving the conception of that which produces it; and so be a substance sufficiently according to his definition. Though there can be no inconvenience in admitting, that things understood apart, by themselves, may be afterwards further and more clearly understood, by considering and comparing them in the habitude and references which they bear as causes and effects (or otherwise) to one another. And now is his,

for this purpose. For if there were two of the same individual nature and attribute, they would not bound one another, but run into one; inasmuch as having but one attribute, they should, according to him, have but one and the same essence; and so be most entirely one, and that there cannot be two, or many times two, of the same special or general nature, is unproved; and the contrary most evident, as may be seen, in what hath been said upon that fifth proposition.

IX. No man needs wish an easier task, than it would be to show the falsehood or impertinency of his Scholia upon this proposition, and of his following discourse, to the purpose above mentioned. But I reckon it unneces sary, his principal supports being (I will not say overthrown, but) discovered to be none at all. I shall therefore follow his footsteps no further, only take notice of some few things that have a more direct aspect upon his main design, and make all the haste I can to take leave of him, that I may be at liberty to pursue my own. What is in his first Scholium follows, he says, only upon his seventh proposition, which itself follows upon nothing; and therefore I further regard it not. His second Schol. would have his seventh.proposition pass for a common notion; and so it will, when he hath inspired all mankind with his sentiments. But why must it do so? Because substance is that which is in itself, and is conceived by itself? Now compare that with his tenth proposition, "Every attribute of substance ought to be conceived by itself." There the definition of substance is given to every attribute of substance; therefore, every attribute of substance is a substance, since the definitions of substance to which he refers us in the demonstration of that proposition, agrees to it; therefore, so many attributes, so many substances. What can be plainer? We have then his one substance multiplied into an infinite number of substances. By his sixth definition, we shall see his own confession of this consequence, by and by.

VIII. Seventh proposition, "That it belongs to the nature of substance to exist," which is so great a pillar, left itself without support; and being understood of substance as such, as his terms and design require it to be, it is manifestly impious, communicating the most fundamental | attribute of the Deity to all substance. And is as little befriended by reason, as it befriends religion; for it rests upon nothing but the foregoing baffled proposition and this definition,f of that which is its own cause; which is, "That whose essence involves existence, or which cannot And whereas in this Schol. he would make us believe, be conceived otherwise than as existing;" whereas, it is that modifications men may conceive as not existing, but sufficiently plain we have a conception clear enough of substances they cannot. Let the reason of this assigned the general nature of a substance as such, abstracted from difference be considered; "That by substance they must existence, or non-existence, conceiving it only to be such, understand that which is in itself, and is conceived by as if it exist, doth subsist in and by itself, i. e. without itself, its knowledge not needing the knowledge of another having a subject to support it; though it may be such as thing. But by modifications they are to understand that to have needed a productive, and continually to need a which is in another, and whose conception is formed by sustaining, efficient cause. Nor is there less clearness in the conception of that thing in which they are: wherefore, this abstract conception of a substance, than there is in we can have true ideas of not-existing modifications, inthat of a modus, or accident, which we may conceive in asmuch as though they may not actually exist, otherwise an equal abstraction, from actual existence, or non-exist- than in the understanding, yet their essence is so compretence; understanding it to be such, as that if it exist, it hended in another, that they may be conceived by the doth inexist, or exist only in another. And now is our same. But the truth of substances is not otherwise withway sufficiently prepared to the consideration of his eighth out the understanding, than in themselves, because they proposition; "That all substance is necessarily infinite." are conceived by themselves," &c. Which reason is eviAnd how is it demonstrated? Why, by his fifth proposi-dently no reason. For with the same clearness, wherewith tion,-"That there can be but one substance, of one and the same attribute," which hath been sufficiently unravelled and exposed, so as not to be left capable of signifying any thing here, as the reader will see by looking back to what has been said upon it. And now it must quite sink; its next reliance failing it, viz. the foregoing seventh proposition,-"That it belongs to it, to exist necessarily." I grant the consequence to be good, and reckon it a truth of great evidence and concernment, "That whatsoever exists necessarily, is infinite." I heartily congratulate Spinosa's acknowledgment of so very clear and important an assertion; and do hope, as in the foregoing discourse I have made some, to make further, good use of it. But for what he assumes, that all "substance necessarily exists;" you see it rests upon nothing, and so consequently doth what he would conclude from it, that all substance is infinite. And his further proof of it avails as little, viz. that it cannot be finite; because (by his second definition) if it be so, it must be limited by something of the same nature, &c. Which would be absurd by proposition fifth,-"That there cannot be two substances of the same attribute:" for that there be two, of the same individual attribute, to bound one another is unnecessary, (as well as impossible,) and absurdly supposed

I conceive a substance, whensoever it exists, as existing in itself; I conceive a modification, whensoever it exists, as existing in another. If therefore any thing existing in another, be as truly existing, as existing in itself, the existence of a substance is no more necessary than the existence of a modification. And if we can have true ideas of not-existing modifications, we may have as true, of notexisting substances: especially since (according to him) we cannot conceive a substance, without conceiving in it some or other modifications. For he tells us, "The essence of modifications is so comprehended in another, that they may be conceived by the same." Now, what means he by the essence of modifications being comprehended in another? By that other, he must mean substance: for modifications do modify substances, or nothing; and if the essences of modifications be contained in substances, they must (according to him) be contained in the essence of substances.

For there is, saith he, nothing in nature, besides substances and their affections or modifications (demonstration of prop. fourth, and def. fifth.) Therefore, since nothing can be conceived in substance, antecedent to these modifications, besides its own naked essence, they must be contained immediately in the very essence of substance,

g Def &

CHAP. I.

THE LIVING TEMPLE.

or in substance itself; wherefore if all substance be necessarily existent, they must be necessarily inexistent. And if the essence of substance contains the inexisting modi, the essence of the modi doth equally contain their inexistence in substance. Whereupon, by consequence also, the essence of these modifications doth as much involve existence (since no one can affirm inexistence to be existence) as the essence of substance doth, in direct contradiction to prop. twenty-fourth, which expressly (and most truly) says, "The essence of things produced by God" (which he, as untruly, intends of these modifications alone) "do not involve existence."

And now for his notanda in this Schol. by which he would conclude, that there is no other than this one infiniteh substance in being. It is true indeed, that the definition of a thing (which we have before said is of specific nature, not of individuals) expresses not any certain number of existing individuals, (be it man, or triangle, or what else you please,) nor any at all. For surely the definition of man, or triangle, would be the same, if every individual of each should be abolished and cease. But that, if any do exist, some cause must be assignable why they exist, and why so many only. What is to be inferred from this? That the reason being the same, as to every substance whose essence involves not existence in it, (which that the essence of every substance doth, or of substance as such, he hath not proved, nor ever can) when any such substance is found to exist, the cause of its existence, not being in its own nature, must be external. And therefore, so many only do exist, because a free agent, able to produce them, (for the very substance of created beings itself, owes not its production to a merely natural, undesigning, or to any subordinate agent only,) was pleased to produce so many, and no more. And so hath this unhappy author himself, with great pains and sweat, reasoned out for us the very thing we assert.

But that it may be further seen, how incurious a writer this man of demonstration is, and how fatally, while he is designing the overthrow of religion, he overthrows his own design, I shall not let pass what he says, in demonstrating his twelfth prop.-" That no attribute of substance can be truly conceived, from which it may follow, that substance can be divided." How he proves it by prop. eighth, and after by the sixth, I shall not regard, till I see those propositions better proved. But that which I at present remark, is his argument from prop. fifth,-"That if substance could be divided, each part must consist of a different attribute; and so of one substance many might be constituted." A fair confession, that many attributes will constitute many substances. And himself acknowledges many attributes of substance, (def. sixth, and prop. eleventh.) And therefore, though he here call this an absurdity, it is an absurdity which he hath inevitably now fastened upon himself, having here allowed, plainly, the consequence (as was above promised to be shown) that if there be diversity of attributes, they will constitute a diversity of substances, which it was before impossible to him to disallow, having defined an attribute (as was formerly noted) to bei that which constitutes the essence of substance. Therefore, his whole cause is here fairly given away; for his one substance is now scattered into many, and the pretended impossibility of the creation of any substantial being, quite vanished into thin and empty air. The many inconsistencies to be noted also in his annexed letters, with several parts of his discourse, it is not my It is enough, to my business particularly to reflect on. purpose, to have shown he comes short of his. X. Upon the whole, little more seems needful for the refutation of this his horrid doctrine of the unity, selfexistence, and infinity of all substance, than only to oppose Spinosa to Spinosa. Nor have I ever met with a discourse so equally inconsistent with all principles of reason and religion, and with itself. And so frequently doth he overthrow his own ill design, in this very discourse, that it is altogether unnecessary to insist on the inconsistencies of this, with his demonstrations of Des Cartes's principles,

kAs his asserting God to be a most simple being, and that his attributes do only differ, ratione Whereas, now, he makes his attributes as divers, as extension and thought, and says, they ought to be conceived as really distinct. Schol. in Prop. 10. There he asserts all things to be created by God, here, nothing.

written divers years before. Against which, every one
that hath compared, knows these his later sentiments to
import so manifest hostility, that I may well spare that
vain and useless labour, it being sufficient only to note the
more principal, in the margin.k

His following propositions (and among them those most
surprising ones, the sixteenth and twenty-eighth) tend to
evince the onliness of substance, and the absolute necessity
of all actions; but upon grounds so plainly already dis-
covered to be vain and false, that we need follow him no
charge it with the many absurdities that belong to it; they
further. Nor is it necessary to disprove his hypothesis, or
are so horrid and notorious, that to any one who is not in
love with absurdity for itself, it will abundantly suffice to
have shown he hath not proved it.

XI. I cannot but, in the meantime, take some notice of the genius, which seems to have inspired both him and his devotees. A fraudulent pretence to religion, while they conspire against it. Whereof many instances might be given; as the prefixing that text of Holy Scripture to so impure a volume, on the title-page, 1 John iv. 13. "By this we know that we dwell in God, and God dwelleth in us, because he hath given us of his Spirit." That the preface to his posthumous works is filled up with quotations out of the Bible; which it is their whole design to make signify nothing. The divine authority whereof, an anony mous defender of his, in that part of his work which he entitles, Specimen artis ratiocinandi, naturalis et artificialis ad pantosophia principia manuducens, undertakes to demonstrate (because, as he says, all religion depends upon the word of God) by an argument, which, he says, he can glory, that after many years meditation, the divine grace favouring him, he hath found out, by which he tell us, he is able (to do what, that he knows, no man hath ever sacred Scripture, that is, That it is the word of God. An done before him) to demonstrate naturally the truth of the argument, he says, able to convince the most pertinacious pagan, &c. And it is taken from the idea of God, compared with that divine saying, Exod. iii. 14. "I am that I am." Whereupon what he says will to any one who attentively reads show his design, viz. at once to expose religion, and hide himself. And so doth his collusion sufficiently appear in making the soul philosophically mortal, and Christianly immortal, p. 70, &c. But if the philosopher perish for ever, what will become of the Christian?

This author also finds great fault with the instances usually given to exemplify the common definition of substance, That is, a being subsisting by itself, or in itself,m because he thought them not agreeable enough to his master Spinosa's notion of the unity and identity of all substances, and consequently of the improductibility of any. And he fancies them to contradict themselves, that while they call the sun, the moon, the earth, this or that tree, or stone, substances, they yet admit them to be produced by another. For how can it be, saith he, that they should be in or by themselves, and yet depend on another, as on a subject, or as an efficient cause? He is very angry, and says they by it do but crucify and mock their readers, only because it crosses and disappoints his and his master's impious purpose of deifying every substance. And therefore, to serve that purpose as he fancies the better, he would more aptly model all things, and reduce them to two distinct kinds only, viz. Of things that may be conceived primarily and in themselves, without involving the conception of another; and again, of things that we conceive not primarily and in themselves, but secondarily and by another, whose conception is involved in their conception. But all the while, what is there in this, more than what is common and acknowledged on all hands? as the sense of the trivial distich he takes the pains to recite,

But when all this is granted, what is he nearer his mark? Of that former sort, still some are from another; and one other only of and from itself. But then (says he)

There he makes corporeal substance divisible; here, all substance indivisible,
1 P. 241, &c.
&c. And yet in this work (vide Schol. in Prop. 19.) refers us to the former, a
if, when the one destroys the other, both were firm.