king so mean a supposition) as to have been confined unto | is, of a distinction of Maresius's to which he is replying, that one temple to which of old he chose to confine his for so occasionally come's in the discourse,) "viz. the inmore solemn worship; that he could be essentially pre-finity of the divine essence, is not so firm as is commonly sent, only here at once, and no where else; were this no thought." And that therefore it may be thought les firm, detraction? They that think him only to replenish and be he thinks fit to cast a slur upon it, by making it the docpresent by his essence in the highest heaven, (as some are trine of the Stoics, exprest by Virgil, Jovis omnia plena; wont to speak,) would they not confess it were a meaner (as if it must needs be false, because Virgil said it, though and much lower thought to suppose that presence circum-Ì could tell, if it were worth the while, where Virgil scribed within the so unconceivably narrower limits as the speaks more agreeably to his sense than ours, according walls of a house? If they would pretend to ascribe to to which he might as well have interpreted this passage, him some perfection beyond this, by supposing his essen- as divers texts of Scripture; and then his authority might tial presence commensurable to the vaster territory of the have been of some value;) and by Lucan, who helps, it highest heavens; even by the same supposition, should seems, to disgrace and spoil it; Jupiter est quodcunque they deny to him greater perfection than they ascribe. vides, quocunque moveris. He might, if he had a mind to For the perfection which in this kind they should ascribe, make it thought paganish, have quoted a good many more, were finite only; but that which they should deny, were but then there might have been some danger it should infinite. pass for a common notion. Next, he quotes some passages of the fathers that import dislike of it, about which we need not concern ourselves; for the question is not what this or that man thought. And then, for the positive account of his own judgment in the case, having recited divers texts out of the Bible that seemed as he apprehended to make against him, he would have us believe, that these all speak rather of God's providence and power. by which he concerns himself in all our works, words, and thoughts, wheresoever we live, than of the absolute infinity of his essence.t And afterwards, That God is by his essence in the supreme heaven, where he inhabits the inaccessible light, but thence he sends out from himself a spirit, or a certain force, whither he pleases, by which he is truly present, and works there.

Again, they will however acknowledge omnipotency a perfection included in the notion of an absolutely perfect Being; therefore they will grant, he can create another world (for they do not pretend to believe this infinite; and if they did, by their supposition, they should give away their cause) at any the greatest distance we can conceive from this; therefore so far his power can extend itself. But what, his power without his being? What then is his power? something, or nothing? Nothing can do nothing; therefore not make a world. It is then some being; and whose being is it but his own? Is it a created being? That is to suppose him, first, impotent, and then to have created omnipotency, when he could do nothing. Whence by the way we may see to how little purpose that distinction can be applied in the present case of essential and virtual contact, where the essence and virtue cannot but be the same. But shall it be said, he must, in order to the creating such another world, locally move thither where he designs it? I ask then, But can he not at the same time create thousands of worlds at any distance from this round about it? No man can imagine this to be impossible to him that can do all things. Wherefore of such extent is his power, and consequently his being. Will they therefore say he can immensely, if he please, diffuse his being, but he voluntarily contracts it? It is answered, That is altogether impossible to a being, that is whatsoever it is by a simple and absolute necessity, for whatsoever it is necessarily, it is unalterably and eternally, or is pure act, and in a possibility to be nothing which it already is not. Therefore since God can every where exert his power, he is necessarily, already, every where: and hence, God's immensity is the true reason of his immobility; there being no imaginable space, which he doth not necessarily replenish. Whence also, the supposition of his being so confined (as was said) is immediately repugnant to the notion of a necessary being, as well as of an absolutely perfect, which hath been argued from it. We might moreover add, that upon the same supposition God might truly be said to have made a creature greater than himself, (for such this universe apparently were,) and that he can make one (as they must confess who deny him not to be omnipotent) most unconceivably greater than this universe now is. Nothing therefore seems more manifest than that God is immense, or (as we may express it) extrinsically infinite, with respect to place; as well as intrinsically, in respect to the plenitude of his perfection. Only it may be requisite to consider briefly what is said against it by the otherwise minded, that pretend not to deny his infinity in that other sense. Wherein that this discourse swell not beyond just bounds, their strength of argument, (for it will not be so seasonable here to discuss with them the texts of Scripture wont to be insisted on in this matter,) shall be viewed as it is collected and gathered up in one of them. And that shall be, Curcellæus, who gives it as succinctly and fully as any I have met with of that sort of men.

The doctrine itself we may take from him thus, First, On the negative part, by way of denial of what we have been hitherto asserting, he says, "The foundation," (that

But proceed we to his reasons, which he saith are not to be contemned. We shall therefore not contemn them so far, as not to take notice of them; which trouble also the reader may please to be at, and afterward do as he thinks fit.

1. That no difference can be conceived between God and creatures, if God, as they commonly speak, be wholly, in every point, or do fill all the points of the universe with his whole essence: for so whatsoever at all is, will be God himself.

Answ. And that is most marvellous, that the in-being or one thing in another must needs take away all their difference, and confound them each with other; which sure would much rather argue them distinct. For certainly it cannot, without great impropriety, be said that any thing is in itself; and is both the container and contained. How were these thoughts in his mind? And these very notions which he opposes to each other, so as not to be confounded with his mind, and consequently with one another? So that it is a great wonder he was not of both opinions at once. And how did he think his soul to be in his body, which, though substantially united with it, (and that is somewhat more, as we will suppose he knew was commonly held, than to be intimately present,) was not yet the same thing? However, himself acknowledges the power and providence of God to be every where: and then at least every thing must, it seems, be the very power and providence of God. But he thought, it may be, only of confuting the words of Lucan, and chastising his poetie liberty. And if he would have been at the pains to turn all their strains and raptures into propositions, and so have gravely fallen to confuting them, he might perhaps have found as proper an exercise for his logic as this. As for his talk of a whole, whereof we acknowledge no parts, (as if he imagined the divine essence to be compounded of such, he should have said so, and have proved it,) it is an absurd scheme of speech, which may be left to him, and them that use it, to make their best of.

2. No idolatry can be committed, if there be not the least point to be found, that is not wholly full of whole God: for whithersoever worship shall be directed, it shall in heaven. be directed to God himself, who will be no less there than

former would be granted as soon as it should be heard, as
Answ. This proceeds upon the supposition that the

Nec loquitur David de Spiritu Sancto, qui peculiaris quidem Dei Spiritus
est, sed de Spiritu Dei simpliciter. Nec dicit Spiritum istum ubique re esse
sed tantum docet nullum, esse locum, ad quem is nequeat pertingere, &c.
the rest) Vorstius, Crellius, &c.
So also F. Socin. Smalcius. And (though not altogether so expressly as

THE

LIVING TEMPLE.

PART II.

CONTAINING ANIMADVERSIONS ON SPINOSA, AND A FRENCH WRITER PRETENDING TO CONFUTE HIM.

WITH

A RECAPITULATION OF THE FORMER PART, AND AN ACCOUNT OF THE DESTITUTION
AND RESTITUTION OF GOD'S TEMPLE AMONG MEN.

A PREFACE,

SHOWING THE INDUCEMENT AND GENERAL CONTENTS OF THIS SECOND PART. THE OCCASION OF CONSIDERING SPINOSA, AND & FRENCH WRITER WHO PRETENDS TO CONFUTE HIM. A SPECIMEN OF THE WAY AND STRENGTH OF THE FORMER'S REASONING, AS AN INTRODUCTION TO A MORE DISTINCT EXAMINATION OF SUCH OF HIS POSITIONS, AS THE DESIGN OF THIS DISCOURSE WAS MORE DIRECTLY CONCERNED IN.

It is not worth the while to trouble the reader with an account why the progress of this work (begun many years ago, in a former part) hath been so long delayed; or why it is now resumed. There are cases wherein things too little for public notice, may be sufficient reasons to oneself: and such self-satisfaction is all that can be requisite, in a matter of no more importance than that circumstance only, of the time of sending abroad a discourse, of such a nature and subject, as that if it can be useful at any time, will be so at all times. The business of the present discourse, is religion; which is not the concern of an age only, or of this or that time, but of all times; and which, in respect of its grounds and basis, is eternal, and can never cease or vary. But if in its use and exercise it do at any time more visibly languish, by attempts against its foundations, an endeavour to establish them, if it be not altogether unfit to serve that purpose, will not be liable to be blamed as unseasonable. Every one will understand, that a design further to establish the grounds of religion, can have no other meaning, than only to represent their stability unshaken by any attempts upon them; that being all that is either possible in this case, or needful. Nothing more is possible: for if there be not already, in the nature of things, a sufficient foundation of religion, it is now too late; for their course and order cannot begin again. Nor is any thing, besides such a representation, needful: for have the adventures of daring wits (as they are fond of being thought) altered the nature of things? Or hath their mere breath thrown the world off from its ancient basis, and new-moulded the universe, so as to make things be after the way of their own hearts? Or have they prevailed upon themselves, firmly to believe things are as they would wish?

One would be ashamed to be of that sort of creature, called Man, and count it an unsufferable reproach to be long unresolved, Whether there ought to be such a thing in the world as religion, yea, or no. Whatever came on't, or whatsoever I did or did not besides, I would drive this business to an issue; I would never endure to be long in suspense about so weighty and important a question. But if I inclined to the negative, I would rest in nothing short of the plainest demonstration: for I am to dispute against mankind; and eternity hangs upon it. If I misjudge, I run counter to the common sentiments of all the world, and am lost for ever. The opposers of it have nothing but inclination to oppose it, with a bold jest now and then. But if I consider the unrefuted demonstrations brought for it, with the consequences, religion is the last thing in all the world upon which I would adventure to break a jest. And I would ask such as have attempted to argue against it, Have their strongest arguments conquered their fear? Have they no suspicion left, that the other side of the question may prove true? They have done all they can, by often repeating their faint despairing wishes, and the mutterings of their hearts, "No God! no God!" to make themselves believe there is none; when yet the restless tossings to and fro of their uneasy minds; their tasking and torturing that little residue of wit and common sense, which their riot hath left them, (the excess of which latter, as well shows as causes the defect of the former,) to try every new method and scheme of atheism they hear of, implies their distrust of all; and their suspicion, that do what they can, things will still be as they were, i. e. most adverse and unfavourable to that way of living, which however at a venture, they had before resolved on. Therefore, they find it necessary to continue their contrivances, how more effectually to disburden themselves of any obligation to be religious; and hope, at least, some or other great wit may reach further than their own; and that either by some new model of thoughts, or by not thinking, it may be possible at length to argue or wink the Deity into nothing, and all religion out of the world. And we are really to do the age that right, as to acknowledge, the genius of it aims at more consistency and agreement with itself, and more cleverly to reconcile notions with common practice than heretofore. Men seem to be grown weary of the old dull way of practising all manner of lewdness, and pretending to repent of them; to sin, and say they are sorry for it. The running this long-beaten circular tract of doing and repenting the same things, looks ridicu lously, and they begin to be ashamed on't. A less interrupted and more progressive course in their licentious ways, looks braver; and they count it more plausible to disbelieve this world to have any ruler at all, than to suppose it to have

PREFACE.

And perhaps of any other repentance they have such a one as they can cheat and mock with so easy and ludicrous a repentance, or reconcile to their wickedness, only by calling themselves wicked, while they still mean to continue so. not heard much; or if they have, they count it a more heroical, or feel it an easier thing to laugh away the fear of any future account or punishment, than to endure the severities of a serious repentance, and a regular life. Nor can they, however, think the torments of any hell so little tolerable as those of a sober and pious life upon earth. And for their happening to prove everlasting, they think they may run the hazard of that. For as they can make a sufficient shift to secure themselves from the latter sort of torments, so they believe the champions of their cause have taken sufficient care to secure them from the former.

As religion hath its gospel and evangelists, so hath atheism and irreligion too. There are tidings of peace sent to such as shall repent and turn to God; and there have been those appointed, whose business it should be to publish and expound them to the world. This also is the method for carrying on the design of irreligion. Doctrines are invented to make men fearless, and believe they need no repentance. And some have taken the part to assert and defend such doctrines, to evangelize the world, and cry "Peace, peace," to men, upon these horrid terms. And these undertake for the common herd, encourage them to indulge themselves in all manner of liberty, while they watch for them, and guard the coasts: and no faith was ever more implicit or resigned, than the infidelity and disbelief of the more unthinking sort of these men. They reckon it is not every one's part to think. It is enough for the most to be boldly wicked, and credit their common cause, by an open contempt of God and religion. The other warrant them safe, and confidently tell them they may securely disbelieve all that ever hath been said, to make a religious regular life be thought necessary; as only invented frauds of sour and ill-natured men, that envy to mankind the felicity whereof their nature hath made them capable, and which their own odd preternatural humour makes them neglect and censure.

And for these defenders of the atheistical cause, it being their part and province to cut off the aids of reason from religion, to make it seem an irrational and a ridiculous thing, and to warrant and justify the disuse and contempt of it, and as it were, to cover the siege, wherewith the common rout have begirt the temple of God; they have had less leisure themselves, to debauch and wallow in more grossly sensual impurities. Herewith the thinking part did less agree: and they might perhaps count it a greater thing to make debauchees than to be such, and reckon it was glory enough to them to head and lead on the numerous throng, and pleasure enough to see them they had so thoroughly disciplined to the service, throw dirt and squibs at the sacred pile, the dwelling of God among men on earth, and cry, "Down with it even to the ground." Nor for this sort of men, whose business was only to be done by noise and clamour, or by jest and laughter, we could think them no more fit to be discoursed with than a whirlwind, or an ignis fatuus. But for such as have assumed to themselves the confidence to pretend to reason, it was not fit they should have cause to think themselves neglected. Considering therefore, that if the existence of a Deity were fully proved, (i. e. such as must be the fit object of religion, or of the honour of a temple,) all the little cavils against it must signify nothing, (because the same thing cannot be both true and false,) we have in the former part of this discourse, endeavoured to assert so much in an argumentative way. And therefore first laid down such a notion of God, as even atheists themselves, while they deny him to exist, cannot but grant to be the true notion of the thing they deny; viz. summarily that he can be no other than a being absolutely perfect. And thereupon next proceed to evince the existence of such a being. And whereas this might have been attempted in another method, as was noted Part 1. Ch. 1. by concluding the existence of such a being first from the idea of it, which (as a fundamental perfection) involves existence; yea, and necessity of existence, most apparently in it. Because that was clamoured at as sophistical and captious, (though very firm unsliding steps might, with caution, be taken in that way,*) yet we rather chose the other as plainer, more upon the square, more easily intelligible and convictive, and less liable to exception in any kind; i. e. rather to begin at the bottom, and rise from necessity of existence, to absolute perfection, than to begin at the top, and prove downward, from absolute perfection, necessity of existence.

Now, if it do appear from what hath been said concerning the nature of necessary, self-existing being, that it cannot but be absolutely perfect, even as it is such, since nothing is more evident than that some being or other doth exist necessarily, or of itself, our point is gained without more ado; i. e. we have an object of religion, or one to whom a temple duly belongs. We thereupon used some endeavour to make that good, and secure that more compendious way to our end; as may be seen in the former Part. Which was endeavoured as it was a nearer and more expeditious course; not that the main cause of religion did depend upon the immediate and self-evident reciprocal connexion of the terms necessary existence, and absolute perfection, as we shall see hereafter in the following discourse; but because there are other hypotheses, that proceed either upon the denial of any necessary being that is absolutely perfect, or upon the assertion of some necessary being that is not absolutely perfect; it hence appears requisite, to undertake the examination of what is said to either of these purposes, and to show with how little pretence a necessary most perfect being is denied, or any such imperfect necessary being, is either asserted or imagined.

We shall therefore in this Second Part, first, take into consideration what is (with equal absurdity and impiety) asserted by one author, of the identity of all substance, of the impossibility of one substance being produced by another, and consequently of one necessary self-existing being, pretended with gross self-repugnancy, to be endued with infinite perfections, but really represented the common receptacle of all imaginable imperfection and confusion.-Next, what is asserted by another in avowed opposition to him, of a necessary self-existent being, that is at the same time said to be essentially imperfect.-Then we shall recapitulate what had been discoursed in the former Part, for proof of such a necessarily existent and absolutely perfect being, as is there asserted.—Thence we shall proceed to show how reasonably Scripture testimony is to be relied upon, in reference to some things concerning God, and the religion of his temple, which either are not so clearly demonstrable, or not at all discoverable the rational way. And shall lastly show how it hath come to pass, if God be such as he hath been represented, so capable of a temple with man, so apt and inclined to inhabit such a one, that he should ever not do so; or how such a temple should ever cease, or be uninhabited and desolate, that the known way of its restitution may be the more regardable and marvellous in our eyes. The authors against whom we are to be concerned, are Benedictus Spinosa, a Jew, and an anonymous French writer, who pretends to confute him. And the better to prepare our way, we shall go on to preface something concerning the former, viz. Spinosa, whose scheme, though, with great pretence of devotion, it acknowledges a Deity, yet so confounds this his fictitious deity with every substantial being in the world besides, that upon the whole it appears altogether inconsistent with any rational exercise or sentiment of religion at all. And indeed, the mere pointing with the finger at the most discernible and absurd weakness of some of his principal supports, might be sufficient to overearn his whole fabric; though perhaps he thought the fraudulent artifice of contriving it geometrically must confound all the world, and make men think it not liable to be attacked in any part.

But whether it can, or no, we shall make some present trial; and for a previous essay, (to show that he is not invul-
nerable, and that his scales do not more closely cohere, than those of his brother-leviathan,) do but compare his defi-
nition of an attribute, "That which the understanding perceives of substance; as constituting the essence thereof,"
A by the excellent Dr. Cudworth, in his Intellectual System, we find is done.
Ethic. Part 1. Def. 4.

As is laid down in his Posthumous Ethics.

with his fifth Proposition, "There cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute;" which is as much as to say that two substances cannot be one and the same substance. For the attribute of any substance (saitn he) constitutes its essence; whereas the essence therefore of one thing, cannot be the essence of another thing, if such an attribute be the essence of one substance, it cannot be the essence of another substance. A rare discovery! and which needed mathematical demonstration! Well, and what now? Nothing, it is true, can be plainer, if by the same attribute or nature, he means numerically the same; it only signifies one thing is not another thing. But if he mean there cannot be two things or substances, of the same special or general nature, he hath his whole business yet to do; which how he does, we shall see in time.

But now compare herewith his definition of what he thinks fit to dignify with the sacred name of God: "By God (saith he*) I understand a being absolutely infinite; i. e. a substance consisting of infinite attributes, every one whereof expresses an infinite essence.' And behold the admirable agreement! how amicably his definition of an attribute, and that mentioned proposition, accord with this definition (as he calls it) of God! There cannot be two substances, he saith, that have the same attribute, i. e. the same essence. But now it seems the same substance may have infinite attributes, i. e. infinite essences! O yes, very conveniently: for he tellst you that two attributes really distinct, we cannot conclude do constitute two divers substances. And why do they not? Because it belongs to the nature of substance, that each of its attributes be conceived by itself, &c. Let us consider his assertion, and his reason for it. He determines, you see, two really distinct attributes do not constitute two divers substances. You must not here take any other man's notion of an attribute, according to which, there may be accidental attributes, that, we are sure, would not infer diversity of substances for their subjects; or, there may be also essential ones, that only flow from the essence of the thing to which they belong; so, too, nobody doubts one thing may have many properties. But we must take his own notion of an attribute, according whereto it constitutes, or (which is all one) is, that very essence. Now will not such attributes as these, being really distinct, make divers substances? Surely what things are essentially diverse, must be concluded to be most diverse. But these attributes are by himself supposed to be really distinct, and to constitute (which is to be) the essence of the substance. And how is that one thing, or one substance, which hath many essences? If the essence of a thing be that, by which it is what it is, surely the plurality of essences must make a plurality of things.

But it may be said, Cannot one thing be compounded of two or more things essential diverse, as the soul and body of a man; whence therefore, the same thing, viz. a man, will have two essences? This is true, but impertinent. For the very notion of composition signifies these are two things united, not identified, that are capable of being again separated; and that the third thing, which results from them both united, contains them still distinct from one another, not the same.

But it may be said, though these attributes are acknowledged and asserted to be distinct from one another, they are yet found in one and the same substance common to them all. And this no more ought to be reckoned repugnant to common reason, than the philosophy heretofore in credit, which taught that the vast diversity of forms throughout the universe, which were counted so many distinct essences, do yet all reside in the same first matter, as the common receptacle of them all. Nor yet doth this salve the business, were that philosophy never so sure and sacred. For you must consider he asserts an attribute is that which constitutes the essence of the substance in which it is. But that philosophy never taught the forms lodged in the same common matter were its essence, though they were supposed to essentiate the composita, which resulted from their union therewith. Yea, it did teach they were so little the essence of that common matter, that they might be expelled out of it, and succeeded by new ones, and yet the matter which received them still remain the same. But that an attribute should be supposed to be the essence of the substance to which it belongs; and that another superadded attribute, which is also the essence of substance, should not make another substance essentially distinct, is an assertion as repugnant to common sense, as two and two make not four. But that which completes the jest, (though a tremendous one upon so awful a subject,) is, that this authort should so gravely tell the world, they who are not of his sentiment, being ignorant of the causes of things, confound all things; imagine trees and men speaking alike, confound the divine nature with the human, &c. Who would imagine this to be the complaining voice of one so industriously labouring to mingle heaven and earth! and to make God, and men, and beasts, and stones, and trees, all one and the same individual substance!

And now let us consider the reason of that assertion of his; why two attributes really distinct, do not constitute two beings, or two distinct substances; because, saith he,§ it is of the nature of substance that each of its attributes be conceived by itself, &c. A marvellous reason! Divers attributes, each whereof, as before, constitutes the essence of substance, do not make divers substances; because those attributes may be conceived apart from each other, and are not produced by one another. It was too plain to need a proof, (as was observed before,) that there cannot be two substances of one attribute, or of one essence, (as his notion of an attribute is,) i. e. two are not one. But that two attributes or essences of substance, cannot make two substances, because they are diverse, is very surprisingly strange. This was (as Cicero upon as good an occasion speaks) not to consider, but to cast lots what to say. And it deserves observation too, how well this assertion, "That two distinct attributes do not constitute two distinct substances," agrees with that," Two substances having divers attributes, have nothing common between them." This must certainly suppose the diversity of attributes to make the greatest diversity of substances imaginable; when they admit not there should be any thing (not the least thing) common between them! And yet they make not distinct substances! But this was only to make way for what was to follow, the overthrow of the creation. A thing he was so overintent upon, that in the heat of his zeal and haste, he makes all fly asunder before him, and overturns even his own batteries as fast as he raises them; says and unsays, does and undoes, at all adventures. Here two substances are supposed having distinct attributes, that is, distinct essences, to have therefore nothing common between them; and yet presently after, the two, or never so many distinct attributes, give unto substance two, or never so many distinct essences, yet they shall not be so much as two, but one only. For to the query put by himself, By what sign one may discern the diversity of substances? he roundly answers, T The following propositions would show there was no other substance but one, and that one infinite, and therefore how substances were to be diversified would be inquired in vain. Indeed, it would be in vain, if knowing them to have different essences, we must not yet call them different substances. But how the following propositions do show there can be no more than one substance, we shall see in time. We shall for the present take leave of him, till we meet him again in the following discourse.