to despair of reconciliation-Why do we sort ourselves with devils? We profess not to be such. Yea, but we have no hope to be forgiven the sin we do not leave, nor power to leave the sin which now we love. This, instead of lessening, makes the wonder a miracle. Ories of nature, and can philosophize (as sufficiently appears) wretched, forlorn creature! Wouldst thou have God out of being for this? (I speak to thee who dost not yet profess to believe there is no God, but dost only wish it.) The sustainer of the world! the common basis of all being! Dost thou know what thou sayest? Art thou not wishing thyself and all things into nothing? This, rather than humble thyself, and beg forgiveness! This, rather than become again a holy, pure, obedient creature, and again blessed in him, who first made thee so! It can never cease, I say, to be a wonder, we never ought to cease wondering, that ever this befell the nature of man, to be prone to wish such a thing, that there were no God! But this is, 'tis true, the too common case; and if we will only have what is more a rarity go for a wonder, how amazing then is it, That if any man would, even never so fain, he ever can make himself believe there is no God! and shape his horrid course according to that most horrid misbelief! By what fatal train of causes is this ever brought to pass? Into what can we devise to resolve it? Why such as have arrived to this pitch are much addicted to the pleasing of their senses; and this they make their business; so as that, for a long time, they have given themselves no leisure to mind objects of another nature; especially that should any way tend to disturb them in their easy course; till they are gradually fallen into a forgetful sleep, and the images of things are worn out with them, that had only more slightly touched their minds Defore. And being much used to go by the suggestions of sense, they believe not what they neither see nor feel. This is somewhat, but does not reach the mark; for there are many very great sensualists, (as great as they at least,) who never arrive hither, but firmly avow it that they believe a Deity, whatsoever mistaken notion they have of him; whereupon they imagine to themselves impunity in their vicious course. But these, it may be said, have so disaccustomed themselves to the exercise of their reason, that they have no disposition to use their thoughts about any thing above the sphere of sense; and have contracted so dull and sluggish a temper, that they are no fitter to mind or employ themselves in any speculations that tend to beget in them the knowledge of God, than any man is for discourse or business when he is fast asleep. are, perhaps, some of them the greatest pretenders to reason. They rely little upon authority of former times and ages, upon vulgar principles and maxims, but are vogued great masters of reason, diligent searchers into the mystebeyond all imagination. But 'tis hoped it may be truly said, for the vindication of philosophy and them that profess it, that modern atheists have little of that to glory in; and that their chief endowments are only their skill to please their senses, and a faculty with a pitiful sort of drollery to tincture their cups, and add a grace to their otherwise dull and flat conversation. Yet all this howsoever being considered, there is here but little advance made to the finding out whence atheism should proceed. For, that want of reason shall be thought the cause, what hath been already said seems to forbid; that many ignorant persons seem possessed with a great awe of a Deity, from which divers, more knowing, have delivered themselves. And yet neither doth the former signify any thing (in just interpretation) to the disrepute of religion. For truth is not the less true, for that some hold it they know not how or why. Nor doth the latter make to the reputation of atheism, inasmuch as men, otherwise rational, may sometimes learnedly dote. But it confirms us that atheism is a strange thing, when its extraction and pedigree are so hardly found out, and it seems to be directly of the lineage, neither of knowledge nor ignorance, neither sound reason nor perfect dotage. Nor doth it at all urge to say, And why may we not as well stand wondering, whence the apprehension of a God, and an addictedness to religion, should come, when we find them peculiar neither to the more knowing nor the more ignorant? For they are apparently and congruously enough to be derived from somewhat common to them both-the impression of a Deity, universally put upon the minds of all men, (which atheists have made a shift to rase out, or obliterate to that degree, as to render it illegible,) and that cultivated by the exercise of reason, in some, and in others, less capable of that help, somewhat confirmed by education, and the other accessaries mentioned above. Therefore is this matter still most mysteriously intricate, that there should be one temper and persuasion, agreeing to two so vastly different sorts of persons, while yet we are to seek for a cause (except what is most tremendous to think of) from whence it should proceed, that is common to them both. And here is, in short, the sum of the wonder, that any, not appearing very grossly unreasonable in other matters, (which cannot be denied even of some of the more sensual and lewder sort of atheists,) should, in so plain and important a case, be so, beyond all expression, absurd; that they without scruple are pleased to think mon practice, and wherein they might more colourably, and with less hazard, go out of the common road; and are here only so dangerously and madly extravagant. Theirs is therefore a particular madness; the dementia quoad hoc; so much the stranger thing, because they whom it possesses do only in this one case put off themselves, and are like themselves and other men in all things else. If they reckoned it a glory to be singular, they might (as hath been plainly shown) more plausibly profess it as a principle, that they are not bound to believe the existence of any secular ruler (and consequently not be subject to any) longer than they see him, and so subvert all policy and government; or pretend an exemption from all obligation to any act of justice, or to forbear the most injurious violence towards any man, because they are not infallibly certain any one they see is a human wight, and so abjure all morality, as they have already so great a part; than offer with so fearful hazard to assault the Deity, (of whose existence, if they would but think a while, they might be most infallibly assured,) or go about to subvert the foundations of religion. Or, if they would get themselves glory by great adventures, or show themselves brave men by expressing a fearless contempt of divine power and justice; this fortitude is not human. These are without the compass of its object; as inundations, earthquakes, &c., are So indeed, in reason, one would expect to find it; but the case is so much otherwise, when we consider particular instances, that we are the more perplexed and entangled in this inquiry, by considering how agreeable it is, that the matter should be thus; and observing that it proves, oft-like other men in matters that concern and relate to comtimes, not to be so; insomuch that reason and experience scem herein not to agree, and hence we are put again upon new conjectures what the immediate cause of this strange malady should be. For did it proceed purely from a sluggish temper of mind, unapt to reasoning and discourse; the more any were so, the more disposed they should be to atheism: whereas, every one knows that multitudes of persons of dull and slow minds, to any thing of ratiocination, would rather you should burn their houses, than tell them they did not believe in God: and would presently tell you, it were pity he should live, that should but intimate a doubt whether there were a God or no. Yea, and many, somewhat more intelligent, yet in this matter are shy of using their reason, and think it unsafe, it not profane, to go about to prove that there is a God, lest they should move a doubt, or seem hereby to make a question of it. And in the mean time, while they offer not at reasoning, they more meanly supply that want, after a sorry fashion, from their education, the tradition of their forefathers, common example, and the universal profession and practice of some religion round about them; and it may be only take the matter for granted, because they never heard such a thing was ever doubted of or called in question in all their lives. Whereas, on the other hand, they who incline to atheism & Anst. Eth. 1. 3. said to be, unto which, that any one should fearlessly ex- | shall have little else to do, besides only the applying of pose himself, can bring no profit to others, nor therefore glory to him. In all this harangue of discourse, the design hath not been to fix upon any true cause of atheism, but to represent it a strange thing; and an atheist, a prodigy, a monster, amongst mankind; a dreadful spectacle, forsaken of the common aids afforded to other men; hung up in chains to warn others, and let them see what a horrid creature man may make himself by voluntary aversion from God that made him. In the meantime, they upon whom this dreadful plague is not fallen, may plainly see before them the object of that worship which is imported by a temple-an existing Deity, a God to be worshipped. Unto whom we shall yet see further reason to design and consecrate a temple for that end, and even ourselves to become such, when we have considered what comes next to be spoken of: his conversableness with men. CHAPTER VI. What is intended by God's conversableness with men, considered only as fundamental and presupposed to a temple. An account of the Epicurean deity. Its existence impossible any way to be proved, if it did exist. Nor can be affirmed to any good intent. That such a being is not God. That the absolute perfection proved of God represents him a fit object of religion. From thence more particularly deduced to this purpose. His omnisciency, omnipotency, unlimited goodness, immensity. Curcellaus's arguments against this last considered. I. NOR is the thing here intended less necessary to a temple and religion than what we have hitherto been discoursing of. For such a sort of deity as should shut up itself, and be reclused from all converse with men, would leave us as disfurnished of an object of religion, and would render a temple on earth as vain a thing, as if there were none at all. It were a being not to be worshipped, nor with any propriety to be called God, more (in some respect less) than an image or statue. We might with as rational design worship for a god what were scarce worthy to be called the shadow of a man, as dedicate temples to a wholly unconversable deity. That is, such a one as not only will not vouchsafe to converse with men, but that cannot admit it; or whose nature were altogether incapable of such converse. For that measure and latitude of sense must be allowed unto the expression, [conversableness with men,] as that it signify both capacity and propension to such converse: that God is both by his nature capable of it, and hath a gracious inclination of will thereunto. Yea and we will add, (what is also not without the compass of our present theme, nor the import of this word whereby we generally express it,) that he is not only inclined to converse with men, but that he actually doth it. As we call him a conversable person that upon all befitting occasions doth freely converse with such as have any concern with him. It will indeed be necessary to distinguish God's converse with men, into That which he hath in common with all men, so as to sustain them in their beings, and some way influence their actions; (in which kind he is also conversant with all his creatures ;) and That which he more peculiarly hath with good men. And though the consideration of the latter of these will belong to the discourse concerning his temple itself which he hath with and in them; yet it is the former only we have now to consider as presupposed thereto, and as the ground thereof; together with his gracious propension to the latter also. As the great apostle, in his discourse at Athens, lays the same ground for acquaintance with God, (which he intimates should be set afoot and continued in another sort of temple than is made with hands,) that he hath given to all breath and being and all things, and that he is near and ready, (whence they should therefore seek him, if haply they might feel after him, and find him out,) in order to further converse. And here, our business will have the less in it of labour and difficulty; for that we principles already asserted (or possibly the more express adding of some or other that were implied in what hath been said) to this purpose. From which principles it will appear, that he not only can, but that in the former sense he doth, converse with men, and is graciously inclined thereto in the latter. And yet because the former is more deeply fundamental, as whereon all depends, and that the act of it is not denied for any other reason than an imagined impossibility; that is, it is not said he doth not sus tain and govern the world upon any other pretence, but that he cannot, as being inconsistent with his nature and felicity. This we shall therefore more directly apply ourselves to evince, That his nature doth not disallow it, but necessarily includes an aptitude thereto. Nor yet, though it may be a less laborious work than the former that we have despatched, is it altogether needless to deal somewhat more expressly in this matter, inasmuch as what opposition hath been made to religion in the world, hath for the most part been more expressly directed against this ground of it. I say more expressly; for indeed by plain and manifest consequence it impugns that also of God's existence: that is, through this it strikes at the other. For surely (howsoever any may arbitrarily, and with what impropriety and latitude of speech they please, bestow titles and eulogies here or there) that being is not God, that cannot converse with men, supposing them such as what purely and peculiarly belongs to the nature of man would bespeak them. So that they who have imagined such a being, and been pleased to call it God, have at once said and unsaid the same thing. That deity was but a creature, and that only of their own fancy; and they have by the same breath blown up and blasted their own bubble, made it seem something and signify nothing: have courted it into being, and rioted it again quite out of it. In their conceit, created it a god; in their practice, a mere nullity. And it equally served their turn, and as much favoured the design of being wicked, to acknowledge only a god they could imagine and dis-imagine at their own pleasure, as to have acknowledged none at all. It could do no prejudice to their affairs to admit of this fictitious deity, that they could make be what or where they pleased; that should affect ease and pleasure, and (lest his pleasure and theirs should interfere) that they could confine to remote territories, and oblige to keep at an obedient and untroublesome distance. Nor, though no imagination could be more madly extravagant than that of a God no way concerned in the forming and governing of the world; and notwithstanding whom, men might take their liberty to do what they listed; yet (as hath been observed long ago, that no opinion was ever so monstrously absurd, as not to be owned by some of the philosophers) hath not this wanted patronage, and even among them who have obtained to be esteemed (not to say idolized) under that name. Which would be seen, if it were worth the while to trouble the reader with an account of the Epicurean deity. As it can only be with this design, that the representation may render it (as it cannot but do) ridiculous to sober men; and discover to the rest the vanity of their groundless and self-contradicting hope, (still too much fostered in the breasts of not a few,) who promise themselves impunity in the most licentious course of wickedness, upon the security only of this their own idle dream. That is, if there be a God, (which they reckon it not so plausible flatly to deny,) he is a being of either so dull and phlegmatic a temper that he cannot be concerned in the actions and affairs of men, or so soft and easy that he will not. But because his good will alone was not so safely to be relied on, it was thought the securer way not to let it be in his power to intermeddle with their concernments. And therefore being to frame their own God, to their own turn, thus the matter was of old contrived. First, Great care was taken, That he be set at a distance remote enough; that he be complimented out of this world, as a place too mean for his reception, and unworthy such a presence; they being indeed unconcerned where he had his residence, so it were not too near them, noster quidem hic mundus, digna sit illorum sedes.--Phil. Epicur, Syntag. So that a confinement of him somewhere, was thought | nor would it answer any valuable end or purpose to revive altogether necessary. Secondly, And then, with the same pretence of great observance and respect, it is judged too great a trouble to him, and inconsistent with the felicity of his nature and being, that he should have given himself any diversion or disturbance, by making the world; from the care and labour whereof he is with all ceremony to be excused, it being too painful and laborious an undertaking for an immortal and a happy being. Besides that he was altogether destitute of instruments and utensils requisite to so great a performance.b Whence also, Thirdly, He was with the same reason to be excused of all the care and encumbrance of government; as indeed, what right or pretence could he have to the government of a world that chose him not, which is not his inheritance, and which he never made? But all is very plausibly shadowed over with a great appearance of reverence and veneration, with magnificent elogies of his never-interrupted felicity; whence also it is made a very great crime not to free even the divine nature itself from business: though yet the true ground and root of this Epicurean faith doth sometime more apparently discover itself, even an impatiency of the divine government, and a regret of that irksome bondage which the acknowledgment of a Deity, that were to be feared by men, would infer upon them. the mention of such horrid opinions, or tell the world And therefore, Fourthly, He is further expressly asserted to be such as need not be feared, as cares not to be worshipped, as with whom neither anger nor favour hath any place. So that nothing more of duty is owing to him than a certain kind of arbitrary veneration, which we give to any thing or person that we apprehend to excel us, and to be in some respect better than ourselves: an observance merely upon courtesy. But obedience and subjection to For the first, That there is no way to prove the existence his government, fear of his displeasure, expectation of his of such a being, is evident. For what ways of proving it favour and benefits, have no place left them. We are not can be thought of, which the supposition itself doth not obliged to worship him as one with whom we have any forbid and reject? Is it to be proved by revelation? But concern, and do owe him no more homage than we have that supposes converse with men, and destroys what it to the Great Mogul, or the Cham of Tartary, and indeed should prove, that such a being, having no converse with are less liable to his severity, or capable of his favours, men, doth exist. And where is that revelation? Is it than theirs; for of theirs, we are in some remote possi- written or unwritten; or who are its vouchers? Upon bility, of his, in none at all. In one word, all converse what authority doth it rest? Who was appointed to inform between him and man, on his part by providence, and on the world in this matter? Was Epicurus himself the ours by religion, is quite cut off. Which evidently appears common oracle? Why did he never tell men so? Did he (from what hath been already collected out of his own ever pretend to have seen any of these his vogued gods? words, and theirs who pretended to speak that so admired No, they are confessed not to be liable to our sense, any author's mind and sense) to be the scope and sum of the more than the inane itself. And what miracles did he ever Epicurean doctrine, in this matter; and was indeed ob- work to confirm the truth of his doctrine in this matter? served to be so long ago, by one that we suppose to have Which sure was reasonably to be expected from one who had better opportunity and advantages to know it, than would gain credit to dictates so contrary to the common we: who, discoursing that a man cannot live pleasantly, sentiments of the rest of mankind, and that were not to according to the principles of Epicurus; and that accord-be proved any other way. And what other way can be ing to his doctrine beasts are more happy than men; devised? Can it admit of rational demonstration? What plainly gives this reason why he says so, viz. that the shall be the medium? Shall it be from the cause? But Epicureans took away providence, and that the design of what cause can (or ever did) he or his followers assign of their discoursing concerning God was, that we might not God? Or from effects? And what shall they be, when the fear him. matter of the whole universe is supposed ever to have been of itself, and the particular frame of every thing made thereof, to have resulted only of the casual coalition of the parts of that matter, and no real being is supposed besides? Or shall it be that their idea, which they have of God, includes existence, as so belonging to him that he cannot but exist? But by what right do they affix such an idea to their petite and fictitious deities? How will they prove their idea true? Or are we bound to take their words for it? Yea it is easily proved false, and repugnant esset. Intelligitur enim a beata immortalique natura, et iram et gratiam segregan. Quibus remotis, nullos a superis impendere motus, &c. Sect. 1. cap. 3. An et mundum fecit, et in mundo homines ut ab hominibus coleretur? At quid Deo cultus hominum confert, beato, et nulla re indigenti. Sect. 2. cap. 3. Unto which purpose also much more may be seen in the same author elsewhere, when he more directly pleads (among divers more philosophical subjects) on behalf of religion against the Epicurean doctrine, which he saith they leave to us in word and show, but by their principles take away indeed, as they do nature and the soul, &c. It is then out of question, that the doctrine of Epicurus utterly takes away all intercourse between God and man. Which yet were little worth our notice or consideration, 1 η θεία φύσις προς ταύτα μηδαμη προσαγέσθω, αλλα αλειτούργητος | διατηρείσθω, και εν την πάσαι μακαριότητι. Laertius, i. 10. Que molitio, quæ ferramenta, qui vectes, quæ machinæ, qui ministri tanti muneris fuerunt? Vell. apud Cicer. de Natura Deorum. e Nihil beatius, nihil omnino bonis omnibus affluentius excogitari potest. Nihil enim agit, nullis occupationibus est implicatus, &c. Id. Oray, rny Bear Qua AN ALTOURYL anоvwow. Laert. ibid. Itaque imposuistis cervicibus nostris sempiternum dominum, quem, dies et noctes, timeremus. Quis enim non timeat omnia providentem, et cogitantem, et animadvertentem, et omnia ad se pertinere putantem, curiosum et plenum negotii Deum. Vell. ubi supra Humana ante oculos fede cum vita jaceret. In terris oppressa gravi sub religione Primum Graius homo (meaning Epicurus, the first champion of irreligion.) Lucret To which purpose besides what we have in Laert. Το μακάριον και αφθαρτον, αυτέ αυτό πραγματα έχει, ούτε αλλων παρέχει ώςε ούτε οργαίς, ούτε χαρισι συνεχεται εν ασθενει γαρ παν το τοιούτον, ι. 10. Much more is collected in the Syntagm. Nam et præstans Deorum natura hominum pietate coleretur, cum æterna esset et beatissima. Habit enim veneraConem justam quicquid excellit. Et metus omnis, a vi atque ita Deorum pulsus Η Και τοι ει μεν εν της προλήψει του θεού την πρόνοιαν απελίτον, εφαίνοντο αν ελπισι χρήσαις πλέον έχοντες οι φρονιμοί των θηρίων προς το ηδέως ζην ; έπει δε τελος ην του περι θεων λόγου, το μη φοβείσθαι θεον, αλλά παύσασθαι πραττομένους, βεβαιοτερον οίμαι τούτο, &c. Plut. e Adversus Colotem. Πως ουν απολείπουσι φυσιν και ψυχην και ζωον ; ως όρκον, ως ευχήν, ως θυσίαν, ως προσκύνησιν, ρηματι και λόγων, και των φαναι και προσποιείσθαι και ονομάζειν, α ταις αρχαις και τοις δόγμασιν avaipovoiv. Unto which purpose is that also in Tully. At etiam de sanetitate, de pietate adversus Deos libros scripsit Epicurus. Ad quomodo in his loquitur? ut Coruncanium aut Scævolam Pontifices maximos te audire dicas non eum, qui subtulerit omnem funditus religionem: Nec manibus ut Xerxes, sed rationibus Templa Deorum et aras everterit. De Natura Deorum. they might be known to the world, who no way ever obliged it, nor were ever like to do! But to regress a little, fain I would know what is this thing they call nature? Is it any thing else than the course and inclination of conspiring atoms, which singly are not pretended to bear any such impression; but as they luckily club and hit together, in the composition of a human soul, by the merest and strangest chance that ever happened? But would we ever regard what they say whom we believe to speak by chance? Were it to be supposed that characters and words serving to make up some proposition or other, were by some strange agitation of wind and waves impressed and figured on the sand; would we, if we really believed the matter came to pass only by such an odd casualty, think that proposition any whit the truer for being there, or take this for a demonstration of its truth, any more than if we had seen it in a ballad? Because men have casually come to think so, therefore there are such beings, (to be called gods,) between whom and them there never was or shall be any intercourse or mutual concern. It follows as well, as that because the staff stands in the corner, the morrow will be a rainy day. The dictates of nature are indeed most regardable things taken as expressions of his mind, or emanations from him, who is the Author and God of nature: but abstracted from him, they are and signify as much as a beam cut off from the body of the sun; or a person that pretends himself an ambassador, without credentials. to itself, while they would have that to be necessarily | prompted, become thus ignorantly officious to these idle, existent (as they must if they will have it existent at all, | voluptuary godlings; and should so effectually take course unto which, in the meantime, they deny the other perfections which necessary existence hath been proved to include. But how vain and idle trifling is it, arbitrarily and by a random fancy to imagine any thing what we please, and attributing of our own special grace and favour necessary existence to it, thence to conclude that it doth exist, only because we have been pleased to make that belong to the notion of it? What so odd and uncouth composition can we form any conception of, which we may not make exist, at this rate? But the notion of God is not arbitrary, but is natural, proleptical, and common to men, impressed upon the minds of all: whence they say it ought not to be drawn into controversy. What! the Epicurean notion of him? We shall inquire further into that anon. And in the meantime need not doubt to say, any man might with as good pretence imagine the ridiculous sort of gods described in Cicero's ironical supposition, and affirm them to exist, as they those they have thought fit to feign, and would impose upon the belief of men. And when they have fancied these to exist, is not that a mighty proof that they indeed do so? But that which for the present we allege, is, that supposing their notion were ever so absolutely universal and agreeing with the common sentiments of all other men, they have yet precluded themselves of any right to argue, from its commonness, to the existence.of the thing itself. Nor can they upon their principles form an argument hence, that shall conclude or signify any thing to this pose. None can be drawn hence, that will conclude immediately, and itself reach the mark, without the addition of some further thing, which so ill sorts with the rest of their doctrine, that it would subvert the whole frame. That is, it follows not, that because men generally hold that there is a God, that therefore there is one; otherwise than as that consequence can be justified by this plain and irrefragable proof-That no reason can be devised of so general an agreement, or of that so common an impression upon the minds of men, but this only; that it must have proceeded from one common cause, viz. God himself; who having made man so prime a part of his creation, hath stamped with his own signature this nobler piece of his workmanship, and purposely made and framed him to the acknowledgment and adoration of his Maker. pur But how shall they argue so, who, while they acknowledge a God, deny man to be his creature, and will have him and all things to be by chance, or without dependence on any Maker? What can an impression infer to this purpose, that comes no one can tell whence or how; but is plainly denied to be from him, whose being they would argue from it? The observation of so common an apprehension in the minds of men, might (upon their supposition) beget much wonder, but no knowledge; and may perplex men much, how such a thing should come to pass, without making them any thing the wiser; and would infer astonishment, sooner than a good conclusion, or than it would solidly prove any important truth. And do they think they have salved the business, and given us a satisfying account of this matter, by telling us, This impression is from nature, as they speak? It were to be wished some of them had told us, or could yet tell us, what they meant by nature. Is it any intelligent principle, or was it guided by any such? If yea, whence came this impression, but from God himself? For surely an intelligent Being, that could have this universal influence upon the minds of all men, is much liker to be God than the imaginary entities they talk of, that are bodies, and no bodies, have blood, and no blood, members, and no members, are some where, and no where; or if they be any where, are confined to some certain places remote enough from our world; with the affairs whereof, or any other, they cannot any way concern themselves, without quite undoing and spoiling their felicity. If they say No, and that nature, which put this stamp upon the minds of men, is an utterly unintelligent thing, nor was ever governed by any thing wiser than itself-strange! that blind and undesigning nature should, without being f Deos, Strabones, patulos, nevum habentes, silos, flaccos, frontones, capitones.-De Natura Deorum, l. 1. Indeed, (as is imported in the words noted from that graves pagan a little before,) the principles of these men destroy quite nature itself, as well as every thing of religion; and leave us the names and show of them, but take away the things themselves. In sum, though there be no such impression upon the minds of men as that which they talk of, yet if there were, no such thing can be inferred from it, as they would infer; their principles taking away all connexion between the argument, and what they would argue by it. 2. We have also too much reason to add, That as the supposition of such a being, or sort of beings, can have no sufficient ground; so it is equally unconceivable that it can be intended for any good end. Not that we think the last assertion a sufficient sole proof of this; for we easily acknowledge that it is possible enough, men may harmlessly and with innocent intentions attempt the building very weighty and important truths upon weak and insufficient foundations; hoping they have offered that as a support unto truth, which proves only a useless cumber. Nor were it just to impute treachery, where there is ground for the more charitable censure, that the misadventure proceeded only from want of judgment and shortness of discourse. But it is neither needful nor seemly, that charity which can willingly wink in some cases, should therefore be quite blind; or that no difference should be made of well-meant mistakes, and mischief thinly hid and covered over with specious pretences. And let it be soberly considered, what can the design be, after the cashiering of all solid grounds for the proving of a Deity, at length to acknowledge it upon none at all? As if their acknowledgment must owe itself not to their reason, but their courtesy. And when they have done what they can to make the rest of men believe they have no need to own any God at all, and they can tell how all that concerns the making and governing the world may well enough be despatched without any, yet at last they will be so generous as to be content there shall be one, however. What, I say, can the design of this be, that they who have contended with all imaginable obstinacy against the most plain and convincing evidences, that do even defy cavil; have quite fought themselves blind, and lost their eyes in the encounter; so that they are ready to swear the sun is a clod of dirt, and noon-day light is to them the very blackness of darkness? They cannot see a Deity encircling them with the brightest beams, and shining upon them with the most conspicuous glory through every thing that occurs, and all things that encompass them on every side. And g Plutarch. yet when all is done, and their thunder-struck eyes make | them fancy they have put out the sun; they have won the day, have cleared the field, and are absolute victors; they have vanquished the whole power of their most dreaded enemy, the light that reveals God in his worksafter all this, without any inducement at all, and having triumphed over every thing that looked like an argument to prove it, they vouchsafe to say however, of their own accord, There is a God. Surely if this have any design at all, it must be a very bad one. And see whither it tends. They have now a god of their own making; and all the being he hath, depends upon their grace and favour. They are not his creatures, but he is theirs; a precarious deity, that shall be as long, and what, and where, they please to have him. And if he displease them, they can think him back into nothing. Here seems the depth of the design. For see with what cautions and limitations they admit him into being. There shall be a god, provided he be not meddlesome, nor concern himself in their affairs to the crossing of any inclinations of humours which they are pleased shall command and govern their lives; being conscious that if they admit of any at all that shall have to do with their concernments, he cannot but be such as the ways they resolve on will displease. Their very shame will not permit them to call that God, which if he take any cognizance at all of their course will not dislike it. And herein that they may be the more secure, they judge it the most prudent course, not to allow him any part or interest in the affairs of the world at all. Yet all this while they court him at a great rate, and all religion is taken away under pretence of great piety: worship they believe he cares not for, because he is full and needs nothing. In this world he must not be, for it is a place unworthy of him. He must have had no hand in framing, nor can they think fit he should have any in the government of it. For it would be a great disturbance to him, and interrupt his pleasures. The same thing as if certain licentious courtiers, impatient of being governed, should address themselves to their prince in such a form of speech, that it is beneath him to receive any homage from them, it would too much debase majesty; that his dominions afford no place fit for his residence, and therefore it would be convenient for him to betake himself into some other country, that hath better air and accommodation for delight; that diadems and sceptres are burthensome things, which therefore if he will quit to them, he may wholly give up himself to ease and pleasure. Yea, and whatsoever would any way tend to evince his necessary existence, is with the same courtship laid aside; (although if he do not exist necessarily and of himself, he cannot have any existence at all; for as they do not allow him to be the cause of any thing, so they assign nothing to be the cause of him ;) that is, with pretence there is no need it should be demonstrated, because all men believe it without a reason, nature having impressed this belief upon the minds of all; or (which is all one) they having agreed to believe it because they believe. But though they have no reason to believe a Deity, they have a very good one why they would seem to do so, that they may expiate with the people their irreligion by a collusive pretending against atheism. And because they think it less plausible plainly to deny there is a God, they therefore grant one to please the vulgar, yet take care it shall be one as good as none, lest otherwise they should displease themselves and so their credit and their liberty are both cared for together. V. But this covering is too short, and the art by which they would fit it to their design, when it should cheat others, deceives themselves. For it is most evident, 3. That the being with the pretended belief whereof they would mock the world, is no God; and that consequently, while they would seem to acknowledge a deity, they really acknowledge none at all. Our contest hath not, all this while, been a strife about words, or concerning the name, but the thing itself. And not whether there be such a thing in being to which that name may, with whatsoever impropriety, be given, but whether Η Όσοι μεν ουν τας αθεούς ασκούσι φιλοσοφίας, &c. D. Halicarnass. Ant. i Bee their ambassador's oration, in Q. Curtius. Rom. 1. there be such a being as whereto it properly belongs: supposing, and taking for granted as a matter out of question, that (even in their own sense) if such a being as we have described do exist, it is most properly God; and that they will not go about to call it by another name; or that they will not pretend this name agrees to any other thing so fitly as to him. And because we have already proved this Being doth exist, and that there can be but one such, it plainly follows theirs is in propriety of speech (even though he did exist) no God; and that much less should he appropriate the name, and exclude the only true God. For since the high and dignifying eulogies, which they are wont to bestow upon their feigned deity, do plainly show they would have it thought they esteem him the most excellent of all existent beings; if we have proved a really existent Being to be more excellent than he, it is evident, even upon their own grounds, that this is God. Hither the Deity must be deferred, and theirs must yield, and give out; inasmuch as we cannot suppose them so void of common sense, as to say the less excellent being is God, and the more excellent is no God. But if they should be so, (whereas the controversy is not about the name,) we have our main purpose, in having proved there is a Being actually existent, that hath all the real excellences which they ascribe to their deities, and infinitely more. And as concerning the name, who made them dictators to all the world, and the sole judges of the propriety of words? or with what right or pretence will they assume so much to themselves, so as, against the rest of the world, to name that God, from which they cut off the principal perfections wont to be signified by that name? And if we speak of such perfections as tend to infer and establish religion and providence, who but themselves, did ever call that God in the eminent sense, that they supposed could not hear prayers, and thereupon dispense favours, relieve the afflicted, supply the indigent, and receive suitable acknowledgments? They indeed (saith a famed writer of Roman history) that exercise themselves in the atheistical sorts of philosophy, (if we may call that philosophy,) as they are wont to jeer at all appearances of the gods, whether among the Greeks or the Barbarians, will make themselves matter of laughter of our histories, not thinking that any God takes care of any man.-Let the story he there tells shift for itself; in the meantime it appears they escaped not the infamy of atheists, who (whatever deities they might imagine besides) did deny God's presence, and regard to men. Which sort of persons he elsewhere of ten animadverts upon. But do we need to insist, that all the rest of the world acknowledged no gods, whom they did not also worship? What meant their temples and altars, their prayers and sacrifices? Or did they take him for God, whom they believed to take no care of them, or from whom they expected no advantage? Even the barbarous Scythians themselves understood it most inseparable to belong to a deity, to be beneficent; when they upbraidingly tell Alexander, That if he were a god, (as they it seems had heard he vogued himself,) he should bestow benefits upon men, and not take from them what was their own. And by the way, it is observable how contradictious and repugnant the Epicurean sentiments are in this, even to themselves: that speaking of friendship, (of which they say many generous and brave things,) they gallantly profess (as Plutarch testifies of them) that it is a more pleasant thing to benefit others than to receive benefits oneself. They yet, while they seem so greatly concerned that their gods be every way most perfectly happy, deny to them this highest and most excellent part of felicity. That a virtuous man may a great deal more benefit the world than they, and consequently have more pure and lively relishes of a genuine and refined pleasure. Upon the whole, it is manifest they so maim the notion of God, as to make it quite another thing. And if they think to wipe off any thing of the foul and odious blot wherewith their avowed irreligion hath stained their name and memory, by the acknowledgment of such a God; they effect the like thing by it, and gain as much to the reputation of their piety as he should of his loyalty, who being k Lib. non posse suaviter vivi, &c. 1 Vid. et lib. maxime cum princip. viris Phil. & c. |