so far from arguing any deficiency or mutability in his bound or limit. This is the same with absolute perfecnature, that there is this continual issue of power and tion: which yet, if any should suspect not to be so, they virtue from him, that it demonstrates its high excellency might, however, easily and expressly prove it of the neces that this can be without decay or mutation. For of all sary being, upon the same grounds that have been already this, we are as certain as we can be of any thing: that alleged for proof of that:-as that the necessary being hath many things are not necessarily, that the being must be actuality answerable to the utmost possibility of the creanecessary from whence all things else proceed, and that ture; that it is the only root and cause of all other being, with necessary being change is inconsistent. It is therefore the actual cause of whatsoever is actually; the possible unreasonable to entertain any doubt that things are so, cause of whatsoever is possible to be: which is most apwhich most evidently appear to be so, only because it is parently true, and hath been evidenced to be so, by what beyond our measure and compass to apprehend how they hath been said, so lately, as that it needs not be repeated. are so. And it would be to doubt, against our own eyes, That is, in short, that nothing that is not necessarily, and whether there be any such thing as motion in the world, of itself, could ever have been or can be, but as it hath or composition of bodies, because we cannot give a clear been or shall be put into being by that which is necessaaccount, so as to avoid all difficulties, and the entanglement | rily, and of itself. So that this is as apparent as that any of the common sophisms about them, how these things thing is, or can be. are performed. In the present case, we have no difficulty but what is to be resolved into the perfection of the divine nature, and the imperfection of our own. And how easily conceivable is it, that somewhat may be more perfect, than that we can conceive it. If we cannot conceive the manner of God's causation of things, or the nature of his causative influence, it only shows their high excellency, and gives us the more ground (since this is that into which both his own revelation and the reason of things most naturally lead us to resolve all) to admire the mighty efficacy of his all-creating and all-sustaining will and word; that in that easy unexpensive way, by his mere fiat, so great things should be performed. VII. We only say further, that this necessary Being is such to which nothing can be added; so as that it should be really greater, or better, or more perfect, than it was before. And this not only signifies, that nothing can be joined to it, so as to become a part of it, (which necessary being, by its natural immutability, manifestly refuses,) but we also intend by it, that all things else, with it, contain not more of real perfection than it doth alone. Which, though it carries a difficulty with it that we intend not wholly to overlook when it shall be seasonable to consider it, is a most apparent and demonstrable truth. For it is plain that all being and perfection which is not necessary, proceeds from that which is, as the cause of it; and that no cause could communicate any thing to another which it had not, some way, in itself. Wherefore it is manifestly consequent that all other being was wholly before comprehended in that which is necessary, as having been wholly produced by it. And what is wholly comprehended of another, i. e. within its productive power, before it be produced, can be no real addition to it, when it is. Now what can be supposed to import fulness of being and perfection, more than this impossibility of addition, or that there can be nothing greater or more perfect? And now these considerations are mentioned, without solicitude whether they be so many exactly distinct heads. For admit that they be not all distinct, but some are involved with others of them, yet the same truth may more powerfully strike some understandings in one form of representation, others in another. And it suffices, that (though not severally) they do together plainly evidence that the necessary being includes the absolute, entire fulness, of all being and perfection actual and possible within itself. Having therefore thus despatched that former part of this undertaking, the eviction of an every-way perfect being, we shall now need to labour little in the other, viz. VIII. Secondly, The more express deduction of the infiniteness and onliness thereof. For as to the former of these, it is in effect the same thing that hath been already proved; since to the fullest notion of infiniteness, absolute perfection seems every way most fully to correspond. For absolute perfection includes all conceivable perfection, leaves nothing excluded. And what doth most simple infiniteness import, but to have nothing for a boundary, or, which is the same, not to be bounded at all? But now let sober reason judge, whether there can be any bounds or limits set to the possibility of producible being; either in respect of kinds, numbers, or degrees of perfection? Who can say or think, when there can be so many sorts of creatures produced, (or at least individuals of those sorts,) that there can be no more? Or that any creature is so perfect as that none can be made more perfect? Which indeed, to suppose, were to suppose an actual infiniteness in the creature. And then it being, however, still but somewhat that is created or made, how can its maker but be infinite? For surely nobody will be so absurd as to imagine an infinite effect of a finite cause. Either therefore the creature is, or some time may be actually made, so perfect that it cannot be more perfect, or not. If not, we have our purpose; that there is an infinite possibility on the part of the creature, always unreplete; and consequently, a proportionable infinite actuality of power on the Creator's part. Infinite power, I say; otherwise there were not that acknowledged infinite possibility of producible being. For nothing is producible that no power can produce, be the intrinsic possibility of it (or its not-implying in itself a contradiction that it should exist) what it will. And I say, infinite actual power, because the Creator, being what he is necessarily, what power he hath not actually, he can never have, as was argued before. But if it be said, the creature either is, or may some time be, actually so perfect as that it cannot be more perfect; that, as was said, will suppose it then actually infinite; and therefore much more that its cause is so. And therefore in this way our present purpose would be gained also. But we have no mind to gain it this latter way, as we have no need. It is in itself plain, to any one that considers, that this possibility on the creature's part can never actually be filled up; that it is a bottomless abyss, in which our thoughts may still gradually go down deeper and deeper, without end: that is, that still more might be produced, or more perfect creatures, and still more, everlastingly, without any bound; which sufficiently infers what we aim at, that the Creator's actual power is proportionable. And indeed the supposition of the former can neither consist with the Creator's perfection, nor with the imperfection of the creature; it would infer that the Creator's productive power might be exhausted; that he could do no more, and so place an actual boundary to him, and make him finite. It were to make the creature actually full of being, that it could receive no more, and so would make that infinite. But it may be said, since all power is in order to act, and the very notion of possibility imports that such a thing, of which it is said, may, some time, be actual; it seems very unreasonable to say, that the infinite power of a cause cannot produce an infinite effect; or that infinite possibility can never become infinite actuality. For that were to say and unsay the same thing, of the same; to affirm omnipotency and impotency of the same cause; possibility and impossibility of the same effect. How urgent soever this difficulty may seem, there needs nothing but patience and attentive consideration to disentangle ourselves and get through it. For if we will but allow ourselves the leisure to consider, we shall find that We intend not now, principally, infiniteness extrinsi-power and possibility must here be taken not simply and cally considered, with respect to time and place, as to be eternal and immense do import; but intrinsically, as importing bottomless profundity of essence, and the full confluence of all kinds and degrees of perfection, without abstractedly, but as each of them is in conjunction with infinite. And what is infinite, but that which can never be travelled through, or whereof no end can be ever arrived unto? Now suppose infinite power had produced all that it could produce, it were no longer infinite, there were an and of it: i. e. it had found limits and a boundary beyond which it could not go. If infinite possibility were filled up, there were an end of that also; and so neither were infinite. It may then be further urged, that there is therefore no such thing as infinite power or possibility. For how is that cause said to have infinite power, which can never produce its proportionable effect, or that effect have infinite possibility, which can never be produced? It would follow then, that power and possibility, which are said to be infinite, are neither power nor possibility; and that infinite must be rejected as a notion either repugnant to itself, or to any thing unto which we shall go about to affix it. I answer, It only follows, they are neither power nor possibility, whereof there is any bound or end; or that can ever be gone through. And how absurd is it that they shall be said, as they cannot but be, to be both very vast, if they were finite; and none at all, for no other reason but their being infinite! And for the pretended repugnancy of the very notion of infinite, it is plain, that though it cannot be to us distinctly comprehensible, yet it is no more repugnant than the notion of finiteness. Nor when we have conceived of power, in the general, and in our own thoughts set bounds to it, and made it finite, is it a greater difficulty (nay, they that try will find it much easier) again to think away these bounds, and make it infinite? And let them that judge the notion of infiniteness inconsistent, therefore reject it if they can. They will feel it reimposing itself upon them, whether they will or no, and sticking as close to their minds as their very thinking power itself. And who was therefore ever heard of, that did not acknowledge some or other infinite? Even the Epicureans themselves, though they confined their gods, they did not the universe. Which, also, though some Peripatetic atheists made finite in respect of place, yet in duration they made it infinite. Though the notion of an eternal world is encumbered with such absurdities and impossibilities, as whereof there is not the least shadow, in that, of an every way infinite Deity. Briefly, it consists not with the nature of a contingent being, to be infinite. For what is upon such terms, only, in being, is reducible to nothing, at the will and pleasure of its maker; but it is a manifest repugnancy, that what is at the utmost distance from nothing (as infinite fulness of being cannot but be) should be reducible thither. Therefore actual infinity cannot but be the peculiar privilege of that which is necessarily. Yet may we not say, that it is not within the compass of infinite power to make a creature that may be infinite. For it argues not want of power that this is never to be done, but a still infinitely abounding surplusage of it, that can never be drained or drawn dry. Nor, that the thing itself is simply impossible. It may be, as is compendiously expressed by that most succinct and polite writer, Dr. Boyle, in fieri, not in facto esse. That is, it might be a thing always in doing, but never done. Because it belongs to the infinite perfection of God, that his power be never actually exhausted; and to the infinite imperfection of the creature, that its possibility or capacity be never filled up: to the necessary self-subsisting being, to be always full and communicative; to the communicated contingent being, to be ever empty and craving. One may be said to have that, some way, in his power, not only which he can do presently, all at once, but which he can do by degrees, and supposing he have sufficient time. So a man may be reckoned able to do that, as the uttermost, adequate effect of his whole power, which it is only possible to him to have effected, with the expiration of his life's-time. God's measure is eternity. What if we say then, this is a work possible to be accomplished, even as the ultimate, proportionable issue of divine power, (if it were his will, upon which all contingent being depends,) that the creature should be ever growing in the mean while, and be absolutely perfect at the expiration of eternity? If then you be good at suppositions, suppose that expired, and this work finished, both together. Wherefore if you ask, Why can the work of making created being infinite, never be i Now Bishop of Clogher, in his Contemplat. Metaphys. done? The answer will be, Because eternity (in every imaginable instant whereof, the inexhaustible power of God can, if he will, be still adding either more creatures, or more perfection to a creature) can never be at an end. We might further argue the infinity of the necessary being, from what hath been said of its undiminishableness, by all its vast communications. Its impossibility to receive any accession to itself, by any its so great productions, both which are plainly demonstrable, as we have seen, of the necessary being, even as it is such, and do clearly, as any thing can, bespeak infinity. But we have thence argued its absolute perfection, which so evidently includes the same thing, that all this latter labour might have been spared; were it not that it is the genius of some persons not to be content that they have the substance of a thing said, unless it be also said in their own terms. And that the express asserting of God's simple infiniteness, in those very terms, is, in that respect, the more requisite, as it is a form of expression more known and usual. IX. There are yet some remaining difficulties in the matter we have been discoursing of; which partly through the debility of our own minds we cannot but find, and which partly the subtilty of sophistical wits doth create to us. It will be requisite we have some consideration of at least some of them, which we will labour to despatch with all possible brevity; leaving those that delight in the sport of tying and loosing knots, or of weaving snares wherein cunningly to entangle themselves, to be entertained by the school-men; among whom they may find enough, upon this subject, to give them exercise unto weariness; and, if their minds have any relish of what is more savory, I may venture to say, unto loathing. It may possibly be here said, in short, But what have we all this while been doing? We have been labouring to prove that necessary being comprehends the absolute fulness of all being: and what doth this signify, but that all being is necessary? That God is all things, and so that every thing is God; that we hereby confound the being of a man, yea, of a stone, or whatever we can think of, with one another, and all with the being of God. And again, how is it possible there should be an infinite self-subsisting being? For then how can there be any finite, since such infinite being includes all being, and there can be nothing beyond all? Here therefore it is requisite, having hitherto only asserted, and endeavoured to evince that, some way, necessary being doth include all being, to show in what way. And it is plain it doth not include all, in the same way. It doth not so include that which is created by it, and depends on it, as it doth its own, which is uncreated and independent. The one it includes as its own, or rather as itself; the other, as what it is, and ever was, within its power to produce. If any better like the terms formally and virtually, they may serve themselves of them at their own pleasure, which yet, as to many, will but more darkly speak the same sense. We must here know, the productive power of God terminates not upon himself, as if he were, by it, capable of adding any thing to his own appropriate being, which is (as hath been evinced already) infinitely full, and incapable of addition, and is therefore all pure act; but on the creature, where there is still a perpetual possibility, never filled up; because divine power can never be exhausted. And thus all that of being is virtually in him, which, either having produced, he doth totally sustain, or not being produced, he can produce. Whereupon it is easy to understand, how necessary being may comprehend all being, and yet all being not be necessary. It comprehends all being, besides what itself is, as having had, within the compass of its productive power, whatsoever hath actually sprung from it, and having within the compass of the same power, whatsoever is still possible to be produced. Which no more confounds such produced or producible being with that necessary being which is its cause, than it confounds all the effects of human power with one another, and with the being of a man, to say, that he virtually comprehended them (so far as they nothing added to it: yet it is without dispute, that whatsoever is so full as that k For howsoever disputable it inay be, whether whatsoever is infinite can have nothing can be added to it, is infinite. were producible by him) within his power. And it is no | wiser an inference from the former, than it would be from this latter, that a house, a book, and a child, are the same thing with one another, and with the person that produced them; because, so far as they were produced by him, he had it in his power to produce them. And that the effects of divine power are produced thereby totally, whereas those of human power are produced by it but in part only, doth, as to the strength and reasonableness of the argument, nothing alter the case. And as to the next, That infinite being should seem to exclude all finite; I confess that such as are so disposed, might here even wrangle continually, as they might do about any thing in which infiniteness is concerned; and yet therein show themselves (as Seneca I remember speaks in another case) not a wit the more learned, but the more troublesome. But if one would make short work of it, and barely deny that infinite being excludes finite, (as Scotus doth little else; besides denying the consequence of the argument, by which it was before enforced, viz. [that an infinite body would exclude a finite; for where should the finite be, when the infinite should fill up all space? And therefore by parity of reason, why should not infinite being exclude finite ?] showing the disparity of the two cases,) it would perhaps give them some trouble also to prove it. For which way would they go to work? Infinite self-subsisting being includes all being, very true; and therefore, we say, it includes finite. And what then? Doth it, because it includes it, therefore exclude it? And let the matter be soberly considered; somewhat of finite being and power, we say, (and apprehend no knot or difficulty in the matter,) can extend so far as to produce some proportionable effect, or can do such and such things. And what, doth it seem likely then, that infinite being and power can therefore do just nothing? Is it not a reason of mighty force, and confoundingly demonstrative, that an agent can do nothing, or cannot possibly produce any the least thing, only because he is of infinite power? finite is not to be looked upon as emerging or springing up of itself out of nothing, or as proceeding from some third thing as its cause, but as produced by that infinite, or springing out of that, which it could not do, but as being before virtually contained in it. For the infinite produces nothing, which it could not produce. And what it could produce, was before contained in it, as in the power of its cause. And to any one that attends, and is not disposed to be quarrelsome, this is as plain and easy to be understood, as how any finite thing may produce another, or rather, more plain and easy, because a finite agent doth not entirely contain its effect within itself, or in its own power, as an infinite doth. If yet it be again said, that which is limited is not infinite, but suppose any finite thing produced into being after a pre-existent infinite, this infinite becomes now limited; for the being of the finite is not that of the infinite, each hath its own distinct being. And it cannot be said of the one, it is the other; therefore each is limited to itself. I answer; that which was infinite becomes not hereby less than it was, for it hath produced nothing but what was before virtually contained in it, and still is, for it still totally sustains the other. But whatsoever it actually doth, it can do, or hath within its power: therefore if it were infinite before, and is not now become less, it is still infinite. Wherefore the true reason why the position of a finite thing after a supposed all-comprehending infinite, doth no way intrench upon or detract from the other's all-comprehensive infinity, is, that it was formerly contained, and still is, within the virtue and power of the other. It is true, that if we should suppose any thing besides that supposed infinite to be of itself, that would infer a limitation of the former. Infer I say, not cause it; that is, it would not make it cease to be all-comprehendingly infinite, but it would argue it not to have been so before; and that the supposition of its infinity was a false supposition, because it would then appear that the former did not comprehend all being any way in itself. Somewhat being now found to be in being, which hath no dependence thereon; whence it would be evident neither can be so. Of which, some good use may be made to a further purpose by and by. Here only we may by the way annex, as a just corolla And For if there be a simple inconsistency between an infinite being and a finite, that will be the case; that, because the former is infinite, therefore it can produce nothing. For what it should produce cannot consist with it, i. e. even not being finite; and then certainly if we could suppose the effect infinite, much less. But what, therefore, is powerry, from the foregoing discourse, that as the supposition of the less for being infinite? or can infinite power, even because it is infinite, do nothing? What can be said or thought more absurd, or void of sense? Or shall it be said that the infiniteness of power is no hinderance, but the infiniteness of being? But how wild an imagination were that of a finite being, that were of infinite power! And besides, is that power somewhat, or nothing? Surely it will not be said it is nothing. Then it is some being; and if some power be some being, what then is infinite power? is not that infinite being? And now, therefore, if this infinite can produce any thing, which it were a strange madness to deny, it can at least produce some finite thing. Wherefore there is no inconsistency between the infinite and finite beings, unless we say the effect produced, even by being produced, must destroy, or even infinitely impair, its cause, so as to make it cease at least to be infinite. But that also cannot possibly be said of that which is infinite and necessary; which, as hath been shown, cannot, by whatsoever productions, suffer any diminution or decay. If here it be further urged, But here is an infinite being now supposed; let, next, be supposed the production of a finite: this is not the same with the other; for surely infinite, and finite, are distinguishable enough, and do even infinitely differ. The finite is either something or nothing: nothing it cannot be said; for it was supposed a being, and produced; but the production of nothing is no production. It is somewhat then; here is therefore an infinite being, and a finite now besides. The infinite, it was said, cannot be diminished; the finite, a real something, is added. Is there therefore nothing more of existent being than there was before this production? It is answered, Nothing more than virtually was before; for when we suppose an infinite being, and afterwards a finite; this necessary self-subsisting matter was before shown to be a in him any ignorance: that is, that he means his intelligence is of an infinitely nothing but the shadow, rather, of being. And that they who would seem zealously concerned to appropriate all being unto God, should, in the height of their transport, so far forget themselves as to set him above all being, and so deny him any at all. For surely that which simply is above all being is no being. CHAPTER V. Demands in reference to what hath been hitherto discoursed, with some reasonings thereupon: 1, is it possible that, upon supposition of this being's existence, it may be, in any way suitable to our present state, made known to us that it doth exist? Proved, 1. That it may. 2. That, since any other fit way that can be thought on is as much liable to exception as that we have already, this must be, therefore, sufficient. Strong impressions. Glorious apparitions. Terrible voices. Surprising transformation. If these are necessary, is it needful they be universal? frequent? If not, more rare things of this sort not wanting. 2. Demand. Can subjects, remote from their prince, sufficiently be assured of his existence? 3. Demand. Can we be sure there are men on earth? I. AND if any should in the meantime still remain either doubtful, or apt to cavil, after all that hath been said for proof of that being's existence which we have described, I would only add these few things, by way of inquiry or demand: viz. First, Do they believe, upon supposition of the existence of such a Being, that it is possible it may be made known to us, in our present state and circumstances, by means not unsuitable thereto, or inconvenient to the order and government of the world, that it doth exist? It were strange to say or suppose, that a Being of so high perfection as this we have hitherto given an account of, if he is, cannot in any fit way make it known that he is, to an intelligent and apprehensive sort of creatures. X. And as to the unity, or onliness rather, of this being, or of the God-head, the deduction thereof seems plain and easy from what hath been already proved; that is, from the absolute perfection thereof. For though some do toil themselves much about this matter, and others plainly conclude that it is not to be proved at all in a rational way, but only by divine revelation; yet I conceive, they that follow the method (having proved some necessary self-subsisting being the root and original spring of all being and perfection, actual and possible, which is as plain as any thing can be) of deducing from thence the absolute, allcomprehending perfection of such necessary being, will find their work as good as done. For nothing seems more evident, than that there cannot be two (much less more) such beings, inasmuch as one comprehends in itself all being and perfection; for there can be but one all, without which is nothing. So that, one such being supposed, another can have nothing remaining to it. Yea, so far is it therefore, if we suppose one infinite and absolutely perfect being, that there can be another, independent thereon, (and of a depending infinity, we need not say more than we have, If indeed he is, and be the common Cause, Author, which if any such could be, cannot possibly be a distinct and Lord of us and all things, (which we do now but sup God,) that there cannot be the minutest finite thing ima pose: and we may defy cavil to allege any thing that is ginable, which that supposed infinity doth not comprehend, so much as colourable against the possibility of the supor that can stand apart from it, on any distinct basis of its position,) surely he hath done greater things than the makown. And that this matter may be left as plain as we can ing of it known that he is. It is no unapprehensible thing. make it; supposing it already most evident, That there is, There hath been no inconsistent notion hitherto given of actually existing, an absolute, entire fulness of wisdom, him; nothing said concerning him, but will well admit power, and so of all other perfection-That such absolute that it is possible such a Being may be now existent. entire fulness of perfection is infinite-That this infinite Yea, we not only can conceive, but we actually have, and perfection must have its primary seat somewhere-That cannot but have, some conception of the several attributes its primary, original seat can be no where, but in necessary we have ascribed to him: so as to apply them, severally, self-subsisting being. We hereupon add, that if we sup- to somewhat else, if we will not apply them, jointly, to pose multitude, or any plurality of necessary self-originate him. We cannot but admit there is some eternal, necesbeings, concurring to make up the seat or subject of this sary being; somewhat that is of itself active; somewhat infinite perfection; each one must either be of finite and that is powerful, wise, and good. And these notions have partial perfection, or infinite and absolute. Infinite and in them no repugnancy to one another; wherefore it is not absolute it cannot be, because one self-originate, infinitely impossible they may meet, and agree together, in full perand absolutely perfect being, will necessarily comprehend fection to one and the same existent being. And hence it all perfection, and leave nothing to the rest. Nor finite, is manifestly no unapprehensible thing, that such a Being because many finites can never make one infinite; much doth exist. Now supposing that it doth exist, and hath less can many broken parcels or fragments of perfection been to us the Cause and Author of our being; hath given ever make infinite and absolute perfection; even though us the reasonable, intelligent nature which we find ourtheir number, if that were possible, were infinite. For the selves possessors of; and that very power whereby we perfection of unity would still be wanting, and their com-apprehend the existence of such a Being as he is to be posimunication and concurrence to any work (even such as we see is done) be infinitely imperfect and impossible. We might, more at large, and with a much more pompous number and apparatus of arguments, have shown that there can be no more gods than one. But to such as had rather be informed, than bewildered and lost, clear proof that is shorter, and more comprehensive, will be more grateful. Nor doth this proof of the unity of the God-head any way impugn the trinity, which is by Christians believed, therein, (and whereof some heathens, as is known, have not been wholly without some apprehension, however they came by it,) or exclude a sufficient, uncreated ground of trinal distinction. As would be seen, if that great difference of beings, necessary and contingent, be well stated, and what is by eternal, necessary emanation of the divine ature, be duly distinguished from the arbitrary products of the divine will; and the matter be thoroughly examined, whether herein be not a sufficient distinction of that which is increated, and that which is created. In this way it is possible it might be cleared, how a trinity in the Godhead may be very consistently with the unity thereof. But that it is, we cannot know, but by his telling us so. It being among the many things of God, which are not to be known, but by the Spirit of God revealing and testifying them, in and according to the Holy Scriptures: as the things of a man are not known but by the spirit of a man. And what further evidence we may justly and reasonably take from those Scriptures, even in reference to some of the things hitherto discoursed, may be hereafter shown. sible, (all which we for the present do still but suppose,) while also his actual existence is not unapprehensible; were it not the greatest madness imaginable to say, that if he do exist, he cannot also make our apprehensive nature understand this apprehensible thing that he doth exist? We will therefore take it for granted, and as a thing which no man well in his wits will deny, that upon supposition such a Being, the Cause and Author of all things, do exist, he might, in some convenient way or other, with sufficient evidence, make it known to such creatures as we, so as to beget in us a rational certainty that he doth exist. Upon which presumed ground we will only reason thus, or assume to it; That there is no possible and fit way of doing it which is not liable to as much exception as the evidence we already have. Whence it will be consequent, that if the thing be possible to be fitly done, it is done already. That is, that if we can apprehend how it may be possible such a Being, actually existent, might give us that evidence of his existence that should be suitable to our present state, and sufficient to out-weigh all objections to the contrary; (without which it were not rationally sufficient;) and that we can apprehend no possible way of doing this, which will not be liable to the same, or equa! objections, as may be made against the present means we have for the begetting of this certainty in us, then we have already sufficient evidence of this Being's existence. That is, such as ought to prevail against all objections, and obtain our assent that it doth exist. Here it is only needful to be considered what ways can be thought of, which we will say might assure us in this matter, that we already have not. And what might be objected against them, equally, as against the means we now have. II. Will we say such a Being, if he did actually exist, might ascertain us of his existence, by some powerful impression of that truth upon our minds? We will not insist what there is of this already. Let them consider, who gainsay what they can find of it in their own minds; and whether they are not engaged by their atheistical inclinations in a contention against themselves, and their more natural sentiments, from which they find it a matter of no small difficulty to be delivered? It was not for nothing, that even Epicurus himself calls this of an existing deity, a proleptical notion. But you may say, the impression might have been simply universal, and so irresistible as to prevent or overbear all doubt, or inclination to doubt. And, first, for the universality of it, why may we not suppose it already sufficiently universal? as hath been heretofore alleged. With what confidence can the few dissenting atheists, that have professed to be of another persuasion, put that value upon themselves, as to reckon their dissent considerable enough to implead the universality of this impression? Or what doth it signify more to that purpose, than some few instances may do, of persons so stupidly foolish, as to give much less discovery of any rational faculty than some beasts, to the impugning the universal rationality of mankind? Besides that, your contrary profession is no sufficient argument of your contrary persuasion, much less, that you never had any stamp or impression of a Deity upon your minds, or that you have quite rased it out. It is much to be suspected that you hold not your contrary persuasion with that unshaken confidence, and freedom from all fearful and suspicious misgivings, as that you have much more reason to brag of your disbelief for the strength, than you have for the goodness, of it. And that you have those qualmish fits, which bewray the impression, (at least to your own notice and reflection, if you would but allow yourselves the liberty of so much converse with yourselves,) that you will not confess, and yet cannot utterly deface. But if in this you had quite won the day, and were masters of your design, were it not pretty to suppose that the common consent of mankind would be a good argument of the existence of a Deity, except only that it wants your concurrence? If it were so universal as to include your vote and suffrage, it would then be a firm and solid argument; (as no doubt it is, without you, a stronger one than you can answer;) but when you have made a hard shift to withdraw your assent, you have undone the Deity, and religion! Doth this cause stand and fall with you, unto which you can contribute about as much as the fly to the triumph? Was that true before, which now your hard-laboured dissent hath made false? But if this impression were simply universal, so as also to include you, it matters not what men would say or object against it; (it is to be supposed they would be in no disposition to object any thing;) but what were to be said, or what the case itself, objectively considered, would admit. And though it would not (as now it doth not) admit of any thing to be said to any purpose, yet the same thing were still to be said, that you now say. And if we should but again unsuppose so much of the former supposition, as to imagine that some few should have made their escape, and disburthened themselves of all apprehensions of God, would they not, with the same impudence as you now do, say that all religion were nothing else but enthusiastical fanaticism; and that all mankind, besides themselves, were enslaved fools? And for the mere irresistibleness of this impression; it is true, it would take away all disposition to oppose, but it may be presumed this is none of the rational evidence which we suppose you to mean; when you admit (if you do admit) that, some way or other, the existence of such a being might be possibly made so evident, as to induce a rational certainty thereof. For to believe such a thing to be true only upon a strong impulse, (how certain soever the thing be,) is not to assent to it upon a foregoing reason. Nor can any, in that case, tell why they believe it, but that they believe it. You will not sure think any thing the truer for this, only, that such and such believe it with a sturdy confidence. It is true, that the universality and naturalness of such a persuasion, as pointing us to a common cause thereof, affords the matter of an argument, or is a medium not contemptible nor capable of answer, as hath been said before. But to be irresistibly captivated into an assent, is no medium at all; but an immediate persuasion of the thing itself, without a reason. III. Therefore must it yet be demanded of atheistical persons, what means, that you yet have not, would you think sufficient to put this matter out of doubt? Will you say, some kind of very glorious apparitions, becoming the majesty of such a one as this Being is represented, would have satisfied? But if you know how to fancy, that such a thing as the sun, and other luminaries, might have been compacted of a certain peculiar sort of atoms, coming together of their own accord, without the direction of a wise agent; yea, and consist so long, and hold so strangely regular motions; how easy would it be to object that, with much advantage, against what any temporary apparition, be it as glorious as you can imagine, might seem to signify to this purpose! Would dreadful loud voices proclaiming him to be, of whose existence you doubt, have served the turn? It is likely, if your ear would have permitted you to use your wit, you would have had some subtle invention how, by some odd rencounter of angry atoms, the air or clouds might become thus terribly vocal. And when you know already, that they do sometimes salute your ears with very loud sounds, (as when it thunders,) there is little doubt but your great wit can devise a way how possibly such sounds might become articulate. And for the sense and coherent import of what were spoken; you that are sc good at conjecturing how things might casually happen, would not be long in making a guess that might serve that turn also; except you were grown very dull and barren, and that fancy that served you to imagine how the whole frame of the universe, and the rare structure of the bodies of animals, yea, and even the reasonable soul itself, might be all casual productions, cannot now devise how, by chance, a few words (for you do not say you expect long orations) might fall out to be sense though there were no intelligent speaker. But would strange and wonderful effects that might surprise and amaze you do the business? We may challenge you to try your faculty, and stretch it to the uttermost; and then tell us what imagination you have formed of any thing more strange and wonderful, than the already extant frame of nature, in the whole, and the several parts of it. Will he that hath awhile considered the composition of the world; the exact and orderly motions of the sun, moon, and stars; the fabric of his own body, and the powers of his soul, expect yet a wonder, to prove to him there is a God? But if that be the complexion of your minds, that it is not the greatness of any work, but the novelty and surprisingness of it, that will convince you, it is not rational evidence you seek: nor is it your reason, but your idle curiosity, you would have gratified; which deserves no more satisfaction than that fond wish, that one might come from the dead to warn men on earth, lest they should come into the place of torment. And if such means as these that have been mentioned should be thought necessary, I would ask, Are they necessary to every individual person, so as that no man shall be esteemed to have had sufficient means of conviction, who hath not with his own eyes beheld some such glorious apparition; or himself heard some such terrible voice; or been the immediate witness or subject of some prodigious wonderful work? Or will the once seeing, hearing, or feeling them suffice? It is not necessary there should be a frequent repetition and renewal of these amazing things, lest the impression wearing off, there be a relapse, and a gradual sliding into an oblivion, and unapprehensiveness of that Being's existence, whereof they had, sometime, received a conviction. Now if such a continual iteration of these strange things were thought necessary, would they not hereby soon cease to be strange? And then if their strangeness was necessary, by that very thing, wherein their sufficiency for conviction is said to consist, they should become useless. Or if by their frequent variations |