Let him but soberly .ell me, what his design was, to dash | any man. The truth is, when I wrote that letter, I had out the word determining from what he recites of that letter, and put in immediate, which he knows is not to be found in any of the places he refers to in it. Or what was the spring of that confidence that made him intimate the Scotists, Thomists, the Jesuists, and particularly Suarez, to be against what is said in the letter, in this thing? If he could procure all the books in the world to be burnt, besides those in his own library, he would yet have a hard task to make it be believed in the next age, that all these were for God's efficacious determination of the wills of men unto wicked actions.

never seen Durandus. Nor indeed did I consult any book for the writing of it, (as I had not opportunity, if I had been so inclined,) except, upon some occasions, the Bible. Not apprehending it necessary to number votes, and consider how many men's thoughts were one way, and of how many the other, before I would adventure to think any of my own. But I have this day, upon the view of his animadversions, taken a view of Durandus too: and really cannot yet guess what should tempt him to parallel my conceptions with Durandus's, but that he took his for somewhat an ill-favoured name. Durandus flatly, in several I need not, after all this, concern myself as to what he places, denies God's immediate concourse to the actions of says about the no medium between the extremes of his dis-the creatures. b Which I never said nor thought; but do junctive proposition. Either the human will must depend really believe his immediate concourse, to all actions of his upon the divine independent will of God, &c. (as he phrases creatures both immediatione virtutis, and suppositi, (that it in the excess of his caution, lest any should think the I may more comply with his scholastic humour, in the use will of God was not a divine will,) or God must depend of such terms, than gratify my own,) yet not determinaon the human will, &c. Unless he can show that the tive unto wicked actions. human will cannot be said to depend on the divine, as being enabled by it, except it be also determined and impelled by it, to every wicked action. A created being that was entirely from God, with all the powers and faculties which belong to it; that hath its continual subsistence in him, and all those powers continued, and maintained by his influence every moment; that hath those powers made habile, and apt for whatsoever its most natural motions and operations, by a suitable influence whensoever it moves or operates: can this creature be said not to depend, as to all its motions and operations, unless it be also unavoidably impelled to do every thing to which it is thus sufficiently enabled?

I again say, was it impossible to God to make such a creature that can, in this case, act or not act? It is here oddly enough said, that the author gives no demonstration hereof. Of what? Why that it can never be proved (as the reference to the foregoing words shows) that it implies a contradiction, &c. It seems it was expected that author should have proved by demonstration, that it can never be proved, that it implies a contradiction for God to make a creature, which should be capable of acting (as he feigns him to have said) without immediate concourse. By what rule of reasoning was he obliged to do so? But if the proving there is such a creature, as in the case before expressed can act without determinative concourse, will serve turn to prove, that it cannot be proved, it implies a contradiction there should be such a one; I may think the thing was done. And may think it sufficiently proved, that there is such a creature; if it appear (whereof there is too much proof) that there are such actions done by creatures, as for the reasons that were before alleged, it could stand with the nature of God to determine them unto. And was nothing said tending to prove this, that it could not consist with the nature of God, to determine men unto all the wicked actions they commit? It seems unless it were put into mood and figure, 'tis no proof. Nor was it the design of those papers to insist upon that subject; but there are things suggested in transitu, as such a discourse could admit, that whether they are demonstrative or no, would puzzle a considering person. That God should have as much influence and concurrence to the worst actions, as to the best. As much or more than the sinner or the tempter. That the matter of his laws to Adam, and his posterity, should be a natural impossibility. And I now add, the irreconcileableness of that determination, with God's wisdom and sincerity, &c. These I shall reckon demonstrations, till I see them well answered.

However, if mine were a bad opinion, why was it not as confutable without the mention of Durandus? But that was, with him, an odious name; and fit, therefore, to impress the brand, which he desired I should wear for his sake. This is a likely way to clear the truth! Yet if it serve not one design, it will another, he thinks, upon which he was more intent. Are all for Durandus's way that are against a predeterminative influence to wicked actions? I could tell him who have shown more strength in arguing against Durandus, than I find in all his arguments: who yet have written, too, against determinative concourse to such actions, more than ever he will be able to answer, or b L. 2. Dist. 1. Q. 5. D. 37. Q. 1.

c Dist. 1. 2. 5. ut supr.

Again, Durandus denies immediate concourse, universally, and upon such a ground, as whereupon, the denial must equally extend to good actions as to bad; viz. that 'tis impossible the same numerical action should be from two or more agents immediately and perfectly, except the same numerical virtue should be in each. But he says the same numerical virtue cannot be in God and in the creature, &c.c Whereas he well knows the concourse or influence (for I here affect not the curiosity to distinguish these two terms, as some do) which I deny not to be immediate to any actions, I only deny to be determinative, as to those which are wicked. Yea, and the authors he quotes, (sec. 11.) Aquinas and Scotus, though every body may know they are against what was the notion of Durandus, yet are as much against himself, if he will directly oppose that letter, and assert determinative concourse, to wicked actions. They held immediate concourse not determinative. The former, though he supposes Divine help in reference to the elections of the human will, yet asserts the elections themselves to be in man's own power, and only says that in the executions of those elections men can be hindered. That (whatsoever influence he asserts of the first cause) men still, habent se indifferenter ad benè vel malè eligendum. The other, though he also excludes not the immediate efficacy of God in reference to the actions of men, yet is so far from making it determinative, that the reason he gives why, in evil actions, man sins, and God does not, is that the one of those causes posset rectitudinem dare actui quam tenetur dare: et tamen non dut. autem, licet non teneatur eum dare: tamen quantum est ex se daret, si voluntas creata co-operaretur; * in the very place which himself refers to. Wherein they differ from this author toto calo, and from me, in that they make not determinative influence necessary in reference to good actions, which I expressly do.

Alia

Thus far it may be seen what pretence or colour he had to make my opinions the same with Durandus's, or his own the same with that of Thomas and Scotus. But if he knew in what esteem I have the schoolmen, he would hardly believe me likely to step one foot out of my way, either to gain the reputation of any of their names, or avoid the disreputation. He, notwithstanding, supposed his own reputation to be so good (and I know no reason why he might not suppose so) as to make it be believed I was any thing he pleased to call me, by such as had not opportunity to be otherwise informed. And thus I would take leave of him, and permit him to use his own reflections upon his usage of me, at his own leisure; but that civility bids me (since he is pleased to be at the pains of catechising me) first to give some answer to the questions wherein he thus expostulates with me.

Q. 1. Whether there be any action of man on earth so good, which hath not some mixture of sin in it? And if God concur to the substrate matter of it as good, must he not necessarily concur to the substrate matter as sinful? For is not the substrate matter of the act, both as good and sinful, the same?

A. 1. It seems then, that God doth concur to the matter of an action as sinful. Which is honestly acknowledged, since by his principles it cannot be denied; though most d 1o Q. 83.

e L. 2. Dist. 27. Q. 2. Į

of his way mince the business, and say the concurrence | ral powers, whereby they can work of themselves, but in a is only to the action which is sinful, not as sinful.

2. This I am to consider as an argument for God's predeterminative concurrence to wicked actions. And thus it must be conceived: That if God concur by determinative influence to the imperfectly good actions of faith, repentance, love to himself, prayer; therefore to the acts of enmity against himself, cursing, idolatry, blasphemy, &c. And is it not a mighty consequence? If to actions that are good quoad substantiam, therefore to such as are in the substance of them evil? We ourselves can, in a remoter kind, concur to the actions of others: because you may afford, yourself, your leading concurrence to actions imperfectly good, therefore may you to them that are downright evil? because to prayer, therefore to cursing and swearing? and then ruin men for the actions you induced .hem to? You will say, God may rather, but sure he can much less do so than you. How could you be serious in the proposal of this question?

We are at a loss how it should consist with the Divine wisdom, justice, goodness, and truth, to design the punishing man, yet innocent, with everlasting torments, for actions which God, himself, would irresistibly move him to; whereas his making a covenant with Adam in reference to himself and his posterity, implied there was a possibility it might be kept; at least that he would not make the keeping of it, by his own positive influence, impossible. And you say, if he might concur to the substrate matter of an action as good, (which tends to man's salvation and blessedness,) he must necessarily concur (and that by an Irresistible determinative influence, else you say nothing to me) to the substrate matter of all their evil actions, as evil, which tend to their ruin and misery, brought upon them by the actions which God makes them do. I suppose St. Luke vi. 9. with Hos. xiii. 9. show a difference. If you therefore ask me, why I should not admit this consequence? I say it needs no other answer, than that I take wisdom, righteousness, goodness, and truth, to belong more to the idea of God, than their contraries.

Q. 2. Is there any action so sinful that hath not some natural good as the substrate matter thereof?

real influence upon those powers.

6. That this influence is in reference to holy and spiritual actions (whereto since the apostacy the nature of man is become viciously disinclined) necessary to be efficaciously determinative; such as shall overcome that disinclination, and reduce those powers into act.

7. That the ordinary, appointed way for the communication of this determinative influence, is by our intervening consideration of the inducements which God represents to us in his word, viz. the precepts, promises, and comminations, which are the moral instruments of his government. No doubt but he may (as is intimated in the letter) extraordinarily act men in some rarer cases, by inward impulse, without the help of such external means, as he did prophets or inspired persons; and when he hath done so, we were not to think he treated them unagreeably to their natures, or so as their natures could not, without violence, admit. But it hath been the care and designment of the Divine wisdom, so to order the way of dispensation towards the several sorts of creatures, as not only not, ordinarily, to impose upon them what they could not conveniently be patient of, but so as that their powers and faculties might be put upon the exercises whereof they were capable, and to provide that neither their passive capacity should be overcharged, nor their active be unemployed. And whereas the reasonable nature of man renders him not only susceptible of unexpected internal impressions, but also capable of being governed by laws, which requires the use of his own endeavour to understand and obey them; and whereas we also find such laws are actually made for him, and propounded to him with their proper enforcements. If it should be the fixed course of God's government over him, only to guide him by inward impulses; this (as is said in that letter) would render those laws and their sanctions impertinencies, his faculties whereby he is capable of moral government so far, and to this purpose, useless and vain: and would be an occasion, which the depraved nature of man would be very apt to abuse into a temptation to them, never to bind their powers to the endeavour of doing any thing that were of a holy and spiritual tendency, (from which their aversion would be always prompting them to devise excuses,) more than a mere machine would apply itself to the uses which it was made for and doth not understand.

A. True. And what shall be inferred? That therefore God must by a determinative influence produce every such action whatsoever reason there be against it? You might better argue thence the necessity of his producing, every hour, a new world; in which there would be a great deal more of positive entity, and natural goodness. Cer-pect God should only surprise them, while they resolvedly tainly the natural goodness that is in the entity of an action, is no such invitation to the holy God by determinative influence to produce it, as that he should offer violence to his own nature, and stain the justice and honour of his government, by making it be done, and then punish it being done.

Q. 3. Do we not cut off the most illustrious part of Divine Providence in governing the lower world, &c. ?

Therefore, lest any should be so unreasonable, as to exsit still and sleep; he hath, in his infinite wisdom, withheld from them the occasion hereof; and left them destitute of any encouragement (whatsoever his extraordinary dealings may have been with some) to expect his influences, in the neglect of his ordinary methods, as is discoursed p. 121. and at large in the following pages. And which is the plain sense of that admonition, Phil. ii. 12, 13. Yea, and though there be never so many instances of A. What? by denying that 'tis the stated way of God's merciful surprisals, preventive of all our own consideragovernment, to urge men, irresistibly, to all that wicked- tion and care, yet those are still to be accounted the ordiness, for which he will afterwards punish them with ever-nary methods which are so de jure, which would actually lasting torments? I should least of all ever have expected be so, if men did their duty, and which God hath obliged such a question to this purpose, and am ashamed further us to observe and attend unto as such. to answer it. Only name any act of providence, I hereby deny, if you can. In the next place, that my sense may appear in my own words; and that I may show how far I am of the same mind with those that apprehend me at so vast a distance from them; and where, if they go further, our parting point must be; I shall set down the particulars of my agreement with them, and do it in no other heads than they might have collected, if they had pleased, out of that letter. As,

1. That God exerciseth a universal providence about all his creatures, both in sustaining and governing them. 2. That, more particularly, he exerciseth such a providence about man.

3. That this providence about man extends to all the actions of all men.

4. That it consists not alone in beholding the actions of men, as if he were a mere spectator of them only, but is positively active about them."

5. That this active providence of God about all the actions of men consists not merely in giving them the natu

8. That in reference to all other actions which are no: sinful, though there be not a sinful disinclination to them, yet because there may be a sluggishness and ineptitude to some purposes God intends to serve by them, this influence is also always determinative thereunto; whensoever to the immense wisdom of God shall seem meet, and conducing to his own great and holy ends.

9. That, in reference to sinful actions, by this influence God doth not only sustain men who do them, and continue to them their natural faculties and powers, whereby they are done, but also, as the first mover, so far excite and actuate those powers, as that they are apt and habile for any congenerous action, to which they have a natural designation; and whereto they are not sinfully disinclined.

10. That, if men do then employ them to the doing of any sinful action; by that same influence, he doth, as to him seems meet, limit, moderate, and, against the inclination and design of the sinful agent, overrule and dispose it to good. But now if, besides all this, they will also

assert; that God doth, by an efficacious influence, move as well as learned men have been of their opinion. And and determine men to wicked actions. This is that which I most resolvedly deny. That is, in this I shall differ with them, that I do not suppose God to have, by internal influence, as far a hand in the worst and wickedest actions, as in the best. I assert more to be necessary to actions to which men are wickedly disinclined; but that less will suffice for their doing of actions to which they have inclination more than enough. I reckon it sufficient to the production of this latter sort of actions, that their powers be actually habile, and apt for any such action, in the general, as is connatural to them; supposing there be not a peccant aversion, as there is to all those actions that are holy and spiritual; which aversion a more potent (even a determinative) influence is necessary to overcome. Ì explain myself by instance.

I seriously believe it. But that signifles nothing to the goodness of the opinion. Nor doth the badness of it extinguish my charity nor reverence towards the men. For I consider, that as many hold the most important truths, and which most directly tend to impress the image of God upon their souls, that yet are never stamped with any such impression thereby; so, it is not impossible some may have held very dangerous opinions, with a notional judgment, the pernicious influence whereof hath never distilled upon their hearts. Neither shall I be willing without necessity to detect other men's infirmities. Yet if I find myself any way obliged further to intermeddle in this matter, I reckon the time I have to spend in this world, can never be spent to better purpose, than in discovering the fearful consequences of that rejected opinion, the vanity of the subterA man hath from God the powers belonging to his na-fuges whereby its assertors think to hide the malignity of ture, by which he is capable of loving or hating an appre-it; and the inefficacy of the arguments brought for it. hended good or evil. These powers being, by a present Especially those two which the letter takes notice of. For Divine influence, rendered habile, and apt for action; he as so ill-coloured an opinion ought never to be admitted can now love a good name, health, ease, life, and hate dis- without the most apparent necessity, so do I think it most grace, sickness, pain, death: but he doth also by these apparent there is no necessity it should be admitted upon powers, thus habilitated for action, love wickedness, and those grounds or any other. And doubt not but that both hate God. I say, now, that to those former acts God the governing providence of God in reference to all events should over and besides determine him, is not absolutely whatsoever, and his most certain foreknowledge of them and always necessary; and to the latter, is impossible. all, may be defended, against all opposers, without it. But But that, to hate wickedness universally, and as such, and I had rather my preparations to these purposes should be to love God, the depravedness of his nature, by the apos- buried in dust and silence; than I should ever see the tacy, hath made the determinative influence of efficacious occasion which should carry the signification with it of grace necessary. Which, therefore, he hath indispensable their being at all needful. And I shall take it for a just obligation (nor is destitute of encouragement) earnestly to and most deplorable occasion, if I shall find any to assert implore and pray for. My meaning is now plain to such against me the contradictory to this proposition :-That as have a mind to understand it. doth not by an efficacious influence, universally move and determine men to all their actions; even those that are most wicked.-Which is the only true and plain meaning of what was said, about this ousiness, in the before-mentioned letter.

Having thus given an account wherein I agree with them, and wherein, if they please, I must differ. It may perhaps be expected I should add further reasons of that 2:fference on my part. But I shall for the present forbear to do it. I know it may be alleged, that some very pious

MAN'S CREATION

IN

A HOLY BUT MUTABLE STATE.

ECCLES. VII. 29.

LO, THIS ONLY HAVE I FOUND, THAT GOD HATH MADE MAN UPRIGHT; BUT THEY HAVE SOUGHT OUT MANY INVENTIONS.

Yet was it most reasonable also, that some positive | (in reference to the former of these,) that this law of nacommands should be superadded, that God's right of do- ture impressed upon Adam's soul, was his very rectitude; minion and government over him as Creator, might be therefore how can this rectitude be a conformity to this more expressly asserted, and he might more fully appre- law? I answer, 1. A law is twofold, regulans, regulata. hend his own obligation as a creature to do some things, 2. The law of nature impressed upon the soul of Adam, because it was his Maker's will, as well as others, because must be considered;-1. as subjected in his mind; so it they appeared to him in their own nature reasonable and consisted of certain practical notions about good and evil, fit to be done; for so the whole of what God requires of right and wrong, &c.-2. as subjected in his heart, so it man, is fitly distinguished into some things which he com- consisted in certain habitual inclinations to conform to mands because they are just, and some things that are those principles. Now these inclinations of the heart, just because he commands them. though they are a rule to actions, they are yet something ruled in reference to those notions in the mind; and their conformity thereto makes one part of original rectitude. And those notions, though they are a rule to these inclinations, yet they are something ruled in reference to the will of God signified by them; and in the conformity thereto, consists another part of this original rectitude.

Prop. 5. Adam was endued in his creation with a sufficient ability and habitude to conform to this whole law, both natural and positive; in which ability and habitude his original recitude did consist. This proposition carries in it the main truth we have now in hand, therefore requires to be more distinctly insisted on. There are two things in it to be considered-the thing itself he was endued with the manner of the endowment.

1. The thing itself wherewith he was endued. That was uprightness, rectitude, (otherwise called the image of God, though that expression comprehends more than we now speak of, as his immortality, dominion over the inferior creatures, &c.) which uprightness or rectitude consisted in the habitual conformity, or conformability, of all his natural powers to this whole law of God; and is therefore considerable two ways, viz. in relation to its subject, and its rule.

1. In relation to its subject; that was the whole soul, (in some sense it may be said the whole man,) even the several powers of it. And here we are led to consider the parts of this rectitude, for 'tis co-extended (if that phrase may be allowed) with its subject, and lies spread out into the several powers of the soul; for had any power been left destitute of it, such is the frame of man, and the dependence of his natural powers on each other, in order to action, that it had disabled him to obey, and had destroyed his rectitude; for bonum non oritur nisi ex causis integris, | malum vero ex quovis defectu. And hence (as Davenant well observes) according to the parts (if I may so speak) of the subject wherein it was, man's original rectitude must be understood to consist of,

2. We have to consider the manner of this endowment. And as to this, 'tis much disputed among the schoolmen, whether it were natural or supernatural. I shall only lay down, in few words, what I conceive to be clear and indisputable.

1. If by natural, you mean essential, (whether constitutively, or consecutively,) so original righteousness was not natural to man; for then he could never have lost it, without the loss of his being.

2. If by natural, you mean connatural, i. e. concreate with the nature of man, and consonant thereto, so I doubt not but it was natural to him.

Prop. 6. This rectitude of man's nature, could not but infer and include his actual blessedness, while he should act according to it. According to the tenor of the covenant, it could not but infer it. And consider this rectitude in itself, it must needs include it: the rectitude of his understanding including his knowledge of the highest good; and the rectitude of his will and affections, the acceptance and enjoyment thereof; as Augustiner in this case, nullum bonum abesset homini quod recta voluntas optare posset, &c. Thus far of the holiness and blessedness of man's first state. It follows to speak of the mutability of it, and of his fall as depending thereon.

Doct. 2. That man's defection from his primitive state was merely voluntary, and from the unconstrained choice of his own mutable and self-determining will. For the asserting of this truth, take the following propositions: Prop. 1. That the nature of man is now become universally depraved and sinful. This, Scripture is full of, and experience and common observation puts it beyond dispute. 'Tis left then that sin must have had some ori

Prop. 2. The pure and holy nature of God could never be the original of man's sin. This is evident in itself. God h disclaims it; nor can any affirm it of him without denying his very Being. He could not be the cause of unholiness, but by ceasing to be holy, which would suppose him mutably holy; and if either God or man must be confessed mutable, 'tis no difficulty where to lay it; whatever he is, he is essentially; and necessity of existence, of being always what he is, i remains everlastingly the fundamental attribute of his Being.

1. A perfect illumination of mind to understand and Know the will of God. 2. A compliance of heart and will therewith. 3. An obedient subordination of the sensitive appetite, and other inferior powers, that in nothing they might resist the former. That it comprehends all these, appears by comparing Col. iii. 10. where the image of God, wherein man was created, is said to consist in knowledge, that hath its seat and subject in the mind, with Eph.ginal among men. iv. 24. where righteousness and holiness are also mentioned; the one whereof consists in equity towards men, the other in loyalty and devotedness to God; both which necessarily suppose the due framing of the other powers of the soul, to the ducture of an enlightened mind. And besides, that work of sanctification (which in these scriptures is expressly called a renovation of man according to the image of God wherein he was created) doth in other scriptures appear (as the forementioned author also observes) to consist of parts proportionable to these I mention, viz. illumination of mind, Ephes. i. 18. conversion of heart, Ps. li. 10. victory over concupiscence, Rom. vi. 7, throughout. 2. Consider this recitude in relation to its rule; that is, the will of God revealed, or the law of God. Sin is the transgression of the law; and accordingly righteousness must needs be conformity to the law; viz. actual righteousness consists in actual conformity to the law; that habitual rectitude which Adam was furnished with in his creation, (of which we are speaking,) in an habitual conformity, or an ability to conform to the same law. This habitual conformity was, as of the whole soul, so to the whole law, i. e. to both the parts or kinds of it, natural and positive. He was furnished with particular principles, inclining him to comply with whatsoever the law of nature had laid before him; and with a general principle, disposing him to yield to whatsoever any positive law should lay before him as the will of God. And if it be said,

g1 Kings viii. 46. Psal. xiv. 1. Rom. iii, 12, &c. cap. v. 12, 13, &c. 1 John V. 19, &c.

3. 'Tis blasphemous and absurd to talk of two principles, (as the Manichees of old,) the one good per se, and the cause of all good; the other evil per se, and the cause of all evil.

Brad wardine's k two arguments, 1. that this would suppose two gods, two independent beings, 2. that it would suppose an evil god, do sufficiently convince this to be full both of blasphemy and contradiction.

4. It was not possible that either external objects, or the temptation of the devil, should necessitate the will of man to sin. External objects could not; for that were to reject all upon God; for if he create objects with such an allective power in them, and create such an appetite in man as cannot but work inordinately and sinfully towards those objects, it must needs infer his efficacious necessitation of sin, being it would destroy the truth already established, that God created man with such a rectitude as that

h Deut. xxxii. 4. Psal. v. 4. 3 John 11.