4. Account of Donati's Comet of 1858. By G. Bond. Cambridge, United States: 1858. Page VI.—1. A Bill intituled 'An Act to provide for the Revision ' and Amendment of the Rubrics contained in the 'Book of Common Prayer.' Presented to the House of Lords by the Lord Bishop of London, June 19, 2. Synodalia, Journal and Chronicle of the Convocation for the Province of Canterbury. London: 1854- VII.-The Origin and History of the Grenadier Guards. By Lieutenant-General Sir F. W. Hamilton, late Grena- dier Guards. In Three Volumes, 8vo. London: 1874, VIII.-L'Antechrist. Par Ernest Renan. Paris: 1873,. IX.-A Journal of the Reigns of King George IV. and King William IV. By the late Charles C. F. Greville, Esq., Clerk of the Council to those Sovereigns. Edited 462 THE EDINBURGH REVIEW, JULY, 1874. No. CCLXXXV. ART. I.—1. Principes des Evolutions navales et de la Tactique des Combats de mer pour les flottes cuirassées à hélice. Par L. LEWAL, Capitaine de Frégate. 8vo. Paris: 1868. 2. Practical Deductions from Recent Experiments with the Harvey' Torpedo. By Lieut. H. H. GRENFELL, R.N., in Proceedings of the Junior Naval Professional Association.' Part I. Portsmouth: 1872. 6 3. The Game of Naval Tactics. By Lieut. W. M. F. CASTLE, R. N. Journal of the United Service Institution.' Vol. XVII. London: 1873. 4. The Gun, Ram, and Torpedo; Manœuvres and Tactics of a Naval Battle in the present day. Essays written in competition for the prize offered by the Junior Naval Professional Association. Small 8vo. London and Portsmouth: 1874. IN N a former number of this Journal we attempted a concise description of the various systems of naval tactics which have been adopted since first men began to fight with organised forces at sea. Going back to a remote historical period, we endeavoured to distinguish the several changes and revolutions which have taken place, at different epochs, in the shifting art of maritime war. We showed, or tried to show, how each successive revolution had been brought about by important alterations or improvements in the construction of ships, in the weapons with which they were supplied, in the application of * No. 278, October 1872; The past and future of Naval Tactics.' VOL. CXL. NO. CCLXXXV. B their motive power, and in the manner of arranging them in combined masses for attack, or for defence. We called attention to the well-attested fact, that as tactical knowledge advanced amongst the officers of the British navy, as true tactical principles came to be understood and appreciated by them, so the victories of our fleets became the more decisive and the more glorious. We lamented that, in the present age, so little had been done to construct a new system of tactics which should meet the requirements of a fleet so abundantly furnished as our own with the ingenious inventions of modern science. And we ventured to express the hope, that naval officers might be induced to apply themselves to the task of considering how to conduct the future battles of the British navy on a plan which should promise results commensurate with its enormous power, and worthy of its old renown. That hope has been most agreeably fulfilled. Since the publication of our former article marked attention has been paid to the elucidation of the many questions connected with the management of our transformed fleets in action, questions which promised but a short time ago to almost defy solution. Great interest has been evinced by officers of various ranks in working out the difficult problems of modern tactics; and their labours have resulted in releasing the service from the surprising and scarcely creditable condition, in which it had so long appeared content to remain, of having devised no method of properly employing the wonderful machines which science had so bountifully placed at its disposal. It is now no longer ne cessary for those who essayed to convince naval officers that a new tactical system had to be established, to linger over explanations of the elementary bases and rudiments of the art, orfrom fear of arousing disgust rather than of interest-to clothe with vague rhetoric appeals to the memory of former glories, or ideas of future acquirements which it was desired to bring into notice. A real, and, we believe, a profitable tactical system has been developed, not too indefinite nor too rigidly precise, but suited to the weapons of the time and to the genius of English seamen. It is indeed pleasant to be able to assert, that though availing themselves of what was useful in the labours of foreign students-the authors of this new tactical system, in its final shape, are officers of our own British navy. It is our intention in the present article to give some explanation of the new conditions under which a naval battle will probably be fought, and to lay before our readers a description of the various weapons with which the fleets of modern times are armed. We have not concealed from ourselves the extreme difficulty of giving such explanation and description in a manner which shall not deter the general reader' from the perusal of them. But we promise those who care to submit themselves to our guidance, that we will avoid all unnecessary technicalities, and explain those which-throughout our accountwe may be compelled to use, in the ordinary language of civil literature. We may regret having to make these preliminary terms with our readers, who may be supposed to belong to a public which is apt to pride itself on its nautical proclivities and tastes; but we fear they are not at all uncalled for. Had but a fraction of the extended and intelligent interest taken in the discussion of purely military matters been evinced in those relating to our navy-which, after all, is the greatest in the world-it would, most likely, have been possible to write this article several years ago. For some time past tens of thousands of readers have been able to peruse weekly, or perhaps even daily, disquisitions upon the recent changes in the tactics of the three military arms-infantry, cavalry, artillery-whilst scarcely any attention has been called to the vast revolution in naval warfare caused by the introduction of steampropulsion, of armour-plates, and of heavy rifled guns. The consequence is, that to the many who can appreciate the merits of the half-battalion system,' or of the company-column,' the starboard line of bearing,' or the bow-and-quarter line,' would be phrases of an unknown tongue. This want of interest in a matter so intimately connected with the efficiency of the navy has reacted upon the service itself, and the few men in it, who-till but quite lately-stood alone in urging the necessity of a deep study of modern tactical problems found but a small audience amongst their brother-officers. Happily a change has taken place. 6 In order to understand clearly the stupendous character of the revolution in maritime war to which we have just alluded, it will be necessary to cast a retrospective glance at the methods in use during the tactical period which was completed by the cessation of our great contest with the first Napoleon. Practically, perhaps, the period actually ended at Trafalgar, but its maxims and ideas retained their vigour long after. Its significance in naval history consists chiefly in that it comprised the latest testing by actual experiment in war of the system of tactics which has now for ever passed away. Yet that system has not become so completely obsolete that we are, even now, unable to draw from the study of it some useful lessons for our guidance in the future. The principles of the tacticians of the time were few in |